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Abstract 
This study discusses small- and medium-scale enterprises (SMEs) and subcontracting in 
the context of economic development in contemporary Indonesia. The main questions 
are whether and how SMEs have contributed to economic development in Indonesia, 
how and why subcontracting linkages between SMEs and large-scale enterprises (LEs) 
have been ( or have not been) established and developed in Indonesia, and whether and 
how subcontracting can be beneficial to SME development in Indonesia. In addressing 
these questions, the study analyses the Indonesian manufacturing industry, particularly 
the machinery industry, based primarily on firm-level data and information obtained 
from an interview and questionnaire survey, with reference to Japan's historical 
expenence. 
Starting with the setting of the research framework, the first part of this study 
reviews the development of SMEs and subcontracting systems in Japan during the 
twentieth century to extract the essence of its historical experience. Subsequently, 
several indicators and productivity growth by firm size based on nation-wide statistical 
data, along with an overview of Indonesian economy, manufacturing industry and 
SMEs, are presented to examine SME development in Indonesia and its contribution to 
the economy. 
In the second part of this study, micro-level evidence obtained from sample 
firms in the automobile, motorcycle, agricultural machinery and bicycle subsectors is 
used to supplement the lack of Indonesian manufacturing statistics related to 
lV 
subcontracting. Our firm-level survey first investigates what kind of external sources 
metalworking and machinery SMEs have used as support mechanisms and how useful 
such sources are for SMEs in developing their technological, marketing and financing 
capabilities. Next, production functions and indices of total factor productivity (TFP) 
are estimated to examine whether subcontracting linkages with large-scale enterprises 
(LEs) enabled SMEs to improve their productivity. Thereafter, qualitative data from 
our firm-level survey are used to explain how and why subcontracting linkages are 
established and can be crucial to SME development. The study then explores the 
detailed characteristics of subcontracting ties in Indonesia, from the perspective of 
large-scale parent firms. 
The results of this study confirm that subcontracting linkages with LEs generally 
enabled SMEs to alleviate some constraints stemming from their limited internal 
resources, improve their capabilities and production efficiency, and contribute to 
economic development not only in Japan but also in Indonesia. The provision of 
technological and marketing support mechanisms and the improvement of production 
efficiency are the major common gains for SMEs obtained from subcontracting 
transactions with LEs. Subcontracting systems in the Indonesian machinery industry 
have developed as a vertical production mode and can be beneficial to the development 
of SMEs. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
In 1994, the author had a chance to visit several small- and medium-scale enterprises 
(SMEs) producing metalworking and machinery goods in Jakarta and its surrounding 
areas. Most of the observed firms supplied their products to large-scale enterprises 
(LEs) in the machinery industry. Those metalworking and machinery SMEs did not 
have state-of-the-art equipment and technologies, and their shop floors were commonly 
hot, dusty, greasy and disorderly. However, they looked very energetic and 
entrepreneurial. This scene in 1990s Indonesia brought to mind the 1960s Kawaguchi 
city in Saitama and Ota ward in Tokyo, which are famous in Japan for their small-
medium foundries and machinery producers. A great number of metalworking and 
machinery SMEs in these districts were dynamically expanding their production 
through subcontracting transactions with LEs during the era of high economic growth. 
We realised from our day-to-day life in the 1960s how these subcontracting SMEs had 
firmly underpinned Japan's industrial and economic development. These experiences 
in Indonesia and Japan motivated the author to examine whether Indonesian SMEs have 
taken an important role in economic development and whether subcontracting ties with 
LEs are beneficial to SME development in Indonesia. 
1 
1.1 Economic Development, SMEs and Subcontracting in Indonesia 
at Present 
Many factors contribute to economic development in developing economies, but 
according to Levy, Berry and Nugent (1999: 1), there is no doubt that the performance 
of SMEs is extremely important for the economic development of most less-developed 
countries. They attributed the importance to well-recognised advantages of SMEs such 
as employment generation, income growth, entrepreneurial training, technical and 
allocative efficiency, lower degree of wage inequality and greater flexibility during 
changing economic conditions. 
How relevant are SMEs as factors in the economic development of Indonesia? 
Hill (2001: 248-50) explained that SMEs in Indonesia have become focal points of 
study for the following reasons: 
(1) the significant contribution of SMEs to the economy ( e.g., workforce and output); 
(2) high priority to SME development given by the Indonesian government with the 
aim of improving efficiency and achieving welfare goals in the context of 
economic development; 
(3) the potential role of SMEs rn promoting pribumi (indigenous Indonesian) 
enterprises that have lagged behind non-pribumi ( ethnic Chinese) counterparts in 
business development; 
( 4) the need to formulate econonnc policies different from those for large-scale 
enterprises (LEs ), because of SME-specific characteristics such as higher 
concentration on particular industrial activities, lower concentration in major urban 
centres and lower foreign ownerships; 
2 
(5) the expected role of SMEs in promoting industrialisation; and 
(6) the better response of SMEs to the 1997-98 crisis, relative to LEs. 
In 1997, SMEs ( defined as manufacturing firms with less than 300 employees) 
in Indonesia employed 72 percent of the industrial workforce and generated 32 percent 
of industrial gross output. SMEs therefore account for a significant portion in the 
Indonesian economy. 
Since the country's independence in 1949, all governments in Indonesia have 
paid special attention to SME development. Support for and promotion of SMEs are 
key public policies in the Five-Year Development Plans (Repelita) and other 
government documents (Hill 2001: 248-9). SME policies have been dealt with by not 
one but two ministries: the Ministry of Indu'stry and Trade (MOIT) and the State 
Ministry of Cooper~tives and Small & Medium Enterprises (MOCSME). These policy 
stances and organisational arrangements imply how important SME development is for 
the Indonesian government. 
In Indonesia, the development of SMEs is perceived to contribute to the 
improvement of income distribution and the promotion of economic activities 
undertaken by economically weak groups, particularly pribumi (indigenous Indonesian) 
people. The dominant role of non-pribumi (mainly ethnic -Chinese) entrepreneurs in 
most of the manufacturing sector continues and significant differences in business 
power between pribumi and non-pribumi firms have not disappeared (Braadbaart 1994: 
21-3; Hill 1997: 6; van Diermen 1997: 2). 1 The Indonesian government expects to 
reduce this imbalance of economic power between pribumi and non-pribumi enterprises, 
a politically and socially important issue, by developing SMEs. 
1 Possible reasons for this are, for example, inadequate SME policies implemented by the government 
and passive response of pribumi firms to the public policies and market signals (Mizuno 1996: 20-7). 
3 
SMEs often require public policies that are different from policies dealing with 
large-scale enterprises, because the former group has specific features (Hill 2001: 249). 
For example, SMEs tend to concentrate on particular industrial subsectors or activities 
such as food processing, garments, wood furniture, metalworking and machinery, 
which are different from those engaged in by LEs. The SME sector is generally less 
concentrated in major urban centres, and is more closely linked to the local economy 
than the LE sector. Relative to large-scale firms, small-medium firms are likely to be 
less foreign- or government-owned. In addition, due to reasons such as insufficient 
internal resources, SMEs usually face difficulties that are different from those of LEs.2 
With reference to international experience, Hill (2001: 249) pointed out a 
possible contribution of an efficient SME sector to rapid industrial development and a 
flexible industrial structure. In Repelita VI (1994/95-1998/99), the Indonesian 
government put the strong emphasis on promoting SMEs for the purpose of rapid 
industrialisation and economic development. 
It has recently been said that SMEs in Indonesia weathered the 1997-98 
economic crisis better than LEs (Hill 2001: 250). This flexible feature during the 
drastically changing economic conditions attracted attention to the SME sector in 
Indonesia. 
All the above descriptions exemplified Hill ' s six reasons why the development 
of SMEs is a focal issue in the Indonesian economy. Such great interest in SME 
development in Indonesia enhances the relevance of questions regarding the factors that 
help SMEs without sufficient internal resources perform well and the ways in which 
they can be assisted to overcome their difficulties and improve their capabilities. As 
2 See, for example, Berry, Rodriguez and Sandee (2001: 363). In developing economies, LEs can 
increase productivity, by simply borrowing advanced technologies in the world through several sources 
such as foreign direct investment (FDI), technology licensing and joint ventures. These channels are 
easily available to LEs, but not SMEs. It is therefore difficult for SMEs to find sources for technologies 
and acquire them. 
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will be discussed in Chapter 2, SMEs cannot necessarily play the roles they are 
expected to play in economic development. Internal constraints such as insufficient 
technological, managerial, marketing and financing capabilities often prevent SMEs 
from fulfilling potential advantages. 
Levy, Berry and Nugent (1999: 17-8) stated that some of these technological, 
marketing and financial problems which are special to SMEs can be alleviated or 
resolved through mutually beneficial linkages with LEs, particularly subcontracting. 
They explained that: 
(1) subcontracting raises the efficiency of the manufacturing industry as a whole by 
distributing functions to the firms best able to undertake them; 
(2) subcontracting increases the labour intensity of the industries involved since SMEs 
tend to operate in more labour intensive ways than LEs do; and 
(3) subcontracting contributes to the healthy development of certain types of SMEs. 
The authors maintained that, although subcontracting may in some cases be an indirect 
form of labour exploitation, it is generally beneficial to SME development in 
developing economies from the perspectives of both efficiency-growth and social 
equality. 
A recent study by Berry, Rodriguez and Sandee (2001) discussed SME 
development in Indonesia before and during the 1997-98 economic crisis. It found that, 
although absolute levels of labour productivity in most SMEs that had only limited 
internal resources remained low, productivity of SMEs had risen over the past few 
decades and those growth rates were not far from those of LEs. The authors 
hypothesised that subcontracting arrangements would be one of the possible sources of 
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productivity increases for Indonesian SMEs which faced the lack of technological and 
other capabilities. 
The issue of SMEs and subcontracting in Indonesia has been discussed in 
several studies, which will be referred to in Chapter 4. However, most of these existing 
studies have not examined the development of SMEs through subcontracting in any 
comprehensive way. Therefore, the roles and mechanisms of subcontracting in SME 
development have not clearly been elucidated in Indonesia. 
Compared with Indonesia's small accumulation of research on subcontracting 
and SME development, Japan's historical experience with SME development through 
subcontracting has been studied at length. Japan's historical experience may be helpful 
in understanding the current situation in Indonesia. As will be examined in detail in 
Chapter 3, there were few capable SMEs in Japan, when subcontracting transactions 
between SMEs and LEs in the machinery industry were initiated in the 1930s and 
resumed in the 1950s. This situation seems similar to Indonesia at present. 3 The 
establishment and resumption of subcontracting systems in the Japanese machinery 
industry in the 1930s and the 1950s were respectively encouraged by the rapid 
expansion of demand under the economic conditions where capital was relatively scarce, 
market growth was unpredictable, wage gaps between LEs and SMEs were substantial, 
and infrastructure and technology developed steadily. These circumstances in Japan 
seem similar to those in Indonesia at present. 
Subcontracting in the Japanese machinery industry between the 1930s and the 
1970s generally linked SMEs to local large-scale assembler firms, rather than to foreign 
firms. This is dissimilar to subcontracting in smaller East Asian economies such as 
3 This is, on the other hand, different from the United States, where capable machine parts producers 
already existed at the time of the development of machine tools and automobile industries in the late 
nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries (Odaka 1978: 248; 1985: 390-1). 
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Taiwan, where local SMEs tend to be linked to foreign customers or markets. 
Indonesia resembles the Japanese situation more. 
Reflecting all the discussions above, this study chooses the performance of 
SMEs out of many possible factors that stimulate economic development for 
developing economies and investigates elements that promote the development of 
SMEs in Indonesia. Specifically, this study will examine SME development through 
subcontracting in Indonesia in a comprehensive way, with reference to Japan 's 
historical experience. In doing so, it is of course necessary to appreciate the differences 
in the economic, social and cultural context in which subcontracting systems involving 
SMEs evolved in Indonesia and Japan in the past. 
1.2 Japan's Experience with Economic Development, SMEs and 
Subcontracting 
Japan developed rapidly from a feudal, inward-looking country in the mid-nineteenth 
century to a highly industrialised, outward-looking country at the end of the twentieth 
century. Many scholars have elaborated the reasons why Japan, an Asian and non-
Western country, was able to achieve this transformation in a relatively short period 
(e.g. , Denison and Chung 1976; Kelley and Williamson 1974; Lockwood 1965; 
Ohkawa and Rosovsky 1973; Pilat 1994). Japan' s economic development has often 
been contrasted with that of other developed economies (e.g., Landes 1965; Pilat 1993). 
In contrast, Ohkawa and his colleagues analysed economic development in Japan in the 
past with the aim of comparing it with that of developing economies at present, in an 
effort to uncover similarities (e.g. , Ohkawa 1976; Ohkawa 1993; Ohkawa and Kohama 
1989; Ohkawa and Ranis 1985). 
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In their analysis of economic development in Japan until the early 1970s, 
Ohkawa and his colleagues identified the role of small- and medium-scale enterprises 
as one of the key factors ( e.g. , Hondai 1992; Motai and Ohkawa 1978; Ohkawa 1976: 
149-66; Ohkawa and Kohama 1989: 105-15, 136-51; Ohkawa and Tajima 1976; Tajima 
1978). Japanese SMEs employed the dominant share of manufacturing workforce and 
linked the traditional economic sector to the modern and industrialised sector.4 Ohkawa 
and Tajima (1976: 32-3) and Tajima (1978: 27) found that SMEs in Japan coexisted 
with large-scale enterprises and contributed to employment creation and 
industrialisation.5 
What factors enabled Japanese SMEs to play such a significant role in economic 
development? SME development in Japan has often been attributed to subcontracting 
relationships between SMEs and LEs. For instance, Ohkawa and Kohama (1989: 150) 
argued that subcontracting arrangements in Japan, particularly in the machinery 
industry, diffused new or improved technological knowledge to SMEs more directly 
and quickly than any other arrangements. They emphasised the important role of 
subcontracting as an organisational device in alleviating shortcomings in the 
technological and other capabilities of SMEs. 
Japan 's experience with SMEs is an important inspiration for this study. It will 
provide a reference for examining: 1) whether SMEs have the potential to contribute in 
any significant way to economic development, despite the fact that they often lack 
4 In general, the traditional sector relies on indigenous technology and organisation and adopts production 
methods of labour intensity, while the modern sector depends on imported Western technology and 
organisation and employs production technique of capital intensity. Small-scale family farming under the 
traditional landlordism and cottage industries run by artisans and craftsmen are a typical example of the 
former group. Large-scale cotton-spinning factories with machinery and wageworkers are a clear 
example of the latter group (Ohkawa and Kohama 1989: 23-7; Ohkawa and Rosovsky 1973: 12). 
5 According to the results of their comparative studies, similar to those in Japan, SMEs in several of the 
observed developing countries basically satisfied necessary conditions for the coexistence with LEs. This 
implies that the SME sector in such developing economies also can play a certain role in economic 
development. 
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sufficient internal resources to achieve it; and 2) whether subcontracting can give an 
impetus to the development of SMEs in a developing economy like Indonesia. 
1.3 Purpose and Approach of the Study 
This study has three mam objectives. The first is to review the development of 
Japanese SMEs particularly in the machinery industry through subcontracting linkages 
between the 1930s and the 1970s and extract the essence of Japan's historical 
experience for comparison with SME development in Indonesia at present. 
The second objective, which is the central one of the three, is to examine in 
detail the development of SMEs especially in the machinery industry and the roles and 
characteristics of subcontracting linkages in this sector in contemporary Indonesia. As 
explained before, some work has been done in this field, which will be discussed in 
Chapter 4, but the role of subcontracting in the development of Indonesian SMEs has 
not necessarily been elaborated in a satisfactory manner. The ref ore, the key discussions 
for this second purpose are whether and how SMEs have contributed to economic 
development in Indonesia, how and why subcontracting linkages between SMEs and 
LEs have been ( or have not been) established and developed in Indonesia, and whether 
and how subcontracting can be beneficial to SME development in Indonesia. 
The third purpose is to identify similarities and differences in the development 
of SMEs and subcontracting systems between Indonesia at present and Japan in the past. 
Based on the comparison of the roles of subcontracting between Indonesia at present 
and Japan in the past, the study draws implications of our micro-level evidence for the 
degree of generalisation of SME development through subcontracting in Indonesia. 
9 
What approach should this study adopt for these purposes? A11 analysis based 
on manufacturing statistical data published by the Indonesian statistical office can draw 
a general picture of SME development in Indonesia, but does not allow the study of 
subcontracting and SME development in any detail. The available data and literature 
have not provided us with sufficient information on the nature of subcontracting 
linkages for SMEs in Indonesia. 
To overcome these shortcomings of the existing data and information, this study 
is based on a firm-level survey, using a questionnaire and interview survey method. 
For the second purpose in particular, the results of an intensive firm-level survey in 
Indonesia will be used. This firm-visit survey aimed to collect a set of microeconomic 
data on production and organisational arrangements which is not covered by the 
published available information. Micro-level evidence based on such firm-level 
observations allows this study to examine in detail SME development through 
subcontracting in Indonesia. 
1.4 Structure of the Study 
After this introduction, Chapter 2 establishes the framework of the study, which 
reviews the roles of SMEs in economic development, presents theoretical accounts for 
subcontracting in the context of SME development, and raises the main research 
questions that this study addresses. 
Chapter 3 looks into the development of SMEs and subcontracting systems in 
Japan since the early twentieth century, with particular attention to the machinery 
industry. It confirms that subcontracting relationships in Japan functioned as support 
mechanisms for SMEs and that they improved production efficiency of SMEs. This 
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chapter establishes the essence of Japan ' s historical experience with SME development 
and subcontracting. 
Chapter 4 provides a broad overview of the development of SMEs in the 
Indonesian economy. Starting with a digest of the development of the Indonesian 
economy, manufacturing industry and SMEs, it calculates several indicators and 
productivity growth by firm size based on national-level statistical data with the aim of 
examining whether SMEs can coexist with LEs and whether they have improved 
production efficiency. This chapter also reviews subcontracting systems in Indonesia, 
on the basis of available literature. 
Four chapters that analyse the data and information obtained from our firm-level 
interview and questionnaire survey follow an explanation on the methods of micro-level 
survey and main characteristics of the sample firms and subsectors in Chapter 5. 
Chapter 6 confirms the importance of subcontracting linkages in Indonesia. It 
investigates what kind of external sources metalworking and machinery SMEs have 
used as support mechanisms. Based on the results of an interview survey with 93 
sample SMEs, it also establishes how useful such sources are for SMEs in developing 
their technological, marketing and financing capabilities. 
Chapter 7 examines in a quantitative way whether subcontracting linkages with 
LEs enable SMEs to improve their productivity. This chapter estimates production 
functions and calculates indices of total factor productivity (TFP), based on micro-level 
data from 60 metalworking and machinery SMEs. 
Chapter 8 explains how and why subcontracting linkages can be crucial to SME 
development. It draws on qualitative data from a survey among 73 metalworking and 
machinery SMEs. It employs a discriminant analysis to investigate the elements for the 
better functioning of subcontracting linkages, after looking at the motivations for and 
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initiation of subcontracting business with parent firms, types of subcontracting linkages, 
and costs of and benefits from subcontracting transactions. 
Chapter 9 explores the detailed characteristics of subcontracting ties m the 
Indonesian machinery industry from the perspective of large-scale parent firms. Based 
on qualitative data from a survey among large assembler firms, the chapter examines 
whether subcontracting systems .have built-in support mechanisms for SME 
development. 
Chapter 10 summarises the main findings on SMEs and subcontracting in this 
study. Taking account of similarities and differences between Japan in the past and 
Indonesia at present, it will reiterate the development of SMEs and the roles of 
subcontracting in the Indonesian machinery industry and discuss some implications of 
our micro-level empirical work for more general issues on SME development through 
subcontracting in Indonesia. 
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Chapter 2 
Framework of the Study 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter constructs a conceptual framework for the study of small- and medium-
scale enterprises (SMEs) and subcontracting linkages in developing economies, which 
will provide an analytical basis for the rest of this study. The framework will help 
explain how and why SMEs are important in the process of economic development and 
how and why subcontracting systems are helpful to the development of such SMEs. 
In this chapter, Section 2.2 explores the roles of SMEs in economic development 
and industrialisation, particularly in developing economies. Section 2.3 presents the 
theoretical foundations of this study. It examines the reasons why subcontracting 
arrangements are, under certain conditions, a suitable way of structuring vertical 
production systems in developing economies. This section also looks into the nature, 
benefits and motivations of subcontracting transactions, the basic conditions under 
which subcontracting can flourish, and the types of subcontracting linkages that 
promote SME development. Based on the analytical framework, Section 2.4 raises 
seven research questions concerning SMEs and subcontracting systems in Indonesia at 
present and Japan in the past. 
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2.2 Roles of SMEs in Economic Development 
This study focuses on SMEs and subcontracting linkages in the context of economic 
development. The following questions may help understand the basic characteristics of 
SMEs: 1) What kind of advantages can SMEs provide to developing economies? ; 2) 
What kind of difficulties or constraints prevent SMEs in LDCs from realising their 
potential roles in economic development? ; and 3) Can SMEs play different roles 1n 
different situations? These questions will be addressed in subsequent subsections. 
2.2.1 Contributions of SMEs in Developing Economies 
Several studies have already demonstrated that SMEs have played various important 
roles in the successful development of many developing economies ( e.g. , Abdullah 
2000: 4-6; Berry and Mazumdar 1991: 35-9; Little, Mazumdar and Page 1987: 8-21 ; 
Odaka 1981: 169-70; Ohkawa 1976: 149-66; Park 1995; Staley and Morse 1965: 190-
223). They list the following reasons: 1) the high share of SMEs in economies in terms 
of the number of establishments, number of employees, value of output, etc. ; 2) the 
contribution of SMEs to the favourable combination and utilisation of production 
factors (i.e., labour and capital) through the adoption of technologies appropriate to 
resource endowments and through the participation in an inter-firm division of labour; 
3) the contribution of SMEs to the establishment of foundations for industrialisation;1 
4) the contribution of SMEs to exports; 5) the contribution of SMEs to a more equal 
1 As will be explained later in this chapter, SMEs can often contribute to the foundations of 
industrialisation because they complement the roles of LEs. For example, parts and components fo r 
machinery tend to be produced by SMEs, while LEs often engage in assembling operations. Thus, 
without the supply of intermediate goods from SMEs, it is difficult for LEs to manufacture final goods. 
Also, in general, many LEs were SMEs when they started operations. 
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income distribution as a consequence of their relatively larger share in labour earnings; 
and 6) flexible response of SMEs to changing economic conditions. 
These six aspects will be explained below. However, the roles of SMEs in 
economic development vary according to the type of economy, stage of economic 
development and sector of industry (Little 1988: 7; Berry and Mazumdar 1991: 35). 
Staley and Morse (1965: 227-8) specifically pointed out the following five elements 
that may influence the development of SMEs: 1) resource endowments; 2) size of the 
domestic market; 3) average income level of consumers in domestic markets; 4) 
existing industrial base; and 5) political and social institutions. For example, SMEs in 
countries with abundant unskilled labour, much underemployment/unemployment and 
limited capital resources tend to use simpler and more labour-intensive technologies 
than those in countries with opposite conditions. Relative to SMEs in small countries, 
those in large countries may have a larger domestic market and may be more inward-
looking. SMEs in countries with a low per capita income are likely to produce lower-
end and less value added products than those in countries with a higher per capita 
income. Economies with a flourishing manufacturing sector, better industrial 
infrastructure, and an open and democratic society may encourage SMEs more 
successfully to engage in higher value added operations. 
While acknowledging the above differences and variations, this subsection 
surveys the available literature on how SMEs, in general, can contribute to economic 
development. Such insights form a useful base for the development of an analytical 
framework in the next section of this chapter. As mentioned above, the following are 
five positive aspects of SMEs in economic development. 
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Significant portion in economies 
Table 2.1 shows the share of SMEs in several East Asian countries including Indonesia, 
in terms of the numbers of establishments and workers, and value added in the mid-
1990s. 2 SMEs constitute at least 85 percent of all manufacturing establishments, while 
they employ between 30 percent and 80 percent of the manufacturing workforce. 
Particularly in Taiwan, Indonesia, Japan and Korea, SMEs employ 70-80 percent of 
manufacturing workers. The contribution of SMEs is somewhere between 25 and 55 
percent of total manufacturing output. These data indicate that with some differences, 
the significant portion of SMEs in economies is a common feature of the East Asian 
countries. 
Based on time series data on the size distribution of manufacturing in Singapore, 
Hill (1997: 276-8) illustrated that the share of SMEs with 100-299 workers in the 
economy increased after 1975 and that of SMEs with 10-99 workers decreased. During 
1975-92, SMEs as a whole in Singapore accounted for, without significant changes, 
roughly 95 percent of establishments, 50 percent of employment and 40 percent of 
value added. The SME sector in Singapore, particularly larger SMEs, continued to 
occupy an important part of the economy over the course of industrialisation. 
According to Hill (1997: 278-9), this trend was also supported by evidence from other 
East Asian countries including Japan and Indonesia. 3 In East Asia, SMEs tend to 
account for a considerable portion of economies regardless of the stage of development 
within respective countries. 
2 Different definitions of SMEs and weak databases for SMEs do not allow the use of a uniform setting in 
the analysis. In Table 2.1, firms with up to 299 workers are SMEs in Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Singapore 
and Thailand, while firms with 199 or less workers are SMEs in Taiwan, Malaysia and the Philippines. 
The data for Japan, Korea and Singapore do not include micro- or cottage-level SMEs with less than 4 or 
5 or 10 workers. 
3 In Indonesia, when firms were classified by size in the initial year, the share of SMEs in value added 
has been expanding since the rnid-1980s. This will be discussed in Chapter 4 of this study. For Further 
details, see Aswicahyono, Bird and Hill (1996: 353-4). 
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Table 2.1 Share of SMEs in the Manufacturing Industry: East Asian Countries 
Countries/Firm Size I) Number of Firms (%) Employment(%) Output (%/) 
Indonesia (1996) 
1 - 19 99.2 61.2 10.7 
20 - 99 0.6 5.6 5.9 
100 - 299 0.1 5.9 10.7 
SMEs (<300) 99.9 72.7 27.3 
Japan (1996) 
4 - 19 73.9 22.1 12.2 
20 - 99 21.9 31.2 23.5 
100 - 299 3.2 18.6 19.5 
SMEs (4-299) 99.0 71.9 55.2 
Korea (1996) 
5 - 49 90.7 40.6 21.9 
50 - 299 8.4 28.6 25.3 
SMEs (5-299) 99.1 69.2 47.2 
Taiwan (1996) 
SMEs (<200) 98.0 79.0 34.4 
· Singapore (1995) 
10 - 19 40.8 5.2 2.7 
20 - 99 42.5 20.7 13.0 
100 - 299 11.4 20.5 18.1 
SMEs (10-299) 94.7 46.4 33.8 
Thailand (1996) 
1 - 49 87.8 21.9 
50 - 99 5.1 9.7 
100 - 299 4.8 20.8 
SMEs (<300) 97.7 52.4 
Malaysia (1994) 
1 - 19 24.0 1.8 0.9 
20 - 99 44.4 14.7 11.6 
100 - 199 16.1 15.1 13.9 
SMEs (<200) 84.5 31.6 26.4 
Philippines (1994) 
1 - 9 88.4 24.3 4.4 
10 - - 99 9.8 18.1 10.7 
100 - 199 0.8 8.9 11.6 
SMEs (<200) 99.0 51.3 26.7 
Notes: 1) Firm size is indicated in terms of the number of employees. 
2) Output in Taiwan is in terms of sales, while that in other economies is value added. 
Sources: Indonesia: Table 4.13 in Chapter 4; Japan: Small and Medium Enterprise Agency, MITI 
(2000); Korea: JSBRI (1999a); Taiwan: JSBRI (1999b); Singapore and Malaysia: JSBRI 
(1998); Thailand: JSBRI (1999c); Philippines: Fukumoto (1999). 
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Favourable combination and utilisation of production factors 
The SME sector in developing economies has often been affected adversely by 
distortions in factor markets, where the price of capital for large-scale enterprises (LEs) 
tends to be lower than its true opportunity cost, while wage levels in LEs are generally 
higher due to factors such as government legislation and trade union activities 
(Mazumdar 2001: 3-4). On the basis of their extensive analysis of postwar Japan, 
Ohkawa and Tajima (1976) and Tajima (1978) suggested that, under such factor market 
conditions, SMEs can coexist with LEs by choosing labour-intensive technology and 
achieving high capital productivity. 
Hill (1983) found in his study of Indonesian cambric producers that, in contrast 
to larger-scale producers who had access to credit at lower interest rates, smaller-scale 
producers had to rely on the informal credit sector where interest rates were higher. 
They therefore tended to select less capital-intensive and more labour-intensive 
techniques from the wide range of available weaving technologies. These findings 
indicate that the greater labour intensity of SMEs is appropriate for developing 
economies with a scarcity of capital and a more plentiful supply of labour, and that 
labour-intensive SME operations result in the improvement of the productive 
efficiency. 4 In his empirical study of Japan's machinery industry, Hondai (1992) also 
observed that contracting-out by LEs to SMEs in the 1930s resulted in an increase in 
the efficiency of capital through the substitution of material inputs for capital, while 
contracting-out in the 1960s reduced the labour cost of LEs through the substitution of 
material inputs for labour. 
4 Not only SMEs but also LEs can be labour-intensive. Depending on the circumstances, LEs in, for 
example, electronics and garment industries, engage in labour-intensive operations. 
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Foundations for industrialisation 
According to Odaka (1981: 169-70) and Takeuchi (1991), before World War II 
Japanese SMEs had a catalytic function in linking traditional to modem industries, 
whereas after the war many SMEs grew and became viable medium-scale enterprises, 
which widely diffused advanced technologies in the domestic manufacturing industry. 
JICA studies (1995 and 1997) on industrial development in Thailand and Indonesia 
observed that machinery SMEs forged more intense forward and backward linkages 
with LEs, which contributed to the strengthening and deepening of the industrial base 
of these economies. 
In general, modern manufacturing industry needs to have supporting industries 
to produce intermediate goods and parts/components, many of which are usually 
produced by SMEs. Modem upstream sectors such as the iron and steel industry need 
to have a downstream market large enough to absorb their products. 
SMEs are an important part of the industry groups that demand such basic 
materials. Abdullah (2000: 5) pointed out that SMEs often serve as schools for 
developing the skills of workers and entrepreneurs. Through learning-by-doing, 
workers and entrepreneurs in the SME sector acquire experiences and improve their 
industrial skills and knowledge. In all these ways, SMEs can contribute to the 
establishment of the foundations for industrialisation in developing economies. 
Export Promotion 
It is possible for SMEs to contribute to the expansion of exports, although LEs tend to 
be more export-oriented. For example, Takeuchi (1991) discussed cases of Japanese 
SMEs in bicycle, knit-fabric, shell-button and brush industries between the late 
nineteenth century and the mid-twentieth century. SMEs played a key role in the 
19 
production of export goods in these labour-intensive sectors. They could be 
competitive in international markets through the development and use of labour-
intensive technologies. 
SMEs in Taiwan with only a limited size · of domestic markets have been very 
export-oriented since the early 1960s and continuously accounted for 50-60 percent of 
total exports in the 1990s (Japan Small Business Research Institute 1999b: 10, 16-7, 60-
1 ). Taiwanese SMEs have shifted their main export items from traditional products 
( e.g., bicycles, electric fans, footwear and umbrellas) until the 1980s, to high-tech 
products (e.g., computers and computer parts/accessories) in the 1990s. 
Hayami, Kikuchi and Marciano (1998) observed cottage manufacturers and rural 
factories for metal craft goods in the Philippines, which recently expanded the 
production of ornaments, gifts and toys for export through export contractors located in 
Greater Manila. Similarly, in Indonesia, Bali's garment and Jepara's furniture 
manufacturers are outstanding examples of SME exporters, both of which have 
remarkably increased their exports since the 1980s, taking advantage of indigenous 
design capacity, local raw materials and foreigners as marketing and technical helpers 
(Berry and Levy 1999; Cole 1998; Sandee, Andadari and Sulandjari 2000). 
More equal distribution of income 
Substantial differences in average wages between SMEs and LEs are a common feature 
of labour surplus developing economies. For example, in the Indian textile and sugar 
industries, wages of workers employed in SMEs were significantly lower than those of 
workers in LEs (Little, Mazumdar and Page 1987: 33-57). As Berry and Mazumdar 
(1991: 37-8) stated, these wage differences between SMEs and LEs imply that, when 
the former group generates a larger share of total output, more of the income accruing 
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to labour is likely to go to the lower wage groups. Tambunan (2000: 45-60) found that 
SMEs in agriculture-based industrial activities in Indonesia have served as a last resort 
for people with low educational levels and for poor farm households in rural areas. 
These observations suggest that SME development contributes to a reduction in income 
inequality in a country. This effect is a reason for policy makers to promote the 
development of SMEs.5 
In addition to income distribution, SMEs have a potential role in improving 
spatial distribution. For example, in China, rural SMEs in the form of township and 
village enterprises (TVEs) have been a main force of the rapidly growing 
manufacturing industry after 1978, and this phenomenon has significantly promoted 
more equitable regional development between urban and rural areas (Otsuka 1998: 448; 
Shaolian 2000). 
Flexibility in changing economic environments 
SMEs can sometimes adapt better to changing economic circumstances than LEs (Berry, 
Rodriguez and Sandee 2001: 363-4). Because of their smaller workforce and their 
poorer production facilities, SMEs are generally able to adjust their production volume 
and diversify product lines according to changes in demand with less negative impact 
on the existing production structure. They tend to produce day-to-day necessities rather 
than luxuries, by using domestic input materials. They are not likely to rely heavily on 
short-term loans from the modern financial sector (Hill 2001: 264). 
Under sharp economic downturns such as the 1997-98 economic crisis, these 
factors enable SMEs to be more flexible in changing their production structure to suit 
5 The argument relating to the impact of SME development on income distribution tends to be discussed 
more frequently than the argument of the efficiency related to distortions in the labour market, because 
differences in the level of efficiency wages between SMEs and LEs are not likely to be significant, 
compared to those of average wages. For further details, see Berry and Mazumdar (1991 : 37-8). 
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market demand. Tambunan (2000: 148-51) described how, during the recent economic 
crisis, Indonesian SMEs including food, wood, rattan and leather producers, have been 
less adversely affected or even, in some cases, positively affected, because they 
generate manufactured necessities for both domestic and foreign markets based largely 
on local resources. In addition, Tambunan stated that inward-looking metalworking 
SMEs have been able to benefit from the economic crisis by quickly shifting their 
product lines to nails, latches, door bolts, spades, hoes and rubbish bins.6 
2.Z.2 Growth Constraints for SMEs in Developing Economies 
Although SMEs may have the potential advantages mentioned above, SMEs cannot 
always fully realise such potential contributions to industrialisation and economic 
development. Many studies have indicated the reasons why SMEs may fail to do so. 
The reasons may depend on factors such as size, age, ethnic affiliation and subsector of 
SMEs, but are often similar in developing economies. Insufficient entrepreneurial and 
managerial skills are typical internal constraints to SME growth, while limited access to 
technologies, markets, input materials and credit and government policies in favour of 
LEs are common external constraints (Schmitz 1982: 430-41 ). Berry and Mazumdar 
(1991: 54-8) stated that many SMEs in Asian developing economies have suffered from 
insufficient capabilities in technology, management, marketing and financing and from 
a lack of access to effective support systems. 
The following experiences of individual countries in East Asia are consistent 
with the common and sometimes inherent impediments to the growth and performance 
6 The shift to the production of these items has been encouraged by the increasing demand for cheaper 
domestic products instead of expensive imported ones, due to the rupiah 's depreciation. The demand for 
those products also appeared in response to the government-funded labour-intensive public work projects 
designed as relief work for the crisis (Tambunan 2000: 148-51). 
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of SMEs. Seong (1995) revealed that SMEs in Korea suffered from a lack of 
economies of scale, insufficient technical skills, insufficient access to formal financial 
institutions, inactive R & D activities, and limited access to international markets. Even 
in Taiwan, where the development of SMEs is generally considered as a successful case, 
Liao and Kao (1995) demonstrated that SMEs faced problems such as poor access to 
adequate credits, difficulties in acquisition of technologies, and inefficient management. 
SMEs in Thailand have encountered similar obstacles including insufficient access to 
necessary information, adequate equipment and adequate financing, in addition to the 
absence of effective standardisation of products (Park 1995: 167). In Malaysia, SMEs 
faced difficulties related to marketing, finance, skilled labour, raw materials, 
management, technology and competition (Chee 1986: 39-51). 
As indicated-above, SMEs tend to suffer from several common problems that 
impinge on their potentially positive impact on economies. In addition to broader 
issues such as a lack of scale economies and adverse effects of government policies, 
they have faced inadequate access to markets , raw materials, favourable credits, 
production technology and information. Furthermore, SMEs experienced problems of 
insufficient managerial and organisational capabilities. Developing economies, 
therefore, may have to relieve these constraints, if they wish to take advantage of the 
roles that SMEs can play in economic development. 
2.2.3 SMEs in Developing Economies in Different Contexts 
SMEs can contribute to economic development in different ways. For instance, cottage 
industries in remote areas can play an important role in reducing uneven regional 
distribution of income, whereas small-medium enterprises with technology and 
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management skills may support the development of the LEs on which industrialisation 
depends. 
According to Romijn (1987: 212-20), in Thailand cottage industries with less 
than 10 workers occupied more than 60 percent of total manufacturing establishments 
in 1980. The share of rural cottage industries in total manufacturing value added 
accounted for nearly one fifth in 1979. Given the heavy Bangkok bias in Thailand ' s 
industry, this figure is not necessarily low. For agricultural households, the share of 
income from cottage industries in total earnings accounted for 22 percent in 1978/79. 
The rural cottage sector also performed well as a foreign exchange earner. More than 
half of the handicrafts export value in the early 1980s was generated by rural cottage 
industries. Because of the highly seasonal nature of agriculture and the excessive 
concentration of business in Bangkok, the roles that cottage industries in rural Thailand 
have played in employment and income creation and export promotion seem quite 
important. 
Hayami, Kikuchi and Marciano (1998: 151-3) illustrated the potential benefits of 
labour-intensive rural metal craft firms in the Philippines to improving the incomes and 
living standards of rural people, particularly those who are poor and landless. The 
small-scale metal craft producers suit the economic environment in the rural Philippines 
in terms of their small capital requirements and the significant creation of low-skilled 
employment. In addition, capable entrepreneurs have emerged from such rural metal 
craft producers, and, as a consequence of collaborative subcontracting linkages with 
urban export agents, they can take advantage of the business opportunities created by 
high economic growth in neighbouring NIEs and ASEAN countries since the late 1980s 
by exporting their products. In these cases, micro-scale SMEs in rural areas can 
contribute to mitigating income inequality and uneven geographical distribution of 
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manufacturing activities 1n a way which conforms to local economic conditions in 
Thailand and the Philippines. 
A common industrial organisation among small-medium manufacturing firms is 
clustering, where SMEs producing similar products concentrate in a certain area. This 
provides collective efficiency through local external economies and joint actions 
(Schmitz 1995: 530). According to Berry (1997: 7-8, 11), clustering in developing 
economies tends to emerge in micro-scale or cottage industries located in small towns 
and villages or in confined segments of large cities. The advantages of cooperation 
among SMEs in clusters are derived from: 1) economies of scale, for instance, 
purchases, sales, investment in common production facilities and infrastructure; 2) 
dissemination of information on technology and markets; and 3) division of labour. 
In Indonesia, the agglomeration of manufacturing SMEs is often observed m 
both rural and urban areas (Berry, Rodriguez and Sandee 2001: 370-1). According to 
Weijland (1999: 1516-20), rural clusters in Indonesia have a seedbed function for the 
development of SMEs, demonstrating -that clustering can improve for producers to 
markets, through dense networks of traders. These clusters can also reduce the 
transaction costs of purchasing inputs and marketing outputs, ease information flows , 
and facilitate order-sharing, labour-sharing, equipment- and skill-sharing and 
subcontracting. 7 
Micro-scale enterprises m the urban and rural informal sector of developing 
countries can play a positive role m socio-economic development. 8 The Asian 
There is evidence that clusters are of limited importance for SME development. In her study on a rural 
metal-casting cluster in Ceper of Central Java, Sato (2000a) found only limited intra-cluster linkages 
among neighbouring SMEs. In this cluster, most SMEs did not conduct collaborative activities such as 
specialisation open information sharing, joint marketing and joint purchasing. She pointed out tha t 
SMEs can establish inter-furn linkages with firms no t only inside but also outside the cluster, if the 
cluster is located in a convenient place in terms of transport, communication and trade intermediation. 
The informal sector is generally characterised by a large number of very small-scale producers and 
service units which tend to be family-owned, use simple and labour-intensive technology, and employ 
unpaid family workers or low-wage workers with low educational levels . The informal sector provides 
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Development Bank (1997: 9-10) pointed out that, despite their insufficient technical, 
marketing, financial and managerial capabilities, such very small-scale firms have a 
potential to serve some major development objectives: 1) poverty reduction; 2) 
employment generation; and 3) the empowerment of women. 
For example, 64 percent of the Indonesian total employment in 1990 was in the 
informal sector (ADE 1997: 121-4) .. This may suggest that microenterprises provide 
employment opportunities to poor groups in the informal sector. A recent ILO report 
(1999) based on the Indonesian economic census of 1996 indicated the significant 
contribution to employment and income generation of microenterprises in the food 
processing, wood processing, textile and garment subsectors in the informal sector. On 
the basis of a survey conducted by the Philippines National Statistical Office and ILO 
in 1995, ADE (1997: 130) described that approximately 55 percent of informal sector 
households in Metro Manila relied on the activities of microenterprises run by the 
household head or other members of the household, while around 30 percent relied on 
wage employment. As an example of women's empowerment, ADE (1997: 118) 
mentioned the case of Bangladesh, where a much higher share of females ( 67 percent of 
all females in the rural non-farm sector employment) was employed in rural informal 
manufacturing than males (32 percent). 
SMEs also play important roles in the formal sector. They can provide ancillary 
support to LEs through inter-firm transactions and realise potential benefits from the 
division of labour, which will be explained in the next section. In Japan in the 1960s, 
LEs started to purchase intermediate inputs on a substantial scale from supporting 
industries, most of which were small-medium producers (Hondai 1995: 82). For 
example, Matsushita, a large · consumer electronics manufacturer in Japan, had by 1980 
local markets with cheap and low quality goods or those which are not produced by the formal sector. 
For this argument on the informal/formal sector in the context of SMEs, see Van Diermen (1997: 15-20). 
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roughly 1,000 supplier firms (Hoang 1992: 20). Japanese LEs sourced a wide range of 
parts, components or processing services from SMEs that specialise in specific products 
and production processes. 
Before the 1997-98 crisis in East Asia, the growmg demand associated with 
rapid economic growth encouraged many local and international assembler firms in the 
region to contract out part of the production processes to supplier firms. 9 This 
circumstance provided LEs with an impetus to foster reliable small-medium producers 
as local supporting industries. 
According to a TICA study (1995), the auto parts and components industry in 
Thailand emerged in the first half of the 1960s parallel to the development of the 
automobile assembly industry. The JICA study reported that the total number of 
companies in the automotive supporting industry was 395 in 1993, of which nearly two 
thirds were small-medium supplier firms with 200 or less employees. These SMEs 
developed through subcontracting business with assembler firms in the growing 
automobile market in Thailand. 10 
A directory issued by the Indonesian Automotive Parts and Components 
Industry Association (GIAMM) in 1997 listed 125 firms as member companies.11 More 
than half of them were small-medium supplier firms with 299 or less workers. A JICA 
study (1997), which focused on Indonesian supporting industries, found that automobile 
assembler firms intended to nurture and develop these small-medium supplier firms in 
order to reduce production costs through the promotion of local production of parts and 
components. Although there were many problems that these SMEs had to overcome, 
9 This could possibly have been caused by a tendency of LEs to wish to benefit from advantages of 
vertically disintegrated production systems, which will be explained in detail in Section 2.3 . 
10 As of 1993, more than 70 percent of automotive parts producers in Thailand were engaged in 
subcontracting business with automobile assembler firms. The JICA study (1995) found that these 
subcontractors in particular increased production and local content ratios during 1988-93. 
11 If second- and lower-tier subcontracting firms and non-OEM (original equipment manufacture) spare 
parts producers are added, the number of parts producers becomes much larger than the above figures in 
Indonesia. Chapter 5 presents further discussion on this issue. 
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the development of small-medium supporting industries contributed to the improvement 
of efficiency and competitiveness in the automobile sector (JICA 1995).12 
Depending on the circumstances, there are several different roles that SMEs can 
play in economic development. As Chapter 4 will explain in detail, this study will seek 
to analyse the development of small- and medium-scale manufacturing enterprises in 
the last context mentioned above. It will focus on SMEs as supporting industries. 
2.3 Theoretical Framework of Subcontracting for SME Development 
This section explains the theoretical foundations of this study. It considers the 
fundamental reasons why subcontracting arrangements are under certain conditions 
suitable · for developing economies as vertical production arrangements from among 
possible alternatives. Particular alternatives are spot market transactions, vertically 
integrated pioduction arrangements and subcontracting transactions. All of these 
arrangements govern vertical relationships between large-scale assembler firms ( or the 
assembling process) and small- and medium-scale supplier firms (or the 
parts/components producing process). 
After examining the potential advantages from an inter-firm division of labour, 
this section discusses the nature, expected benefits and motivations of subcontracting 
transactions, the basic conditions necessary for the implementation of subcontracting 
practices, and several types of subcontracting linkages useful for the development of 
SMEs. 
12 Based on the responses from Japanese-affiliated assembler firms in Thailand and Indonesia, 
"insufficient quality and precision," "unstable delivery timing," and "lack of local supplier firms" are the 
main common problems with local procurement (Japan Overseas Enterprises Association 1994: 66). 
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2.3.1 Vertical Production Systems 
Opportunities for the division of labour are closely related to the stage of 
industrialisation and economic development (Mead 1984: 1095; Stigler 1951). In an 
early stage of industrial development, the main production activities that involve the 
production of raw materials, their transformation into final products, and the selling of 
the output are often carried out within one firm. However, with the progress of 
economic development, each of these processes in the production system may evolve 
into separable activities, each of which tends to be separately dealt with by a number of 
independent specialised firms. 
Stigler (1951: 188) stated that the division of labour is particularly encouraged 
by the size and growth of a market. If all production processes are undertaken within a 
single company in the growing market, the cost of coordination for a wider range of 
internal operations rises and some resources may be underutilised. The expansion of 
the market urges firms to specialise in individual business activities, such as the 
production of raw materials, the production of parts and components, and the 
assembling of products in order to increase productivity. The participation of supplier 
firms in the specialisation of production processes would improve production efficiency 
and achieve economies of scale, both for the individual firms involved and the economy 
as a whole, through a more economical use of resources. A precondition is that 
production processes are divisible. Spot-basis exchanges can reduce the price levels of 
input materials, if supplier firms operate in a competitive market environment. 
In an efficient market with low transaction costs and risks, spot-type transactions 
based on prices would be effective and sufficient to coordinate the market and promote 
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the division of labour. In that situation, the inter-firm division of labour through simple 
one-off exchanges could improve the overall efficiency of production in the economy. 
However, markets do not necessarily work efficiently and perfectly, particularly 
in less-developed economies (Hayami 1998: 5). Williamson (1975: 20-40) listed the 
following factors as organisational failures of markets: 1) uncertainty/complexity and 
bounded rationality; 2) small-numbers exchange relations and opportunism between 
participants; 13 and 3) information impactedness (information disparities between 
participants). In circumstances where contracts cannot completely cover uncertain and 
complex situations, spot markets do not economise production costs. In the case of 
current and future transactions between only a small number of players, spot markets 
amplify opportunistic behaviour among them. Information asymmetry increases the 
risk of market exchanges and the cost of transactions between the parties. Figure 2.1 
summarises the advantages and disadvantages of pure market transactions on a spot-
basis in comparison with in-house production and subcontracting. Key aspects of these 
vertical production systems will be discussed below. 
In developing economies, there are usually significant uncertainties and risks in 
the market and the wider economy. There tend to be limited numbers of assembler 
firms and capable supplier firms. Hence, the market is not so competitive. Products 
and associated technologies are not highly standardised or well diffused, and 
information on the market appears incomplete and asymmetric between buyers and 
sellers. These conditions imply that markets in developing economies are not perfect 
and cannot sufficiently coordinate transactions between buyers and sellers. 
13 The behaviour called "opportunism" refers to a lack of fairness or truthfulness in transactions. 
Recurrent spot transactions across the market are particularly costly and risky when opportunism appears 
together with the small number of supplier firms (Williamson 1975: 9-10; 1985: 47-49, 64-67). 
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Figure 2.1 Advantages and Disadvantages of Vertical Production Systems 
In-house Production System 
advantages: 
sufficient information 
· little anxiety about quality, delivery 
timing, etc. of inputs (P) 
· low external coordination cost (P) 
combination of advantages for both vertical 
integration and market transactions 
disadvantages: 
· not available to benefits from inter-
firm division of labour (P) 
(e.g., · inflexible to fluctuation, 
· not scale economies/specialisation, 
· not economical use of labour/capital, 
· high internal management cost, 
· weak competition) 
· small chance to participate (S) 
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· low internal management cost (P) 
SME development 
· stable market for SMEs (S) 
· imorovement of SME caoabilities (S) 
combination of advantages for both vertical 
integration and market transactions 
disadvantages: 
· high cost for external coordination 
and improvement of SMEs (P) 
· dependence of supplier firms on 
parent firms (S) 
important precondition: 
· good coordination between firms 
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Note: (P) = advantages/disadvantages for parent firms, (S) = those for supplier firms. 
Source: Prepared by author based on discussions in 2.3.1. 
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In fact, Lall (1980: 203) studied inter-firm linkages in India and noted that, in 
developing economies, there are very few markets that perform under perfect conditions 
in which technologies can be easily diffused, a large number of buyers and suppliers 
operate, no monopolistic or oligopolistic party exists, and future trends can be foreseen 
in a rational manner. Under such imperfect market conditions, it is difficult for 
assembler firms to purchase, throµgh spot transactions, products and processing 
services that are satisfactory with respect to quality, quantity and delivery timing. 
To overcome organisational failures of markets, there are basically two 
alternatives to spot market transactions. One is the vertical integration system, in which 
production processes from raw materials to intermediate inputs and assembling are 
vertically integrated and brought under the control of one management group. The 
other is the subcontracting system, where various activities in production processes are 
contracted out by a principal firm to supplier firms based on long-term contracts 
together with technical specifications. Costs associated with internally hierarchical 
transactions and subcontracting transactions are very different (Hayami 1998: 6). 
Figure 2.1 shows that a vertically integrated production system can minimise 
transaction costs through the internalisation of spot-base exchanges in the open market 
(Coase 1937: 390-3). Imperfect or asymmetric information problems can be overcome 
by controlling almost all production processes within one organisation. In that case, 
parent firms do not have to supervise supplier firms in terms of quality, quantity, cost 
and delivery timing of input materials. On the other hand, labour and capital costs in 
this system are largely fixed for assembler firms because these firms need to have more 
employees, machinery and equipment, and other production facilities, relative to firms 
that concentrate on specific processes. Such a structure of production requires 
assembler firms to engage in not only advantageous but also disadvantageous 
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production processes. This may lead to underutilisation of factor resources, 
employment of high-wage workers, an increase in internal management costs, and 
possibly inflexibility in times of drastic economic fluctuations (Coase 1937: 394-7). In-
house production also takes away opportunities to reduce the prices of parts and 
components which may be obtained by making supplier firms compete. 
Figure 2.1 also explains subcontracting, which is considered as a continuum of 
vertical governance arrangements between vertical integration at one extreme and spot-
base market transactions at the other (J oskow 1985: 36). There is a possibility that 
subcontracting emerges and evolves, if two other alternatives, in-house production and 
one-off exchanges, are not economical or feasible. A subcontracting system may 
provide assembler firms ,vith advantages for both vertical integration and market 
transactions, which include: 1) scale economies and concentration on specialised 
manufacturing activities; 2) reduced underutilisation of labour and capital resources; 3) 
exploitation of economies of small-scale production such as lower labour costs of the 
SME sector; 4) utilisation of specialised technologies and expertise owned by supplier 
firms· 5) reduction of the cost of monitoring own employees; and 6) flexible response 
to drastic economic changes (Coase 1937: 394-7; Hayami 1998: 6-7; Lall 1980: 205-7; 
Mead 1984: 1096-7; Watanabe 1971: 56-7). 14 
On the other hand parent firms in a subcontracting system need to bear 
transaction costs associated with inter-firm relations. As described before, markets do 
not generall work ell in developing economies, due to several reasons such as small 
numbers of assembler firms and competent supplier firms and sjgnificant uncertainties 
and risks. Parent firms are therefore required; 1) to find supplier firms with potential 
capabilities· - ) to establish and maintain close relationships with such supplier firms; 3) 
1
~ Lall (19 0: _Q6) used the term, 'economies of small-scale production,' to express benefits to be 
pro ·ded b) the SME sector \-\hich include the use of less capital-intensive and simpler technology, 
smaller overheads, more flexibility, etc. in addition to lo er wages. 
to enable supplier firms to meet requirements such as quality, cost (price) and delivery 
timing, by enhancing their capabilities through technical and other necessary support; 
and 4) to force supplier firms to fulfil contract terms without creating moral hazards 
(Coase 1937: 390-3; Hayami 1998: 7; Williamson 1985). 
Whether subcontracting transactions will come into use will therefore depend on 
the balance between benefits and · transaction costs associated with this vertical 
disintegration relative to two other alternatives, spot-type transactions and vertical 
integration, and the distribution of these benefits and transaction costs between parent 
firm and supplier firms (Hayami 1998: 7; McMillan 1990: 52). If one-off exchanges 
and vertical integration are not feasible or economical for parent firms, subcontracting 
arrangements that govern transactions with supplier firms can be expected to economise 
on transaction costs and serve as a practical production system (Coase 1937: 395; 
Joskow 1985: 23). When subcontracting is selected as a production system, it should 
be feasible and economical for supplier firms as well, compared to pure market 
transactions on a spot-basis. 
2.3.2 Subcontracting for the Development of SMEs 
With reference to the existing literature (e.g. , Berry 1997: 7; Hondai 1995: 79; Lall 
1980: 203; Tsutomu Nakamura 1983: 50; Nishiguchi 1994: 3; Odaka 1978; Watanabe 
1971: 54), this study defines or understands subcontracting and other related terms in 
the following way: 
(1) subcontracting is when a firm (the parent or principal firm) places an order with 
another firm (the supplier or subcontracting firm, or subcontractor) for parts and 
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components production, material processmg services, or sub-assembling and 
assembling activities which will be incorporated into a product which the parent 
firm seeks to sell; 
(2) the parent firms are often, but not always, large-scale enterprises, while many of 
the supplier firms are usually small-medium enterprises; 
(3) subcontracting practice differs from the simple purchasing of ready-made parts and 
components in spot markets in that a written or oral agreement between the parent 
firm and the supplier firm stipulates the detailed technical specifications of the 
custom-tailored goods; and 
( 4) the parent firm and the supplier firm usually keep close business relationships and 
repeat transactions with each other in the longer term. 
As indicated above, subcontracting systems can under certain conditions become 
effective in generating benefits for parent firms. Tsutomu Nakamura (1983: 52) argued 
that the subcontracting system as a quasi-vertical integration system or a continuum 
between vertical integration and spot-base market exchanges offers advantages 
embedded in both types of vertical production arrangements. Similar to the vertically 
integrated system, the subcontracting system can coordinate the parties engaging in 
different production processes through close relationships between principal and 
supplier firms. At the same time, similar to the one-off exchanges, the quasi-vertical 
integration system can respond in a flexible manner to changes in economic situations, 
generate economies of scale and achieve the economical combination of production 
factors. 
Subcontracting arrangements are not only beneficial for large-scale parent firms 
but also for small- and · medium-scale supplier firms , as shown in Figure 2.1. 
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Subcontracting relationships are generally associated with the mechanisms for the 
development of SMEs. As described in the previous section, the main constraints on 
SME development in developing economies are unfavourable access to markets, market 
information, raw materials, capital, modem technology, managerial skills, sufficient 
production facilities and so on. Under subcontracting systems, large-scale parent firms 
may enhance access to these kinds . of resources which are not generally available to 
SME supplier firms to a sufficient degree. 
Based on experiences in East Asian economies, several studies have indicated 
the potential benefits from subcontracting transactions for small and medium supplier 
firms (e.g. , Otsuka 1998: 450; Supratikno 1998: 18; Watanabe 1971: 65; Yuwono, 
Supramono and Rietveld 1994: 358). One of the most important advantages is that 
large-scale principal firms, in general, guarantee to purchase parts and components 
produced by small-medium supplier firms over a long period. 15 In addition, parent 
firms can supply input materials to subcontracting SMEs. This provision of raw 
materials and intermediate inputs contributes to a saving in scarce working capital for 
SMEs. Moreover, large parent firms can provide small-medium supplier firms with 
technical assistance and second-hand equipment, which enable the latter to improve the 
quality, cost and delivery of products. For instance, Kojima and Okada (1997: 19) 
appraised the role of subcontracting networks in upgrading technological capabilities of 
Japanese casting SMEs. Kim and Nugent (1999: 125-37) illustrated that large-small 
linkages in Korea have functioned as important technological support mechanisms for 
SMEs. 
15 This contmurng and long-term purchase of specific items allows supplier firms to promote 
specialisation in areas in which they are able to employ a technology ( e.g., casting, forging and stamping) 
and are able to produce parts ( e.g. , crankshaft, fuel tank, leaf spring and disk brake) in the most 
advantageous way. 
36 
Hondai (1992: 176-8) summarised the benefits which SMEs can obtain from 
subcontracting transactions with large-scale parent firms as follows: 
(1) the reduction of information and transaction costs through subcontracting ties, 
which includes easy and cheap acquisition from large-scale parent firms of new 
technologies, product designs, production processes, management methods, 
marketing and input materials; 
(2) the reduction of risks and uncertainty and an increase in the expected rate of profit 
as a consequence of stable orders and better payment conditions; and 
(3) the improvement of creditworthiness, for example, in the form of debt guarantees 
by parent firms. 
In this way, the subcontracting system can potentially help SMEs rn developing 
economies overcome impediments to growth and performance. 
2.3.3 Types of Subcontracting Linkages in Developing Economies 
With special reference to India, Lall (1980: 207) specified the following four groups of 
market imperfections and related problems as the main reasons for the establishment of 
various types of subcontracting relationships in developing economies: 
(1) technical problems: markets in developing econormes cannot by themselves 
pro ·ide potential supplier firms with a good environment for the development of 
technological competence to satisfy the demand for products with sufficient quality, 
quantity and cost required in modern industry; 
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(2) uncertainty about delivery: it is difficult for buyers to ensure the purchasing of 
parts and components at preferable timing in the markets in developing countries 
without any special institutional arrangements, because of supplier firms' 
opportunistic attitudes, uncertainty beyond the control of supplier firms, incomplete 
market information and insufficient numbers of competent supplier firms; 
(3) coordination of future capacities: market forces in developing economies cannot 
necessarily coordinate investment capacities of parts supplier firms to be required 
by individual parent firms without the direct exchange of information on future 
plans; and 
( 4) sharing of revenues: due to the absence of competitive prices in the markets for 
parts and components in developing countries, other means are required to 
determine the price levels that result in a reasonable sharing of revenues for both 
large-scale parent firms and small-medium supplier firms. 
After considering several factors including such organisational failures of 
markets, parent firms may decide to contract out the production and processing of parts 
and components to supplier firms through subcontracting arrangements. The following 
three types of subcontracting represent the main motivations of principal firms to 
implement transactions with supplier firms (e.g., Chew 1988: 37; Li 1992: 30; Nabi 
1985: 14-5): 
(1) specialised subcontracting: parent firms that do not have specific skills, 
technologies or facilities necessary for their operations can commission supplier 
firms that have such skills, technologies or facilities to deal with some parts of 
production processes in a supplementary way; 
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(2) economic subcontracting: in cases where in-house production is not economical, 
principal firms contract out some parts of production processes to supplier firms ; 
and 
(3) capacity subcontracting ( cyclical subcontracting): parent firms can respond to 
changing demand in fluctuating markets, by utilising the production capacity of 
supplier firms. 
Specialised subcontracting may allow assembler firms to utilise the particular 
skills that SMEs possess, ensure the purchasing of better parts and components in terms 
of quality, price and delivery time, and concentrate on assembling and other 
advantageous processes. However, under specialised subcontracting, small-medium 
supplier firms need to achieve certain levels of technological and other capabilities that 
satisfy the requirements of principal firms. Economic subcontracting may enable 
parent firms to reduce production costs through the utilisation of lower wages of SMEs, 
reduction in costs for monitoring their own employees, and the generation of scale 
economies through concentration on specific processes. When assembler firms are 
interested in capacity subcontracting, they expect SMEs to become shock absorbers that 
allow them to avoid underutilisation and/or capacity shortfalls at times of drastic 
changes in production volume. 
These motivations encourage principal firms to have a wide range of vertical 
inter-furn linkages with small-medium supplier firms. Taking account of the above 
market imperfections and motivations, and based on his field survey in India, Lall 
(1980: 208-9) presented ten types of linkages generally observed in subcontracting: 
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(1) establishment-oriented linkages: encouraging the establishment of supplier firms 
capable of producing better and cheaper parts; 
(2) location-oriented linkages: facilitating local and foreign supplier firms in setting up 
their production facilities close to principal firms; 
(3) information-oriented linkages: providing supplier firms with information on 
production and investment planning for the short- to long-term period; 
( 4) technology-oriented linkages: assisting supplier firms in acquiring technology 
necessary for adequate quality of products; 
(5) finance-oriented linkages: providing supplier firms with financial assistance for 
supplementing capital deficiencies in their operations; 
(6) raw materials-oriented linkages: assisting supplier firms . 1n overcommg 
uncertainties about the quality and availability of raw materials; 
(7) management-oriented linkages: improving the managerial capability of supplier 
firms through training and other assistance; 
(8) pricing-oriented linkages: establishing a procedure to achieve reasonable pnces 
between parent and supplier firms; 
(9) distribution-oriented linkages: adjusting the distribution of revenues and costs 
between parent and supplier firms by means other than prices such as sharing of 
inventory cost, product development cost, and replacement markets; and 
(10) diversification-oriented linkages: encouragmg supplier firms to diversify their 
markets at home or abroad. 
Basically, most subcontracting relationships may facilitate the better functioning 
of inter-firm transactions under conditions in which markets are imperfect and vertical 
integration is not economical. However, as Lall (1980: 209) argued, not all types of 
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subcontracting linkages in the previous explanation are, of course, necessarily 
beneficial to SMEs, LEs, or the economy as a whole. For example, unequal market 
power between buyers and sellers may be found in subcontracting ties. 16 Some 
subcontracting linkages may be the consequence of responses to misguided industrial 
policies in the public sector, whereas other linkages may reflect collusive anti-
competitive behaviour in the business sector.17 Lall, therefore, emphasised the need for 
detailed case studies to reveal the real impact of subcontracting linkages in different 
environments. The types of subcontracting ties usually vary with the social, cultural 
and economic systems in individual countries. In this sense, for instance, Japan's 
subcontracting models need to be carefully interpreted, with attention to not only 
advantages but also limitations, when seeking to draw lessons that may be relevant to 
other countries (Hill 1985: 247; Van Diermen 1997: 27; Watanabe 1974: 405). 
2.3.4 Difficulties with and Conditions for Subcontracting Arrangements in 
Developing Economies 
While there are potential benefits from subcontracting, it is not easy to arrange 
subcontracting business in such a way that all these benefits are captured. Referring to 
Baranson's study on the diesel manufacturing sector (1967: 68-9) as an example, 
Watanabe (1974: 414-5) listed the following four sets of inadequacies as problems in 
the development of subcontracting systems in India: 
16 In fact, during the 1950s and 1960s, subcontracting SMEs in Japan struggled with subordinate 
relationships with large-scale parent firms, which reflected the power imbalance between the former and 
the latter. This will be explained in Chapter 3. 
17 Chapter 4 will discuss misguided SME policies in Indonesia. 
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(1) insufficient technical and engineering experience required for the acquisition of 
modem technology and its adaptation to local conditions; 
(2) insufficient workers' skills and discipline, such as the ability to read blueprints, set 
up tools and equipment, and operate machinery and equipment; 
(3) insufficient industrial organisation, which impedes small-scale workshops from 
serving as ancillary industries for the modem large-scale industrial sector; and 
( 4) insufficient size of domestic markets and insufficient rates of economic growth. 
Based on a series of interviews with selected local supplier firms in Malaysia, Li 
(1992: 33-36) identified the following common factors as the main obstacle to the 
establishment of functional inter-firm relations between LEs and SMEs: 
(1) difficulties of SMEs in purchasing machinery and equipment that satisfy the 
requirements of LEs due to capital shortages as well as uncertainties and high 
risks; 
(2) lack of entrepreneurship in supplier SMEs; 
(3) red tape in the government sector ( e.g., customs regulations and taxes); 18 
( 4) shortages of skilled labour in the SME sector; 
(5) lack of information on both potential principal firms and potential subcontracting 
SMEs; 
( 6) lack of incentives and encouragement for subcontracting businesses; and 
(7) lack of technical support for the development of potential supplier SMEs. 
18 For example, in Malaysia around 1990, bureaucratic customs regulations often hampered the smooth 
transfer of input materials between Free Trade Zones (FTZs), where many LEs are located, and non-
FTZs, where SMEs operate. This had an adverse effect on the development of subcontracting linkages. 
Also, the imposition of sales tax on the transactions of intermediate inputs tends to discourage the 
establishment of inter-firm linkages (Li 1992: 35). 
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Some studies investigated the basic conditions that are required to establish 
beneficial subcontracting linkages and make effective use of the above-mentioned 
potential advantages. Both Mead (1984: 1097-9) and Otsuka (1998: 449-51) suggested 
three major conditions for the founding of subcontracting systems. The first two 
conditions are the "technological divisibility" of production processes and 
"transportation costs" in moving subcontracting items from one stage to another. For 
technological reasons, production processes for some products ( e.g., iron, steel and 
fertiliser) cannot be separated at all or without significant additional costs. Also, 
disintegration of production processes is costly or not feasible when the transfer of 
intermediate goods from supplier to buyer is not easy or economical, possibly because 
1) two parties are located at a distance without good access to transport facilities to link 
the two locations or 2) intermediate products are heavy, bulky or fragile and, therefore, 
not transportable. In the case where these extra costs associated with technological 
separation and transportation are greater than potential benefits, subcontracting linkages 
are discouraged. On the other hand, if such additional costs are relative! y smaller than 
expected benefits, the operation of subcontracting transactions is largely encouraged. 
The third condition is "coordination between the participants and enforcement of 
contracts," which is crucial to carrying out subcontracting business. 19 For parent firms, 
coordination of separate producers and enforcement of contracts are necessary 
preconditions to ensure that supplier firms meet requirements regarding the quality, 
quantity and delivery timing of subcontracting items. Enforcement of fair transactions 
is also indispensable to supplier SMEs, because it can protect weak SMEs from 
unreasonably excessive requests by stronger LEs. In addition, the establishment of 
reasonable prices and payment conditions is an important coordination area for the 
19 In general, the old and complex legal systems that can often be observed in developing countries result 
in difficulties when it comes to enforcing contracts or penalising parties who do not comply with them 
(Mead 1984: 1099). 
43 
smooth operation of subcontracting practices (McMillan 1990: 52). Access to good 
communication infrastructure is an essential condition for the effective coordination of 
individual participants in subcontracting business. According to Mead (1984: 1098), if 
coordination and enforcement are difficult or costly, production is more likely to take 
place in a vertically integrated manner by parent firms through a hierarchical structure 
in which managers of the firms ma.ke the decisions. Also, SMEs may intend not to 
supply their products to large-scale principal firms through subcontracting transactions 
but sell their output on markets ( e.g., spot-basis replacement parts market) through 
traders or in a direct way. 
Accordingly, one of the key conditions that initiate and promote subcontracting 
business is some guarantee that the coordination and enforcement costs will not rise. In 
order to take full advantage of potential benefits from a vertically disintegrated 
production system, both LEs and SMEs have to reduce the coordination and 
enforcement costs for subcontracting through the establishment of relational contracts 
between them. 20 
2.4 Research Questions 
With reference to the discussion above, this study assumes with care that the 
development of SMEs can be supported by the inter-firm division of labour through 
industrial subcontracting transactions. Based on this assumption, our study raises the 
following research questions in relation to SMEs and subcontracting linkages in 
Indonesia at present and Japan in the past. 
20 In addition to the private sector, the public sector can help reduce coordination and enforcement costs 
associated with subcontracting. For example, as Chapter 3 will elaborate, the Japanese government 
introduced various policies and laws to ensure fair and mutually beneficial subcontracting transactions 
between SMEs and LEs after World War II. 
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Question 1: What is the essence of Japan's historical experience with SME 
development through subcontracting? 
How and why did subcontracting systems emerge and evolve in the Japanese economy? 
How and why did subcontracting linkages play an active role in the development of 
SMEs in Japan? This question is intended to examine Japan's historical experience 
with SME development through subcontracting to establish a point of reference and 
comparison for our study of SMEs and subcontracting in Indonesia. 
Question 2: Does the SME sector contribute to economic development in Indonesia? 
How has the Indonesian SME sector developed during the last few decades? Has the 
SME sector contributed to economic development in Indonesia and if so, how? How is 
its recent economic performance in terms of productivity, factor proportions, wages and 
so on? Are subcontracting relations between SMEs and LEs significant in the 
Indonesian manufacturing industry? Question 2 sketches a broad picture of the features 
of Indonesian manufacturing SMEs, particularly machinery SMEs, based on nation-
wide data and information. Answers to this question can serve as a reference for a 
subsequent firm-level analysis. 
Question 3: What are external sources that support SME development in Indonesia? 
What kind of external support mechanisms have SMEs used to improve their 
capabilities? How effective have such external sources been for SMEs in developing 
their capabilities? Question 3 probes the external sources available to SMEs and 
examines how they work as support mechanisms for the development of SMEs in 
Indonesia, using data and information obtained from a firm-level survey. Our main 
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interest is whether subcontracting relations with large-scale parent firms have supported 
Indonesian SMEs by supplementing their internal resources. 
Question 4: Can subcontracting improve productivity of SMEs in Indonesia? 
If SMEs consider subcontracting linkages with LEs as important support mechanisms, 
can subcontracting improve the . production efficiency of SMEs in Indonesia? 
Specifically, does subcontracting cooperation with LEs have a positive impact on the 
productivity of SMEs? Question 4 will also be examined on the basis of micro-level 
evidence. 
Question 5: What are the mechanisms of subcontracting linkages in the Indonesian 
SME sector? 
Why do SMEs exploit subcontracting transactions with large-scale parent firms and 
how do SMEs initiate business relationships with LEs? What type of linkages with LEs 
do SMEs have through subcontracting business? What kind of costs and benefits have 
SMEs borne that are associated with and obtained from subcontracting transactions, and 
how significant are they? What are the conditions for larger gains from subcontracting 
ties? Question 5 is designed to investigate the mechanisms of subcontracting linkages 
that exist in Indonesia at present, on the basis of qualitative data obtained from a survey 
among SMEs. 
Question 6: What are the characteristics of subcontracting linkages with SMEs that 
Indonesian LEs have established? 
Why did large-scale assembler firms in Indonesia initiate subcontracting transactions 
with SMEs? What type of linkages have LEs established with SMEs through 
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subcontracting? What kind of costs and benefits have LEs borne that are associated 
with and obtained from subcontracting transactions with SMEs, and how significant are 
they? To what extent do large-scale parent firms support their small-medium supplier 
firms? Question 6 will explore the detailed characteristics of subcontracting ties, from 
the perspective of LEs, on the basis of qualitative evidence from an interview survey. 
Question 7: Is Indonesia at present significantly different from Japan in the past? 
What kind of similarities or dissimilarities exist between Indonesia at present and Japan 
in the past in terms of SME development, industrial subcontracting and related matters? 
Can subcontracting be beneficial to SME development in Indonesia, as in the case of 
Japan? Question 7 compares Indonesia at present as analysed in responses to Questions 
2 to 6, with Japan in the past as discussed in the response to Question 1. 
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Chapter 3 
SME Development and Subcontracting in 
the Japanese Manufacturing Industry: 
The Historical Experience 
3.1 Introduction 
Large-scale enterprises (LEs) and small- and medium-scale enterprises (SMEs) in the 
Japanese manufacturing industry developed concurrently in the process of 
industrialisation and economic growth from the 1930s (Hondai 1992). Ohkawa (1976: 
149-66) ascribed the successful economic growth in Japan during the twentieth century 
( up to the 1960s) to SME development through close interactions between LEs in the 
modem sector and SMEs in the traditional sector. These patterns of industrialisation 
and industrial organisation in Japan in the past have been perceived as models for 
developing economies to follow. In such countries, including Indonesia, SMEs with 
traditional elements remain dominant, but require strengthening in order to absorb the 
growing workforce, or form the basis for further industrialisation (Hondai 1995: 67 ; 
Hondai and Murakami 1996: 35-6). 
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This chapter will look into the development of SMEs in Japan, and the evolution 
of vertical subcontracting ties which have linked SMEs that did not have sufficient 
internal resources with LEs that had technological, financial and other necessary 
resources. Despite the existence of some unique features in Japan, its past patterns of 
industrialisation and economic development have elements in common with developing 
economies in more recent years (Ohkawa and Kohama 1989). The purpose of this 
chapter is to review Japan's experience in order to: 1) establish basic ways to examine 
SMEs in Indonesia at present; and 2) provide material for a comparative analysis of 
Indonesian SMEs, at a subsequent stage in this study. 
In context of the historical development of the Japanese economy and 
manufacturing industry, this chapter examines the growth of the SME sector and the 
evolution of subcontracting systems during the twentieth century. Specifically, it seeks 
to address the following questions: 1) how and why did subcontracting systems start 
and evolve in Japan's manufacturing industry?; and 2) how and why did subcontracting 
linkages contribute to the development of manufacturing SMEs in Japan? Answers to 
these questions will reveal the lessons that may be drawn from SME development 
through subcontracting in Japan for developing economies, particularly Indonesia. 
Section 3.2 observes the emergence of subcontracting in the development of the 
Japanese economy and SMEs before World War II. Section 3.3 investigates the 
evolution of Japanese SMEs and subcontracting, with particular attention to the 
machinery industry, during the period of high economic growth after World War II . 
Section 3 .4 examines how subcontracting linkages provided support mechanisms for 
SMEs, while Section 3.5 looks into the way in which subcontracting improved 
production efficiency of SMEs. Finally, Section 3.6 presents the essence of Japan ' s 
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historical experience with SME development, which will be used as a point of reference 
for the analysis of SMEs and subcontracting in Indonesia in subsequent chapters. 
3.2 SMEs and the Initiation of Subcontracting in Japan before World 
War II 
Under the slogan shokusan kogyo (develop industry and promote enterprise), the Meiji 
government undertook a range of modernisation and industrialisation programs from 
the 1870s. 1 Table 3.1 shows that the primary and traditional sectors accounted for most 
employment during 1881-1935. However, due to private sector initiatives as well as 
these government efforts, the modem industrial sector significantly increased its share 
in employment from 1.8 percent in 1881-85 to nearly 12 percent in 1921-25. The rapid 
expansion of employment in the modem sector was observed particularly during World 
War I ( 1914-18). The war caused an overall shortage of goods in the world market and 
Japanese manufacturers took advantage of this opportunity to increase production for 
both exports and domestic demand (Yoshihara 1994: 10-1). 
After both the recession in the early 1920s and the depression in 1930-31, 
Japan 's manufacturing industry expanded rapidly. Output increased particularly in the 
machinery industry in the 1930s, due to a sharp increase in exports and the Japanese 
military expansion on the Asian mainland.2 The economic boom from 1932 generated 
an environment in which large-scale manufacturers were not able to expand production 
fast enough to meet demand without contracting out work to supplier firms. In a 
1 The shokusan kogyo policies consisted of 1) the lending (or sale) of funds and equipment to private 
enterprises, 2) establishment (and later selling) of public sector factories, 3) promotion of a national 
banking system, and 4) building of infrastructure such as railroad and postal/telegraph networks 
(Takafusa Nakamura 1983: 59-60). 
2 From the early 1930s, demand for munitions and armaments grew. In the late 1930s, when military 
requirements increased rapidly, output in the machinery industry followed, expanding from 1.6 billion 
yen in 1936 to 4.3 billion yen in 1938 ( ishiguchi and Brookfield 1997: 90). 
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substantial sense, this was the beginning of subcontracting systems in Japan, which 
originated from the putting-out production systems that already existed. 
Table 3 .1 Growth of and Share in Employment in Japanese Primary, Modem and 
Traditional Industries, 1881-1935 
Growth of Employment over Previous Period (%) 
1881-
1885 
1886-
1890 
1891-
1895 
1896-
1900 
1901-
1905 
1906-
1910 
1911-
1915 
1916-
1920 
1921-
1925 
1926-
1930 
1931-
1935 
Total Primary 2) Nonprimary 3) 
1.8 
2.6 
3.4 
2.8 
2.6 
2.1 
2.6 
3.5 
3.4 
4.1 
5.7 
Total Modem Traditional Total 
Industry Industry 
0.2 5.9 
-0.2 15.3 8.8 9.2 
-0.7 45.5 10.3 12.6 
0.7 33.0 4.5 6.9 
1.4 28.6 2.0 4.8 
1.0 33.4 -0.2 4.2 
-1.5 26.4 6.4 9.8 
-9.1 44.4 18.0 23.1 
-4.5 14.1 12.0 .12.5 
1.2 7.4 6.7 6.9 
2.5 6.4 9.2 8.6 
Share in Employment (%) 1) 
Total Primary 2) Nonprimary 3) 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
Total Modem Traditional Total 
Industry Industry 
70.8 
68.9 
66.1 
64.8 
64.0 
63.3 
60.7 
53.3 
49.2 
47.9 
46.4 
1.8 27 .5 
(6.2) (93.8) 
2.1 
(6.8) 
2.9 
(8.6) 
3.8 
(10.8) 
4.7 
(13.1) 
6.1 
(16.6) 
7.6 
(19.3) 
10.6 
(22.7) 
11.7 
(23.0) 
12.0 
(23.0) 
12.1 
(22.6) 
29.1 
(93.2) 
31.0 
(91.4) 
31.5 
(89.2) 
31.3 
(86.9) 
30.6 
(83.4) 
31.7 
(80.7) 
36.1 
(77.3) 
39.1 
(77 .0) 
40.1 
(77.0) 
41.5 
(77.4) 
29.2 
(100) 
31.1 
(100) 
33.9 
(100) 
35.2 
(100) 
36.0 
(100) 
36.7 
(100) 
39.3 
(100) 
46.7 
(100) 
50.8 
(100) 
52.1 
(100) 
53.6 
(100) 
Notes: 1) Figures in parentheses indicate the shares in nonprimary sector employment. 
2) Primary industry includes agriculture and forestry. 
3) Nonprimary industry consists of modem and traditional industries. Modem industry 
employment includes the total number employed in factories with 5 or more employees in the 
areas of manufacturing, mining, education, civil service, private railroads and electricity, 
maritime, and municipal and village government. 
Source: Nakamura, Takafusa (1983: 28). 
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3.2.1 Economic Development and SMEs in Japan before World War II 
The process of Japan 's economic development started in earnest around 1885 (Ohkawa 
and Kohama 1989: 24). Table 3.2 shows the composition of production, exports and 
imports by industry in Japan from that year. Before World War II, Japan tended to 
import textile materials (e.g. , cotto.n yarn and wool) , process them and export semi-
finished or finished textile products. In this period, textile items (including both 
industrial and primary products) accounted for roughly 25 to 40 percent of total imports 
and manufacturing production and around 45 to 65 percent of total exports. A variety 
of manufactured products such as buttons, camphor, lacquer ware, matches , straw plaits 
and toys made up the rest of production and exports. In broad terms, the earnings from 
exports of these textile and sundry goods financed the imports of chemical, metal and 
machinery products, many of which were not produced domestically due to the lack of 
modem industrial capacity. Thus, before World War II, Japan tended to produce and 
export traditional or simple manufactured products, while it imported other industrial 
products and various primary products used as inputs. 3 
What roles did manufacturing SMEs play in this structure of industry and trade? 
Table 3.3 presents the share of SMEs in the Japanese manufacturing industry. In 1909, 
when Japan 's first manufacturing census was published, SMEs with 5-99 workers 
accounted for 97 percent of factories and 58 percent of manufacturing employment. In 
the machinery sector, SMEs occupied around 96 percent and 43 percent of factories and 
3 The gradual development of heavy and chemical industry since World W ar I and the yen depreciation 
due to Japan 's abandonment of the gold standard in 1931 increased exports of Japanese chemical, metal 
and machinery products in the 1930s. In this decade, fertiliser, steel plate, insulated wire, simple textile 
machinery and parts , and simple electrical machinery and parts were typical export items produced in the 
heavy and chemical industry. However, before World War II, the share of these products in production 
and exports was smaller than that of traditional products (Tominaga 1999: 31 -8). 
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employment, respectively. These proportions fluctuated, but remained broadly constant 
until World War II. 
Table 3.2 Share of Product Goods in Production, Exports and Imports in Japan, 1882-
1980 (Annual Averages) 
Industrial Products (%) Primary Products (%) 
Chemicals, Other Industrial Textile Fuels and Primary 
Textiles Metals and Industrial Products Materials I ) Metal Products 
Machinery Products (total) Materials 2) (total) 
Value of Production in the Manufacturing Industry 
1882 - 1891 33.1 18.8 48.1 100.0 
1902 - 1911 32.6 , 20.9 46.5 100.0 
1917 - 1926 36.5 29.1 34.4 100.0 
1930 - 1939 26.3 46.2 27.5 100.0 
1956-1960 13.0 58.1 28.9 100.0 
1966 - 1970 8.2 63.4 28.4 100.0 
1976-1980 5.9 65.3 7.5 100.0 
Exports 
1882 - 1891 8.8 7.2 9.1 25.1 36.8 5.1 74.9 
1902 - 1911 27.7 12.6 14.5 54.8 26.2 4.9 45.2 
1917 - 1926 35.2 14.3 14.0 63.5 28.4 0.8 36.5 
1930-1939 35.0 26.5 18.6 80.1 13. l 0.0 19.9 
1956-1960 32.0 45.1 18.4 95.5 4.5 
1966 - 1970 13.7 71.2 13.4 98.3 1.7 
1976 - 1980 4.7 87.1 4.5 99.1 0.9 
Imports 
1882 - 1891 37.3 . 26.6 17.4 81.3 5.8 6.4 18.7 
1902 - 1911 9.4 32.3 12.1 53.8 25.9 4.1 46.2 
1917 - 1926 5.0 30.8 9.9 45.7 29.5 3.7 54.3 
1930 - 1939 2.5 29.7 9.8 42.0 25.1 10.0 58.0 
1956 - 1960 0.5 19.7 3.1 23.3 19.3 29.5 76.7 
1966-1970 1.2 23.3 5.8 30.3 6.9 34.0 69.7 
1976 - 1980 2.9 16.2 1.6 25 .0 2.3 51.1 75.0 
Notes: 1) Textile materials for exports are raw silk. 
2) Fuels and metal materials for exports are copper. 
Sources: Calculated from Yamazawa and Yamamoto (1979: 5-6, 15) and Yamazawa (1984: 240-5). 
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Table 3.3 Share of SMEs in the Japanese Manufacturing Industry, 1909-1980 
Number of Establishments 
SMEs (!) 2l SM Es (!I) 2l3l 
4-29 30-99 4-99 4-299 
Manufacturing 
1909 
1920 
1930 
1937 
1954 
1960 
1970 
1980 
86.0 10.8 96.7 
83.1 12.4 95.4 
85.2 10.6 95.8 
86.2 10.1 96.4 
86.4 10.5 96.9 99.1 
81.6 14.1 95.6 98.8 
85.6 10.5 96.1 98.9 
87.4 9.3 96.7 99.2 
Machinery only 
1909 86.2 10.0 96.2 
1920 82.3 12.2 94.5 
1930 87.4 9 .0 96.4 
1937 83.6 12.0 95.5 
1954 79.2 15.1 94.3 98.2 
1960 71.1 20.8 91.8 97.6 
1970 78.0 14.8 92.8 97.7 
1980 81.8 12.4 94.2 98.2 
Number of Employees 
SMEs (1) 2l SM Es (II) 2l3l 
4-29 30-99 4-99 4-299 
36.0 21.9 58.0 
27.0 19.2 46.2 
28.7 19.9 48.6 
27.3 17.8 45.1 
35.4 19.8 55.2 69.3 
29.1 22.0 51. 1 67.3 
29.6 19.7 49.3 66.0 
35.0 20.3 55.3 71.8 
26.5 16.3 42.8 
15.0 11.6 26.6 
24.1 15.1 39.2 
19.0 14.6 33.6 
22.0 18.4 40.4 55.7 
16.3 19.2 35.6 52.4 
16.6 16.1 32.7 48.8 
21.2 16.7 37.9 54.5 
Gross Output 1l 
SMEs(J) 2l SM Es (II ) 2l3l 
4-29 30-99 4-99 4-299 
22.4 19.9 42.3 
17 .5 15.8 33.3 
20.2 17.1 37.4 54.7 
14.7 16.4 31.1 47.9 
15.6 15.7 31.3 48.4 
17.5 16.3 33.8 51.4 
14.3 14.3 28.6 
13.3 13.6 27.0 
11.6 14. l 25.7 41.4 
7.1 11.7 18.8 31.9 
8.3 10.7 19.1 31.8 
9.6 10.7 20.3 33.9 
Notes: 1) The data of output before World War II (no data in 1909 and 1920) represent value of gross 
output, while those after World War II indicate value of shipments. 
2) Firm size here is in terms of the number of employees. The data before World War II cover 
factories with five (not four) or more workers. 
3) Before World War II, the data for establishments with 100-299 workers are not separately 
classified. The ref ore, the share of factories with 299 or less workers cannot be calculated in 
that period. 
Sources: Before World War II, calculated from MITI (1961: 180-1 , 6~8-9). After World War Il, 
calculated from MITI, Kogyo Tokei Hyo (Census of Manufactures). 
Up to World War I (1914-18), the average level of personal consumption 1n 
Japan did not increase significantly and Japanese producers were internationally 
competitive only in cheap but low-quality consumer goods. As a consequence, SMEs 
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largely engaged in production of traditional goods (e.g., raw silk, fabrics , lacquer ware, 
bamboo products, pottery), most of which simply required handicraft operations 
suitable for home industry or small producers. However, some SMEs attempted to 
modify traditional production techniques and manufacture new types of products in 
competition with large-scale manufacturers equipped with imported machinery. 
Takeuchi (1991: 166) discussed examples such as small-scale brush producers who 
devised simple wood-framed machines for planting bristles, as alternatives to imported 
metal-framed ones, and small-scale shell-button producers who developed hand- or 
foot-driven drilling and grinding machines, as alternatives to Western power-driven 
ones. In the same period, SMEs that produced simple machines and parts and were 
engaged in repair work were operating in the machinery industry. These SMEs 
supplied their products to other SMEs that did not require high quality. They were not 
able to produce parts and components for large-scale machinery manufacturers in the 
modem sector, because of the inferior quality of their products (Whittaker 1997: 20-1). 
World War I created an opportunity to expand Japanese manufacturing 
production for both exports and domestic demand. Japan's industrial GDP (including 
manufacturing and mining) grew by 8.3 percent annually during 1914-19 (Ohkawa, 
Takamatsu and Yamamoto 1974: 227). In response to this boom, the number of SMEs 
with 5 to 99 workers increased remarkably by nearly 40 percent from 30,000 in 1914 to 
42,000 in 1919 (MITI 1961: 180-1). In addition, the share of SMEs that utilised 
electric power increased during the war. While the use of electric power was largely 
limited to firms with 30 or more employees before the war, it was available to roughly 
60 percent of SMEs with 5 to 29 workers in 1920 (Komiyama 1941: 12-5). The rapid 
expansion of electricity production and distribution helped SMEs increase production 
capacity and improve their technological capabilities. 
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Throughout most of the 1920s and during 1930-31, Japan experienced an 
economic recession. Under these conditions, SMEs had to restrict themselves to the 
market for low-end goods and services, because of the poor quality of their products, 
insufficient power capacity and their use of primitive machinery (Whittaker 1997: 22-3). 
During these years, the majority of SMEs in the urban areas were still characterised by 
their short-term relationships witb customers, irregular job orders and high worker 
turnover. Komiyama (1941: 98-101) and Tasugi (1941: 242-3) referred to these firms 
as fudoteki (floating or unstable) SMEs. 
After the 1930-31 recession, the machinery industry grew significantly, due to 
substantial increases in export and military demand in the rest of the 1930s. In fact, 
value of production in the machinery sector in constant prices increased by nearly 18 
percent per annum in the first half of the 1930s (Shinohara 1972: 146-7). The share of 
heavy and chemical industry (including chemical, metal and machinery sectors) in 
manufacturing output and employment surpassed that of the textile industry in 1935 and 
1937, respectively (MITI 1961: Table 2.2). In this period of high economic growth, 
subcontracting production systems became important in the Japanese machinery 
industry. 
3.2.2 Putting-out Systems as a Prototype of Subcontracting Systems 
Until around 1930, a typical business form in Japan was the tonya (putting-out) system, 
particularly in light industries such as textile and sundry goods production. In terms of 
marketing and production operations the small business sector was organised and 
controlled b traders or holesalers through a putting-out system. 
Komiyama ( 1941: 6-11, 26-31) distinguished between the old and new putting-
out systems. Under the old putting-out system, traders and wholesalers with no 
production activities provided necessary equipment and input materials to farms and 
households that produced manufactured goods and commissioned them to produce 
simple processed products. Until around 1910, this old putting-out system was often 
observed in 1) silk reeling and weaving in rural areas, 2) the production of imitation 
flowers , matches and toys in urban slums, and 3) craftsman-type industries such as 
lacquer ware and porcelain-making (Komiyama 1941: 8-9). Farm and cottage industry 
sectors simply engaged in the production required by traders and wholesalers and 
earned incomes that were not much higher than workers' salaries. 
During the 1910s, associated with the progress of industrialisation in Japan, the 
old putting-out household industry system shifted to the new putting-out factory system. 
Wholesale merchants still did not handle substantial production activities and controlled 
small-medium producers through the provision of input materials, market outlets and 
financial support. However, suppliers were no longer cottage industries but producers 
who often operated their own factories with paid workers and power-driven machinery 
d . 4 an equipment. 
Fujita (1954: 133-7, 1965: 92-100) found that traders and wholesalers placed 
orders with cottage industries in Aichi prefecture for cotton fabrics up to the late Meiji 
era (around 1910) and that they started to organise small factories in addition to cottage 
industries after around 1910. This was in response to the expansion of markets and the 
increase in small factories that used electrically operated looms. Toyozaki (1949: 58-
60) observed that, in some cases, small-scale metalworking and machinery factories 
4 During the 1910s, many SMEs employed power-driven machinery and equipment, but their power 
sources were different. Oil engines and steam engines were still widely used and the use of electricity 
started to increase (Yui 1994: 220-4). 
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were involved in putting-out systems controlled by wholesale merchants in the late 
19 l0s. 
As Tsutomu Nakamura (1983: 15) stated, putting-out systems linked agents and 
wholesalers with small-scale producers and allowed the agents and wholesalers to 
manage the processes of production. These systems could promote inter-firm division 
of labour and extend assistance to . SMEs with limited internal resources in providing 
input materials, market outlets and financial support. However, traders and wholesale 
merchants did not have a profound interest in and sufficient knowledge of product 
quality and productivity, because they were not manufacturers. Therefore, traders and 
wholesalers were not able to substantially improve the technological capabilities of 
small-medium producers under the putting-out production systems. 
3.2.3 Emergence of Subcontracting Systems in the 1930s 
For around a decade until 1931, Japan faced a series of economic difficulties such as the 
post-war panic of 1920, the Great Kanto Earthquake of 1923, the Financial Panic of 
1927, and the downturn of 1930 and 1931 due to the international Great Depression. 
However, the Japanese economy quickly recovered in the early 1930s, and thereafter 
experienced a period of high growth associated with the expansion of heavy industry 
under the quasi-wartime and wartime conditions before and during World War II. 
This economic growth and development of heavy industry in the 1930s were a 
consequence of the reflation policy adopted by the government (Nishikawa 1996: 268-
9). In the early 1930s, the gradual militarisation of the economy following the 
occupation of Manchuria in 1931 expanded domestic demand for products of the 
machinery industry . In addition, as Tominaga ( 1999: 3-9) emphasised, the yen 
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depreciation due to Japan ' s abandonment of the gold standard at the end of 1931 
resulted in a substantial growth of exports during the rest of the 1930s. The export 
boom induced significant increases in plant and equipment investment and private 
consumption, which contributed to the high economic growth in the 1930s. 
The economic expansion of the 1930s provided a rapidly growing market to 
large-scale machinery manufacturers. Such a sharp increase in demand exceeded the 
existing production capacity of large-scale firms . To cope with the shortage of their 
output capacity, the large modem production sector could either expand their 
production facilities through investment or take advantage of the production capacity of 
SMEs through subcontracting (Tasugi 1941: 190-1). Before 1930, LEs used to produce 
a wide range of parts and other input materials in their own factories. There were few 
SMEs capable of supplying reliable parts.5 In the 1930s, however, large enterprises in 
the machinery sector started to contract out to small supplier firms rather than expand 
their own production facilities. This reflected the following economic conditions at that 
time (Hondai 1995: 81; Mishina 1962: 86; Nishiguchi and Brookfield 1997: 90; Tasugi 
1941:190-2, 283-6): 1) relatively expensive capital; 2) the surging export and military 
demand in an unpredictable and quickly changing world economy; 3) the availability of 
cheap labour in SMEs; and 4) the development of infrastructure and technology. 
These economic conditions stimulated LEs in the machinery industry to contract 
out the production or processing of simple parts to SMEs. Hondai (1992: 27-34) found 
that the horsepower-labour ratio of the machinery industry declined between 1931-40 
5 Despite its preference for outsourcing from domestic firms , Toyota, which started the production of 
vehicles in the early 1930s and was officially established as an automobile manufacturer in 1937, had to 
depend entirely on in-house production and imported inputs at the initial stage of operation, because it 
could not find domestic supplier firms capable of producing reliable parts and components (Komiyama 
1941: 41-2; Odaka 1981: 182-3). In fact, to ensure sufficient levels of metal materials, Toyota 
established the Toyota Steel Company (presently Aichi Steel), an affiliated company, in 1940. 
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during the growth of the economy. 6 After considering other possible factors , he 
concluded that this decline in the horsepower-labour ratio of the machinery industry 
resulted from the spread of subcontracting transactions between LEs and SMEs in the 
1930s and that subcontracting substituted for capital, which was generally scarcer than 
labour in this period. 
The ups and downs of the e~onomy in the 191 Os and 1920s dissuaded LEs from 
expanding their own production capacity in the 1930s. In the 1920s, they had 
experienced difficulties in adjusting their overcapacity caused by investment in plants 
and machinery during World War I (Tasugi 1941: 190). This experience made LEs 
more cautious about expanding their production capacity in the 1930s and more 
inclined to embrace subcontracting. 
Table 3 .4 Differences in Wages in the Japanese Manufacturing Industry by Firm Size, 
1909-1980 
Finn Size I ) 1909 191 4 1932/33 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1980 
1 - 9 8? ..., _ _ .J 78.5 51.8 33 .9 35.5 37.4 35.0 38.2 37.5 
10 - 19 87.6 83.1 65.3 46.0 43.3 47.2 60.9 63.5 58.1 
20 - 99 96.5 91.9 82.9 59.7 52.2 57.2 69.8 70.0 63 .1 
100 - 299 75.8 67.4 68.2 78.0 76.9 75.2 
1 - 299 54.0 51.0 55.7 62.3 62.9 58.1 
300 - 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Tote: 1) Finn size is based on the number of employees. Before World War II , the size category of 1-9 
workers is 5-9 workers , that of 20-99 is 50-99, and that of 300 or more is 100 or more. 
Therefore, the data in that period do not exactly correspond to those after World War II. 
Sources: Before World War II, Odaka (1984: 41) and Yasuba (1976: 258). After World War II, MITI, 
Kogyo Tokei Hyo (Census of Manufactures). 
6 Since other data representing capital stock were not available before World War II, Hondai used the 
horsepower-labour ratio, instead of the capital-labour ratio. 
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Table 3 .4 indicates that differences in wage levels between small and large 
manufacturing firms in 1932/33 were higher than in 1909 and 1914. This may also 
explain why LEs in the 1930s were willing to contract out some processes to SMEs that 
used cheap labour, with the aim of reducing production costs. 
Nishiguchi and Brookfield ( 1997: 90) pointed out that the development of 
national transportation and communication systems made it easier for SMEs to market 
their output. Standardised manufacturing processes and mass production systems 
enabled SMEs to participate in subcontracting business such as simple machining and 
drilling jobs. The increased use of electrically operated machinery and equipment 
supported by the improvement in access to electrical power integrated SMEs into 
production processes of LEs. 
Table 3 .5 shows the results of a survey on subcontracting transactions in the 
machinery industry in 1934.7 Out of 734 valid responses, 571 firms or 78 percent of the 
total respondents had subcontracting linkages with 8,401 supplier SMEs. The cost of 
contracting out work to supplier firms accounted for 13 percent of the total output value. 
What were the main features of the subcontracting system during the 1930s? 
Subcontracting was characterised as a subordinate business relationship. Large 
manufacturers forced small producers to supply cheap products through subcontracting 
transactions, by controlling the latter in terms of the supply of raw materials, the 
marketing of products and financing (Fujita 1954: 141-3). 
7 This survey, Kikai-kigu Kogyo Shitauke Gaichu Jyokyo Shirabe (Survey of Subcontracting in the 
Machinery Industry) (1936) conducted by the Japanese Ministry of Commerce and Industry dealt with 
machinery manufacturers with 30 or more workers in Tokyo, Kanagawa, Aichi, Osaka, Hyogo, 
Hiroshima and Fukuoka (Fujita 1954: 144-5; Komiyama 1941: 44-7; Tasugi 1941 : 193-4). 
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Table 3 .5 Subcontracting in the Japanese Machinery Industry in 1934 
Firm Size Number of Value of Contract-out Contract-out Number of 
(Number of Sample Production Amount Ratio Z) Supplier 
Workers) F . I ) zrms (million yen) (million yen) (%) Firms 3) 
- 29 4,263 
(50.7) 
30 - 49 179 22.8 6.3 27.6 945 
( 11.2) 
50 - 99 167 40.3 8.9 22.1 666 
(7.9) 
100 - 199 110 65.1 13.7 21.0 336 
(4.0) 
200 - 499 60 132.3 13.9 10.5 307 
(3.7) 
500 - 999 24 76.9 12.1 15.7 101 
(1.2) 
1000 - 31 323.9 29.3 9.0 147 
(1.7) 
unknown 1,636 
( 19 .5) 
Total 571 661.3 84.2 12.7 8,401 
(100.0) 
Notes: 1) This survey covered seven prefectures (Tokyo, Kanagawa, Aichi, Osaka, Hyogo, Hiroshima 
and Fukuoka). According to Kojyo Tokei Hyo in 1934 (Census of Factories), there were 1,209 
machinery factories with 30 or more workers in these prefectures. Out of 734 valid responses, 
571 factories contracted out their parts and components to supplier firms. 
2) contract-out ratio= (contract-out amount)/(production value) x 100 
3) This represents the number of supplier firms that were used by 571 parent firms. The figures in 
parenthesis indicate the share of subcontractors by size. Nearly 20 percent or 1,636 of supplier 
firms were not classified in terms of firm size, because parent firms did not have sufficient 
information. 
Sources: Fujita (1954: 144), Komiyama (1941: 45) and Tasugi (1941: 197, 199), all of which referred to 
the data from Ministry of Commerce and Industry (1936), Kikai-kigu Gaichu Jyokyo Shirabe (Survey of Subcontracting in the Machinery Industry). 
Based on another survey of 335 sample firms in Tokyo in 1936, Komiyama 
(1941: 61-74) identified characteristics of the subcontracting linkages small-medium 
machinery producers had with large parent firms. His main findings were: 
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(1) smaller SMEs tended to deal only with the processing of parts, while larger SMEs 
tended to engage in producing parts; 
(2) input materials were supplied to almost 40 percent of SMEs with 10 or less 
workers; 
(3) financial support including investment capital and working capital was provided to 
around 10 to 20 percent of SMEs with 30 or less workers; 
(4) only 10 to 20 percent of SMEs were exclusively attached to specific parent firms 
and most of them received financial support from parent firms; 
(5) around 70 to 80 percent of SMEs had plural parent firms to avoid the fluctuation of 
sales; and 
( 6) almost 10 percent of SMEs with around 30 workers had two to three supplier 
SMEs. 
Komiyama' s observations indicated that parent firms tended to contract out simple 
processing work to smaller SMEs, and that support mechanisms for improving the 
capabilities of SMEs were not established well in subcontracting relationships between 
large parent firms and small supplier firms in the 1930s. 
There were, however, some parent firms that fostered supplier firms. Komiyama 
(1941: 108-11) and Tasugi (1941: 247-54) elaborated the example of Okuma, a pioneer 
machine tools manufacturer in Japan, which intended to contract out several processes 
to SMEs for the purpose of enhancing the efficiency of its production structure. The 
machine tools company found that the number of competent SMEs was limited in the 
early 1930s and concluded that it was necessary to foster small-medium supplier firms 
in order to incorporate them into its production processes. Okuma perceived 
subcontracting with SMEs as beneficial and believed that SMEs could improve 
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technological and other capabilities, if necessary assistance was provided. It promoted 
the development of SMEs through 1) an increase in the number of supplier firms 
exclusive to Okuma (almost 30 exclusive firms , out of 60 supplier firms ), 2) provision 
of technical assistance including training and expert dispatch, 3) instructions for 
supplier firms to replace inadequate machinery and equipment, together with financial 
support for the purchase of new machinery and equipment, 4) supply of input materials 
and lending of tools , 5) advice on establishing wages of workers, 6) transfer of 
Okuma' s workers to supplier firms, and 7) promotion of subcontractors to specialise in 
the use of specific technologies. 
A different type of subcontracting arrangements beneficial to SMEs emerged 
due to the expansion of military demand. For the purpose of relieving the SME sector 
from the consequences of the recession in the late 1920s and early 1930s, the Kochi 
prefectural government requested the Kure Navy arsenal in Hiroshima to contract out 
metalworking and machinery work to local small-medium producers (Komiyama 1941: 
111-4; Tasugi 1941: 289-300). Although the Kure Navy arsenal had concerns about 
quality, prices and delivery timing, it responded to the request and placed an order with 
local SMEs through the Kochi prefectural government and the local industrial 
association for simple metal products . Since the products of SMEs in Kochi were 
acceptable in quality and deli very time, other Navy and Army arsenals also started to 
contract out simple parts to local SMEs in several other prefectures in order to meet the 
expansion of military demand, utilise labour surplus in rural areas, and enhance weak 
SMEs in local areas. 
Through such special subcontracting arrangements, Navy and Army arsenals, 
prefectural governments local industrial associations, and the Ministry of Commerce 
and Industry pro ided SMEs in provincial towns with the following assistance: 1) 
64 
dispatch of technical experts from Navy and Army arsenals; 2) loan of disused 
equipment and machinery owned by Navy and Army arsenals; 3) technical instruction 
by technical experts from prefectural governments; 4) national and local subsidies for 
improvement of production facilities; and 5) technical assistance including materials 
and products testing by pref ectural laboratories (Tasugi 1941 : 281-2). These special 
subcontracting arrangements encouraged SMEs located outside metropolitan areas to 
produce better products, because all organisations (i.e. Navy and Army arsenals, 
prefectural governments, local industrial associations and the Ministry of Commerce 
and Industry) responsible for this scheme paid attention to: 1) effective use of 
prefectural governments and industrial associations as intermediaries; 2) complete 
division of labour and distribution of orders to adequate firms among participant SMEs 
in each provincial town; and 3) transfer of knowledge on quality (Morris-Suzuki 1994: 
134-5; Odaka 1981: 183-4). 
In the 1930s, large-scale machinery manufacturers started to incorporate S-MEs 
as supplier firms into their production processes. However, since the number of 
competent SMEs was limited, large parent firms became aware of product quality, 
production technologies and productivity of SMEs and the need to assist SMEs in 
becoming capable subcontractors. This is the reason why LEs in the machinery 
industry began to provide SMEs with various forms of support, including technical 
assistance, from the early 1930s onwards. Support mechanisms for SME development 
were associated with subcontracting linkages between SMEs and LEs. 8 
As armament production expanded and Japan became increasingly deeper 
involved in warfare on the Asian mainland and in the Pacific during the late 1930s and 
the early 1940s, the government strengthened economic controls, which constrained the 
8 Large-scale machinery manufacturers under subcontracting systems started to extend technical 
assistance to SMEs. This was different from the past, because in the putting-out system, traders and 
wholesalers did not provide SMEs with technical support. 
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business activities of the private sector. Economic controls on industry compelled 
smaller and ,veaker SMEs to exit and instructed the rema1n1ng SMEs to become 
subcontractors exclusive to specific large-scale machinery firms, particularly those 
producing for military usage. The number of SMEs that could continue operations 
decreased, as government controls and material shortages were getting tight toward the 
final stage of the Pacific war. Th~se restrictions imposed on LEs and SMEs may not 
have been efficient, but established a model in which LEs and SMEs worked closely 
together in vertical production systems. 
Before the war, the expansion of demand under the conditions of capital 
shortages , unstable market situations, wage gaps between LEs and SMEs, and the 
development of infrastructure and technology encouraged LEs to initiate and develop 
subcontracting business with SMEs. LEs started to provide several forms of support to 
SMEs that could not satisfy their needs. Large-scale parent firms considered that 
benefits from subcontracting with SMEs were more than the costs associated with 
technical and other support to SMEs. The prewar subcontracting experiences 
established the foundations for the development of the subcontracting system after 
World War II. 
3.3 SME Development through Subcontracting in Japan after World 
War II 
Japan 's real GDP per capita in 1946 was less than 55 percent of the prewar peak level 
1n 1934-36, while the manufacturing index in 1946 fell to almost one fifth of its peak 
le el in 1944 (Kuroda 1993: 21). Howe er, Japan recovered from this setback during 
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the next 10 years. When the postwar recovery was finished, Japan continued a period 
of extremely high economic growth up to the early 1970s. 
After World War II, a series of economic reforms was implemented such as 
abolition of military organisations, execution of land reforms, dissolution of Japan's 
industrial conglomerates (zaibatsu) and promotion of labour unions. These changes 
provided favourable conditions for increases in individual incomes. In addition to these 
internal conditions, better external economic circumstances in the 1950s and 1960s 
generated an economic boom, during which increases in both domestic demand and 
exports led to the expansion of machinery production. 
The machinery industry developed as a leading sector in Japan's manufacturing 
industry after World War II. This section analyses the development of SMEs and the 
formation and structure of subcontracting systems during the postwar era of high 
economic growth. It focuses on the machinery industry. 
3.3.1 High Economic Growth and SMEs in the Postwar Japan 
Before World War II, as described above, Japan imported products of mainly heavy and 
chemical industries for which domestic production was insufficient, in exchange for 
exports of mainly textile products. After World War II, as indicated in Table 3.2, the 
structure of industry and trade in Japan changed significantly. Japan started to export 
industrial products, in particular high-quality chemical, metal and machinery products, 
which were manufactured by using imported primary materials. 
Table 3.6 presents a concise overview of the growth and composition of 
manufacturing production in Japan between 1950 and 1980. Prior to the 1973 oil crisis, 
the Japanese manufacturing industry as a whole recorded high rates of growth of 
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production of 18 percent and 14 percent per year, respectively, during 1950-60 and 
1960-70. The production of both transportation equipment and electrical machinery in 
the machinery industry grew by more than 20 percent per annum during 1950-70, 
which was faster than other manufacturing sectors. In particular, the production of 
passenger cars increased by 46 percent annually during 1950-70. 
Table 3.6 Growth and Share of Production in the Japanese Manufacturing Industry, 
1950-1980 
Subsectors 
Food 
Texti les and Apparel 
Lumber and Wood 
Chemicals 
Iron and Steel 
Machinery 
General Machinery 
Metalworking Machinery 
Sewing Machinery 
Electrical Machjnery 
Transport Equipment 
Vehicles3l 
Bicycles 
Precision Machinery 
Manufacturing 
Annual Average Growth 
of 
Production (% )1) 
1950-60 1960-70 1970-80 1950-70 1950-80 
11.7 
14.3 
7 .2 
16.9 
15.5 
26.7 
20.9 
34.8 
18.7 
32.1 
26.8 
59.1 
12.3 
25.2 
18.1 
8.5 
8.2 
4.9 
14.5 
15.5 
18.2 
16.9 
12.3 
3.2 
19.6 
19.0 
34.4 
3.2 
14.0 
13.8 
2.3 
0.3 
-1.6 
5. 1 
2. 9 
6.6 
4.2 
-3.S 
-4.7 
8.8 
5.9 
8.3 
4.6 
13 .0 
4.2 
10.1 
11.2 
6.1 
15 .7 
15.5 
22.3 
18.9 
23.1 
10.7 
25.7 
22.8 
46.2 
7.7 
19.5 
15 .9 
7 .4 
7.5 
3.5 
12.0 
11.1 
16.9 
13.7 
13.5 
5.3 
19.8 
16.9 
32.3 
6.6 
17.3 
11.9 
Share of 
Production in 
Manufacturing (% )2) 
1950 
13 .4 
23.2 
3.9 
12.9 
13.0 
13.9 
4.8 
0.2 
0.3 
3.1 
5.2 
1.6 
0.8 
0.8 
100 
1970 
10.4 
7.7 
3.2 
8.0 
9.5 
32.3 
9.9 
1.6 
0.2 
10.6 
10.5 
7.9 
0.1 
1.3 
100 
1980 
10.5 
5.2 
2.5 
8.4 
8.3 
31.8 
8.2 
1.1 
0.2 
10.4 
11.6 
9.9 
0.2 
1.6 
100 
Totes : 1) Calculated from indices of manufacturing production (base year = 1985). 
2) Calculated from total value of shipments. 
3) Average growth rates are calculated from the data on passenger cars , while production 
composition is based on those including all types of vehicles and motorcycles. 
Sources: Calculated from MITI (1992: 94-7 169, 171 ) and MITI, Kogyo Tokei Hyo (Census of 
Manufactures). 
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The share of the textile and apparel industry, the largest sector in the prewar 
period, decreased sharply in total manufacturing production from 23 percent in 1950 to 
5 percent in 1980. In contrast, the production share of the machinery sector increased 
significantly from 14 percent in 1950 to 32 percent in 1980, reflecting its high growth 
during the period. 
Table 3 .3 revealed that SMEs occupied a significant share in the manufacturing 
industry after World War II. In the entire manufacturing industry, SMEs with 299 or 
less workers accounted for 99 percent of establishments, two thirds of employees and 
half the value of output from the mid-l 950s to the 1970s. In the machinery sector, 
SMEs also had a considerable share in firm number, employment and production during 
1954-80. Since 1909, the year of the first manufacturing census, the size distribution of 
LEs and SMEs in the Japanese manufacturing industry basically remained unchanged 
until the 1970s, even though significant changes . in industrial structure took place 
during this period. This trend may reflect high entry rates of SMEs and their 
adaptability to changing economic conditions (Whittaker 1997:32-4). 
Table 3.7 shows capital intensity, productivities and wage rates by firm size in 
1957 and 1966. 9 These indicators show the basic characteristics of manufacturing 
SMEs in Japan. They are largely consistent with theoretical predictions concerning the 
relationships between these indicators and firm size. 10 Labour productivity (YIL) 
increases with firm size. Capital intensity (KIL) and wage rates (cv) also rise with size, 
except for the smallest firm group with one to three or one to nine workers. Capital 
intensity (KIL) is largest, labour productivity (YIL) is second largest, and wage rates (cv) 
are smallest, in terms of the differentials between firm groups by size. Capital 
9 In these two years, comprehensive data on SMEs were available, because census surveys of small- and 
medium-scale manufacturing enterprises were carried out by Small and Medium Enterprise Agency, 
Ministry of International Trade and Industry. 
1
° For theoretical conditions under which SMEs can compete with LEs, see Berry and Mazumdar (1991: 
52), Tajima (1978: 12-5) and Section 4.4 of this study. 
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productivity (YIK) falls with size, except for small-scale finn groups with 19 or less 
workers in 1957 and with 29 or less workers in 1966. 11 
Table 3.7 Capital Intensity, Productivities and Wage Rates 1n the Japanese 
Manufacturing Industry by Firm Size, 1957 and 1966 (Finn Size 30-49 = 
100) 
KIL 1) 
Finn Size 5) 1957 1966 
1 - 3 6) 
4 - 9 
10 - 19 
20 - 29 
30 - 49 
} 88 
so - 99 
100 - 199 
200 - 299 
300 - 499 
500 - 999 
1,000 -
Notes: 1) KIL= capital intensity 
85 
90 
100 
133 
185 
232 
343 
452 
779 
2) YIL = labour productivity 
3) YIK = capital productivity 
4) w = wages per worker 
1 1 1 
98 
95 
98 
100 
118 
141 
164 
205 
261 
402 
YIL 2) 
1957 1966 
} 55 
78 
91 
100 
121 
141 
164 
201 
226 
265 
44 
66 
84 
97 
100 
107 
119 
135 
148 
168 
208 
5) Firm size in terms of the number of employees. 
6) 1-3 in 1957 = firms with 1 to 9 workers 
Y/K 3) 
1957 1966 
} 63 
93 
101 
100 
89 
77 
70 
59 
49 
34 
40 
67 
88 
99 
100 
90 
85 
83 
72 
64 
52 
4) (JJ 
1957 1966 
} 82 
92 
100 
100 
108 
117 
133 
142 
158 
208 
113 
90 
95 
100 
100 
105 
110 
115 
123 
154 
144 
Sources: Calculated from Tajima (1978: 34) for 1957 and Motai and Ohkawa (1978: Appendix Table 1) 
for 1966, both of which were based on the data from Small and Medium Enterprise Agency, 
MITI, Chusho Kigyo Sago Kihon Chosa 1957, 1966 (Comprehensive Survey on SMEs 1957, 
1966). 
11 Statistical irregularity for the smallest SME group is related to data reliability. In addition , this SME 
group includes both unincorporated (mixed-income) enterprises and incorporated enterprises. It is 
possible that capital for the former SMEs is overestimated because of their counting of physical assets for 
household purposes (Ohkawa and Kohama 1989: 108-10). 
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Table 3.8 Capital Intensity, Productivities and Wage Rates in Four Sectors of the 
Japanese Manufacturing Industry by Firm Size and Sector in 1966 (Firm 
Size 30-49=100) 
Firm Size 5l Textiles Chemicals 
KIL 1l YIL 2l Y/K 3l 4) KIL l) YIL 2l Y/K 3l 4) w w 
1 - 3 134 44 33 91 92 32 35 80 
4 - 9 117 61 52 88 69 47 67 73 
10 - 19 100 83 83 97 93 77 83 92 
20 - 29 102 97 95 100 102 86 84 102 
30 - 49 JOO 100 JOO 100 JOO 100 JOO 100 
50 - 99 122 104 85 106 153 1 11 73 108 
100 - 199 137 101 74 106 175 113 65 114 
200 - 299 151 123 81 113 193 151 78 116 
300 - 499 188 115 61 119 317 156 49 124 
500 - 999 198 115 58 122 344 188 55 137 
1,000 - 200 113 57 91 505 191 38 143 
Firm Size 5l General Machinery Transportation Equipment 
KIL I ) YIL 2l Y/K 3l w 4) KIL l) Y/L 2l Y/K 3l w 4) 
1 - 3 112 57 51 100 102 59 58 112 
4 - 9 98 76 78 94 84 77 92 98 
10 - 19 98 91 93 96 96 95 99 98 
20 - 29 100 98 98 98 92 108 117 98 
30 - 49 JOO 100 100 100 JOO 100 JOO 100 
50 - 99 112 106 95 100 102 113 110 105 
100 - 199 115 111 96 104 116 127 109 107 
200 - 299 138 115 83 110 141 122 86 107 
300 - 499 144 142 99 118 143 133 93 112 
500 - 999 152 141 93 112 173 132 76 121 
1,000 - 187 156 83 106 288 263 91 153 
Notes: 1) KIL= capital intensity 
2) Y/L = labour productivity 
3) YIK = capital productivity 
4) w = wages per worker 
5) Firm size in terms of the number of employees. 
Source: Calculated from Motai and Ohkawa (1978: Appendix Table 1), based on the data from Small 
and Medium Enterprise Agency, MITI, Chusho Kigyo Soga Kihon Chosa 1966 (Comprehensive Survey on SMEs). 
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The disaggregated data for 1966 in Table 3.8 show almost the same tendency as 
the aggregate data in Table 3.7. There are differences in the economic performance of 
firms among different sectors. For example, the chemical industry shows a steeper rise 
in capital intensity (KIL) with firm size and a larger differential in it by firm size. This 
reflects a feature of chemical industry: major plants or factories tend to be large-scale 
and use capital-intensive technology. Although this kind of sector-specific difference 
exists, capital productivity (YIK) basically decreases with firm size, while capital 
intensity (KIL), labour productivity (YIL) and wage rates (cv) increase with firm size, 
with some anomalies in the smaller SME groups. These findings in both the aggregate 
and disaggregate data indicate that SMEs can coexist with LEs, by producing a unit of 
output with less capital but more labour than LEs (Berry and Mazumdar 1991: 52; 
Tajima 1978: 27). 
3.3.2 Development of Subcontracting Systems after World War II 
During the turmoil following World War II, large-scale machinery manufacturers in 
Japan could not immediately start their business activities on a full scale, because their 
production facilities were blocked by the Allied Occupation administration for the 
purpose of reparations payments and deconcentration policies. By contrast, SMEs in 
the machinery industry were allowed to resume operations without significant 
restrictions. From making parts/components for arms and machinery in response to 
military and investment demand before the war, they became engaged in producing 
consumer goods in response to growing daily needs. There were few subcontracting 
transactions between SMEs and LEs until the early 1950s (Fujita 1954: 150). 
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The Cold War shifted occupation policies from demilitarisation to econoffilc 
recovery, and removed business restrictions on large manufacturers through the 
suspension of reparations payments and deconcentration (Kosai and Teranishi 1993: 2-
3 ). The Korean War (1950-53) gave an impetus to the machinery industry and 
triggered a rapid expansion of production. 
To meet this surging demand in the early 1950s, large-scale machinery 
manufacturers resumed contracting out their intermediate inputs to the SME sector, 
with the aim of: 1) saving scarce capitat 2) utilising low labour cost in a dual economic 
structure; and 3) coping with economic fluctuations (Mishina 1962: 86-7). 12 
Subcontracting linkages reemerged in the machinery industry from the early 1950s 
onwards. The expected benefits of LEs from subcontracting in the early 1950s were 
similar to those in the 1930s. In the early postwar era, industries were confronted with 
difficulties in financing their investment and purchasing imported production 
equipment, due to tight monetary policy, credit controls and import controls (Okazaki 
and Yoshikawa 1993: 92-3, 98; Teranishi 1993: 139). Table 3.4 revealed large 
differences in wage rates between LEs and SMEs in 1950. Unstable business 
conditions continued and this dissuaded manufacturing firms from expanding their own 
production facilities. 
Upon achieving economic recovery in the mid- l 950s, Japan entered a period of 
sustained economic growth. Basic conditions of subcontracting systems drastically 
changed. Manufacturing firms gained better access to credit, loans and other funding 
from banks and financial institutions in the private and public sectors (Minami 1994: 
12 On the other hand, SMEs, which did not generally have sufficient technology, capital and human 
resources, found it necessary to establish subcontracting linkages with large-scale manufacturers to 
develop products, technologies and markets. 
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268-9; Okumura 1995: 911-2). 13 Since the late 1950s, structural change also took place 
in the labour market. Economic growth created a high demand for labour in the 
manufacturing industry and resulted in a shortage of labour and an increase in wages 
around 1960 (Minami 1973: 271-3). As shown in Table 3.4, the end of a labour surplus 
reduced wage differentials between SMEs and LEs in the late 1950s and early l 960s. 14 
These changes further stimulated. large manufacturers in the machinery industry to 
contract out intermediate inputs to small-medium subcontractors in order to substitute 
for labour, instead of capital (Hondai 1995: 82-3). 
Significant changes in industrial structure in the manufacturing industry 
occurred during the process of economic growth. Figure 3.1 illustrates changes in the 
share of value added among four types of industries: 1) light industry in the production 
of materials ; 2) light industry in the processing of semi-finished or finished products; 3) 
heavy industry in the production of materials; and 4) heavy industry in the processing 
of semi-finished or finished products. Large-scale manufacturers greatly increased the 
share of value added of heavy industry dealing with the processing of goods from 22 
percent in 1955 to nearly 50 percent in 1975, while small- and medium-scale producers 
also raised it from 23 percent in 1955 to 32 percent in 1975. 
The tendency toward higher processing industrialisation 1n heavy industry 
accelerated upgrading and specialisation of production technology. Technological 
progress and diversification of demand increased the number of products (including 
parts/components) and made production processes complicated. Fierce competition in 
domestic and foreign markets required LEs to rationalise production processes and 
strengthen the division of labour. These factors for promoting a division of labour 
13 Banks and financial institutions in the private sector increased their !endings to the industrial sector 
from 640 biilion yen in 1951 to 2.6 trillion yen in 1961 , while those in the public sector increased from 
13 billion yen in 1951 to 180 billion yen in 1961 (MITI 1992: 312). 
14 Despite this disappearance of labour surplus, the dual structure visible in the differences in wage levels 
between LEs and SMEs continued in the Japanese economy (Minami 1994: 237-51 ). 
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encouraged large manufacturers to have technically reliable subcontractors and 
establish efficient subcontracting networks. Large-scale machinery firms did not 
require subcontractors which only offered low wages, but also those which were 
modernised, mechanised and technologically capable. 
Figure 3 .1 Changes in the Share of Value Added by Industry: LEs and SMEs in the 
Japanese Manufacturing Industry, 1955-1985 
La.rge-scale Enterprises (LEs ) 
(Unit: %) 
23 .7 
(1 ) (2) (3) 
.. 
.... ········•······ 
42.2 
49.6 
58.6 
(4) 
22.0 1955 
1965 
1975 
1985 
Small- Medium Enterprises (SM Es) 
(Unit:%) 
--15.9 23.2 
~~, 
30.6 
. . .... 
32.3 
36.1 
(1 ) (2) (3) (4) 
Notes: (1 ) Light industry (material- type business): food, textiles, lumber/wood, pulp/paper, and ceramics/ 
stone. 
(2) Light industry (processing- type business): apparel, furniture/fixture , publishing/printing, 
rubber, plastic, and other manufacturing. 
(3) Heavy industry (material- type business): chemicals, oil/coal , steel and non-ferrous. 
(4) Heavy industry (processing- type business): metals , general machinery, electrical equipment, 
transportation equipment, and precision equipment. 
Source: Small and Medium Enterprise Agency, MITI (1993: 249-50). 
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The 1957 Economic White Paper stated that LEs in the machinery industry 
could no longer remain competitive without efficient parts and components supplier 
firms (EPA 1957: 39-42). However, technical standards of small-medium producers 
were still backward in the mid-1950s and the number of SMEs capable of supplying 
parts of high quality in large volume on time was small, despite efforts to enhance 
small-medium supplier firms in .the machinery sector during the interwar period 
(Whittaker 1997: 30). The rapid expansion of machinery demand in the 1950s could 
not wait until SMEs developed naturally (Mishina 1962: 87). 
Under these conditions, large manufacturers in the machinery industry felt a 
need to give technical, financial and other support to underdeveloped small-medium 
supplier firms through close working relationships. LEs in the machinery industry 
organised vertical industrial groupings consisting of their supplier firms as an enhanced 
form of subcontracting linkages, which was often referred to as keiretsu. 15 LEs started 
to integrate small and medium supplier firms into vertical keiretsu subcontracting 
groupings and to foster them through the provision of various kinds of assistance. As 
the machinery industry grew, subcontracting systems evolved into more coordinated 
and cooperative production arrangements as organisational devices. From the mid-
1950s onwards, Japanese SMEs became profoundly integrated into subcontracting 
networks and such vertical arrangements promoted the modernisation and development 
of SMEs (MITI 1994: 57-8). 
15 There are basically two types of keiretsu groupings. The horizontal keiretsu is a grouping of large 
firms across industries including the financial sector. These links are characterised as business 
collaboration between different sectors and intra-group mutual share holdings. This institutional device 
aims to enjoy scale economies within a group under the principle of one member enterprise in each 
business sector and avoid the risk of unfriendly takeover by other firms (Yamamura 1997: 339-41). The 
Vertical keiretsu group is formed on the initiative of assembler firms. Through this grouping, parent 
firms intend to strengthen ties with subcontractors without vertical integration and to ensure better 
functioning of subcontracting linkages. The main features of vertical keiretsu grouping are, 1) high 
dependence of member supplier firms on sales to parent firms, 2) transfer of technologies from parent 
firms to member supplier firms, and 3) long-term contracts between the two parties. 
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The proportion of subcontracting SMEs in the manufacturing industry increased 
consistently from 53.3 percent in 1966 to 58.7 percent in 1971, 60.7 percent in 1976 
and 65.5 percent in 1981 (Small and Medium Enterprise Agency, MITI 1983: 158-9, 
1998: 92-4). 16 The rising trend implies an increasingly important role of subcontracting 
in the Japanese economy and SME development. 
Table 3.9 shows a dependence of SMEs with 299 or less workers on 
subcontracting transactions with large-scale manufacturers in 1971 and 1976. Around 
60 percent of SMEs in the manufacturing industry acted as subcontractors. About 80 
percent of such subcontracting SMEs reported that they derived 80 percent or more 
income from subcontracting transactions with parent firms. A particularly high 
proportion of SMEs engaged in subcontracting is observed in the textile, apparel, metal 
products, general machinery, electrical equipment, transport equipment and precision 
machinery sectors. Around 70 to 80 percent in 1971 and 75 to 85 percent in 1976 of 
SMEs in these sectors performed as subcontractors under vertical inter-firm networks. 
Almost 70 to 90 percent of small-medium subcontractors in these sectors supplied 80 
percent or more of their total output to parent firms through subcontracting transactions. 
Along with SMEs in the textile and apparel sector, those in the machinery sector tended 
to rely very much on subcontracting arrangements as their production systems. This 
indicates that the machinery industry had developed under subcontracting systems 
during the postwar period of high growth. 
16 After the peak in 1981 , the share of SMEs engaging in subcontracting business decreased to 55.9 
percent in 1987 and 51.6 percent in 1996 (Small and Medium Enterprise Agency, MITI 1998: 94). By 
the early 1980s, many subcontracting SMEs achieved improvements in technology and productivity. 
Some of them acquired high and specialised technologies, while some other developed their own-brand 
products . As a result, SMEs tended to seek looser relationships with clients/markets. On the other hand, 
under the severe market conditions, LEs adopted policies to narrow SMEs down to a smaller number of 
competent supplier firms. These factors may explain such a decline in subcontracting ratios after the 
early 1980s (Small and Medium Enterprise Agency, MITI 1993: 256). 
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Table 3.9 Share of Japanese SMEs with Subcontracting Transactions with Parent 
Firms, 1971 and 197 6 
Manufacturing (only SMEs) 
Size (no. of employees) 
I - 19 
20 - 49 
50 - 299 
Sectors 
Textiles 
Apparel 
Lumber and Wood 
Chemicals 
Iron and Steel 
Metal Products 
General Machinery 
Electrical Equipment 
Transport Equipment 
Precision Machinery 
Share of SMEs with 
Subcontracting 
Transactions I) (%) 
1971 
58.7 
59.2 
56.9 
47.l 
75.9 
71.4 
43.8 
39.0 
66.0 
71.7 
75.9 
79.0 
77.9 
70.8 
1976 
60.7 
61.9 
50.4 
51.4 
84.5 
83.9 
42.9 
37.1 
70.4 
74.8 
82.7 
82.3 
86.2 
72.4 
Share of SMEs with Subcontracting 
Transactions: Specific Rate 2) (%) 
40 % or less 
1971 
9.3 
8.9 
13.8 
15.1 
3.1 
6.2 
10.8 
18.4 
11.1 
11.4 
7.3 
6.5 
6.4 
8.7 
1976 
10.5 
9.7 
17.9 
21.3 
5.1 
6.1 
18.5 
30.6 
13.7 
IO.I 
10.2 
8.2 
5.7 
7.8 
80 % or more 
1971 
76.7 
78.1 
62.1 
58.6 
91.5 
83.8 
72.1 
57.0 
61.3 
71.7 
78 .2 
80.5 
81.8 
78.8 
1976 
81.3 
82.0 
70.3 
73.8 
92.5 
89.2 
69.7 
56.4 
74.8 
78.3 
79.8 
85.0 
88.4 
86.9 
Notes: 1) In the total number of SMEs with 299 or less employees, the share of SMEs that conduct 
subcontracting transactions with parent firms. 
2) In SMEs with subcontracting deals, the share of SMEs whose rate of dependence on 
subcontracting transactions is less than 40 percent and more than 80 percent, respectively, in 
the total sales. 
Sources: Small and Medium Enterprise Agency, MITI (1974: 126-67; 1979: 188-92; 1980: 156). 
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Table 3.10 Share of Japanese LEs which Purchased Inputs from Supplier Firms 
through Subcontracting Transactions, 1971 and 197 6 
Share of LEs with 
Purchasing through 
Subcontracting I) 
(%) 
1971 1976 
Manufacturing (only LEs ) 82.2 84.2 
Size (no. of employees) 
300 - 499 
500 -
Sectors 
Textiles 
Apparel 
Metal Products 
General Machinery 
Electrical Equipment 
Transport Equipment 
Precision Machinery 
80.5 
83.6 
86.0 
83.5 
93.9 
99.4 
93.7 
98.0 
93.8 
80.2 
87.2 
88.7 
87.8 
96.0 
98.6 
97.8 
96.3 
98.0 
Share of LEs with Purchasing 
through Subcontracting: 
Specific Rate 2) (%) 
15% - 30 % 
1971 
19.2 
19.9 
18.7 
18.3 
30.0 
25.3 
31.6 
18.2 
24.9 
18.4 
1976 
19.1 
22.4 
16.8 
13.3 
27.7 
20.3 
29.6 
26.4 
27.8 
27.1 
30 % or more 
1971 
13.7 
10.9 
15.7 
4.6 
3.0 
20.6 
16.8 
21.8 
22.9 
28.9 
1976 
11.0 
10.2 
11.6 
2.7 
12.3 
12.6 
17.7 
13.8 
22.4 
28.1 
Average 
Number of 
Subcontractors 
per LE 
1971 
88 
36 
127 
51 
42 
68 
118 
115 
124 
121 
1976 
71 
39 
93 
36 
55 
60 
105 
85 
136 
123 
Notes: 1) In the total number of LEs with 300 or more employees, the share of LEs that purchase input 
materials/parts from supplier firms through subcontracting deals. 
2) In LEs with purchasing through subcontracting transactions, the share of LEs whose rate of 
dependence on purchasing inputs from supplier firms through subcontracting deals is 15-30 
percent and more than 30 percent, respectively, in the total production cost. 
Sources: Small and Medium Enterprise Agency, MITI (1974: 92-7; 1979: 78-87 ; 1980: 158). 
Table 3 .10 demonstrates the situation regarding subcontracting transactions 
based on responses from large-scale manufacturing firms with 300 or more employees. 
More than 80 percent of LEs procured intermediate inputs from their subcontractors. 
More than 10 percent of the LEs that employed subcontractors sourced 30 percent or 
more of total inputs from them. Procurement by large enterprises through 
subcontracting was very common in the machinery industry, including the general 
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machinery, electrical equipment, transportation equipment and prec1s1on machinery 
sectors. Most notable is the transportation equipment sector, where almost all LEs 
purchased input materials through subcontracting, and LEs used on average 130 
subcontractors. Subcontracting appears to have been an important organisational 
device for large-scale assembler firms, particularly in the machinery industry, in the 
1970s. 
Subcontracting linkages enabled LEs to obtain sufficient products at a low cost, 
of sufficient quality and in a timely manner, and to save precious production factors, 
particularly expensive labour. The Small and Medium Enterprise Agency (1980: 159) 
conducted a comprehensive survey in the late 1970s. It reported that the reason most 
frequently given by LEs for contracting out to SMEs was to take advantage of 
specialised technologies and specific production facilities of supplier firms. On the 
other hand, close subcontracting relationships with LEs allowed small-medium supplier 
firms to secure stable markets and acquire valuable information, knowledge, technology 
and other resources. 
What made subcontracting an efficient and effective organisational 
arrangement? Yokokura (1984: 458-61) provided the following answers: 1) continuous 
and long-term relations between large parent firms and small-medium supplier firms; 2) 
competitive mechanisms within subcontracting systems; 3) technical and other support 
extended by large parent firms to small-medium supplier firms; and 4) government 
support for building effective subcontracting systems. 
Long-term business relationships can encourage large parent firms to provide 
subcontractors with technical, financial and other types of support and, at the same time, 
allow small-medium supplier firms to invest in plant and equipment in coordination 
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with parent firms. 17 To maintain such relationships, however, small and medium 
subcontractors were required to meet specifications given by large parent firms in terms 
of quality, quantity, price, delivery time and so on. 
Competition between parent firms, which resulted in competition between 
keiretsu groups and further between subcontractors within each keiretsu group, could 
lead parent firms to impose stricter conditions on subcontractors. Parent firms would 
stop placing orders with subcontractors, if the latter could not regularly respond to the 
demands of the former. These circumstances created a competitive environment which 
encouraged supplier firms to continuously seek ways to improve their technological and 
other capabilities. 
Parent firms have provided subcontractors with technical, marketing and 
financial support. This enabled LEs to integrate capable SMEs in their subcontracting 
networks and improve the efficiency of their subcontracting production systems. 
The Japanese government also assisted industries in improving environments for 
subcontracting relationships between LEs and SMEs. With regard to the modernisation 
of subcontractors, the 1956 Law concerning Temporary Measures for the Promotion of 
the Machinery Industry (Kikai Kogyo Shinko Rinji Sochi Ho) played an important role 
in modernising production facilities of metalworking and machinery SMEs, particularly 
small-medium auto parts producers, through directed credit with low interest rates. 18 
The 1970 Law on the Promotion of Subcontracting Small and Medium Enterprises 
(Shitauke Chusho Kigyo Shinko Ho) encouraged small- and medium-scale 
17 The Small and Medium Enterprise Agency (1977: 172) reported that only one fifth of subcontracting 
SMEs reduced the dependence of their sales on the largest parent firm or replaced the largest customer 
for four years between 1974 and 1977. This illustrates the existence of continuous subcontracting 
relationships between LEs and SMEs. 
18 Odaka (1996) evaluated the effects of the 1956 La.w concerning Temporary Measures for the 
Promotion of the Machinery Industry. MITI (1990: 551-87) explained the history, measures, 
performance and effects of the law comprehensively. 
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subcontractors to modernise production facilities and carry out joint operations. 19 To 
prevent LEs from abusing their disproportionate power, the 1956 Law on the 
Prevention of Delay in the Payment of Subcontracting Charges and Related Matters 
(Shitauke Daikin Shiharai Chien-to Bos hi Ho) worked as a means of ensuring fair 
transactions between large-scale parent firms and small-medium subcontractors. 20 
These policies helped strengthen . the functioning of subcontracting systems in the 
private sector. 
During a decade from the mid-1950s, Japanese policy makers and scholars often 
argued that the "dual structure" issue was a problem generated by the power imbalance 
between large parent firms and small-medium supplier firms (e.g., Broadbridge 1966; 
Kiyonari 1997: 67-95; MITI 1994: 56-9).21 Under the dual structure, subcontracting 
SMEs had to accept subordinate relationships with large-scale parent firms. However, 
SMEs gradually overcame such one-sided relationships with LEs, by improving quality 
and productivity through investment in plants and equipment and acquisition of 
production and other technology, in the process of high growth during the 1960s 
(Nakamura 1994: 247-51) . As Kiyonari (1997: 127-30) pointed out, the subordinate 
and exploitative nature of subcontracting faded away in the 1960s and 1970s and the 
inter-firm relationships between LEs and SMEs became more cooperative. Despite the 
existence of a dual structure, as discussed above, Japanese subcontracting evolved as a 
useful organisational device for the promotion of specialisation and contributed to the 
development of SMEs in the manufacturing industry. 
19 For details of the law, see MITI (1993: 387-91). 
20 The government was entitled to instruct LEs in violation of the law to redress unfair transactions with 
SMEs. MITI (1991: 110-6) explains this law in detail. 
21 The term "dual structure" was first used by Arisawa in 1956 and then by the 1957 Economic White 
Paper, which popularised the idea that SMEs were inferior to LEs and subject to the controls by LEs 
through subcontracting arrangements. See, for example, Friedman (1988: 244-5) and Kosai (1994: 207-
11 ). 
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As observed before, after reaching a peak in the early 1980s, the proportion of 
subcontracting SMEs in Japan gradually declined, whereas that of independent SMEs 
steadily rose. This change may suggest that the roles and effectiveness of 
subcontracting linkages vary according to the stages of economic development, the 
development of the industrial sector, and the maturity of SMEs. Japan ' s experience 
implies that subcontracting can play a more active role in fostering the SME sector and 
increasing the efficiency of the manufacturing industry at earlier stages of economic 
development than at later stages. The development of SMEs and economies may make 
market transactions on a spot-basis more feasible and economical than subcontracting 
transactions. In addition, SMEs do not necessarily require substantial support from LEs 
through subcontracting ties, if they develop and acquire necessary capabilities such as 
technology, marketing, management and finance to a sufficient degree. 
3.3.3 Subcontracting in the Machinery Industry 
Table 3.9 indicated that dependence of SMEs on subcontracting was much more 
significant in the machinery industry than in other industries. Why was this , and what 
were the main features of subcontracting in the machinery industry? The Small and 
Medium Enterprise Agency of MITI (1980: 160-3, 1983: 160-2) explained the basic 
characteristics of subcontracting relationships between LEs and SMEs in the following 
way, by looking at some of the typical subsectors in the machinery industry, such as 
electrical home appliances, shipbuilding and automobile subsectors. 
In the electrical home appliances sub sector, there existed 1) large-scale electrical 
manufacturers as assembler firms , 2) specialised parts manufacturers as finished parts 
producers, and 3) smaller supplier firms as subcontractors under specialised parts 
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manufacturers. Due to the standardisation of parts and components, assembler firms 
and specialised parts supplier firms tended to have relatively loose relationships. On 
the other hand, specialised parts producers had many small subcontractors that 
undertook simple processing activities such as press/stamping, plating, painting and 
plastic molding. 
Mishina (1962: 104) reported that Matsushita, Sanyo and Sharp had 
approximately 570, 190 and 70 subcontractors, respectively, in 1960. Since these 
numbers represented only direct subcontractors, the total number including second-tier 
and lower-tier supplier firms would have been substantially higher. These assembler 
firms in the electrical home appliances industry used to manufacture main parts and 
components in-house. However, as the number of parts required to complete products 
increased in the 1950s and the 1960s, assembler firms increasingly felt the need to 
contract out parts production and processing to supplier firms. 
In the shipbuilding subsector, assembler firms constructed ships by organising 
subcontractors, which were divided into two types according to the work undertaken 
and the location of their operations. Outside subcontractors produced or processed 
parts and components including engine parts, propellers and outfits at their own 
production facilities, whereas in-house subcontractors conducted jobs such as welding, 
painting and piping work inside assemblers' shipyards through the provision of 
manpower. Assembler firms had a large number of these small-medium subcontractors. 
In general, SMEs supplying parts and components were not significantly dependent on 
a limited number of shipbuilders, while in-house-type subcontractors located in 
shipbuilding towns often relied heavily on specific assembler firms. 
Since business conditions were unstable in the shipbuilding industry, parent 
firms used subcontractors as a buffer against fluctuations in demand. At the same time, 
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the shipbuilding industry needed to keep certain technical standards to compete in 
international markets, even though technological levels in this industry were not very 
high compared with, for example, the automobile industry. Therefore, shipbuilders 
tended to grade subcontractors in terms of technology, facilities and management and 
foster and utilise them differently (Mishina 1962: 96-9). 
In the automobile subsector, one assembler firm and a large number of supplier 
firms formed a pyramidal structure through subcontracting networks. 22 First-tier 
subcontractors usually produced finished and complicated parts or components, 
whereas the majority of second-tier and lower-tier subcontractors often engaged in 
material processing activities, such as machining, press/stamping, casting, forging, 
plating, surface treatment and dies/mold making. Some of the large-scale automobile 
manufacturers adopted the "key subcontractor" system, in which they assigned their 
selected first-tier subcontractors to contract out to second-tier or lower subcontractors 
and supervise such subcontracting business. According to the example given in Figure 
3 .2, one large-scale automobile assembler firm at the top of the hierarchy employed 168 
first-layer, 4,700 second-layer and 31,600 third-layer supplier firms in 1977. Large 
numbers of SMEs were integrated into such multi-layer pyramidal structures, where the 
firm size became smaller down the hierarchy of subcontractors. This hierarchical 
structure of subcontracting systems, which is known as vertical keiretsu groupings, 
indicates the existence of a huge number of smaller supplier firms at the bottom of the 
pyramid as well as the extent of the inter-firm division of labour. 23 
22 The prototype of vertical subcontracting linkages emerged in the Japanese automobile industry in the 
second half of the 1930s, when the government promoted the production of cars mainly for military purposes. After World War II, subcontracting transactions between automobile assembler firms and parts 
supplier firms became more prominent in response to the growing demand for vehicles during the Korean War (1950-53) (Kamiyama et al. 1995: 258-60). 
23 During the 1956-57 economic boom, small-medium parts supplier firms failed to meet the volume of 
orders from assembler firms. This triggered the start of vertical keiretsu groupings. Automobile 
assembler firms sought to establish closer relationships with parts producers and ensure the supply of a 
necessary quantity of parts and components (Okumura 1960: 326-33). 
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Figure 3.2 
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Structure of Multi-layer Subcontracting Networks in Japan: An Automobile Assembler Firm in 1977 
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2 or more higher-layer firms . 
Source: Small and Medium Enterprise Agency , MITI (1977: 168-9). 
As shown in Table 3.6, the Japanese automobile industry developed rapidly in 
the 1950s and 1960s. In addition to the rapid expansion of demand and the 
considerable increase in plant and equipment investment by assembler firms, the 
vertical subcontracting system illustrated in Figure 3.2 contributed to the significant 
growth in car production during that period (Mishina 1962: 87-8; Small and Medium 
Enterprise Agency, MITI 1977: 167). The "just-in-time (JIT)" system adopted by 
automobile assembler firms in the early 1960s improved the quality, quantity and 
efficiency of car manufacturing (Kamiyama et al. 1995: 266). 24 The production of only 
necessary parts/components in a necessary quantity at a necessary time required 
assembler firms to organise not only their own factories but also their supplier firms 
from the first-layer to the bottom. Without the modernisation and rationalisation of 
supplier firms, the JIT system does not work well and the eff arts made by assembler 
firms themselves are unlikely to yield fruit. To establish an effective JIT system, it is 
necessary to improve the levels of technology and productivity of supplier firms. This 
is the main reason why tightly knit relationships between large-scale assembler firms 
and small-medium subcontractors emerged in the Japanese automobile industry. 
3.3.4 Is Subcontracting in Japan Unique? 
It can be asked whether Japan's expenence with the evolution of SMEs and 
subcontracting systems is unique. Some scholars have given a socio-cultural 
explanation for Japanese subcontracting. Dore ( 1987: 169-73) argued that relational or 
obligational contracting is dependent on the benevolence, loyalty and goodwill 
24 The JIT production system was originally developed by Toyota and has been utilised by many other 
assembler firms. 
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observed in Japanese culture.25 These cultural features in Japan may reduce transaction 
costs associated with subcontracting more significantly than in other economies. 
Intimate and long-term trading relationships based on mutual goodwill tend to prevent 
business participants from using opportunistic behaviour and promote successful 
subcontracting business. Similarly, Tsutomu Nakamura (1983: 53-4) attributed the 
successful development of subcontracting systems in Japan to group consciousness, 
loyalty and mutual trust. He stated that these factors tended to be nurtured in the 
Japanese social context, where individualism was weak, groupism (or group mentality) 
was strong, and vertical (or paternalistic) human relationships were easily accepted. 
Comparing customer-supplier relationships in the British and Japanese 
electronics industries, Sako ( 1992: 241-5) found that obligational contractual relations 
(OCR) or subcontracting linkages were more often observed in the latter than in the 
former. She explained that the key conditions for establishing OCR or subcontracting 
ties were the creation of contractual trust, competence trust and goodwill trust. 26 
According to Sako, contractual trust already existed in Britain, while the other two 
types of trust did not. Competence trust can be established by better training and 
retraining of the British workforce. However, goodwill cannot easily be created 
because it is based on national culture. Sako stated that the willingness to be indebted 
to someone and to recognise high mutual dependence may appear more easily in less 
individualistic Japan than in Britain. 
25 Relational or obligational contracting means subcontracting, or continued contracting associated with 
close relations between two parties. It is conceptually opposite to spot contracting or arm's-length 
contracting. Benevolence is defined as something shown in paternalistic relations between unequal 
parties, by superior to inferior, which is usually the reciprocal of loyalty. Goodwill is defined as the 
sentiments of friendship and the sense of diffused personal obligation that occur between parties engaged 
in continued contractual economic exchange (Dore 1987: 170). 
26 According to Sako (1992: 37-40), contractual trust may exist in the situation where business 
participants adhere to specific written or oral agreements (promises). Competence trust refers to the 
expectation that a trading partner can perform its role competently. Goodwill trust is defined as mutual 
expectations of open commitment to each other. This commitment is the willingness to do more than is 
formally expected. 
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Such cultural specificity has certainly existed in Japan. However, Dore ( 1987: 
186-7) noted that close and long-term business relationships are not unique to Japanese 
industry. Piore (1990: 283-6) stated that the U.S. manufacturing industry promoted 
subcontracting transactions since the 1970s, following Japanese practices. He found 
that large-scale assembler firms in the U.S. during the 1970s and 1980s tended to: 
(1) reduce the number of subcontractors and develop closer and long-term 
relationships with those selected supplier firms; 
(2) have close coordination in terms of delivery timing through the introduction of the 
JIT (just-in-time) system; 
(3) establish collaborative relationships with subcontractors 1n the area of product 
design; and 
(4) encourage employees to establish their own companies as subcontractors. 
Nishiguchi (1994: 212-4) found in the electronics industry that the Japanese 
subcontracting system was transplanted by Japanese-affiliated assembler firms 
operating in Britain and basically accepted by British supplier firms. Although British 
subcontractors did not share common social and cultural characteristics with Japanese 
businesses, they understood that the high quality and low cost which could be realised 
through subcontracting were beneficial to not only customers but also supplier firms. 
Nishiguchi suggested that the principles of subcontracting are applicable to a degree to 
cultures outside Japan, if non-Japanese firms can perceive subcontracting as 
economically beneficial production systems. Sako (1992: 244-5) also argued that 
goodwill trust between two parties necessary to establish useful subcontracting linkages 
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can be deliberately cultivated to some extent, by choosing trading partners carefully and 
by having frequent and intense communications. 
Japan's cultural specificity appears to have special factors in favour of the 
establishment and functioning of subcontracting systems. Is it difficult or impossible 
for countries without Japanese-type culture to initiate and make use of subcontracting 
production systems? As discussed above, it seems possible that even countries which 
do not share common cultural features with Japan develop subcontracting systems to a 
different degree, if subcontracting proves beneficial to respective economies. 
Nishiguchi and Brookfield (1997: 100) indicated that a trend emerged among many 
Western producers to follow Japanese subcontracting practices. Therefore, Japan's 
experience will provide other economies with some relevant lessons concerning the 
development of subcontracting systems. 
3.4 Subcontracting Linkages as Support Mechanisms for SMEs in 
Japan 
Large-scale parent firms traditionally cited low wage rates, capital- or labour-saving 
and a buffer against fluctuations in demand as benefits of subcontracting. In the 
postwar period of high economic growth, LEs expected SMEs to function not only as 
cheap input sources and shock absorbers but also as competent producers with high 
productivity and specialised technology. However, not many SMEs could satisfy the 
needs of LEs until the mid-l 950s . Accordingly, LEs had to enhance the capabilities of 
SMEs through the provision of support and guidance in order to increase their own 
efficiency of production and improve their competitiveness in domestic and 
international markets. 
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Figure 3.3 shows the types of support provided through subcontracting linkages 
in the mid- l 970s, based on responses to survey questions from subcontractors and 
parent firms. The answers show quite similar results, even though the percentages 
based on responses from parent firms are higher than those from supplier firms. 27 
Subcontractors responded that transfer of production technologies and production 
management, lending of production equipment and machinery, and the development of 
new products were the main areas of assistance extended by large-scale parent firms. 
Support from parent firms was concentrated on technology-related matters. Figure 3.4 
confirms that parent firms were the largest source of technology for SMEs. In the early 
1980s, more than half of the SMEs in Japan acquired technologies from principal firms 
through subcontracting linkages. 
Table 3 .11 lists characteristics of support extended by four large-scale 
manufacturers to their small-medium supplier firms under subcontracting ties in the late 
1950s. Automobile assembler firms Mitsubishi, Nissan and Toyota, and agricultural 
machinery firm Kubota, all organised a large number of keiretsu-member and non-
keiretsu-member subcontractors in the late 1950s, the initial stage of high economic 
growth in Japan. The four manufacturers had similar subcontracting policies, which 
aimed to foster supplier firms and integrate the latter into the former' s production 
structures. 
27 This is because parent firms in the survey were limited only to listed companies, which would generally be larger and more capable of assisting supplier firms than parent firms on average. 
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Figure 3 .3 Assistance Extended by Lar0 e b Parent Firms to Small-Medium 
Subcontractors in the Japanese Manufacturing Industry in 1977 
(Respondents= Small-Medium Subcontractors )1l 
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Notes: 1) Based on responses from small-medium subcontractors with respect to assistance extended by 
large parent firms through subcontracting linkages. 
2) Based on responses from large parent firms with respect to assistance extended to small-
medium subcontractors through subcontracting linkages. Parent firms here are limited only to 
listed companies. 
3) The total exceeds 100 % because of multiple answers. 
Source: Small and Medium Enterprise Agency, MITI (1977: 174). 
Figure 3 .4 Sources of Technologies for SMEs in Japan in 1984 
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Source: Small and Medium Enterprise Agency, MITI (1985: 187). 
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Table 3.11 Support from Parent Firms through Subcontracting Linkages: the Japanese 
Automobile and Agricultural Machinery Subsectors in the Late 1950s 
Mitsubishi Nissan Toyota Kubota 
Products vehicles vehicles vehicles agricultural machi-
nery, diesel engine 
No. of Factory · 4,000 workers · 7,500 workers 5,500 workers (excl 1,500 workers 
Workers temporary workers) 
Production/month 600 million yen 5,000-6,000 million yen 7 ,000-8,000 million yen 1,200 million yen 
Contract-out Ratio 70% 70% 52-53 % 
No. of Supplier 180 supplier firms 800 supplier firms 800 supplier finns 130 supplier firms 
Firms 52 firms (member of 120 firms (member of 150 firms (member of 70 firms (highly-
Mitsubishi supplier Nissan supplier Toyota supplier dependent on Kubota) 
association) association) association) 
Policies for to establish mutual to foster members of to contract out to closely link 
Subcontracting trust through the Nissan supplier adequate parts to supplier firms to 
technical/financial association in order suitable supplier Kubota's production 
support to ensure stable firms structure 
to develop production and 
specialized suppliers reduce costs 
Technical positive provision of dispatch of experts technology dispatch of technical 
Support technical support to to suppliers upgrading and cost staff to suppliers 
supplier firms enhancement of reduction through 
supplier association's expert dispatch and 
role in technical training by purchase 
support dept. and association 
Financial provision of loans provision of supplier consideration of each introduction of 
Support for supplier firms firms with loan case on demand supplier firms to 
supply of used guarantees banks 
machines at low cost 
Supply of provision of supply of materials supply of materials supply of materials 
Input Materials casting/forging at cost required for quality related to quality 
materials without provision of or safety reasons problem without cost 
cost drawings supply of drawings supply of materials 
supply of other provision of tools if to new suppliers at 
materials at cost necessary cost 
Price Setting negotiation on prices use of prices based negotiation of prices negotiation of prices 
based on suppliers' on Nissan's cost renew of contract based on suppliers' 
cost breakdown and breakdown every 6 month cost breakdown 
cash flow review of price 
levels every 3 month 
Managerial provision of provision of provision of 
Support managerial guidance managerial lectures managerial support 
by the dispatch of through Nissan through Toyota 
Mitsubishi 's retired supplier association supplier association 
employees provision of 
use of supplier managerial 
association as an assistance looking at 
opportunity to suppliers' internal 
improve managerial documents 
skills 
Source: Takeuchi (1962: 26-7, 31-3). 
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All large manufacturers actively provided supplier firms with technical support 
and guidance through subcontracting relationships. Such support mainly took the form 
of dispatching technical experts or engineers and offering training courses. In addition 
to assembler firms themselves, associations of supplier firms in each assembler keiretsu 
group assisted in improving technological capabilities of subcontracting SMEs. Large 
principal firms extended financial .assistance to their subcontractors in different ways. 
Mitsubishi directly provided supplier firms with loans and used equipment, while 
Kubota introduced subcontractors to banks and financial institutions. The parent firms 
in the table tended to provide their supplier firms with raw materials and intermediate 
inputs, particularly those required for quality or safety purposes. They generally 
offered subcontracting SMEs opportunities to discuss price levels based on cost 
breakdowns, and to review contracts periodically. Automobile manufacturers also 
made efforts to improve the managerial capabilities of subcontractors through lectures, 
seminars or training programs organised by each keiretsu association. 
Itoh and Urata (1998) conducted a case study on the technological development 
of SMEs in the Japanese auto parts industries based on an interview survey in the early 
1990s. They selected Ohta city in Gunma prefecture as one of their cases, where Fuji 
Heavy Industries produces Subaru cars. A large number of small-medium 
metalworking and machinery firms were engaged in producing auto parts and 
components. 
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Table 3.12 Channels and Effectiveness of Technology Support Mechanisms for Auto 
Parts SMEs in Ohta City, Gunma Prefecture, Japan in the Early 1990s 
User Firms Differences in No. of Mean Scores Differences in Mean 
Channels (N = 33 1>) User Firms by Size of Effectiveness Scores by Size 
No. of Firms 2> Size 3) Mean 4) Size S) 
(%) Rank p-values (s.d.) Rank F-values 
1. Parent Firms 24 1 0.10 * 3.25 4 1.25 
(72.7) (+) ( 1.29) 
2. Equipment 21 2 0.94 3.90 2 0.18 
Suppliers (63.6) (1.41) 
3. Public Technical 6 4 0.80 3.83 3 0.40 
Institutions (18.2) ( 1.60) 
4. Firms in Similar 11 3 2.91 6 
Businesses (33.3) ( 1.64) 
5. Technical 4 6 1.75 7 
Literature (12.9) (1.50) 
6. Industrial 5 5 3.20 5 
Associations (16.7) ( 1.48) 
7. Universities 3 7 4.33 1 
(9.4) (0.58) 
Notes: 1) The number of respondents with respect to technical literature, industrial associations and 
universities is not 33, but 31, 30 and 32, respectively. 
2) Figures in the upper row indicate the number of firms which utilise each channel. Figures in 
parentheses are the share of firms with each channel in the total sample firms. 
3) Differences in frequency ratios between firms with 1-9, 10-19, 20-50, and 51< workers, which 
are indicated by p-values of Pearson's chi-square test. *** = significant at the 1 % level, ** = 
significant at the 5 % level, * = significant at the 10 % level. When the differences are 
significant, ( +) = smaller SMEs > larger SMEs, (-) = smaller SMEs < larger SMEs. 
4) Figures in the upper row are the average of scores indicated by firms' rating from 1 (not at all 
effective) to 5 (very effective). Figures in parentheses are standard deviation. 
5) Differences in mean scores of effectiveness between firms with 1-9, 10-19, 20-50, and 51< 
workers, which are indicated by F-values of ANOV A. *** = significant at the 1 % level, ** = 
significant at the 5 % level, * = significant at the 10 % level. When the differences are 
significant, ( +) = smaller SMEs > larger SMEs, (-) = smaller SMEs < larger SMEs. 
Source: Calculated from Itoh and Urata (1998: 338-9). 
Table 3.12 surnmanses the results of their interview survey involving 33 
machinery SMEs in Ohta. More than 70 percent of the firms received technical support 
from parent firms through subcontracting. The difference between firms according to 
size in the share of SMEs with technical assistance from parent firms is statistically 
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significant at the 10 percent level. Smaller SMEs relied more on this form of support 
than larger SMEs. The effectiveness of this source of technology was deemed to be 
high, with an average score of 3.25 on a scale of 1 (ineffective or not useful) to 5 
(effective or useful). More than 60 percent of the sampled SMEs received technology 
support from machinery and equipment suppliers. This channel was evaluated at a high 
3.90. One-third of the respondent .SMEs utilised another inter-fmn linkage, peer firms 
in similar lines of business, to upgrade the technical capabilities. Despite a high 
appreciation for the support provided by public technical institutions and universities, 
these were less frequently cited as sources of technology. This case study indicated that 
inter-firm linkages in the private sector, particularly subcontracting ties , enhanced the 
access of auto parts supplier firms to technological support and guidance. 
As observed above, subcontracting linkages enhanced access of SMEs in the 
Japanese manufacturing industry, particularly in the machinery sector, to various forms 
of mutually beneficial assistance, based on the need for parent firms to improve the 
efficiency of the production processes as a whole. This suggests that subcontracting 
linkages themselves may have built-in support mechanisms for SME development. 
3.5 Subcontracting and Productivity of SMEs in Japan 
During the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, subcontracting arrangements re-emerged and 
developed as an important production system in the Japanese manufacturing industry. 
Large-scale manufacturers extended technical and other support to small and medium 
supplier firms in order to stimulate the latter to upgrade their capabilities and to enable 
the former to improve efficiency. Did these subcontracting production systems indeed 
improve the productivity of SMEs? 
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Urata ( 1995) examined technological progress in manufacturing SMEs during 
1966-72. He estimated total factor productivity (TFP) growth on the basis of MITI's 
Census of Manufactures. Table 3.13 summarises the results of technological progress 
as measured by TFP growth and its contribution to the growth of value added according 
to firm size. During 1966-72, TFP in the manufacturing industry as a whole grew at the 
rate of 1.3 percent annually, which accounted for 12 percent of the annual average 
growth rate of real value added. The average growth rate of TFP for SMEs with 20 to 
299 workers was 1.24 percent per annum, which was marginally higher than that for 
LEs with 300 or more employees. SMEs with 100 to 299 employees showed the 
highest TFP growth rate. These findings suggest that SMEs, particularly larger SMEs, 
played a positive role in promoting technological progress in the Japanese economy at 
the time. By sector, the machinery industry, especially electrical equipment, general 
machinery and transportation equipment sectors, recorded remarkable TFP growth. 
SMEs in these sectors also showed relatively high TFP growth. 
Subsequently, Urata (1995) investigated factors behind differences in TFP 
growth rates between different groups of firms according to size. As shown in Table 
3.14, TFP growth in 50 sectors (ISIC 2- and 3-digit levels) by size is regressed on: 1) 
the share of engineers in total employees; 2) the share of firms with industrial patents; 
3) the share of firms with export business; 4) the share of LEs that contract out work to 
supplier firms; and 5) the share of SMEs that carry out subcontracting transactions with 
parent firms. The regression analysis indicates that independent variables related to 
subcontracting are statistically significant at the 5 percent level with an expected 
positive sign. Based on the results, subcontracting ties with parent firms increased TFP 
for small-medium supplier firms, while purchasing from supplier firms through 
subcontracting transactions raised TFP for large-scale manufacturers. Urata ( 1995: 26) 
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concluded that subcontracting contributed to technological progress in the Japanese 
manufacturing industry, due to technology transfer from large-scale parent firms to 
small-medium subcontractors as well as the promotion of a division of labour between 
LEs and SMEs. 
Table 3.13 Total Factor Productivity (TFP) Growth and the Ratio of TFP Growth to 
Value Added Growth in Japanese Manufacturing SMEs and LEs, 1966-
1972 (Percentages) 
SMEs 20-299 l) LEs I ) All 1) 
20-49 50-99 100-299 20-299 300- 20-
(1)2) (2)3) (1)2) (2)3) (1)2) (2)3) (1)2) (2)3) (1)2) (2)3) (1)2) (2)3) 
Manufacturing 1.19 13.1 1.09 11.4 1.34 12.2 1.24 12.4 1.20 10.5 1.30 11.9 
Food -0.43 -6.6 -0.79 -9.9 0.07 0.8 -0.29 -3.6 3.58 28.0 1.87 17.5 
Textiles 2.15 40.0 -6.77 113.8 2.75 32.3 0.15 3.9 4.64 59.2 2.58 42.7 
Apparel 0.33 4.0 2.54 21.3 3.49 22.8 2.06 17.4 0.91 5.5 1.86 14.6 
Lumber/Wood 0.61 12.2 1.37 20.5 0.16 2.1 0.68 11.1 2.93 18.4 1.25 15.1 
Pulp/Paper 2.30 26.6 0.85 11.0 2.47 29.8 2.06 25.0 -0.64 -10.1 0.49 7.0 
Chemicals -4.11 -35.8 -3.17 -29.0 -0.35 -3.3 -1.39 -12.9 -0.63 -7.6 -0.65 -7.4 
Rubber 5.07 42.3 1.45 10.6 1.69 24.2 2.77 26.6 0.90 10.2 1.27 13.9 
Ceramics 2.54 17.6 1.89 17.0 2.79 25.7 2.53 20.8 2.17 23.2 2.43 23.0 
Iron and Steel -0.70 -9.0 -1.40 -16.6 1.45 10.7 0.06 0.6 -0.62 -6.2 -0.43 -4.3 
Non-ferrous -2.56 -38.1 -1.90 -21.1 1.85 16.6 -0.16 -1.7 -1.34 -13.5 -1.08 -11.0 
Metals 1.34 11.8 2.55 23 .1 0.56 4.4 1.41 12.0 3.39 22.6 2.12 16.6 
General Machinery 2.40 23.5 1.91 19.0 2.49 23.5 2.32 22.4 4.15 29.2 3.35 27.0 
Electric Machinery 1.49 12.1 0.91 7.2 2.25 15.2 1.70 12.5 5.44 34.9 4.66 30.6 
Transpon Equipm't 3.25 30.6 2.81 30.0 1.79 17 .9 2.43 24.3 1.27 11.8 1.51 14.1 
Precision Machinery 1.71 24.5 1.03 14.8 2.47 18 .5 1.91 19.7 -0.71 -6.5 0.28 2.7 
1 otes: 1) Firm size in this table is in terms of the number of workers. 
2) Annual average TFP growth rate estimated on the basis of a translog production function. 
3) Ratio of annual a erage TFP growth rate to annual average value added growth rate. 
Source: Urata (1995: 13, 15). 
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Table 3 .14 Determinants of TFP Growth in Japanese Manufacturing SMEs and LEs, 
1966-1972 
SMEs 20-299 I ) 
(1) (2) 
Constant 
-2.25 
-3.43 * 
(-1.51) (-2.40) 
Engineers3) 
-9.16 
(-1.43) 
Patents4) 
-0.55 
(-0.13) 
Contract-out5) 2.89 2.28 
(1.56) ( 1.23) 
Subcontracting6) 4.82 * 2.13 * 
(2.03) (2.15) 
Export7) 2.40 2.03 
(0.95) (0.71) 
0.302 0.272 
LEs 300- 2) 
(3) 
-2.87 
(-1.28) 
0.90 
(0.27) 
4.88 * 
(2.12) 
1.69 
(0.71) 
0.108 
(4) 
-1.72 
(-0.80) 
-4.75 * 
(-2.02) 
5.76 * 
(2.58) 
3.67 
(1.52) 
0.178 
Notes: 1) The dependent variable for regression models of (1) and (2) is the average annual TFP growth 
rate for SMEs with 20-299 workers during 1966-72. Figures in parentheses are t-values. 
* indicates significance at the 5 % level. 
2) The dependent variable for regression models of (3) and (4) is the average annual TFP growth 
rate for LEs with 300 or more workers during 1966-72. Figures in parentheses are t-values. 
* indicates significance at the 5 % level. 
3) The share of engineers in the total employees in 1971. 
4) The share of firms with industrial property right in 1971. 
5) The share of firms that contract out goods/services to supplier firms in 1971. 
6) The share of firms engaged in subcontracting with parent firms in 1971. 
7) The share of firms with export business in 1971. 
Source: Urata (1995: 25). 
Hondai (1992) also estimated productivities of SMEs with 30 to 299 employees 
and LEs with 300 or more employees in the Japanese manufacturing industry during 
1965-82, based on MITI' s Census of Manufactures. He analysed factors which had a 
positive impact on increases in productivity of SMEs. Table 3.15 shows the average 
annual growth rates of labour productivity and TFP of the 15 sectors. The machinery 
industry, including general machinery, electrical machinery, transportation equipment 
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and prec1s1on machinery sectors, which Hondai identified as having intense 
subcontracting relationships between SMEs and LEs, shows a higher rate of TFP 
growth and a higher proportion of such TFP growth to labour productivity growth than 
other sectors such as food , lumber/wood and ceramics, which had weaker 
subcontracting ties between SMEs and LEs. 
Table 3.15 Labour Productivity Growth and Total Factor Productivity Growth 1n 
Japanese Manufacturing SMEs and LEs, 1965-1982 (Percentages) 
Food 
Textiles 
Apparel 
Lumber/Wood 
Pulp/Paper 
Chemicals 
Rubber 
Ceramics 
Iron and Steel 
Non-ferrous 
Metals 
General Machinery 
Electric Machinery 
Transport Equipment 
Precision Machinery 
Gyl) 
SMEs 4) 
5.7 
7.9 
4.7 
5.7 
6.7 
9.0 
6.5 
6.2 
7.3 
7.7 
7.3 
8.1 
9.9 
9.8 
9.5 
LEs 5) 
3.4 
6.4 
4.6 
5.5 
4.8 
8.0 
7.2 
6.0 
7".8 
6.9 
7.7 
8.3 
11.5 
9.2 
10.4 
GR 2 ) 
SMEs 4) 
-0.2 
4.0 
1.8 
0.5 
1.6 
3.1 
2.0 
0.6 
2.3 
2.6 
2.4 
4.2 
5.9 
4.9 
5.6 
Notes : 1) The annual average growth rate of labour productivity. 
2) The annual average growth rate of TFP. 
LEs 5) 
-1.5 
1.9 
1.8 
0.9 
-0.2 
2.6 
0.9 
1.4 
2.6 
1.8 
2.8 
4.3 
5.9 
3.5 
4.8 
GR/Gy 3) 
SMEs 4) 
-2.8 
50.7 
38.0 
4.9 
24.0 
34 .2 
30.7 
9.9 
31.0 
34.0 
32.7 
51.6 
60.0 
49.7 
59.0 
LEs 5) 
-44.1 
29.5 
39.6 
17 .0 
-4.7 
32.9 
13.0 
22.9 
32.9 
26.3 
36.1 
51.3 
51.3 
38.2 
46.6 
3) The ratio of annual average TFP growth rate to annual average labour productivity growth rate. 
4) SMEs with 30 to 299 employees . 
5) LEs with 300 or more employees. 
Source: Hondai (1992: 191-2). 
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Table 3.16 Determinants of the Ratio of TFP Growth to Labour Productivity Growth in 
Japanese Manufacturing SMEs, 1965-1982 
Ratio of TFP Growth to wbour Productivity Growth: SM Es l ) 
Constant 
Capital Stock2) 
Share ofTFP 
Contribution: LEs3) 
Contract-out4) 
Subcontracting5) 
Adjusted R 2 
(1) 
-15.659 
1.4335 
(1.4431) 
0.2336 
(0.1712) 
0.5033 ** 
(0.1804) 
0.732 
(2) 
-3.568 
0.2583 
(0.1693) 
0.4923 ** 
(0.1800) 
0.733 
(3) (4) 
-37.654 -37.087 
0.1592 
(1.6611) 
0.2944 0.2920 
(0.1890) (0.1794) 
0.7411 * 0.7510 * 
(0.3510) (0.3218) 
0.744 0.702 
Notes: 1) The dependent variable for regression models of (1) to (4) is the ratio of annual average TFP 
growth rate to annual average labour productivity growth rate for SMEs with 30-299 workers 
during 1965-1982. Figures in parentheses are standard errors. * * indicates significance at the 
1 % level. * indicates significance at the 5 % level. 
2) The average annual capital stock growth rate for SMEs during 1965-82. 
3) The ratio of annual average TFP growth rate to annual average labour productivity growth rate 
for LEs with 300 or more workers during 1965-82. 
4) The share of LEs that contract out goods/services to supplier firms in 1976. 
5) The share of SMEs engaged in subcontracting with parent firms in 1976. 
Source: Hondai (1992: 195). 
Based on the estimated productivities, Hondai (1992: 193-6) elaborated the 
impact of subcontracting linkages on the performance of SMEs. For this purpose, he 
regressed the ratio of TFP growth to labour productivity growth of the 15 sectors on: 1) 
the growth of capital stock of SMEs during 1965-82; 2) the ratio of TFP growth to 
labour productivity growth in LEs during 1965-82; 3) the share of LEs that contract out 
input materials/goods to supplier firms through subcontracting arrangements in 1976; 
and 4) the share of SMEs that carry out subcontracting business with parent firms in 
197 6. Table 3 .16 contains the results and shows that the explanatory variables 
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representing the share of SMEs which engaged in subcontracting transactions and the 
share of LEs which purchased inputs from subcontractors are both statistically 
significant at the 1 percent and the 5 percent levels, respectively. The analysis therefore 
indicates that subcontracting arrangements between SMEs and LEs tend to raise 
productivity of SMEs in manufacturing. Similar to Urata (1995), Hondai (1992) 
concluded that the improvement in productivity of SMEs was the result of technical and 
other support extended by parent firms. 
3.6 The Essence of Japan's Historical Experience with SME 
Development through Subcontracting 
This chapter observed the development of manufacturing SMEs, the evolution of 
subcontracting systems, the relevance of subcontracting linkages as support 
mechanisms for SMEs, and the effects of subcontracting on productivity growth of 
SMEs in Japan during the 20th century. The chapter paid particular attention to the 
machinery industry. It is now possible to answer the two questions in the introduction 
to this chapter. 
How and why did subcontracting systems emerge and develop in Japan's 
manufacturing industry? Figure 3.5 summarises that process. Before World War II, the 
rapid expansion of domestic and foreign demand for Japan's manufactures in the 1930s 
resulted in a shortage of output capacity in large-scale manufacturing enterprises, 
particularly in large machinery firms. To cope with this situation, large-scale 
machinery manufacturers started to contract out simple parts making and processing to 
SMEs, instead of following their earlier preference for in-house production. The 
initiation of subcontracting transactions reflected the following factors at that time: 1) 
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the rapid expansion of markets; 2) unpredictable future economic situations; 3) scarce 
capital resources; 4) an increasing wage gap between LEs and SMEs; and 5) the 
development of infrastructure · and technology. In addition, the effort by prefectural 
governments, local industrial associations and the central government to arrange 
business with Navy and Army arsenals and wartime economic controls contributed to 
some extent to the formation of subcontracting ties between LEs and SMEs. 
Before the war, LEs provided SMEs with technical and other support through 
vertical inter-firm relationships mainly because: 1) LEs perceived subcontracting 
transactions with SMEs as necessary and economical; 2) SMEs did not have sufficient 
technological and other capabilities that could satisfy the needs of LEs; and 3) LEs 
expected that SMEs were able to acquire such capabilities and meet the requirements of 
LEs, if the former extended assistance to the latter. However, in the early stage of the 
development of subcontracting, the cooperative relationship between LEs and SMEs 
was embryonic. 
After World War II, subcontracting reappeared during the rapid economic 
expansion caused by the Korean War (1950-53). Large-scale machinery firms expected 
that subcontracting with SMEs would yield the same advantages as before the war: 
saving of scarce capital; low wages; and a buffer in times of economic fluctuations. 
However, continued high rates of economic growth after the mid-1950s changed the 
characteristics of subcontracting. Access to financial sources improved and the labour 
surplus decreased quickly. This inspired large machinery enterprises to purchase parts 
and components from small-medium producers with the aim of substituting for labour, 
instead of capital. Several other factors, such as the modernisation of the industrial 
structure, quick, technological innovation and fierce competition in internal and external 
markets, also encouraged large principal firms to incorporate technically capable small-
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medium supplier firms into their production processes. At this stage, LEs expected that 
SMEs could not only offer low wage rates but would also have sufficient technology 
and equipment. 
In the mid-l 950s and the early 1960s, there were not many SMEs capable of 
supplying parts of high quality in required volumes at specified times. The rapid 
increase in demand for machinery at this time threatened to be constrained by the 
relatively low rate of progress in SMEs. Consequently, LEs began to strengthen SMEs 
that lacked the required capabilities, by providing them with technical, financial and 
other support. For the purpose of establishing beneficial and cooperative relationships, 
large-scale machinery firms, particularly automobile assembler firms, organised vertical 
keiretsu groups, in which large numbers of SMEs were integrated into multi-layer 
pyramidal structures. These large-scale manufacturers perceived that, without the 
modernisation and rationalisation of supplier firms, subcontracting systems did not 
function well and improvements only within assembler firms were unlikely to yield 
fruit. 28 
Japan's expenence suggests that the key factors that made subcontracting 
systems work well were: 1) long-term and continuous relationships between large 
parent firms and small-medium subcontractors; 2) competition between supplier firms 
within a subcontracting system; 3) technical and other support given by parent firms to 
supplier firms; and 4) government support for creating environments that can promote 
the formation of functional subcontracting systems. 
28 For example, as observed before, the TTT Uust-in-time) system does not improve production efficiency 
for assembler firms , if supplier firms are not able to produce a necessary quantity of parts and 
components and deliver them at a specific time. 
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Figure 3.5 Development of Subcontracting Systems in Japan 
1914-1919 
1904 
Russo-Japanese War 
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How and why did subcontracting linkages in Japanese manufacturing contribute 
to the development of SMEs? In the 1950s and 1960s, the dual structure caused by 
power imbalance between SMEs and LEs became an issue associated with 
subcontracting. However, SMEs redressed their subordinate relationships with LEs in 
the process of high growth from the early 1960s onwards. Several indicators by firm 
size during this period implied th~t Japan's SMEs were able to coexist with LEs, by 
producing a unit of output with less capital but more labour than LEs. The rising trend 
in the proportion of subcontracting SMEs in the manufacturing industry between the 
mid-l 960s and the early 1980s suggested the increasingly important role of 
subcontracting in the Japanese economy and SME development. The role was 
important particularly for machinery SMEs, because the dependence on subcontracting 
was more significant in the machinery industry than in other industries. 
In addition to stable markets, various forms of support that LEs extended to 
SMEs were important benefits of subcontracting to SMEs. The main types of 
assistance provided by large-scale manufacturing firms were technology-related support, 
such as transfer of production technology and production management, lending of 
production equipment, and the development of new products. Through subcontracting 
ties, parent firms were the largest source of new technology for manufacturing SMEs. 
Studies that estimated TFP growth show that subcontracting contributed 
significantly to the improvement of productivity of manufacturing SMEs. This was 
attributed to the fact that subcontracting benefited SMEs in the forms of technological 
and other support and specialisation of work. 
These answers to the two questions are the essence of Japan's historical 
experience with SME development through subcontracting and constitute the lessons 
from Japan for developing economies. Cultural specificity influences the establishment 
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and development of subcontracting systems. Japanese culture has some special features 
that favour vertical inter-firm production arrangements. However, subcontracting has 
emerged and developed outside Japan, depending on whether the production system 
proved beneficial to the respective countries. Therefore, the following chapters in this 
study will analyse SME development and subcontracting in Indonesia with reference to 
Japan's historical experience, while considering the different settings in the two 
countries. 
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Chapter 4 
Development of SMEs and Subcontracting in 
the Indonesian Manufacturing Industry 
4.1 Introduction 
The Indonesian economy experienced significant econormc growth during 1966-97. 
The manufacturing industry has played an increasing role in this process (Hill 1996). It 
is often said that the LE sector, supported by government policies and measures, has 
been an important player in rapidly expanding the Indonesian manufacturing sector 
(e.g., Berry and Levy 1999: 33). As the previous chapter has shown, Japan's 
experience indicates that manufacturing SMEs, which developed concurrently with LEs, 
played an essential role in the process of industrialisation and economic development in 
that country during the 1930s and the high growth period from the mid-l 950s to the 
early 1970s. This chapter seeks to examine whether SME development also took place 
in Indonesia concurrently with LE development and to what degree the SME sector 
contributed to industrial and economic development. 
Section 4.2 provides an overview of economic growth in general and of the 
manufacturing industry in particular since the mid-1960s. Specific attention will be 
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given to the machinery industry, which is the main sector discussed in the subsequent 
chapters of this study. Thereafter, Section 4.3 examines the development of 
manufacturing SMEs in Indonesia. For the purpose of exploring SME development, in 
Section 4.4, economic performance and productivity growth of SMEs are compared 
with LEs, based on the nation-wide manufacturing statistical data. Section 4.5 observes 
subcontracting linkages in Indonesia as possible support arrangements for SME 
development, on the basis of existing literature. 
4.2 Economic Development in Indonesia 
This section observes economic growth in Indonesia and the associated structural 
changes during the New Order period. 1 It then traces the development of the 
manufacturing industry. Particular attention is paid to the machinery sector, on which 
subsequent chapters will focus. 
4.2.1 Economic Growth and Structural Changes in Indonesia 
During the nineteenth century, Dutch colonial control expanded from Java to the rest of 
Indonesia. From around 1900, all of the country was brought under Dutch colonial 
administration, which gradually intensified in the following four decades. In 1942, the 
Japanese military occupied Indonesia and Dutch colonial rule ended. After the 
declaration of independence in 1945, Indonesia had to rally opposition against a return 
to Dutch colonial rule. It was not until 1949 that Indonesia obtained full independence 
with modest economic recuperation. The economic revival, however, paused in the late 
1 The term New Order refers to the period since the commencement of former President Soeharto's rule (including the period before he became President) in 1966 (Hill 1996: xv). 
109 
1950s and turned into decline in the early 1960s due to political turmoil and misguided 
economic policies under the first President, Sukarno. Before the mid-1960s , agriculture 
dominated the Indonesian economy as the leading sector and manufacturing had only a 
minimal role in economic activities (van der Eng 2002: 143-5) .2 
After recovering from the unstable political and economic situation in the first 
half of the 1960s, Indonesia maintained remarkable growth for around 30 years until 
1997, when it was affected by the East Asian economic crisis. In these three decades , 
the Indonesian economy grew rapidly and its structure changed significantly. Figure 
4.1 shows that per capita GDP with and without oil/gas increased fourfold during 1966-
97 .3 
The pace and sources of economic growth have not necessarily been even or 
similar throughout this process. Hill (1996: 14-7) divided the years since 1966 into 
several identifiable sub-periods, talcing account of the main economic trends and policy 
changes. He identified four sub-periods: 1) rehabilitation and recovery (1966-70); 2) 
rapid growth (1971-81) ; 3) adjustment to lower oil prices (1982-86); and 4) 
liberalisation and recovery ( 1987-92). With some modifications, Table 4.1 shows 
growth and sectoral composition of GDP for those sub-periods and for the period as a 
whole.4 
During the period of rehabilitation and recovery, the Indonesian government 
controlled hyper-inflation, re-established relations with the international aid community, 
and regained the confidence of international investors , by carrying out a stabilisation 
program advised by the IMF (Booth 1998: 178-83, Hill 1996: 15). The quick recovery 
2 During 1900-65 (except for 1942-48), agriculture occupied more than 40 percent of total GDP on 
average, while man ufacturing accounted for only 10 percent (van der Eng 2002: 171 -2) . 
3 Per capita income with oil/gas grew at 4.4 percent annually, while that without oil/gas at 4.9 percent in 
the period of 1966-97. 
4 The period during 1993-96 is incorporated in 4) liberalisation and recovery (1987-92) . In addition, a 
new sub-period is created as 5) economic turmoil during and after the 1997-98 crisis (1997-2000). 
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of basic economic conditions and a rapid expansion of oil production for exports led to 
a growth of real GDP (including oil/gas) by 7.4 percent per year during 1966-70. 
Indonesia maintained high economic growth during the 1970s, largely because 
of the rapid expansion of oil production and a sharp hike in oil prices after 1973. Real 
GDP expanded by an average of more than 7 percent per year during 1970-81. During 
this decade, high oil revenues facilitated the government's stance towards nationalist 
economic policies, which were inward-looking, restrictive and pro-pribumi in trade, 
foreign investment and business fields. 
Figure 4.1 GDP per capita in Indonesia, 1965-2000 (1983 Rupiah) 
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Source: Van der Eng (2002: 172-3), updated for 1999 and 2000 with data from BPS ' s National Income 
of Indonesia. 
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Table 4.1 Growth and Sectoral Share of GDP in Indonesia, 1966-2000 
(Unit: %) 
Agriculture Industry I ) Services Total 
Manufacturing only Total without oil/gas with oil/gas 
Growth 2) 
1966 - 1970 
1970 - 1981 
1981 - 1986 
1986 - 1996 
1996 - 2000 
1966 - 1996 
1966 - 2000 
Sectoral Share 3) 
1966 - 1970 
1971 - 1981 
1982 - 1986 
1987 - 1996 
1997 - 2000 
3.2 
4.2 
3.3 
3.6 
1.0 
3.7 
3.4 
42.4 
33.8 
27.6 
21.3 
18.2 
Sectoral Contribution to Growth 4) 
1966 - 1970 
1970 - 1981 
1981 - 1986 
1986 - 1996 
1996 - 2000 
28.9 
19.0 
17.7 
9.5 
-14.8 
8.9 
10.2 
8.9 
11.3 
0.7 
10.2 
9.0 
11.9 
14.7 
17.8 
23.1 
27.0 
22.5 
19.6 
30.2 
31.1 
-15.5 
10.8 
10.3 
6.6 
11.9 
-0.8 
10.3 
8.9 
17.6 
24.1 
26.7 
33.3 
38.9 
40.4 
32.1 
33.9 
47.2 
25.7 
3.6 
8.9 
5.5 
7.9 
-2.5 
7.3 
6.1 
40.0 
42.1 
45.7 
45.4 
42.9 
30.7 
48.9 
48.4 
43.3 
89.1 
Notes: 1) Industry includes manufacturing, mining, utilities and construction. 
4.7 
7.5 
5.2 
8.3 
-1.2 
7.0 
6.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
7.4 
7.1 
3.0 
7.4 
-1.3 
6.5 
5.6 
2) The growth of GDP represents average annual growth rates based on 1983 constant prices in 
each period. 
3) The sectoral share is calculated as an average for respective years in each period. 
4) The contribution of each sector group to GDP growth is weighted by respective sectoral GDP 
shares. 
Source: Calculated using van der Eng (2002: 172-3), updated for 1999 and 2000 with data from BPS's 
National Income of Indonesia. 
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When oil and gas pnces started to fall after 1982, the Indonesian economy 
slowed down. Export earnings decreased and foreign debt repayments became more 
difficult. Although the economy shrank in 1982, real GDP continued to increase at an 
annual average rate of 3 percent during 1981-86. The economic slowdown induced the 
government to prepare a series of economic reforms. It quickly introduced 
macroeconormc adjustment programs such as devaluation of the rupiah in 1983, 
reduction of government expenditure, cancellation of large-scale national projects and 
financial sector reforms. 5 A further fall in energy prices in 1986 required the 
government to implement further microeconomic reforms, which enhanced export-
oriented manufacturing and foreign direct investment (FDI). 
Such changes in economic policies contributed to an acceleration of economic 
growth until the onset of the 1997-98 economic crisis. During the decade from 1986, 
Indonesia's annual average growth of GDP (without oil/gas) exceeded 8 percent, driven 
by a rapid expansion of the manufacturing sector, which contributed to more than 30 
percent of total growth. This high economic growth along with deregulation measures 
stimulated business activities in the private sector. 6 
Indonesia suffered an economic setback after 1997. The collapse of the rupiah 
together with other factors such as a sharp increase in energy and food costs and a rapid 
expansion of money supply drove inflation up roughly 58 percent in 1998, which 
exacerbated macroeconomic instability. Year-on-year GDP (with oil/gas) growth 
slowed to 4.3 percent in 1997 and the economy contracted by 13 .1 percent in 1998. 
Output declined in 1998 across almost all sectors, with construction (-36.5 % ) and 
5 Pangestu (1996) well documented Indonesia 's economic reforms, deregulation and privatisation between the early 1980s and the mid-1990s. 
6 Based on his analysis of total factor productivity (TFP), Timmer (1999) concluded that a range of deregulation programs introduced by the Indonesian government since the mid-l 980s have been beneficial to all industries, although performance varied significantly across industries. In broad terms, 
these policy changes also improved the business environment for SMEs. The policy reforms tended to 
reduce discrimination against SMEs that had traditionally existed in trade policies , financial regulations 
and regulatory framework. For further details , see Hill (2001: 253-5). 
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banking/finance (-34.0%) most seriously affected. GDP of manufacturing shrank by 
11.4 percent in 1998. Despite recovery in 1999 and 2000, GDP decreased at annual 
average rates of 1 percent during 1996-2000. 
From a sectoral viewpoint, industry (including manufacturing, mining, utilities 
and construction) has been the main engine of economic growth in Indonesia since the 
mid-1960s. Table 4.1 illustrates . that both manufacturing and industry as a whole 
expanded at more than 6 percent annually in each sub-period between 1966 and 1996. 
Growth in these sectors was significantly higher in the 1966-96 period than that in the 
economy as a whole. During 1986-96, the industrial sector contributed nearly half of 
total growth, surpassing agricultural and service sectors. 
As a consequence of economic growth, substantial structural changes took place 
1n the Indonesian economy. Agriculture's share declined steadily to 18 percent in 
1997-2000. By contrast, industry's share increased from less than 20 percent during 
1966-70 to nearly 40 percent during 1997-2000. The share of manufacturing increased 
from 12 percent to 27 percent in the same period and exceeded that of agriculture in 
1991. 
Changes in employment patterns also demonstrate structural transformation in 
the Indonesian economy. Table 4.2 indicates that the agricultural sector remained 
dominant, albeit that its share decreased from more than 70 percent in 1961 to less than 
45 percent in 1999. By contrast, the share of industry in total employment significantly 
increased from 8 percent in 1961 to 18 percent in 1999, and that of the services sector 
doubled from 20 percent to nearly 40 percent. These different patterns of employment 
reflect differences between higher output growth of industry and services and lower 
output growth of agriculture. However, as Hill ( 1996: 21) explained, sectoral 
employment shares change more slowly than those of output. The discrepancies 
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between the low output share and dominant employment share of agriculture and 
between the significant output share and low employment share of industry are 
remarkable. These may be explained by the fact that the agricultural sector is generally 
more labour intensive and/or more labour absorptive than the industrial sector.7 
Table 4.2 Growth and Sectoral Share of Employment in Indonesia, 1961 :.1999 
Agriculture Industry I ) Services Total 
Manufacturing only Total 
Growth (%? 
1961 - 1971 0.6 4.8 4.1 5.1 2.0 
1971 - 1980 1.3 4.4 5.8 · 4.9 2.9 
1980 - 1990 4.2 5.8 5.0 3.2 4.0 
1990 - 1996 -2.3 7.0 8.3 7.1 2.5 
1996 - 1999 0.6 2.2 0.7 2.1 1.2 
Sectoral Share (%) and 
Total Number of Employment (thousand) 
1961 71.9 5.7 7.9 20.2 100.0 32,709 
1971 62.8 7.4 9.7 27.5 100.0 39,692 
1976 61.6 8.4 10.4 28.0 100.0 47,306 
1980 54.8 8.5 12.5 32.7 100.0 51,192 
1985 54.7 9.3 13.4 31.9 100.0 62,457 
1990 55.9 10.1 13.7 30.4 100.0 75,851 
1995 44.0 12.6 18.1 37.9 100.0 85,702 
1999 43.2 13.0 17.8 39.0 100.0 88,817 
Notes: 1) Industry includes manufacturing, mining, utilities and construction. 
2) The growth of employment is represented as average annual growth rates in each period. 
Sources: Calculated from BPS , Population Census (1961, 1971, 1980 and 1990), Intercensal Population 
Survey (1976 and 1985), and National Labor Force Survey (1996 and 1999). 
7 This may also be a matter of definition of employment. Underemployment is concentrated significantly 
in the agricultural sector. People with their main occupation in agriculture are likely to have sidelines in 
the informal sector. 
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Table 4.3 Exports, Imports and Foreign Direct Investment in Indonesia, 1966-1999 
(Unit:%) 
Export Import 
Growth I ) Exports/GDP 2) Growth I ) FDI/GCF 3) 
1966-1970 10.4 11.4 16.8 
1970 - 1975 11.6 20.1 24.2 4.5 
1975 - 1980 6.9 26.8 10.9 2.8 
1980 - 1985 -5.7 27.3 5.2 0.9 
1985 - 1990 8.2 23.3 3.2 1.9 
1990 - 1996 10.5 26.3 12.9 5.0 
1996 - 1999 -6.4 34.9 -13.6 1.6 
Notes: 1) Average annual growth rates in each period are calculated using the data for exports and 
imports of goods and services (with oil/gas) at 1995 constant US$ prices. 
2) The ratio of exports to GDP is calculated as an average for respective years in each period. The 
calculation of this ratio uses exports of goods and services and GDP, both of which include 
oil/gas and are indicated in current rupiah prices. 
3) The ratio of FDI (net inflows of foreign direct investment) to GCF (gross capital formation) is 
calculated as an average for respective years in each period. The ratio during 1966-70 is not 
available. 
Source: Calculated from World Bank, World Development Indicators 2001. 
As Table 4.3 has shown, exports have played an important role in Indonesian 
economic development since the mid-1960s. Due to the rehabilitation of production 
sector in the late 1960s and a sharp rise in oil prices in the first half of the 1970s, export 
values increased rapidly at annual average rates of around 10 percent. However, the 
pace of export growth slowed down to 7 percent a year in the second half of the 1970s 
and became negative in the first half of the 1980s, reflecting the oil glut. Thereafter, a 
series of economic reforms accelerated exports of non-oil/gas commodities (mainly 
manufactured goods), until the onset of the recent crisis. Exports grew remarkably at 
average annual rates of 8.2 percent during 1985-90 and 10.5 percent during 1990-96. 
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Table 4.4 Sectoral Share of Export and Import Commodities Ill Indonesia, 1966-
1999 1) 
(Unit: %) 
Agriculture 2) Mining 3) Manufacturing Other Total 
Exports 
1966-1970 52.8 44.6 2.1 0.5 100.0 
1971 - 1975 36.7 61.7 1.4 0.2 100.0 
1976 - 1980 25.5 72.4 2.0 0.1 100.0 
1981-1985 13.3 79.0 7.2 0.5 100.0 
1986-1990 20.9 50.8 28.3 0.0 100.0 
1991 - 1996 16.5 34.3 49.2 0.0 100.0 
1997 - 1999 15.8 26.9 47.3 10.0 100.0 
Imports 
1966 - 1970 16.8 3.2 79.8 0.2 100.0 
1971 - 1975 13.6 5.6 80.7 0.1 100.0 
1976 - 1980 18.6 13.5 67.7 0.2 100.0 
1981 - 1985 11.2 21.1 67.2 0.5 100.0 
1986 - 1990 11.8 12.8 75.0 0.4 100.0 
1991 - 1996 13.1 12.0 74.6 0.3 100.0 
1997 - 1999 15.4 13.2 71.1 0.3 100.0 
Notes: 1) The sectoral share of commodities in merchandise exports and imports (at current US$ prices) 
is calculated as an average of respective years in each period. 
2) Agriculture includes food and agricultural raw materials. 
3) Mining includes fuels (oil/gas), ores and metals. 
Source: Calculated from World Bank, World Development Indicators 2001. 
Table 4.4 shows the composition of commodity exports and imports since 1966. 
Until the rnid-l 980s, primary commodities (agricultural products , oil/gas and other 
minerals) occupied more than 90 percent of the total merchandise exports. Since the 
rnid-l 980s, manufacturing exports increased quickly and their share grew from 7 
percent in the first half of the 1980s to nearly 50 percent in the 1990s. 
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By contrast, the composition of imports did not change markedly. Primary 
commodities (agriculture and mining) accounted for 20-30 percent of the total 
merchandise imports, while manufactured goods occupied the remaining 70-80 percent. 
The Indonesian economy continued a significant dependence on manufactured imports 
during the past 30 years despite the progress of industrialisation. 
Table 4.3 indicates that the_ ratio of exports to GDP did not vary much during 
1970-96. 8 It fluctuated around 25 percent, which was lower than in some other East 
Asian developing countries.9 As Hill (1996: 14) points out, economic development in 
Indonesia has not necessarily been export-led, compared with neighbouring countries. 
In general, larger economies tend to be less export-reliant than smaller economies. 
Therefore, lower export dependence of the large Indonesian economy relative to that of 
some smaller neighbouring economies seems understandable. 
Table 4.3 also shows the contribution of foreign direct investment (FDI, net 
inflows) to fixed capital investment in Indonesia. In the 1970s, the mining sector 
attracted most FDI, while in the late 1980s and the early 1990s, the more labour-
intensive manufacturing sector was the main recipient of FDI as a consequence of 
deregulation measures. Similar to the above export ratio, the ratio of FDI to gross 
capital formation in Indonesia was not high, compared to that in some neighbouring 
countries. 10 However, FDI accelerated manufacturing development in Indonesia (Hill 
1988). FDI was a source of resources that were scarce in industries, such as new 
8 A rise in the ratio during 1996-99 reflected the situation in which most economic activities in Indonesia 
stagnated due to the shrinkage of domestic demand through the adverse effect of the recent crisis, while 
the export sector boomed because of a substantially lower exchange rate. 
9 For example, the exports/GDP ratios in Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia and Hong Kong were roughly 38 
percent, 183 percent, 83 percent and 141 percent, respectively, during 1990-96 (World Bank, World 
Development Indicators 2001). 
10 This may reflect the size of the economy and the policy stance to foreign investment. The FDI/gross 
capital formation ratios in Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines were around 28 percent, 17 
percent, 4 percent and 7 percent, respectively, during 1990-96 (World Bank, World Development 
Indicators 2001 ). The former two countries with relatively higher ratios are smaller economies and have 
adopted more FDI-intensive strategy than the latter two countries with relatively lower ratios. 
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technology, modem production facilities, skilled and experienced personnel, 
employment opportunities, and domestic and foreign markets. 11 
Indonesia experienced rapid economic growth and structural transformation 
during the three decades before the onset of the 1997-98 crisis. The role of agriculture 
in terms of output and employment decreased, while that of industry increased. In 
terms of exports, the share of primary products decreased from nearly 100 percent in 
the 1960s and 1970s to roughly 50 percent in the 1990s, while that of manufactured 
exports rose to 50 percent. These observations suggest that the manufacturing industry 
was crucial to the transformation of the economy. 
4.2.2 A Brief History of the Manufacturing Industry in Indonesia until the 1960s 
During the Dutch colonial period, the role of the manufacturing sector in the Indonesian 
economy had been limited (Higgins 1959: 688; Hill 1988: l; Paauw 1963: 180; Segers 
1988: 16-38). Until the early 1930s, Indonesia did not experience significant growth in 
the manufacturing industry. Most of the modem manufacturing enterprises were owned 
by Western investors and engaged in processing agricultural commodities (e.g., 
sugarcane) and minerals (tin ore and crude oil) for export markets. Apart from those 
foreign companies, small-scale indigenous manufacturing firms largely concentrated on 
the production of goods for domestic needs. Ethnic Chinese were involved in several 
manufacturing enterprises including the production of sugar, cassava flour, kapok, and 
arrack distilleries. 
In the early 1930s, the colonial government introduced trade protection, mainly 
in the form of tariffs and quotas, based on a Company Regulations Ordinance of 1934. 
11 Dhanani and Hasnain (2002) examined the impact of FDI on the manufacturing industry in Indonesia. 
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This policy attracted several large-scale multinational enterprises (e.g., General Motors, 
Goodyear Tyre, British-American Tobacco and Unilever) and promoted industrial 
development in Indonesia between the mid- l 930s and the beginning of World War II 
(Thee 1989: 142-4). 
However, such an impetus to manufacturing growth was interrupted by the 
Japanese occupation during 1942:-45 and the subsequent struggle for independence 
during 1945-50. When Indonesia obtained its full sovereignty in 1949, the economy 
needed postwar reconstruction and repair. 12 At the time, the industrial structure was 
still the same as in the colonial era. According to Paauw (1963: 180), small-scale 
handicraft producers were dominated by pribumi entrepreneurs, while export-oriented 
enterprises were occupied by foreign owners. Modern factories producing consumer 
goods such as garments for local consumption were managed by Europeans and ethnic 
Chinese. The Chinese group also engaged in less capital-intensive consumer goods 
production such as rice mills and ice factories. 
The government of newly independent Indonesia introduced in 1951 the 
Economic Urgency Plan as an import substitution strategy to foster pribumi 
manufacturing industries and control foreign investment (Hill 1988: 4). In 1956, the 
government launched the first five-year development plan, which aimed to rehabilitate 
existing factories, maximise the use of domestic raw materials and upgrade managerial 
capability and labour skills (Soehoed 1967: 68). The nationalistic stance of a newly 
independent country induced the government to adopt inward-looking industrial 
policies and less frequently utilise foreign knowledge on industrial development. The 
activities of foreign enterprises were restricted through, for example, limits on imports 
12 During World War II arid the war of independence, the damage suffered by the industrial sector was 
around 60 percent of the total capital invested in industry (Neuman 1955: 27). 
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of essential commodities (e.g., textiles, cement, iron bars and wire, tin plate and paper), 
and Dutch companies were nationalised in 1957-58. 
In the first half of the 1960s, shortages of electricity, spare parts and imported 
raw materials occurred, mainly because of the shortages of the government budget and 
foreign exchange earnings. As a result, textile manufacturers were not able to fully 
utilise their production capacity. In the second half of 1962, 95 percent of non-
mechanised looms were not in operation (Palmer and Castles 1971: 315, 322-5). Also, 
the utilisation ratio of capacity in heavy and chemical industries, most of which were 
run by state-owned enterprises, was on average less than 30 percent in 1966, due to 
inefficient planning and management in addition to the lack of imported materials 
(Soehoed 1967: 78-80). 
Overall, until the 1960s, Indonesia had not experienced significant progress in 
industrialisation. Moreover, by the mid-1960s, the underdeveloped manufacturing 
sector experienced a further setback caused by the mismanagement of economic 
policies and accelerating political turmoil. The Indonesian manufacturing sector as a 
whole accounted for roughly 10 percent of GDP in 1965 and GDP in industry shrank at 
the rate of -1.2 percent annually during 1940-65 (Van der Eng 2002: 171-3). Large-
scale enterprises existed mainly in export-oriented resource-based industry, but they 
were dominated by foreign investors, not local entrepreneurs. 13 There were few 
linkages between production activities of those LEs and local SMEs, due to the 
characteristics of colonial economic management and less linkage-generated subsectors 
in which foreign-affiliated LEs engaged. Throughout the colonial period and the first 
20 years from the end of World War II, small domestic demand for products from the 
machinery sector seems to have limited chances for the manufacturing industry to 
13 In the late 1950s and the early 1960s, almost all foreign enterprises were nationalised and changed to 
state-owned enterprises. 
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develop. At the beginning of the New Order era in 1966, Indonesia had to start with an 
effort to reconstruct its industrial sector. 
Although a great number of small-scale producers had already emerged in the 
country ' s manufacturing industry by the 1960s, most of them were traditional 
handicraft producers and did not have sufficient capabilities to produce or supply 
modern and quality products eitper for intermediary use or final consumption. 
However, the existence of numerous SMEs without sufficient capabilities in Indonesia 
in the 1960s was not very different from Japan's situation in the early 1930s, as 
observed in Chapter 3. There were very few competent SMEs in Japan in the early 
1930s, when its manufacturing industry, particularly the machinery industry, initiated 
and expanded subcontracting transactions between SMEs and LEs. 
4.2.3 Development of the Indonesian Manufacturing Industry since the Early 
1970s 
Most of the data available for exarmn1ng the development of the manufacturing 
industry are provided by Large and Medium Manufacturing Statistics , an annual survey 
on manufacturing establishments with 20 or more workers. 14 For sectoral analysis in 
manufacturing, two- or three-digit International Standard Industrial Classification 
(ISIC) is used. 15 Specific attention will be paid to the machinery industry (ISIC 38). 
14 In 1996, this annual survey covered roughly 90 percent of manufacturing value added and 40 percent 
of employment, respectively. The rest was generated by firms with 19 or less workers. Since BPS's 
backcast data were not available to the author, this study used its original data. This means that the 
earlier data, particularly before the mid- l 980s, were undervalued due to lower response rates and, as a 
consequence, the average annual growth rates are likely to be overestimated between the earlier and later 
years . Tne difference between the BPS original data and its backcast data for employment and value 
added tends to narrow from around 30 percent in 1980 to 10 percent in 1990 (Ito and Orii 2000) . 
15 This and subsequent sections deal mainly with the non-oil/gas manufacturing industry and exclude oil 
and gas subsectors (ISIC 353 and 354 ). 
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Table 4.5 Growth of and Sectoral Share in Real Value Added 1n Indonesia's Non-
Oil/Gas Manufacturing Industry, 1971-19991) 
(Unit: %) 
Sector 2) 1971-75 1975-80 1980-85 1985-90 1990-96 1996-99 1976-96 1976-99 
Growth JJ 
Manufacturing 9.3 13.2 13.8 15.6 13.3 -1.8 14.1 11.9 
Food 6.2 8.2 9.0 13.2 6.4 7.2 9.9 9.6 
(31) 
Textiles and Apparel 19.1 . 7.5 13.6 20.4 16.3 0.7 14.3 12.4 
(32) 
Wood and Paper 19.5 21.4 19.5 22.2 9.3 1.7 18.2 15.9 
(33+34) 
Chemicals & Basic Metals -4.3 19.7 21.6 13.3 13.4 -8.2 16.3 12.7 
(35+37) 
Machinery 39.3 21.4 10.1 17 .1 22.2 -6.5 16.8 13.5 
(38) 
Metal working 22.1 12.0 19.8 8.3 20.3 -7.8 14.3 11.1 
(381) 
General Machinery 54.4 11.7 8.5 18.4 16.4 -26.1 16.4 9.7 (382) 
Electrical Machinery 42.9 25.8 7.2 9.4 31.6 -1.4 17.7 15.0 (383) 
Transport Equipment 58.8 24.2 9.6 26.9 18.6 -8.2 17.2 13.5 (384) 
Precision Equipment 51.6 27.8 15. l 18.9 42.6 13.0 26.4 24.6 
(385) 
Other4J 22.8 18.2 13.6 7.8 15.6 -7.5 12.6 9.7 (39+36) 
Sectoral Share ) J 
Food 50.3 40.8 35.5 26.7 22.8 23.4 
(3 1) 
Textiles and Apparel 14.9 13 .7 11.7 15.4 17.9 18.2 
(32) 
Wood and Paper 5.3 6.9 9.7 15.6 14.2 14.2 
(33+34) 
Chemicals & Basic Metals 16.5 17.4 21.2 23.6 21.0 19.0 
(35+37) 
Machinery 8.9 14.3 15.9 14.3 19.3 20.7 
(38) 
Metal working 3.0 3.4 3.5 4.3 3.7 3.2 
(38 1) 
General Machinery 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.0 1.4 1.4 
(382) 
Electrical Machinery 2.3 4.3 4.2 2.7 4.7 7.0 
(383) 
Transport Equipment 2.5 5.4 6.9 6.2 9.3 8.7 
(384) 
Precision Equipment 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.4 
(385) 
Other4J 4.1 6.9 6.0 4.4 4.8 4.5 (39+36) 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
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Table 4.5 Growth of and Sectoral Share in Real Value Added in Indonesia's Non-
Oil/Gas Manufacturing Industry, 1971-1999 ( continued) I) 
(Unit: % ) 
Sector 2) 1971-75 1975-80 1980-85 1985-90 1990-96 1996-99 1976-96 1976-99 
Sectoral Contribution to Growth o ) 
Food 29.1 24.6 23.4 22.0 10.8 -141.9 
(31) 
Textiles and Apparel 26.5 7.6 11.6 19.6 21.5 -10.7 
(32) 
Wood and Paper 9.7 10.9 13 .8 21.6 9.8 -20.3 
(33+34) 
Chemicals & Basic Metals -6.6 25.2 33.5 19.5 20.8 131.2 
(35+37) 
Machinery 32.6 22.5 11.7 15.2 31.6 113.3 
(38) 
Metalworking 5.8 3.0 4.6 2.2 5.5 20.6 
(38 1) 
General Machinery 5.3 1.0 0.6 1.1 1.7 30.1 
(382) 
Electrical Machinery 8.7 8.4 2.0 1.6 11.0 8.1 
(383) 
Transport Equipment 12.9 9.9 4.4 10.2 12.8 58.8 
(384) 
Precision Equipment 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.6 -4.3 
(385) 
Other4) 8.7 9.2 6.0 2.1 5.5 28.4 
(39+36) 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Notes: 1) This table uses the data for manufacturing firms with 20 or more employees, except for those 
between 1971 and 1973, where firms with 5 or more workers with use of power equipment or 
firms with 10 or more workers without use of power equipment are included. Oil and gas 
subsectors (ISIC 353 and 354) are excluded. 
2) The numbers in parentheses indicate ISIC (International Standard Industrial Classification) 
code. 
3) The growth indicates average annual growth rates in each period. Value added data in this and 
following tables of this chapter are deflated by the implicit GDP deflator for manufacturing 
(1993=100) from BPS's National Income of Indonesia, due to a lack of adequate and long-term 
sectoral and subsectoral deflators. 
4) Other includes miscellaneous (ISIC 39) and non-metal/mineral (ISIC 36) products . 
5) The (sub )sectoral share of value added is calculated as an average for respective years in each 
period. The observed periods for this share are: 1971-75, 1976-80, 1981-85, 1986-90, 1991-96, 
and 1997-99. 
6) The contribution of each (sub)sector group to manufacturing value added growth is weighted 
by respective (sub)sectoral value added. 
Source: Calculated from BPS , Large and Medium Manufacturing Statistics. 
Table 4.5 shows the growth pattern of real value added 10 the non-oil/gas 
manufacturing industry since 1971. Before the 1997-98 cns1s, the manufacturing 
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industry as a whole was expanding at an annual average growth rate of 14.1 percent 
during 1976-96. 
Value added in the food processing industry (ISIC 31) grew at a stable rate in the 
last 30 years including the recent crisis period. This may reflect the situation where the 
food products are largely based on domestically produced inputs, rather than imported 
materials, and the fact that food products are not subject to swings in demand, as luxury 
products are. 16 The textile and apparel industry (ISIC 32), which has been one of the 
key manufacturing sectors in Indonesia, expanded rapidly. The labour-intensive 
production processes of its downstream side are suitable for labour-abundant and lower 
wage Indonesia. The chemicals and basic metals industries (ISIC 35+ 37), which have 
been protected by government regulations such as restrictions on foreign investment, 
showed high but unstable growth of output. Since these industries are capital-intensive 
and need to rely on imported inputs and technologies, they were more vulnerable to the 
changes in international and domestic economies such as the recent crisis. 
Value added of the machinery industry (ISIC 38) expanded faster than 
manufacturing as a whole, except for some periods including the 1997-98 crisis. In the 
first half of the 1990s, the machinery industry contributed more to the growth of 
manufacturing value added than any other sector. All subsectors of the machinery 
industry, metalworking (ISIC 381), general machinery (ISIC 382), electrical machinery 
(ISIC 383), transport equipment (ISIC 384) and precision equipment (ISIC 385) grew 
rapidly during the 1970s and during 1985-96. Particularly since 1986, the economic 
boom, supported by a series of deregulation measures , accelerated the expansion of 
production in these machinery subsectors. For example, after its single-digit growth 
during 1980-85, the transport equipment subsector including automobile and 
16 In addition, the food processing industry expanded its production capacity . 
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motorcycle production recorded a high annual growth rate of more than 18 percent. 17 
Subsequent to this high growth period, however, the machinery industry was seriously 
affected by the 1997-98 economic crisis, when value added of general machinery and 
transport equipment shrunk at annual rates of -26 and -8 percent, respectively. This 
resulted mainly from the reliance of the machinery industry on imported inputs and the 
limited size of domestic markets fo~ luxury goods. 
Table 4.5 also shows that the composition of manufacturing value added 
changed markedly since 1971, reflecting the different rates of growth among the sectors. 
The share of the food industry (ISIC 31) fell significantly to only one-fifth in the 1990s. 
The share of the other sectors increased, but to a different extent. For instance, the 
share of both textile and apparel (ISIC 32) and chemicals and basic metals (ISIC 
35+37) reached 18-20 percent in the second half of the 1990s, increasing by 3-4 
percentage points over the past 30 years. 
The machinery industry (ISIC 38) accounted for 21 percent of manufacturing 
output in the second half of the 1990s, more than doubling its share in the past 30 years. 
It has become the second largest value added generator after the food processing 
industry. More specifically, electrical machinery (ISIC 383) and transport equipment 
(ISIC 384) substantially increased their output share, occupying respectively 7 and 8.7 
percent in the late 1990s. 
Table 4.6 indicates that employment 1n the Indonesian non-oil/gas 
manufacturing industry grew considerably by 6 to 12 percent per annum between 1971 
and 1996, before slowing down to 0.2 percent during the recent crisis. Compared to the 
food processing industry (ISIC 31), employment growth in other industries tended to be 
significantly higher, except during the economic downturns of 1996-99. 
17 See Aswicahyono, Basri and Hill (2000) for the automobile industry and Thee (1997) for the 
motorcycle industry. Both of them discussed in detail the characteristics, structure and performance of 
these subsectors in Indonesia. 
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Table 4.6 Growth of and Sectoral Share in Employment in Indonesia1s Non-Oil/Gas 
Manufacturing Industry, 1971-1999 1) 
Sector 2) Growth and Sectoral Share of Employment (% )3) 
1971-75 1975-80 1980-85 1985-90 1990-96 1996-99 
Growth 
Manufacturing (3) 
Food (31) 
Textiles and Apparel (32) 
Wood and Paper (33+34) 
Chemicals/Basic Metals (35+37) 
Machinery (38) 
Metal working (38 1) 
General Machinery (382) 
Electrical Machinery (383) 
Transport Equipment (384) 
Precision Equipment (385) 
Other (39+36)4) 
Sectoral Share 
Food (31) 
Textiles and Apparel (32) 
Wood and Paper (33+34) 
Chemicals/Basic Metals (35+37) 
Machinery (38) 
Metalworking (38 1) 
General Machinery (382) 
Electrical Machinery (383) 
Transport Equipment (384) 
Precision Equipment (385) 
Other (39+36)4) 
Total 
8.7 
3.9 
9.9 
15.0 
14.8 
18.1 
7.0 
15.1 
17.8 
48.9 
54.6 
13.1 
42.8 
27.8 
8.0 
8.0 
8.4 
3.4 
1.2 
1.7 
2.0 
0.1 
5.0 
100.0 
6.4 
2.5 
5.3 
8.5 
13.2 
14.6 
12.8 
6.2 
29.2 
9.2 
20.1 
6.9 
36.3 
27.0 
9.2 
10.9 
11.4 
4.0 
1.2 
3.0 
3.1 
0.1 
5.2 
100.0 
11.7 
10.0 
8.1 
19.7 
17.4 
8.1 
7.7 
6.8 
3.1 
14.0 
16.3 
13.8 
30.3 
24.3 
13.7 
13.9 
12.2 
3.9 
1.1 
3.8 
0.1 
5.6 
100.0 
9.7 
3.4 
14.0 
15.7 
9.5 
7.8 
6.4 
13 .1 
6.6 
8.5 
9.3 
7.6 
27.6 
24.4 
16.9 
15 .4 
10.2 
3.3 
1.0 
2.3 
3.5 
0.1 
5.5 
100.0 
8.0 
4.7 
10.8 
6.7 
4.3 
12.3 
12.5 
6.8 
18.6 
7.4 
29.3 
10.5 
20.3 
32.1 
17.5 
12.9 
11.2 
3.5 
1.1 
3.3 
3.1 
0.2 
6.0 
100.0 
0.2 
0.3 
-0.3 
0.4 
1.3 
0.0 
-8.5 
0.8 
11.7 
-8.6 
5.1 
0.1 
19.5 
31.7 
17.7 
12.7 
12.1 
3.1 
1.1 
4.8 
2.7 
0.4 
6.3 
100.0 
Notes: 1) This table uses the data for manufacturing firms with 20 or more employees, except for those 
between 1971 and 1973, where finns with 5 or more workers with use of power equipment or 
firms with 10 or more workers without use of power equipment are included. Oil and gas 
subsectors (ISIC 353 and 354) are excluded. 
2) The numbers in parentheses indicate ISIC code. 
3) The growth indicates average annual growth rates in each period, while the sectoral share is 
calculated as an average for respective years in each period. The observed periods for the 
sectoral share are: 1971-75, 1976-80, 1981-85, 1986-90, 1991-96, and 1997-99. 
4) Other includes miscellaneous (ISIC 39) and non-metal/mineral (ISIC 36) products. 
Source: Calculated from International Economic Data Bank (IEDB), Stars (database) based on UNIDO 
data (originally from BPS 's employment data). 
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Due to its poorer growth performance, the share of the food processing industry, 
which occupied more than 40 percent of total manufacturing employment in the early 
1970s, more than halved by the late 1990s. By contrast, all other sectors occupied a 
greater employment share in the late 1990s than in the early 1970s. The textile and 
apparel industry (ISIC 32), instead of the food processing industry, has become the 
main absorber of additional labour in manufacturing since the early 1990s. Notably, the 
share of the wood and paper industries (ISIC 33+ 34) increased from 8 percent to 18 
percent. The labour-intensive wood processing industry clearly absorbed significant 
amounts of labour during this period. As a consequence of the rapid growth of the 
machinery industry (ISIC 38), it accounted for more than 12 percent of manufacturing 
employment in the latter half of the 1990s. Metalworking (ISIC 381), electrical 
machinery (ISIC 383) and transport equipment (ISIC 384) occupied 3-5 percent of the 
manufacturing workforce by the late 1990s. 
The sectoral composition of non-oil/gas manufactured exports and imports over 
the past 30 years is shown in Table 4. 7, which refers to the data converted from SITC 
(Standard International Trade Classification) to ISIC by the International Economic 
Data Bank (IEDB). The sectoral share of manufactured exports has changed 
remarkably since the early 1970s. Similar to our observation above in relation to value 
added and employment, the food processing industry (ISIC 31) reduced its share of 
exports from more than 56 percent during the early 1970s to less than 10 percent in the 
late 1980s. The export share of textile and apparel (ISIC 32), wood and paper (ISIC 
33+ 34) and machinery (ISIC 38) rose considerably from single-digit levels in the early 
l 970s. 
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Table 4.7 Sectoral Share of Indonesia's Non-Oil/Gas Manufactured Exports and 
Imports, 1971-1999 1) 
Sector 2) 
Sectoral Share of 
Exports and Imports (% )3) 
1971-75 1976-80 1981-85 1986-90 1991-96 1997-99 
Exports 
Food (3 1) 
Textiles and Apparel (32) 
Wood and Paper (33+34) 
Chemicals/Basic Metals (35+37) 
Machinery (38) 
Metalworking (38 1) 
General Machinery (382) 
Electrical Machinery (383) 
Transport Equipment (384) 
Precision Equipment (385) 
Other (39+36)4) 
Total 
Imports 
Food (31) 
Textiles and Apparel (32) 
Wood and Paper (33+34) 
Chemicals/Basic Metals (35+37) 
Machinery (38) 
Metalworking (38 1) 
General Machinery (382) 
Electrical Machinery (383) 
Transport Equipment (384) 
Precision Equipment (385) 
Other (39+36)4) 
Total 
55.9 
1.4 
4.9 
28.6 
8.7 
4.8 
1.6 
0.4 
0.8 
0.3 
0.5 
100.0 
8.2 
6.9 
3.0 
30.2 
48.4 
6.4 
17.1 
7.8 
15.3 
1.8 
3.3 
100.0 
37.2 
4.3 
13.7 
30.3 
13.5 
2.2 
0.6 
4.4 
1.8 
0.7 
1.0 
100.0 
15.2 
3.5 
3.3 
28.8 
46.9 
6.7 
14.3 
10.2 
13.8 
1.9 
2.3 
100.0 
15.5 
12.5 
31.0 
31.1 
8.3 
1.4 
0.2 
5.3 
1.3 
0.1 
1.6 
100.0 
6.8 
2.0 
3.3 
32.3 
53.4 
7.1 
19.9 
8.7 
15.4 
2.3 
2.2 
100.0 
otes: 1) Oil and gas subsectors (ISIC 353 and 354) are excluded. 
9.8 
22.4 
39.0 
21.5 
4.0 
1.5 
0.1 
1.4 
0.7 
0.3 
3.3 
100.0 
4.5 
3.2 
3.9 
35.5 
50.9 
4.8 
21.5 
8.3 
13.1 
2.6 
2.0 
100.0 
8.2 
27.2 
26.4 
20.6 
13.7 
2.6 
1.7 
6.9 
1.8 
0.7 
3.9 
100.0 
5.1 
5.5 
3.9 
30.7 
52.8 
5.3 
21.7 
10.6 
12.6 
2.2 
2.0 
100.0 
9.9 
20.8 
21.8 
21.5 
19.9 
3.1 
4.3 
9.6 
2.0 
0.9 
6.1 
100.0 
7.9 
6.7 
4.8 
30.3 
48.0 
5.4 
19.0 
11.8 
9.6 
2.0 
2.3 
100.0 
2) The numbers in parentheses indicate ISIC code. The data were converted from SITC (Standard 
International Trade Classification) to ISIC by the International Economic Data Bank (IEDB). 
3) The sectoral share is calculated as an average for respective years in each period. 
4) Other includes miscellaneous (ISIC 39) and non-metal/mineral (ISIC 36) products. 
Source: Calculated from International Economic Data Bank (IEDB), Stars (database). 
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According to Hill ' s analysis (1996: 81-4), revealed comparative advantages 
(RCAs) for labour-intensive manufactures such as textile and apparel rose quickly after 
the mid- l 980s. 18 This implies that a series of macroeconomic and microeconomic 
reforms since the early 1980s enabled Indonesian producers to obtain a comparative 
advantage in the labour-intensive manufactured products trade, reflecting its relative 
factor endowments as a consequenc.e of the elimination of regulatory obstacles. 
Different from the patterns of exports, the composition of manufactured imports 
by sector did not change significantly after 1971. According to Table 4.7 , the largest 
import sectors were chemicals and basic metals (ISIC 35+37) and machinery (ISIC 38), 
which together accounted for 75-85 percent of total manufactured imports during the 
entire period. The former sector occupied roughly 30 percent, and the latter sector 
around 50 percent of imports . Among machinery imports, general machinery (ISIC 
382), electrical machinery (ISIC 383) and transport equipment (ISIC 384) were 
outstanding. High import-dependency on machinery, chemicals and basic metals 
remained unchanged in Indonesian industrial structure. 19 
Table 4.8 presents the results of a UNIDO (2000: 116-7) study that examined 
export intensity and import dependence of the Indonesian manufacturing industry in the 
1990s. During the years of high economic growth 1990-96, the export intensity of the 
non-oiVgas manufacturing increased, as measured by the percentage of exports to 
output. Gross export intensity for manufacturing as a whole increased from 12 percent 
in 1990 to 27 percent in 1996, before declining to 14 percent in the crisis year of 1998. 
Most of the sectors also experienced an upward trend between 1990 and 1996 and a 
18 A steep rise in RCAs for resource-based manufactures was also observed in the early 1980s, in addition 
to an increase in those for labour-intensive manufactures. This reflected a sharp growth in plywood 
exports mainly in response to the log export ban (Hill 1996: 83-4). RCAs measure relative export 
performance by country and industry. defined as a country's share of world exports of a good divided by 
its share of total world exports . 
19 See Hayashi (1996), which used I-0 anal ysis to identify the reasons why the Indonesian economy has 
not been able to change the structure of heavy import-dependency on those items . 
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downward trend from 1996 to 1998. Wood and furniture (ISIC 33), textiles and apparel 
(ISIC 32) and other (ISIC 39) including toys and jewellery were sectors with a 
relatively high export-orientation. The machinery industry (ISIC 38) was not 
considerably export-oriented, but its gross export intensity rose from 4 percent in 1990 
to 22 percent in 1996. 
Table 4.8 Export Intensity and Imported Inputs Ratio of Indonesia's Non-OiVGas 
Manufacturing Industry, 1990-19981) 
Export Intensity (% )3) 
Sector 2) Gross Export Intensity Net Export Intensity 4) 
Imported Inputs 
Ratio (%)5) 
1990 1993 1996 1998 1990 1993 1996 1998 1990 1993 1996 1998 
Manufacturing 
Food 
(31 ) 
Textiles/ Apparel 
(32) 
Wood/Furniture 
(33) 
Paper/Printing 
(34) 
Chemicals 
(35) 
12 20 
6 10 
17 33 
34 56 
6 1 
13 
Non-metals/Minerals 6 
15 
8 
(3 6) 
Basic Metals 
(37) 
Machinery 
(38) 
Other 
(39) 
10 12 
4 13 
11 57 
27 
16 
43 
69 
9 
25 
11 
10 
22 
41 
14 
13 
19 
30 
1 
16 
9 
3 
10 
21 
0 6 10 -3 31 28 32 33 
2 6 11 8 11 7 10 8 
4 16 24 -3 31 33 35 40 
33 55 68 27 3 3 3 5 
-7 -13 -5 -14 35 30 29 31 
-5 -2 7 -4 42 35 32 35 
1 5 -1 28 28 21 36 
-7 -14 -11 -24 50 58 59 42 
-18 -16 -8 -24 53 57 57 64 
-2 35 24 4 33 45 34 35 
Notes: 1) This table uses the data fo'r manufacturing firms with 20 or more employees. Oil and gas 
subsectors (ISIC 353 and 354) are excluded. 
2) The numbers in parentheses indicate ISIC (International Standard Industrial Classification) 
code. 
3) Export intensity is indicated as the percentage of exports to gross output. 
4) Net exports= gross exports - imports of raw materials and intermediate inputs. 
5) Imported inputs ratio is as the percentage of imported inputs to total inputs. 
Source: UNIDO (2000), Tables 5.6 and 5.7. 
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After deducting imports of raw materials and intermediate inputs from gross 
exports, it appears that the levels of export intensity for wood and furniture (ISIC 33) 
and food (ISIC) are not significantly different in gross and net terms. These two sectors 
did not utilise imported input materials as extensively as other sectors. Particularly, the 
wood and furniture industry imported less than 5 percent of . raw materials and 
intermediate goods as necessary inputs during 1990-98. 
By contrast, machinery (ISIC 38) and basic metals (ISIC 37) both recorded -24 
percent net export intensity in 1998, which means that these two sectors imported more 
than the value of their exports. They have an extremely high import-dependent 
structure.20 This finding is consistent with Hayashi (1996: 14-5), which observed that 
the machinery sector in Indonesia is highly dependent on imported inputs. An increase 
in demand induces a large increase in imported intermediate goods through direct and 
indirect linkages. This implies a lack of sufficient supporting industries that supply raw 
materials and intermediate inputs to the machinery sector in Indonesia. 
Table 4.9 shows the geographical distribution of manufacturing value added in 
Indonesia. Java has continued to dominate in the process of industrial development, 
accounting for around three quarters of non-oil/gas manufacturing value added during 
1983- 1998. Jakarta/West Java and East Java, which occupied more than 60 percent of 
total manufacturing value added, are clearly key centres of industrial activity in 
Indonesia, reflecting locational advantages such as large markets and well-developed 
physical and human infrastructure. 
20 In general , these sectors are trade-intensi ve in intra-industry. However, the Indonesian case indicates 
not a two-way trade (i.e . export and import) but a one-way trade on the basis of highly import-reli ant 
structure with less export-oriented production. 
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Table 4.9 Geographical Distribution of Value Added 1n Indonesia's Non-OiVGas 
Manufacturing Industry, 1983 , 1990 and 1998 
(Unit: %) 
Region/Province 1983 1990 1998 
Java and Bali 76.2 75.8 73.5 
Jakarta/West Java 42.5 42.6 41.8 
East Java 22.3 20.8 20.0 
Sumatra 16.8 14.7 17.1 
Kalimantan 4.6 6.6 6.0 
Sulawesi 1.7 1.7 2.2 
Other Region 0.7 1.2 1.2 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: BPS, Gross Regional Domestic Product of Provinces in Indonesia by Industrial Origin. 
4.3 SME Development in Indonesia 
There are several definitions of SMEs and different definitions are used by vanous 
Indonesian government agencies. This section first defines SMEs suitable for the 
purpose of this study. In the next part, SME policies and measures in Indonesia are 
reviewed in order to understand the general conditions under which SMEs developed. 
Thereafter, the section provides an overview of the development of SMEs in the 
manufacturing industry , particularly the machinery sector. 
4.3.1 Defmition of Sl\1Es in This Study 
The Indonesian government often perceived the promotion of SMEs not as an aspect of 
industrial development but of social development. It tended to support micro and 
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smaller SMEs. Berry and Levy (1999: 31) state that LEs and micro- or very small-scale 
enterprises have received a large part of the incentives which the Indonesian 
government provided. 21 These enterprises occupied a considerable share of output and 
workforce. In contrast, medium-scale viable firms have received limited attention and 
occupied a modest share in production and employment. 22 The experience of these 
medium-scale enterprises with 1 OQ to 300 workers has hardly been highlighted in the 
context of Indonesia. 
Consequently, most SME definitions in Indonesia cover only smaller SMEs and 
do not include larger SMEs. As indicated in Table 4.10, BPS (the former Central 
Bureau of Statistics, currently Statistics Indonesia) defines firms with four or less 
workers, those with 5 to 19 workers and those with 20 to 99 workers as household, 
small-scale, and medium-scale enterprises, respectively. The Indonesian Ministry of 
Industry and Trade (MOIT) defines manufacturing SMEs on the basis of the value of 
their assets (excluding land and buildings). Firms with assets of less than Rp 200 
million are small-scale enterprises and those with assets of Rp 200 million to Rp 5 
billion are small- and medium-scale enterprises. The Indonesian Small Business Law 
of 1995, which aimed to foster SMEs for the purpose of promoting a fair and equitable 
society, defines small-scale enterprises as firms with assets (excluding land and 
buildings) of less than Rp 200 million or with sales of less than Rp 1 billion. 23 This 
2 1 Despite frequent manifestations of great sympathy for SMEs, the public policies in Indonesia have 
tended to favour LEs (Hill 2001: 253). On the other hand, when the government extends assistance to 
SMEs, the main target group has been not medium-scale enterprises but cottage or small-scale enterprises 
particularly owned by pribumi entrepreneurs. Chapters 6 and 8 in this study will illustrate that the latter 
group had better access to technical and financial support provided by the public sector. 
22 As stated above, in Indonesia dynamic SMEs do not have a broad base in industrial structure and are 
ignored at policy levels as being too big to be small and too small to big. Berry and Levy (1999: 31) 
characterised this industrial phenomenon in Indonesia as a "missing middle." The "missing middle" 
results in the underutilisation of productive capability that viable SMEs potentially have. 
23 In addition to small-scale enterprises, medium-scale enterprises have recently been defined by the 
government as firms with assets of Rp 200 million to Rp 10 billion or with sales of Rp 1 billion to Rp 50 
billion . This definition can include larger SMEs. Based on these capital and sales criteria, however, 
firms cannot easily or quickly be classified into size categories when data from BPS or our field survey 
are used. 
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definition has been used by Bank Indonesia, the central bank, and by the State Ministry 
of Cooperatives and Small & Medium Enterprises (MOCSME) . 
Table 4.10 Definition of Manufacturing SMEs in Asian and Pacific Countries 
Country/ 
Organization 
Indonesia BPS2) 
MOIT2) 
Japan 
Korea 
Malaysia 
Philippines 
Singapore 
Taiwan 
Bank Indonesia/ 
MOCSME2) 
Thailand Bank of Thailand 
MOI3) 
MOI3) 
Canada 
USA 
Criterion 
Employment 
Assets 
Assets 
Sales 
Employment 
Invested Capital 
Employment 
Invested Capital 
Employment 
Assets 
Assets 
Employment 
Invested Capital 
Employment 
Employment 
Assets 
Employment 
Sales 
Employment 
Definition of Manufacturing SMEs 
Size I ) 
SMEs < 100 · 
SMEs < Rp 5 billion (US$ 0. 7 million) 
SMEs :S Rp 10 billion (US$ 1.4 million) 
SMEs :S Rp 50 billion (US$ 7 million) 
SMEs < 300 
SMEs < ¥ 300 million (US$ 3 million) 
SMEs :S 300 
SMEs :S MR 2.5 million (US$ 0.7 million) 
SMEs < 200 
SMEs :S P 60 million (US$ 1.5 million) 
SMEs < S$ 15 million (US$ 9 million) 
SMEs < 200 
SMEs :S NT$ 60 million (US$ 2 million) 
SMEs < 300 
SMEs < 200 
SMEs < 100 million baht (US$ 2.7 million) 
SMEs < 500 
SMEs :S CDN$ 20 million (US$ 14 million) 
SMEs < 500 
Notes: 1) Figures in parentheses in this column indicate the amount in terms of US dollars converted by 
respective exchange rates at the end of 1999 (IMF, International Financial Statistics ). 
Indonesia: US$ = Rp7 ,085 , Japan: US$ = ¥102.20 , Malaysia: US $ = MR3.80, Philippines : 
US$ = P40.31 , Singapore: US$ = S$1.67, Taiwan: US$ = NT$31.40, Thailand: US$ = 
37.52baht, and Canada: US$= CDN$1.44. 
2) BPS = Statistics Indonesia, MOIT = Ministry of Industry and Trade, and MOCSME = the State 
Ministry of Cooperatives and Small & Medium Enterprises. 
3) MOI = Ministry of Industry . 
Sources: APEC (1 994 : 10-2) and JSBRI (1 998 : 6) . 
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Table 4.10 indicates that most of the neighbouring countries adopt the number of 
workers as their main criterion which distinguishes SMEs from LEs and they often use 
the size of 200 to 500 employees as a cutoff between SMEs and LEs. For instance, 
Japan, South Korea and Thailand regard manufacturing firms as SMEs if their number 
of employees is less than 300 workers. In addition, this study aims to cover not only 
SMEs that can be promoters of di~tributional or welfare goals but specifically SMEs 
that can be a driving force in the process of industrialisation. Attention is paid to the 
"missing middle" or potential and dynamic SMEs. For these reasons, it seems 
appropriate to define in this study SMEs in Indonesia as enterprises with 299 or less 
employees.24 
4.3.2 Policies and Measures for SME Development in Indonesia 
The Indonesian government has advocated the importance of SMEs in many official 
statements. It has formulated and implemented various types of policies and measures 
aimed at the development of the SME sector. For example, in Repelita VI (the Sixth 
Five-year Development Plan during 1994/95-1998/99), the government emphasised the 
promotion of SMEs, aiming mainly at 1) creating employment and 2) improving huge 
imbalances of income distribution across regions and ethnic groups. Table 4.11 
provides a chronological overview of the policies, programs and organisations relevant 
to the promotion of SMEs in Indonesia. 
Table 4.11 reveals that the Indonesian government has tried almost all types of 
SME support at one time or another. The BIPIK (small industries development) 
24 In support of this definition, we can refer to Goeltom (1995: 18) who, in her empirical analysis on the 
effects of financial reforms in Indonesia on the manufacturing industry, classified firms as small if the 
number of employees is less than 100, medium if the number of employees is between 100 and 500, and 
large if the number of employees is more than 500. This definition allowed her to evaluate in detail the 
impact of financial liberalisation on larger SMEs that have not usually been focused on. 
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program was introduced in 197 4 and carried out as one of the main technical support 
programs for small-scale industry. Under this program, technical assistance was 
extended to small enterprises through UPTs (technical service units) staffed by TPLs 
(extension field officers). After the BIPIK program finished in 1994, the PIKM (small-
scale enterprises development) project was launched and has continued until now. 
However, because of budget constraints and institutional problems, the UPTs-TPL 
system has not functioned well. Consequently, the PIKM has not been able to provide 
small industry with sufficient technical support. 25 
As financial support programs , the government initiated the KIK (credit for 
small investment) and the KMKP ( credit for working capital) in 1973 and continued 
them in the 1980s. In 1990, however, because of high default rates and budget 
constraints of the government, such subsidised credit programs were abolished and, 
instead, the non-subsidised KUK (credit for small businesses) scheme was established 
(Thee 1994: 101-4). During the last five to ten years, the main credit programs 
available to SMEs have been: 1) the KUK (credit for small businesses) scheme, which 
requires banks in Indonesia to allocate 20 percent of their lending to small-scale firms; 
and 2) the Liquidity Credit Scheme, which restarted in 1998 and provided credits to 
farmers, cooperatives and SMEs. Despite these programs, only around 10 percent of 
SMEs use bank credit and the remaining 90 percent do not receive loans from formal 
financial institutions (Urata 2000: 16-32). 
From 1976 to 1993, the government attempted to foster small- and medium-
scale parts supplier firms through the Deletion (localisation) programs for some import-
25 UPTs are public technical institutions specialising in technical support for SMEs. In the middle of the 
1990s the Indonesian Ministry of Industry and Trade (MOIT) stopped allocating a budget to UPTs and 
they have since then faced serious financial difficulties. The number of UPTs declined from more than 
160 in the peak period of the 1980s to around 80 in 1997. When the author visited the UPT in PIK 
Pulogadung of Jakarta in October 1999, it had six staff members who managed their operations on a very 
limited budget of Rp 2,000,000 (around US$ 300) per month. 
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substitution products, such as commercial vehicles, motorcycles and diesel engines. 
Recognising that inter-firm linkages would be a key to the development of SMEs, the 
Indonesian government initiated a forced subcontracting program, known as the Bapak 
Angkat (foster-father) program.26 However, these programs did not achieve significant 
results. LEs did not participate in the programs in a positive way, because the forced 
subcontracting linkages tended to provide them with only limited benefits. 
Even though several ministries and organisations in the government sector such 
as MOIT and MOCSME have experimented with various kinds of programs for the 
promotion and protection of SMEs, most of them were not effective or did not function 
well. Thee (1994) attributed these outcomes to insufficient institutional capabilities of 
the government sector as well as inadequate design of policies and programs. Berry, 
Rodriguez and Sandee (2001: 377) suggested that unproductive assistance to small 
firms extended by public agencies be ascribed to a philosophy that the government 
should guide and help weaker groups in society, many of which comprise people who 
work in the SME sector. Such motivations have induced the government to extend free 
support services not to viable medium-scale enterprises but to innumerable micro- and 
small-scale enterprises. By spreading the effort over so many firms, the public sector 
has tended to provide "one-shot" support to micro- and small-sized enterprises only, 
without sufficient follow-up services. 
26 The "Foster Father-Business Partner" partnership and linkage program (Program Kemitraan dan 
Keterkaitan Bapak Angkat-Mitra Usaha) was introduced in 1984 to promote the development of local 
SMEs. The program urged LEs as the "Foster Fathers" to support SMEs as small "Business Partners" 
through the establishment of subcontracting relationships. The government expected LEs to provide 
SMEs through these forced linkages with assistance in the areas of technology, management, marketing, 
financing and so on. For further details, see Thee (1994: 106-7). 
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Table 4.11 Policies, Programs and Organisations for SME Development in Indonesia 
Technology 1969 MIDC (Metal Industry Development Center) established. 
1974 BIPIK (Small Industries Development) Program formulated as a technical support 
program for SMEs. 
1979 Under BIPIK program, LIK and PIK (Small Industrial Estates) constructed and 
technical assistance extended to SMEs in or near LIK/PIK mainly through UPT 
(Technical Service Units) staffed by TPL (Extension Field Officers). 
1994 BIPIK program finished and PIKM (Small-scale Enterprises Development Project) 
launched. 
Marketing 1979 Reservation Scheme introduced to protect markets for SMEs. 
1999 Anti-Monopoly Law enacted. 
Financing 1971 PT ASKRINDO established as a state-owned credit insurance company. 
General 
1973 KIK (Credit for Small Investment) and KMKP (Credit for Working Capital) 
introduced as government-subsidised credit programs for SMEs. 
1973 PT BAHANA founded as a state-owned venture capital company. 
1974 KK (Small Credit) administered by BRI (Indonesian People's Bank) launched and 
later (1984) changed to KUPEDES scheme (General Rural Savings Program) aimed 
at promoting small business. 
1989 SME Loans from state-owned enterprises (1 to 5 % benefits) introduced. 
1990 Government-subsidised credit programs for SMEs (KIK/KMKP) abolished and 
unsubsidised KUK (Credit for Small Businesses) scheme introduced. 
1998 The Liquidity Credit Scheme restarted. 
1999 The responsibility of directed credit programs transferred from Bank Indonesia 
(the central bank) to PT PNM (State-owned Corporation for SMEs) and Bank 
2000 
1973 
1976 
1978 
1984 
1991 
1991 
1993 
1993 
1995 
1997 
1998 
1998 
1999 
Export Indonesia. 
Major government credit programs for SMEs, including KUK, abolished. 
Ministry of Light Industry and Ministry of Heavy Industry merged into Ministry of 
Industry. 
Deletion (localisation) Programs for commercial cars introduced (motorcycles in 
1977 and some other products such as diesel engines and tractors later on). 
Directorate General for Small-scale Industry established (in Ministry of Industry) . 
Foster Father (Bapak Angkat) Program introduced to support SMEs. 
Foster Father-Business Partner Linkage extended to a national movement. 
SENTRAs (Groups of Small-scale Industry) in industrial clusters organised as 
KOPINKRA (Small-scale Handicraft Cooperatives). 
Deletion Programs for the commercial cars finished and Incentive Systems adopted. 
Ministry of Cooperatives started handling small business development. 
Basic Law for Promoting Small-scale Enterprises enacted. 
Foster Father (Bapak Angkat ) Program changed to Partnership Program 
(Kemitraan ) . 
Ministry of Cooperatives and Small Business added medium business development 
to its responsibilities . 
SME promotion emphasised in People's Economy as a national slogan. 
New Automobile Policy announced and Incentive Systems finished. 
Sources: Thee (1994: 101-11 ), internal documents prepared by the Indonesian Ministry of Industry and 
Trade, and author's interview survey. 
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4.3.3 An Overview of SME Development in Indonesia 
As was already observed, Indonesia experienced dynamic economic development 
through the rapid growth of its manufacturing industry after the early 1970s. The LE 
sector, particularly in those subsectors that allowed specialisation in labour-intensive 
assembling operations and a sh~ft toward export-oriented production, played an 
important role in this remarkable industrial development (Berry, Rodriguez and Sandee 
2001: 364). How did the SME sector contribute to the development of the 
manufacturing industry? This subsection examines the role of SMEs in the process of 
industrial and economic development in Indonesia. 
Table 4.12 indicates that LEs with 300 or more employees recorded generally 
higher growth rates of value added and employment than SMEs with 299 or less 
employees. During 1986-99, value added and employment of SMEs in manufacturing 
as a whole expanded at average annual rates of 6.4 percent and 4.5 percent, lower than 
those of LEs. Annual value added growth of smaller SMEs (including 
microenterprises) with 19 or less workers was less than 4 percent, while that of medium 
and larger SMEs with 20 to 99 workers and with 100 to 299 workers was 7 .5 percent 
and 8.1 percent, respectively. 
During 1996-99, however, output 1n the entire manufacturing SME sector 
decreased by 0.1 percent per annum, significantly less than the decrease of output in the 
LE sector of 3.2 percent. Within the SME sector, medium to larger SMEs with 20 to 
299 employees responded more flexibly to the sudden changes in economic conditions 
than smaller SMEs with 19 or less employees. 
It is necessary to recognise that the impact of the economic crisis on SMEs has 
been different in each case. Case studies conducted by the Center for Economic and 
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Social Studies (1999) show that small-medium supplier firms in heavy equipment, 
snack food and telecommunication equipment have suffered losses from the economic 
crisis, while those in rattan handicrafts have experienced the crisis as a boom. 
According to a case study conducted by Sandee, Andadari and Sulandjari (2000), the 
furniture industry in Jepara on the north coast of Central Java did well in flexibly 
adjusting to changes in economic conditions. Small-scale furniture producers in Jepara 
have been successful in expanding their export production since the outbreak of the 
economic crisis, due to a low rupiah exchange rate and their low dependence on 
imported inputs. Tambunan (2000: 143-53, 160-1) pointed out that the influence of the 
financial crisis on SMEs depends on the kinds of products, types of input materials and 
destination of products. Sato (2000b) stated, based on her case study of the 
metalworking industry in Java, that an evaluation of the damage caused by the crisis to 
the SME sector is not easy, because sufficient statistical data for small firms with 19 or 
less employees are not available. In addition, she noted that the impact on SMEs is 
quite heterogeneous according to factors such as firm size (even within SMEs), sector 
(even within metalworking), location and market orientation. 
The selected sectors in Table 4.12, food (ISIC 31), textiles and apparel (ISIC 32) 
and machinery (ISIC 38) show almost the same trend as manufacturing as a whole. 
SMEs as a whole in the machinery sector recorded a higher growth of value added 
during 1986-99 than their counterpart SMEs in manufacturing as a whole and in other 
selected sectors. In terms of the growth of value added and employment, medium and 
larger machinery SMEs with 20 to 299 employees were outstanding during 1986-96. 
They were able to take advantage of an opportunity to supply parts and components to 
rapidly growing LEs during the period of high growth. 
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Table 4.12 Growth of Value Added and Employment 1n Indonesia's Non-Oil/Gas 
Manufacturing Industry by Firm Size, 1986-1999 1) 
Average Annual Growth Rates (%)3) 
Sector/Firm Size Z) 
Manufacturing 
1 - 19 
20 - 99 
100 - 299 
SMEs 
LEs 
All Firm Sizes 
Food (31) 
1 - 19 
20 - 99 
100 - 299 
SMEs 
LEs 
All Firm Sizes 
Textile and Apparel (32) 
1 - 19 
20 - 99 
100 - 299 
SMEs 
LEs 
All Firm Sizes 
Machinery (38) 
1 - 19 
20 - 99 
100 - 299 
SMEs 
LEs 
All Firm Sizes 
1986 -1996 
Value Added Employment 
7.7 
9.4 
8.8 
8.5 
13.3 
11.8 
6.8 
7.9 
9.5 
7.8 
9.4 
8.9 
11.9 
2.8 
4.2 
7.1 
10.3 
9.5 
8.7 
9.8 
13.4 
11.7 
22.5 
19.7 
6.6 
5.7 
7.8 
6.6 
11.1 
7.7 
7.2 
4.2 
5.2 
6.9 
4.5 
6.5 
8.5 
5.1 
8.4 
8.0 
16.0 
11.2 
5.1 
6.4 
8.4 
6.1 
13.5 
9.1 
1996 - 1999 
Value Added Employment 
-7.8 
1.3 
5.7 
-0.1 
-3.2 
-2.4 
-6.8 
4.9 
20.4 
5.3 
7.2 
6.7 
-12.5 
0.0 
14.8 
-0.3 
-0.6 
-0.5 
-9.9 
12.0 
-4.6 
-1.4 
-7.7 
-6.6 
-2.6 
-1.6 
-0.2 
-2.3 
0.6 
-1.5 
-4.8 
-1.7 
1.7 
-4.3 
0.6 
-3.5 
-2.2 
-3.4 
-0.1 
-2.1 
0.0 
-1.0 
-2.8 
-0.4 
-3.7 
-2.6 
1.0 
-0.8 
Notes: 1) Oil and gas subsectors (ISIC 353 and 354) are excluded. 
1986 - 1999 
Value Added Employment 
3.9 
7.5 
8.1 
6.4 
9.3 
8.3 
3.5 
7.2 
11.9 
7.2 
8.9 
8.4 
5.7 
2.1 
6.6 
5.3 
7.7 
7.1 
4.1 
10.3 
8.9 
8.5 
14.7 
13.0 
4.4 
3.9 
5.9 
4.5 
8.6 
5.5 
4.3 
2.8 
4.4 
4.2 
3.6 
4.1 
5.9 
3.1 
6.4 
5.6 
12.1 
8.3 
3.2 
4.8 
5.5 
4.1 
10.5 
6.8 
2) The numbers in parentheses represent ISIC industrial code. Finn size is indicated in terms of 
the number of employees: SMEs = firms with 299 or less workers; and LEs = those with 300 or 
more workers. 
3) The growth of value added is calculated using 1993 constant prices. 
Sources: Calculated from BPS, unpublished data of Large and Medium Manufacturing Statistics, 
Economic Census (1986 and 1996), and Statistical Year Book of Indonesia. 
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Table 4.13 Share of SMEs . Indonesia's Non-Oil/Gas Manufacturing Industry, Ill 
1974/75-1999 1) 
Share of SMEs in All Firm Sizes (%)3) 
Sector 2) Number of Establishments Number of Employees Value Added 
1-19 20-99 100-299 1-299 1-19 20-99 100-299 1-299 1-19 20-99 100-299 1-299 
Manufacturing 
1974/75 99.5 0.4 86.5 22.1 
1979 99.5 80.6 22.4 
1986 99.2 0.6 0.1 99.9 67.5 6.7 5.8 80.0 15.4 7.3 14.0 36.7 
1991 99.3 0.5 0.1 99.9 61.5 5.6 6.4 73.5 11.8 5.7 16.1 33.6 
1996 99.2 0.6 0.1 99.9 61.2 5.6 5.9 72.7 10.7 5.9 10.7 27.3 
1999 99.1 0.6 0.2 99.9 59.2 5.6 6.1 70.9 9.0 6.6 13.6 29.2 
Food (31 ) 
1974/75 99.5 0.4 85.3 21.7 
1979 99.6 85 .7 24.2 
1986 99.2 0.6 0.1 99.9 70.9 5.9 3.7 80.5 16.7 5.6 8.1 30.4 
1991 99.4 0.4 0.1 99.9 73.8 5.2 3.3 82.3 11.0 3.8 16.9 31.7 
1996 99.4 0.4 0.1 99.9 75.7 4.7 3.3 83.7 13.6 5.1 8.5 27.2 
1999 99.3 0.5 0.1 99.9 72.8 5.0 3.8 81.6 9.1 4.8 12.3 26.2 
Textiles and Apparel (32) 
1974/75 98.6 1.2 73.8 15.6 
1979 98.9 62.8 ._ 18.9 
1986 98.3 1.3 0.2 99.8 49.1 10.3 8.0 67.4 8.5 6.6 10.4 25.5 
1991 98.8 0.8 0.2 99.8 40.2 6.3 7.9 54.4 17.2 4.6 8.9 30.7 
1996 98.8 0.8 0.2 99.8 38.4 5.9 6.2 50.5 10.5 3.5 6.3 20.3 
1999 98.6 0.9 0.2 99.7 37.0 5.5 6.4 48.9 7.1 3.6 9.8 20.5 
Machinery (38) 
19752) 97.4 1.9 58.2 10.2 
1979 98.0 55.0 14.3 
1986 96.9 2.2 0.6 99.7 39.5 12.2 14.5 66.2 7.3 8.6 18.4 34.3 
1991 95.7 2.7 1.0 99.4 29.2 10.6 14.4 54.2 4.6 6.9 17.9 29.4 
1996 96.2 2.4 0.8 99.4 27.1 9.4 13.6 50.1 2.8 3.6 10.8 17.2 
1999 95.7 2.8 0.9 99.4 25.5 9.5 12.4 47.4 2.5 6.3 11.4 20.2 
Notes: 1) Oil and gas subsectors (ISIC 353 and 354) are excluded. 
2) The numbers in parentheses indicate ISIC industrial code. 
3) The numbers in the column headings indicate firm size in terms of the number of employees. 
The mark (-) illustrates unavailability of the data. 
Sources: Calculated from BPS, unpublished data of Large and Medium Manufacturing Statistics , 
Economic Census (1974/75 , 1986 and 1996), and Statistical Year Book of Indonesia. 
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Table 4.13 indicates changes in the size distribution of the Indonesian non-
oil/ gas manufacturing industry in terms of numbers of establishment, employment and 
value added since the mid- l 970s. In accordance with the typical patterns of size 
structure in developing economies, the Indonesian economy shows that the shares of 
SMEs are dominant in terms of establishments and labour force, while LEs generate the 
majority of manufacturing value aqded. 27 
The SME group as a whole occupied nearly 100 percent of total establishments, 
without significant changes across sectors and over time. Among SMEs, those with 19 
or less employees formed 95-99 percent of the total. In the case of the machinery sector 
(ISIC 38), the share of smaller SMEs with 19 or less workers was slightly lower than 
the two other sectors and manufacturing as a whole and, instead, that of medium and 
larger SMEs with 20 to 99 workers and with 100 to 299 workers was higher. However, 
the overwhelming majority of establishments consisted of SMEs. 
In manufacturing employment, SMEs also dominated, but their shares declined 
continuously. In the 1970s, smaller SMEs with 19 or less workers employed more than 
80 percent of the total workforce in manufacturing.28 The employment share of this 
SME group decreased to 68 percent in 1986 and around 60 percent in the second half of 
the 1990s. The share of medium and larger SMEs in employment did not change much 
during 1986-9, and remained above 5 to 6 percent. As a consequence, the employment 
share of the entire SME sector with 299 or less workers declined from 80 percent to 70 
percent between 1986 and 1999. These changes reflect the growth patterns of 
27 Based on the 1986 BPS data, Hill (1992: 244) also stated that the size distribution of Indonesian 
manufacturing resembles the typical developing country pattern in terms of output and employment. 
28 The levels of the employment and output share of smaller SMEs with 19 or less employees were 
remarkably different in the 1970s and in 1986. This gap implies that the 1974/75 census and 1979 survey 
overestimated employment and output of smaller SMEs and/or underestimated those of the remaining 
firm groups with 20 or more employees . Therefore, it is better to consider the figures of employment and 
output in the 1970s as rough indications of trend. 
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employment between different firm size groups, in which LEs grew more rapidly in 
creating employment than SMEs. 
During 1986-99, around 80 percent of employment in food processing (ISIC 31) 
was at SMEs with 299 or less workers. In this industry, scale economies are less 
significant and the necessity for on-site processing may actually provide advantages to 
small-scale operations (Hill 1992: 246). On the other hand, the share of employment at 
SMEs in the textile and apparel (ISIC 32) and machinery (ISIC 38) sectors clearly 
decreased over the period. 
The share of LEs in value added exceeded that of SMEs and generally increased 
after the mid- l 970s. In manufacturing as a whole, the share of smaller SMEs in value 
added decreased from more than 20 percent in the 1970s to roughly 10 percent in the 
latter half of the 1990s. This is the main explanation for the decrease in the share of the 
entire SME sector in value added. Food (ISIC 31 ), textiles and apparel (ISIC 32) and 
machinery (ISIC 38) reveal similar trends over time in the share of value added between 
different firm size groups. 
Although the share of SMEs in value added was relatively small and decreased 
since the mid- l 970s, it is evident that the SME sector contributed significantly to the 
Indonesian economy in terms of the number of establishments and employment. In 
addition, it should be noted that our analysis of the size distribution of manufacturing 
firms was based on the data in the years shown in Table 4.13 (current year series). If 
this study had used the data classified by firm size in a specific base year or in the year 
when firms started operations (initial year series), the trend in the share of SMEs in 
value added would have been different. Aswicahyono, Bird and Hill ( 1996: 353-4) 
investigated the distribution of value added by firm size, employing the data based on 
both the current year and initial year series. According to their analysis on the basis of 
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the current year classification, the share of smaller firms with 20-99 workers in value 
added declined gradually after the late 1970s. On the other hand, their observation on 
the data of the initial year series revealed a dynamism of SMEs, showing that the share 
of the 20-99 firm group in value added was substantially higher than that of the 
counterpart group based on the current year series, and that the medium group with 
100-499 workers expanded remartably after the mid-1980s. This implies that firms 
starting from small- and medium-scale operations tend to grow more dynamically than 
those from large-scale operations. 
4.4 Economic Performance and Productivity Growth of the 
Indonesian Manufacturing Industry by Firm Size 
This section analyses the development of SMEs in Indonesia, based on the national-
level statistical data. The economic performance of manufacturing enterprises by firm 
size is discussed in the first part, while the growth of labour productivity and total 
. 
factor productivity (TFP) are calculated for SMEs and LEs separately in the second part. 
4.4.1 Economic Performance of SMEs and LEs in Indonesia 
It is useful to compare economic performance of manufacturing SMEs and LEs in order 
to understand the characteristics of production structure in both groups. For this 
purpose, our study uses the unpublished Large and Medium Manufacturing Statistics of 
BPS , which gives value added (Y), the number of employees (L), and wage rates (cv, 
defined as total labour costs divided by the number of workers) by firm scale during 
1986-99. As explained before, since BPS ' s backcast data were not available to the 
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author, our study uses its original data~ This study estimates capital stock (K) excluding 
land in 1993 constant prices (see Appendix 4.1 to this chapter). Because of difficulties 
in estimating capital stock for SMEs with 19 or less workers, these smaller SMEs are 
not included in our analysis.29 
What patterns of scale differentials in the economic performance of firms can be 
found in the Indonesian non-oil/gas manufacturing industry? Are such observations in 
Indonesia consistent with theoretically expected patterns or those obtained from Japan's 
experience, as discussed in the previous chapter? Table 4.14 shows productivities, 
capital intensity, wage rates and income share of labour by firm size in 1986, 1996 and 
1999. 
Some previous studies (e.g., Berry and Mazumdar 1991: 52; Tajima 1978: 12-5) 
discussed conditions under which SMEs can compete with LEs. According to the 
theoretical framework presented in these studies, when capital intensity rises 
consistently with firm size, labour productivity tends to increase, but (assuming 
constant returns to scale) less than proportionately to capital intensity, which leads to a 
decrease in capital productivity. Wages are likely to escalate with firm scale, which is 
one of the reasons for the increase in capital intensity. However, unless profitability is 
to decline with firm size, wage rates have to increase less than labour productivity, so 
that a higher share of value added can be used for investment in fixed capital. 
The aggregate manufacturing data for Indonesia indicate a similar trend in three 
different years before and after the crisis, 1986, 1996 and 1999. Table 4.14 shows that 
capital intensity (KIL) rises with firm size, albeit with some irregularities. In 1986 and 
1996, the peaks in the capital-labour ratio were found in the second largest scale group 
29 Since no time series data on annual investment for firms with 19 or less workers has to our knowledae b been available, it is extremely difficult to estimate capital stock for those smaller SMEs. 
147 
with 300 to 999 employees. In 1999, on the other hand, capital intensity increased up to 
a peak in the range of 100 to 299 employees, before levelling off. 
Table 4.14 Economic Performance of Indonesia's Non-Oil/Gas Industry by Firm Size 
in 1986, 1996 and 1999 1) 
Indices of Indicators (Firm Size 20-49 = JOO) 3) 
Firm Size 2) KIL YIL YIK (JJ wl.lY 
(/J) 
Manufacturing in 1986 
20 - 49 100 100 100 100 100 
50 - 99 257 165 64 146 89 
100 - 299 350 281 80 204 73 
300 - 999 378 350 93 203 58 
1,000 - 320 388 121 218 56 
Manufacturing in 1996 
20 - 49 100 100 100 100 100 
50 - 99 256 262 102 143 55 
100 - 299 421 293 69 187 64 
300 - 999 431 316 73 209 66 
1,000 - 361 499 138 245 49 
Manufacturing in 1999 
20 - 49 100 100 100 100 100 
50 - 99 222 258 116 159 61 
100 - 299 356 317 89 164 52 
300 - 999 342 367 107 172 47 
1,000 - 356 335 94 166 50 
Notes : 1) Oil and gas subsectors (ISIC 353 and 354) are excluded. 
2) Finn size is indicated by the number of employees. 
3) Y = value added, L = the number of employees, K = capital stock, w = wages per employee 
(wage rates), YIL = labour productivity, K/L = capital-labour ratio , Y/K = capital productivity, 
and wVY = income share of labour. 
Source: Calculated from BPS , unpublished data of La.rge and Medium Manufacturing Statistics. 
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Labour productivity (Y/L) increased with size, except for 1999, when the second 
largest size group recorded the highest productivity level. Capital productivity (YIK) 
was not consistent with expected patterns. The output-capital ratio first decreased, then 
increased as firms are larger. Wage rates (w) rose with firm scale, with an anomaly in 
1999, when the second largest size group provided the highest wages. The income 
share of labour (wUY or /3) fell almost monotonously, with small irregularities in 1996 
and 1999. In accordance with normal predictions, labour productivity rose less steeply 
than capital intensity with the scale of firms, except for anomalies in the largest size 
group in 1986 and 1996. Similarly, differences in wages between firm groups by scale 
are less than those in labour productivity. 
Compared to Japan in Chapter 3, Indo11esia does not show regular patterns in a 
set of indicators representing the production structure of firms classified by scale. 
Tajima (1978: 16-27) suggested three possible reasons for these irregularities in 
developing economies. As a primary reason, he raised statistical problems such as the 
limited number of sample firms and inaccurate data, . particularly for capital stock. This 
reason is relevant to the case of Indonesia, where the number of sample establishments 
in the manufacturing industry as a whole in 1996 is around 23,000, far less than that of 
Japan, observed in Chapter 3.30 Irregularities are more frequently observed in sectoral 
performance, because individual characteristics tend to appear in a relatively small 
sample size.31 As described above, capital productivity behaves in an irregular fashion 
in Indonesia. This may be due partly to the limitations of the capital stock estimates. 
30 The annual survey of Large and Medium Manufacturing Statistics has been conducted in the form of a 
complete enumeration. In this survey, questionnaires are delivered to all establishments that are 
considered to employ 20 or more workers and are recorded in the Manufacturing Industry Directory 
compiled by BPS. However, it seems that a large number of eligible firms are not covered in the 
directory. In fact, this study found several firms in our sample which were not listed in the directory. In 
addition, the number of manufacturing establishments with 20 or more workers in Indonesia is not large, 
because of the nascent stage of industrial development. For reference, the number of sample enterprises 
in Japan in 1957 described in Chapter 3 was more than 400,000. 31 In a preliminary analysis based on the data in 1996, our study confirmed this tendency in Indonesia. 
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Tajima' s second reason originates from heterogeneity, which often appears in 
the process of industrialisation in developing economies. The coexistence of traditional 
and modern production systems, which are likely to have extremely different capital 
intensities, causes an anomaly in capital-related indicators. For example, compared to 
other industries, the chemical and basic metal industries in Indonesia are 
disproportionately dependent on capital-intensive technology. Non-pribumi firms seem 
to be far more capital-intensive than pribumi firms . These kinds of heterogeneity may 
distort capital productivity in Indonesia. 
The third reason is related to policy stance of governments towards different-
scale enterprises. As noted in the previous section of this chapter, the Indonesian 
government has introduced and implemented industrial policy measures in favour of 
LEs. This policy distortion usually generates irregularities in economic performance 
between different-scale firm groups in the manufacturing sector. 
However, our analysis of the Indonesian manufacturing industry generally 
indicates that 1) capital intensity, labour productivity, and wage rates rise with firm 
size; 2) the income share of labour declines with firm scale; 3) the differentials in 
labour productivity between firm groups by scale are larger than those in wage rates; 4) 
the differentials in the capital-labour ratio by firm size are larger than those in labour 
productivity in some cases; and 5) capital productivity falls with firm scale in some 
cases. These findings confirm that SMEs can in principle coexist with LEs, by 
producing a unit of output with less capital but more labour than LEs (Berry and 
Mazumdar 1991: 52; Tajima 1978: 27). 
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4.4.2 Productivity Growth of SMEs and LEs in Indonesia 
As was already observed, the Indonesian non-oillgas manufacturing industry grew 
rapidly during the decade prior to the 1997-98 economic crisis. This high growth in 
manufacturing was led by not only LEs but also SMEs. Table 4.12 showed that, during 
1986-96, SMEs increased value added and employment at annual rates of 8.5 percent 
and 6.6 percent, while LEs raised them at 13.3 percent and 11.1 percent. 
This subsection examines the evolution of dynamic forces operative 1n the 
manufacturing industry, and assesses changes in productivity for both SMEs and LEs. 
Similar to the previous subsection, this subsection also uses the unpublished Lczrge and 
Medium Manufacturing Statistics of BPS to obtain the data of value added (Y), the 
number of employees (L), wage rates (co), capital stock (K) at a benchmark year and 
capital fixed investment (I) for SMEs with 20 to 299 employees and LEs with 300 or 
more employees during 1986-99. 32 
Table 4.15 displays the average annual growth rates of labour productivity (YIL) 
for SMEs and LEs in manufacturing as a whole and several selected sectors/subsectors 
over the period 1986-96. Labour productivity is a useful indicator, because it can 
represent the efficiency of labour (as an abundant resource in Indonesia) in generating 
output. In manufacturing as a whole, average labour productivity for SMEs and LEs 
increased at annual rates of 2.3 percent and 2.2 percent, respectively. The food industry 
(ISIC 31) maintained high annual labour productivity growth of 4.2 percent and 5 
percent for SMEs and LEs, respectively, while labour productivity in the textile and 
32 As stated in Section 4.2, this study uses not BPS' s backcast data but its original data. All data are in 
real terms at 1993 constant prices. Value added (Y), wage rates (cv) and capital fixed investment (I) are deflated by implicit GDP deflator for manufacturing industry from the Indonesian national accounts, 
consumer price indices from World Development Indicators 2001 (World Bank) and implicit deflator for gross fixed capital formation from the Indonesian national accounts, respectively. With regard to the 
capital stock estimates, see Appendix 4.1 to this chapter. 
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apparel industry (ISIC 32) recorded negative growth at -2.9 percent and -5.6 percent for 
SMEs and LEs. As already indicated in Table 4.12, even though output in the textile 
and apparel industry grew remarkably at the rate of 9 .5 percent annually during 1986-96, 
employment increased more rapidly at the annual rate of 11.2 percent. This rapid 
absorption of employment in the textile and apparel sector is the main explanation for 
the negative growth rates of labour productivity for SMEs and LEs. 
Table 4.15 Growth of Labour Productivity and Total Factor Productivity (TFP) 1n 
Indonesia's Non-OiVGas Manufacturing Industry, 1986-19961) 
Sector 2) 
Manufacturing 
Food and Beverages (31) 
Textiles and Apparel (32) 
Machinery (38) 
Metalworking (381) 
General Machinery (382) 
Electrical Equipment (383) 
Automobile Assembling (38431 ) 
Automobile Parts (38432+33) 
Bicycle(38443+44) 
YIL 
2.3 
4.2 
-2.9 
4.8 
5.9 
9.7 
3.6 
8.8 
6.8 
Average Annual Growth Rates (% )3) 
SMEs 4) LEs 4 ) 
TFP YIL 
1.9 2.2 
-3.5 5.0 
-6.5 -5.6 
7.5 8.9 
3.9 2.6 
16.3 11.3 
11.3 8.6 
26.7 
10.6 24.2 
-0.2 22.7 
Notes: 1) Oil and gas subsectors (ISIC 353 and 354) are excluded. 
TFP 
2.3 
-4.0 
2.1 
4.9 
7.0 
-19.8 
8.6 
16.0 
11.5 
11.4 
2) The numbers in parentheses indicate ISIC (International Standard Industrial Classification) 
code. 
3) The data at 1993 constant prices are used to calculate the growth of labour productivity and 
TFP. 
4) SMEs = firms with 20 to 299 workers , LEs = those with 300 or more workers. 
Source: Calculated from BPS , unpublished data of Large and Medium Manufacturing Statistics. 
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In the machinery sector (ISIC 3 8), LEs achieved high rates of increase in labour 
productivity over the period 1986-96. Significant is transport equipment, under which 
automobile assembling (ISIC 38431), automobile parts (ISIC 38432+38433) and 
bicycle (ISIC 38443+38444) producing firms all raised labour productivity at more than 
20 percent per annum. This implies that LEs improved labour productivity under the 
conditions in which the demand for their products rapidly grew during the economic 
boom. On the other hand, the SME sector in the machinery industry raised labour 
productivity at 4.8 percent annually. Still, most of the machinery subsectors showed a 
sufficient performance in labour productivity growth. Within the transport equipment 
subsector, automobile parts (ISIC 38432+38433) and bicycles (ISIC 38443+38444) 
increased their labour productivity at 8.8 percent and 6.8 percent per year, respectively, 
under the expansion of their markets in the high economic growth period. 
Table 4.15 also shows changes in total factor productivity (TFP), which can 
indicate technological progress in a broad sense defined as the residual not explained by 
increases in factor inputs. In this study, the labour input is not adjusted for quality 
changes, due to the data constraints. The data for capital stock are weak, as Appendix 
4.1 explains. The growth of TFP is measured simply as the residual between output 
growth and factor input increases.33 
Several studies measured TFP growth in Indonesia. Aswicahyono ( 1998) and 
Timmer (1999) are recent and comprehensive studies that focused on TFP in 
Indonesia's manufacturing industry over the long-term period. They estimated TFP for 
each sector in the manufacturing industry with the use of technically sophisticated 
methods. However, no TFP estimates have been undertaken for Indonesia by firm size 
33 Under these conditions, our rough estimates of TFP growth, of course, include observational and 
approximation errors and do not purely draw technological or institutional development. For further details of this type of growth accounting and the associated errors, see Hayami (1997: 116-9). 
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category (Berry, Rodriguez and Sandee 2001: 367). Despite its simple approach , this 
study is the first to measure TFP growth for SMEs and LEs separately. 
For the estimates of TFP growth, the following Cobb-Douglas production 
function is assumed: 
Y=AF (K, L) (4.4.1 ) 
where manufacturing value added Y is produced from capital K and labour L under the 
conditions of neutral technological change and constant returns to scale. By taking total 
derivatives of equation ( 4.4.1) with respect to time (t) and dividing all terms by Y, the 
Cobb-Douglas production function can be written as: 
g (Y) = g (A) + ag (K) + /Jg (L) (4.4.2) 
where g indicates the growth rates, and a and /3 represent the income shares of capital 
and labour, respectively, as equivalent with production elasticities of capital and 
labour.34 g(A ) is a residual in the growth of Y after the effects of increases in Kand L 
are subtracted. Since value added Y is the sum of capital and labour incomes, a and /J 
add up to one (a + /J = 1). Subsequently, by subtracting g(L) from both sides of 
equation ( 4 .4.2), the growth of labour productivity can be approximated by: 
g (Y/L ) = g (A) + ag (KIL) (4 .4.3) 
34 For TFP estimates in this chapter, income share of labour (/J) is calculated as the average of wUY in 
1986 and 1996. After that, income share of capital (a) can simply be obtained by subtracting /J from 1. 
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The data for Y, K, L and a. (a. = 1 - /3) by firm size during 1986-96 are available from 
the unpublished BPS source Large and Medium Manufacturing Statistics, as explained 
before. With the use of these data, g(A), the growth of residual or TFP, can be 
calculated by subtracting measured a.g(K/L) from measured g(YIL) based on the relation 
of equation (4.4.3). 
In the manufacturing industry as a whole, TFP for SMEs grew at 1. 9 percent per 
year, which is slightly lower than that for LEs of 2.3 percent. Both manufacturing 
SMEs and LEs in Indonesia demonstrated technological advance during 1986-96. The 
levels of these TFP growth rates are similar to those given by Osada (1994: 482) and 
Timmer (1999: 86-7), which estimated 3.6 percent during 1985-90 and 2.1 percent 
during 1991-95, respectively, as the aggregate TFP growth in manufacturing. 
SMEs in the food processing (ISIC 31) and textile and apparel (ISIC 32) 
industries recorded annual TFP growth of -3.5 percent and -6.5 percent, respectively. 
Value added and labour productivity for SMEs and LEs in the food processing sector 
increased at remarkable rates. However, the growth of capital input was more rapid 
than that of output. As a consequence, TFP growth for both firm groups became 
negative. This result is not significantly different from that of Osada (1994: 482), 
which indicated annual TFP growth of -1 percent for the food processing industry 
during 1985-90. 
In the textile and apparel industry, some possible explanations for the negative 
TFP growth of the SME group may be considered. A significant increase in investment 
in this industry during the period of export boom seems to have surpassed the capacity 
of SMEs to absorb it. A series of economic reforms since the early 1980s may have 
had some adverse effects on an improvement of efficiency for textile and apparel SMEs. 
However, TFP for LEs increased at a modest rate of 2.1 percent per year and the textile 
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and apparel industry as a whole including both SMEs and LEs indicated a positive 
growth of 1 percent per annum. This rate is lower, but not substantially different from 
that of Aswicahyono (1998: 218) and Timmer (1999: 87), which presented annual TFP 
growth rates of 2.4 percent during 1989-93 and 3.6 percent during 1991-95, 
respectively. 
In the machinery industry (I.SIC 38), SMEs and LEs showed TFP growth of 7 .5 
percent and 4.9 percent per year, respectively. Most of the machinery subsectors 
recorded significant TFP growth of SMEs and LEs, with some exceptions such as 
general machinery (ISIC 382). SMEs in automobile parts (ISIC 38432+38433) 
experienced rapid TFP growth of more than 10 percent annually. These estimates are 
consistent with those of Timmer (1999: 87), which reported that TFP in the machinery 
sector as a whole grew at an average rate of 6.9 percent per annum during 1991-95. 
SMEs in the Indonesian machinery sector increased TFP to a significant degree 
during 1986-96. How were these SMEs able to achieve such high rates of TFP change? 
An increase in TFP can _ be achieved through the development of technology. 
Technological upgrading in this context includes not only investment in better 
machinery and equipment but also improvement in production technology, product 
design, quality management, workplace organisation, inventory management and so on. 
However, as Berry, Rodriguez and Sandee (2001: 363) pointed out, the majority of 
SMEs are generally less able to improve such areas successfully on their own than LEs. 
From this point of view, subcontracting ties with LEs may possibly have been an 
important source of technological improvement for SMEs, as described in the previous 
chapters. It seems reasonable to hypothesise that the rapid TFP growth of Indonesian 
machinery SMEs in 1986-96 can be attributed to some extent to the role of 
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subcontracting in providing them with opportunities to acquire knowledge of how to 
upgrade technological capabilities. 
In general, due to the sectoral characteristics such as the divisibility of 
production processes and the products for use as intermediate inputs, SMEs and LEs in 
the machinery industry tend to establish subcontracting linkages more frequently than 
other manufacturing industries (Odaka 1978: 245-6). 35 Van Diermen (1997: 171) 
concluded that vertical inter-firm linkages in garment and wood furniture subsectors in 
Jakarta were not very frequent and did not play a significant role in the development of 
SMEs. Other studies, for instance, Berry and Levy (1999) and Sandee, Andadari and 
Sulandjari (2000), discussed subcontracting SMEs in garment and furniture sectors in 
Indonesia. However, most of the case studies on subcontracting in Indonesia deal with 
the machinery industry. For example, Harianto (1996: 60) pointed out that 
subcontracting linkages in the machinery sector (bicycle and pumps for oil as his 
specific cases) have been intense because of the nature of the production processes and 
technologies, the quality standard required in the final markets and the competitiveness 
of the markets. Altogether, these studies suggest that vertical inter-firm linkages occur 
relatively more frequently in the machinery sector than in other sectors. 
The high TFP growth of SMEs in automobile parts corresponds to the 
remarkable TFP growth of LEs in automobile assembling (ISIC 38431) and LEs in 
automobile parts. The latter groups are business counterparts for the former group as 
principal firms or higher-layer supplier firms. This suggests that small-medium 
automotive parts supplier firms obtained benefits such as knowledge of production 
technology and advice on management from large automobile assembler firms or large 
automotive component supplier firms , possibly through their subcontracting linkages . 
35 Of course, the extent of such interrelations varies from country to country . 
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4.5 SMEs and Subcontracting in Indonesia 
Many of the case studies on subcontracting linkages in the Indonesian manufacturing 
industry focused on the machinery sector. Based on the available literature, Table 4.16 
summarises several types of support for small-medium supplier firms extended by large 
parent firms through subcontracting transactions in the machinery industry in Indonesia. 
Thee (1985) reported subcontracting linkages between small-scale metalworking 
and machinery parts supplier firms and large-scale diesel engine assembler firms in the 
early 1980s. This case study found that some kinds of assistance were provided to 
small firms through vertical inter-firm linkages such as QC (quality control) support, 
credit, supply of raw materials and managerial training (Table 4.16). Thee concluded, 
however, that subcontracting networks remained weak and fluid, and did not 
sufficiently improve the technical and other capabilities of SMEs . The results of Thee' s 
study may reflect the stage of Indonesian industrial development in the early l 980s, 
when the market was not expanding rapidly, the economy was still in its industrial 
infancy, and technological gaps between what small enterprises could manage and what 
large assemblers expected were considerable (Hill 2001: 249). 
In the 1990s, several studies investigated the role of subcontracting 1n SME 
development. Harian to ( 1996) analysed characteristics of subcontracting transactions 
in local Indonesian firms in the early 1990s, taking bicycle, pumps for oil and trading of 
garment products as his cases. A large manufacturer of oil pumps provided its 
subcontracting SMEs with support in several areas, particularly technology and finance . 
Similarly, a large bicycle assembler firm extended technical , QC and managerial 
support to small-scale supplier fi rms through the dispatch of engineers. The parent firm 
sometimes involved its subcontractors in parts design and organised study tours that 
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took them to foreign bicycle industries in, for example, Taiwan. Through 
subcontracting, the bicycle assembler firm also gave its parts supplier firms 
opportunities to negotiate price levels based on the cost plus fee method. Harianto 
found that the expected benefits from subcontracting transactions prevented both 
supplier and assembler firms from pursuing short-term gains by behaving 
opportunistically. The bicycle assembler firm recognised the benefits of subcontracting 
linkages including information on the technical and managerial reliability of supplier 
SMEs, while SME parts suppliers perceived gains such as information on the 
production plans of the assembler firm and large and continuous orders in the longer 
term. 
Sato (1998a) traced the development of subcontracting networks in the 
Indonesian motorcycle industry in the mid-1990s. She observed that lower-layer 
(second- and third-layer) parts supplier firms had emerged relatively recently and that 
under multi-strata subcontracting chains, SME support had been extended by both 
higher-tier supplier firms and assembler firms. In her case study, one large-scale 
motorcycle manufacturer provided assistance in establishing a first-tier supplier firm 
owned by an ex-employee. The first-tier parts producer, in tum, assisted its employees 
to spin out of the firm to establish new enterprises that served it as second- or third-tier 
supplier firms. It provided these spin-off supplier firms with various forms of 
assistance including technical, managerial, marketing and financial support. 
Supratikno ( 1998) investigated subcontracting arrangements as a competitive 
strategy and production organisation for assembler firms in the mid- l 990s, looking in 
detail at three assembler firms engaged in the production of motorcycles, diesel engines 
and brass handicrafts. Supratikno concluded that subcontracting relationships can 
facilitate the growth of supplier SMEs and help them overcome development 
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constraints such as unstable markets and low quality and technology, although the 
contribution of subcontracting to the competitiveness of parent firms was not significant. 
Other than the machinery industry, subcontracting linkages in the garment and 
furniture industries have been studied. On the basis of case studies involving rattan 
furniture, wooden furniture and garments production, Berry and Levy (1999: 50) 
pointed out that subcontracting is .a prevailing way of channelling SME products into 
export markets and that it has played an important role in disseminating technologies 
relevant for export production to SMEs. A case study focusing on the wooden furniture 
industry in Jepara (Central Java) allowed Sandee, Andadari and Sulandjari (2000: 190) 
to conclude that QC, standardisation and sophisticated finishing provided by LEs 
through subcontracting ties enabled small-scale furniture producers to participate in 
export production. 
These case studies demonstrate that in the 1990s subcontracting networks 
beneficial to SME development have emerged in Indonesia's manufacturing industry , 
particularly the machinery industry.36 Larger SMEs as well as competent LEs often 
played an essential role in activating subcontracting in Indonesia. The emergence of 
those subcontracting ties can be seen as a response to rapid market expansion and 
industrial development which increased the opportunities for firms to explore mutually 
beneficial subcontracting relations. Through vertical inter-firm linkages, SMEs have 
been offered various forms of support, particularly in the areas of technology and 
marketing. The above findings on the evolution of subcontracting ties between SMEs 
and LEs are not very unusual cases but a recent tendency especially in the machinery 
industry (Hill 2001: 263) . 
36 This development of subcontracting linkages between SMEs and LEs was consistent with government 
policy such as the deletion programs and the Bapak Angkat (foster-father) programs. However, the 
above case studies did not indicate that these government programs significantly supported the promotion 
of subcontracting transactions in the private sector in a direct or indirect manner. 
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Table 4.16 Support from Parent Firms through Subcontracting Linkages in Indonesia's 
Machinery Industry 
Technical 
Support 
Financial 
Support 
and 
Price Setting 
Supply of Input 
Materials 
Managerial 
Support 
Other Support 
Observation 
Period 
Diesel Engines 
· provision of QC 
support 
· provision of 
technical 
specification 
• provision of loans 
for suppliers 
· provision of credit 
guarantees for 
suppliers 
· lending of 
machinery 
· price negotiation 
between parent 
and supplier firms 
· provision of raw 
materials 
· provision of 
managerial 
training for small 
industry 
· the first half of the 
1980s 
Pump Units for Oil 
· provision of 
technical support 
in production 
processes and 
inspection via 
dispatch of 6 
experts 
· selection of proper 
production 
equipment 
· setting of 
favourable 
payment 
· conditions 
provision of loan 
guarantees for 
· suppliers 
supply of used 
equipment at low 
cost 
· supply of input 
materials 
· provision of 
managerial support 
through dispatch 
of experts 
· assistance in 
establishing 
supplier firms 
· the early 1990s 
Bicycles Motorcycles 
· provision of · preparation for 
technical and QC training programs 
support through in QC and 
dispatch of experts production 
· dispatch of technologies (e.g., 
suppliers to dies making) 
foreign markets as · frequent evaluation 
study tour on suppliers' 
· involvement of performance ( e.g., 
suppliers in design QCD) 
phase 
· setting of · provision of loan 
favourable guarantees for 
payment suppliers 
conditions 
(limited) 
· price negotiation, 
adopting cost plus 
fee method 
· supply of input · supply of input 
materials ( very materials 
limited) 
· provision of · preparation for 
managerial support training programs 
in managerial 
fields (e.g., 
accounting) 
· assistance in · assistance in 
establishing establishing 
supplier firms supplier firms 
· assistance in · support by higher 
finding other tier suppliers to 
customers lower tier suppliers 
· the early 1990s · the mid- l 990s 
Sources: Diesel engines: Thee (1985); pump units for oil and bicycles: Harianto (1996); and 
motorcycles: Sato (1998a). 
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Since nation-wide statistical data on inter-firm linkages are available in Japan, it 
is possible to measure the impact of subcontracting on the development of SMEs in a 
quantitative and comprehensive way.37 However, the lack of such data in Indonesia has 
prevented us from generalising the role of subcontracting in supporting the SME sector. 
Therefore, several studies described in this chapter and other literature that focused on 
SMEs and vertical inter-firm link~ges in Indonesia used a descriptive and case study 
approach with the use of micro-level and qualitative information. Similarly, this 
chapter itself also cannot sufficiently examine the relationships between subcontracting 
and changes in productivity of SMEs. For the purpose of overcoming such constraints , 
the subsequent chapters in this study are designed to investigate SME development 
through subcontracting in Indonesia based on a micro-level survey that covers not only 
qualitative but also quantitative aspects. 
4.6 Conclusion 
The Indonesian economy grew rapidly and its structure transformed substantially 
during the three decades before the 1997-98 crisis. Agriculture lost its dominant share 
in output and employment, while industry, in particular manufacturing, gained 
. prorrunence. 
Although Indonesia formulated a variety of policies for the promotion of SMEs, 
most of them were not effective or did not work well, due to inadequate designs of 
programs and insufficient implementation capabilities of the government sector. The 
performance of the LE sector was generally better than that of the SME sector. 
However, along with LEs, SMEs developed reasonably well in terms of output and 
37 See Hondai (1 992) and Urata (1995), both of which were referred to and analysed in Chapter 3. 
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employment growth. In particular, SMEs in the machinery sector recorded good results. 
The share of SMEs in value added was relatively small, but the SME sector contributed 
to a great extent to the Indonesian economy in terms of the number of establishments 
and labour force. The impact of the 1997-98 crisis on SMEs was different in each case. 
The analysis of economic performance in the Indonesian manufacturing industry 
by firm size indicates that: 1) capital intensity, labour productivity, and wage rates rise 
with firm size; 2) the income share of labour declines with firm size; 3) the differentials 
in labour productivity between firm groups by size are larger than those in wage rates; 
4) the differentials in capital-labour ratio by firm size are larger than those in labour 
productivity in some cases; and 5) capital productivity falls with firm size in some cases. 
Despite several irregularities, these findings support in broad terms the suggestion that 
SMEs can coexist with LEs, by producing a unit of output with less capital but more 
labour than LEs (Berry and Mazumdar 1991: 52; Tajima 1978: 27). 
In Indonesian manufacturing as a whole, SMEs and LEs increased labour 
productivity at a similar rate during 1986-96. SMEs in the machinery industry 
increased labour productivity faster than SMEs in other main sectors. SMEs in the 
machinery industry also increased their TFP markedly, compared with SMEs in other 
key sectors, and even compared with LEs in the same sector. The machinery sector 
stands out for its closer subcontracting ties between SMEs and LEs than in other sectors. 
It therefore seems that subcontracting ties may help understand the better performance 
of SMEs in this sector, as they may have contributed to improvements in efficiency and 
technology during the economic boom period 1986-96. Thus, similar to Berry, 
Rodriguez and Sandee (2001 ), the rest of this study seeks to test the hypothesis that 
subcontracting was a key factor in improving the performance of SMEs in Indonesia. 
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As Hill (2001: 270) pointed out, more micro-level SME case studies are required 
to understand the factors affecting dynamic changes in the performance of the 
Indonesian SMEs. The rest of this study provides a detailed investigation into how, to 
what extent and why subcontracting has contributed to the development of SMEs in the 
machinery industry. The next chapter explains the design of our firm-level survey 
focusing on subcontracting relatiqnships between SMEs and LEs in the metalworking 
and machinery industries. 
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Appendix 4.1 Estimation of Capital Stock in the Manufacturing 
Industry 
The estimation of fixed capital stock in the Indonesian manufacturing industry is based 
on the following formula: 
Kr = ( 1 - c5) Kr-1 + Ir 
where Kr is fixed capital stock in year t, Ki_ 1 fixed capital stock in year t-1 , J the average 
depreciation rate in year t, and Ir annual fixed capital investment in year t. This 
procedure was used to calculate the real value of fixed assets. These data by firm size 
exclude land and are from BPS's unpublished Large and Medium Manufacturing 
Statistics. The values of annual fixed capital investment are deflated by the deflator of 
gross fixed capital formation (1993 = 100) from the Indonesian national accounts. The 
average depreciation rate is taken to be 7 percent per annum. This is an average of the 
rates of depreciation in different categories of capital stock; 5 percent (buildings where 
the period of depreciation is 20 years) , 6.7 percent (machinery 15 years), 10 percent 
(vehicles 10 years) , and 15 percent (other items 7 years).38 The average was obtained 
as a weighted average, using the shares of these fixed assets in the total for 1988 and 
1995. Since BPS does not have the values of annual fixed capital investment in 1996, 
they were estimated as a simple average of the values in 1995 and 1997. 
In accordance with the above formula, this study added the real value of annual 
fixed capital investment to the value of fixed assets in 19·88 , with an annual adjustment 
38 These depreciation rates are based on the information from firms we visited during the 1999-2000 field 
survey in Indonesia. The service lives adopted by this study are similar to those used by Goeltom (1995: 
84) and Timmer (1999: 80), which suggested 30 years for buildings, 10 years for machinery and 5 years 
for vehicles and other equipment. 
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of 7 percent for depreciation, to obtain the values of fixed capital stock (K) in the 1993 
constant prices during 1989-99. The data on fixed assets in 1988 are the oldest ones by 
firm size available to us. Fixed capital stock in 1986 and 1987 was estimated by 
deducting annual fixed capital investment in 1993 constant prices in the previous year 
with an adjustment of depreciation, working backwards from 1988. 
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Chapter 5 
Introduction to Micro-level Survey 
in Indonesia 
5.1 Introduction 
As explained in the previous chapters, this study hypothesises that the existence of 
vertical inter-firm linkages has been a factor that helped SMEs in Indonesia improve 
their capabilities and performance. Studies of small-medium enterprises based on a 
manufacturing database at the national level, as presented in Chapter 4, are of limited 
value to investigate this hypothesis. A comprehensive survey on subcontracting 
linkages has never been carried out in Indonesia. The existing literature, as discussed in 
Chapter 4, offers only incomplete data and information on the relevance of 
subcontracting transactions. For these reasons, this study obtained primary data and 
information on firms through a firm-level interview and questionnaire survey in 
Indonesia. This chapter and the following four are based on the results of this detailed 
firm-level survey in the metalworking and machinery industries. 
This chapter provides an introduction to our micro-level survey in Indonesia. 
Section 5 .2 illustrates the background of our field survey in Indonesia and discusses 
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issues such as the timing of survey, the collaborative organisations, and the impact of 
the 1997-98 economic crisis on the machinery industry. Section 5.3 explains the 
technical issues of our firm-level survey including the sampling procedures. Sections 
5.4 and 5.5 provide an overview of the basic characteristics of the sample SMEs and 
their subsectors. 
5.2 Background of the Field Survey in Indonesia 
Our field survey in Indonesia was undertaken during August 1999-March 2000, in the 
aftermath of the 1997-98 economic crisis. Its aim was to obtain firm-level data and 
information on metalworking and machinery SMEs. These were collected from SMEs 
themselves and large-scale assembler firms through an interview and/or questionnaire 
survey. In addition, supplementary data and information were collected from 
government agencies, industrial associations, financial institutions and other 
organisations related to SME development. This industry survey in Indonesia was 
conducted in cooperation with Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) and the 
Indonesian Ministry of Industry and Trade (MOIT), but the results and interpretations 
presented in this study are entirely independent from the views of these organisations. 
Because of the timing of the survey, the data obtained from our interview and 
questionnaire survey reflect effects of the 1997-98 crisis on the sample SMEs. As 
observed in Chapter 4, the negative consequences of this crisis have been significant for 
the Indonesian manufacturing industry as a whole. The collapse of the rupiah along 
with some other factors such as a rapid expansion of money supply drove inflation up 
roughly 58 percent in 1998, which intensified macroeconomic instability. After year-
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on-year GDP growth slowed to 4.3 percent in 1997, the economy contracted by 13.1 
percent in 1998. GDP in manufacturing also shrank by 11.4 percent in 1998. 
As the statistical data by firm size discussed in Chapter 4 indicated, these 
significant changes in the economic environment tended to negatively affect SMEs in 
the machinery sector, including our sample firms. During 1996-99, the SME sector in 
the machinery industry (ISIC 38) decreased its output at 1.4 percent per year. 
According to JICA (1999), approximately 80 percent of 129 sampled auto parts supplier 
firms in Indonesia replied that they had experienced negative effects during 1997-98. 
However, it is necessary to note that the impact of the economic crisis on SMEs 
is quite heterogeneous according to factors such as firm size (even within SMEs), sector 
(even within metalworking and machinery), location and market orientation. For 
example, within the SME sector in the machinery industry, medium SMEs with 20 to 
99 employees were better able to respond to the sudden changes in economic conditions 
than smaller SMEs with 19 or less employees. During 1996-99, value added of the 
former SME group expanded at an average annual rate of 12 percent, while that of the 
latter SME group contracted at a rate of 10 percent. It seems that performance of 
subcontracting SMEs in the crisis period would significantly depend on whether, in a 
relative sense, subcontracting linkages during 1997-98 served for LEs as buffers for 
economic fluctuations or served for SMEs as mechanisms of maintaining long-term 
relations and stable orders. 
Accordingly, this chapter and the following four will carefully consider the 
consequences of the crisis contained in the data and information obtained from our 
interview and questionnaire survey. Chapter 7 will be cautious, because it is largely 
based on quantitative data from SMEs on their production, which appear to be affected 
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by the crisis. 1 However, our study does not intend to focus on the impact of the crisis, 
but to understand the role of subcontracting linkages in SME development in a longer-
term perspective. 
5 .. 3 Methods of Firm-level Survey 
This study focuses on small-medium metalworking and machinery firms that have 
supplied their products or processing services to: 1) automobile and motorcycle; 2) 
agricultural machinery; and 3) bicycle manufacturers. The selection of these subsectors 
is a consequence of considerations about the divisibility of production processes and the 
need to compare different levels of quality of products and services required and 
supplied. The metalworking and machinery industry tends to have many production 
processes and can easily be divided into several operation stages. In general, 
automobile and motorcycle assembler firms require products from their supplier firms 
that are of a higher quality than agricultural machinery and bicycle assembler firms. 
From the above subsectors, firms were selected according to three criteria: 1) 
employment size (less than 300 employees); 2) investment status (mainly domestic 
investment); and 3) location (Jakarta, Sukabumi, Bandung and Surabaya). As argued in 
Chapter 4, this study defines SMEs as firms with 299 or less employees. Since joint 
venture companies have usually received strong support from their headquarters abroad, 
in addition to assistance from domestic sources, the study aimed to look mainly at 
Indonesian local firms without such intensive support from overseas. Also, this study 
needed to cover both urban and rural areas within a limited time. Chapter 4 illustrated 
that manufacturing in Indonesia has been concentrated in Java, particularly in 
1 Chapter 7 will examine whether and how our quantitative data are atypical owing to the impact of the 
economic crisis. 
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Jakarta/West Java and East Java. Such geographical distribution of manufacturing 
businesses may allow this study to select sample metal working and machinery firms in 
the following areas: 1) metropolitan JABOTABEK (greater Jakarta area consisting of 
the cities Jakarta, Bogor, Tanggerang and Bekasi); 2) the city Bandung (including its 
surrounding areas); 3) the town of Sukabumi (a town in rural West Java); and 4) the 
city Surabaya (including its surrounding areas). 
The fallowing information sources were used for the selection of our sample 
firms: 
(1) directories such as Indonesian Machinery Industry Directory (1998), Indonesian 
Manufacturers Directory 1997/1998 (1997) and Automotive Parts and Components 
Industry Directory in Indonesia ( 1996) of Capricorn Indonesia Consultant; 
(2) Manufacturing Directory Indonesia 1998 (1999) of BPS; 
(3) directories issued by industrial associations such as GIAMM Directory 97 (1997) of 
the Indonesian Automotive Parts and Components Industries Association and 
Metalworks & Machinery Industry Directory 1998-1999 (1997) of the Federation of 
Associations of Indonesian Metalworks and Machinery Industries (GAMMA); 
(4) Telephone Guide in Jakarta 1999: Industry and Commerce (Yellow Pages) (1999) 
of Inf omedia N usantara; and 
(5) direct information from industrial associations, assembler firms , higher-tier 
subcontractors and peer firms in similar lines of business. 
Based on such criteria and information sources, 205 firms were identified by the 
purposive sampling method and these were contacted by telephone and/or facsimile. In 
response to our request, 97 firms (93 local owned and 4 foreign affiliated) allowed us to 
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visit them and conduct our interview survey. Nonresponse bias does not seem serious 
in this firm-level survey, because of no clear indications of how nonresponse is related 
to firm performance and of relatively high response rates to our interview and 
questionnaire. 2 Most of the remaining 108 firms did not accept our visit. For some of 
them, the correct contact details were not available or firms had gone bankrupt. 
Interview surveys of 2 to 3 hours were conducted with the owners ( or at least directors) 
of 96 (93 local owned and 3 foreign affiliated) SMEs. 3 These 96 firms also allowed an 
inspection of the production facilities. After the interview, our questionnaire was 
submitted to owners (or directors). 
The responses from these 96 SMEs that replied to our interview survey are used 
1n Chapter 6 as the sampled data and information. Chapters 7 and 8 are based on 
further detailed data and information obtained from our questionnaire survey. The 
number of sampled SMEs in these two chapters is 60 in Chapter 7 and 73 in Chapter 8. 
The sample size is explained in each chapter. 
In addition to SMEs, interviews were conducted with 15 large-scale assembler 
firms consisting of six automobile assembler firms (including one large-scale 
components producer), two motorcycle assembler firms, three agricultural machinery 
assembler firms , and four bicycle assembler firms. 4 Chapter 9, which examines SMEs 
and subcontracting linkages from the viewpoint of large-scale parent firms , is based on 
the responses from the above 15 assembler firms. In parallel, interviews were also 
conducted in 20 government agencies, industrial associations, financial institutions and 
other organisations responsible for SME development. 
2 For further details on nonresponse bias, see Chapter 7 in this study. 
3 One foreign-affiliated SME refused to respond to our questions after we visited its office. 
4 Our visit to large-scale assembler firms is designed to supplement interviews with SMEs through 
obtaining from LEs the data and information on subcontracting linkages with SMEs and examining 
whether responses from SMEs are consistent with those from LEs. As will be observed in the subsequent 
section , populations of LEs in the selected subsectors are much smaller than those of SMEs. Therefore, 
the sample size of LEs is small in this study. 
172 
5.4 Basic Characteristics of the Sample Firms 
What types of SMEs were selected for this study? Table 5 .1 presents some of the key 
features of the 96 sample metalworking and machinery SMEs in the automobile, 
motorcycle, agricultural machinery and bicycle subsectors in 1998. 
The number of SMEs in our sample is distributed almost evenly over the size 
categories in terms of employment from micro-scale (1-19) to larger-scale (100-299). 
Around one third of the sample producers are managed by pribumi (indigenous 
Indonesian) entrepreneurs and the remaining two thirds by their non-pribumi (mainly 
ethnic Chinese) counterparts. 5 This proportion may suggest that non-pribumi 
entrepreneurs have played a major role in operations of Indonesian metalworking and 
machinery SMEs. Nearly three quarters of the firms were located in Jakarta (and 
surrounding areas), one fifth in Surabaya (including surrounding areas) and the rest in 
Sukabumi and Bandung (including surrounding areas). This reflects the locational 
concentration of the automobile, motorcycle, agricultural machinery, and bicycle 
businesses, which is consistent with the geographical distribution of manufacturing 
output discussed in Chapter 4. 
Two thirds of the sample SMEs were in the automobile and motorcycle 
subsectors and one third in the agricultural machinery and bicycle subsectors . These 
proportions of automotive/motorcycle and bicycle firms are close to those of the 
relative number of SMEs in these two groups reported in BPS's manufacturing statistics 
in 1998. 6 More than half of the respondents were engaged in machining and 
press/stamping, 10 percent in casting and forging, another 10 percent in plating, heat 
5 In this study, despite different wordings, expressions saying that " ..... firm is owned, directed, run , 
managed, etc. by ..... " refer to ethnic affiliation of the ownership of the firm. 6 The ISIC 'classification does not allow us to easily extract the number of SMEs producing agricultural 
machinery parts from BPS data. Therefore, the number of agricultural machinery parts supplier firms 
cannot be related to that of their automotive and motorcycle counterparts. 
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treatments , surface treatments, welding and painting, and the rema1n1ng 1n multi-
processes covering two or more activities of the above technological areas and sub-
assembling of parts/components. Our sampled SMEs tend to specialise in relatively 
simple materials processing technology. 
Approximately half of the firms began operations before 1989 and the remaining 
firms were established in the l 99Qs. The latter group started their business in response 
to the rapid expansion of respective markets. Almost one-third of the owners in the 
sample had university education, while approximately one-sixth of the surveyed 
enterprises employed skilled workers (including engineers and technicians) with some 
higher education. The educational levels of our metalworking and machinery SME 
entrepreneurs are similar to those of Indonesia's furniture counterparts, where nearly 30 
percent of entrepreneurs completed at least some university education (Levy, Berry and 
Nugent 1999: 23). Large and Medium Manufacturing Statistics 1996 reported that 
workers with higher educational levels of diploma (D3) or university accounted for 5 
percent of the total workforce in machinery SMEs. Compared to this BPS data, our 
sample SMEs appear to have workers with relatively high educational attainments. 
However, the discrepancy between these two sources is due to the use of different kinds 
of data. The data in this study showed average educational levels only in skilled 
workers working for SMEs with 299 or less employees located mostly in urban areas, 
whereas the data from BPS indicated educational levels of both skilled and non-skilled 
workers for SMEs with 20 to 99 employees located in urban and rural areas. 
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Table 5 .1 Profile of 96 Sample SMEs in 1998 
l. Size: Number of Workers 
1) 1 - 19 
2) 20 - 49 
3) so - 99 
4) 100 - 299 
2. Ethnic Group of Entrepreneurs 
l) pribumi 
2) non-pribumi 
3. Location 
1) Jakarta (and surrounding areas) 
2) Surabaya (and surrounding areas) 
3) Sukaburni 
4) Bandung (and surrounding areas) 
4. Subsector 
1) automotive/motorcycle 
2) agricultural machinery 
3) bicycle 
S. Major Manufacturing Processes I) 
1) multi-processes2) 
2) casting 
3) forging 
4) machining 
5) press/stamping 
6) others3) 
6. Year Established 
1) - 1979 
2) 1980 - 1989 
3) 1990 -
7. Educational Levels of Entrepreneurs 
1) high school or less (including D3)4) 
2) university 
8. Educational Levels of Skilled Employees (average) 
1) high school or less 
2) university (including D3)4) 
23% 
26% 
25 % 
26% 
37 % 
63 % 
74% 
18% 
6% 
2% 
67% 
21% 
12% 
24% 
8% 
1% 
33 % 
23 % 
11 % 
20% 
33 % 
47 % 
65% 
35 % 
83 % 
17% 
Notes: 1) Major manufacturing processes represent main technological activities or areas that each firm 
deals with in subcontracting business. 
2) Multi-processes indicate two or more technological areas among 2) casting - 6) others and sub-
assembling of parts/components. 
3) Others include plating, heat treatments , surface treatments , welding and painting. 
4) D3 represents polytechnic (or equivalent level) graduates. 
Source: Based on author's interview and questionnaire survey during 1999-2000. 
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Table 5.2 Main Problems of Sample Firms at the Initial Stage and at the Present 
Initial Stage Present 
Problems Mean Scores I ) Rank Mean Scores I ) Rank 
? ) (s.d.t (s .d.) 2) 
l. Market Access 4.47 1 4.38 2 
(0.60) (0.59) 
2. Input Materials 3.84 7 3.85 6 
(0.91) (0. 76) 
3. Skilled Labour 4.04 6 3.70 7 
(0.82) (0.74) 
4. Production Technology 4.30 2 4.25 3 
(0.78) (0.68) 
5. Financial Sources 4.14 3 4.47 1 
(0.93) (0.58) 
6. Management 4.05 5 3.93 5 
(0.66) (0.71) 
7. Access to Technical 3.14 11 2.73 9 
Institutions (0.95) (1.20) 
8. Infrastructure 3.36 9 2.82 8 
(0.90) (0. 79) 
9. Production Capacity 3.32 10 1.86 11 
(0.60) (0.63) 
10. Expensive Machinery & 3.53 8 1.93 10 
Equipment (0.73) (0.61) 
11. Competition in Markets 4.07 4 4.14 4 
(0.82) (0.65) 
Number of Sample Firms3) 73 73 
Notes: 1) Mean scores represent the average of scores indicated by firms' rating from 1 (the lowest score, 
a very small problem) to 5 (the highest score, a very large problem). 
2) Figures in parentheses are standard deviation. 
3) The number of sample SMEs is 73, instead of 96, because of data constraints. 
Source: Based on author's interview and questionnaire survey during 1999-2000. 
As already discussed in Chapter 2, due to reasons such as insufficient internal 
resources and industrial policies in favour of LEs, SMEs usually encounter specific 
problems that are different from those of LEs. Our sample SMEs faced similar 
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problems.7 Table 5.2 shows the main difficulties in operations of sample SMEs both at 
the initial stage and at the moment of the survey.8 The numbers in the table are average 
scores on a five-point Likert-type scale, where "5" represents the highest degree of 
seriousness and "1" the lowest. 
At the initial stage, problems with respect to marketing, technology and financial 
sources are the most difficult ones, rated by sample SMEs at average scores of 4.5, 4.3 
and 4.1, respectively. Despite their easy foundation relative to LEs, SMEs cannot start 
in the manufacturing business without markets, technologies and capital. In addition to 
these three, severe competition in markets, insufficient managerial skills and the lack of 
skilled labour were the substantial problems our sample SMEs had to overcome before 
launching their manufacturing businesses. 
For instance, a small-scale firm (Firm SJ 6) in Jakarta was confronted with 
difficulties in channelling press parts for motorcycles to after-market (spot-basis 
replacement parts market) at a start-up phase of operations in 1990. Finn SJ 6 
continued to struggle with marketing in unstable and competitive one-off exchanges 
until the mid-l 990s, when it started subcontracting transactions with -large-scale 
automobile and motorcycle assembler firms. When a small and pribumi firm (Firm 
S17) prepared for the production of press parts for vehicles in 1995, it was not able to 
invest in plant and machinery at a desirable level, due to a failure to mobilise start-up 
capital from formal financial institutions. A founder (not a current president) of Firm 
S66 in Surabaya had initial teething troubles in the areas of technology and 
management, when he left being a salaried worker in car maintenance and started his 
7 Similar to the observation in this chapter, Urata (2000: 87-107), on the basis of a survey covering SMEs, cooperatives and chamber of commerce and industry in five cities in Indonesia, indicated that SMEs faced the following problems: 1) insufficient production technologies and quality control ; 2) the lack of market access ; 3) limited access to SME finance; 4) insufficient managerial capabilities; and 5) inadequate production equipment. 
8 The number of respondents in this table is not 96 but 73 , due to data constraints. 
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own small-scale business in the production of parts for agricultural machinery in 1980. 
As a principal engineer and top management, he had to make great efforts to acquire 
production technology and managerial skills from scratch without sufficient support 
from outside. 
At the time of the survey, financial problems were ranked the highest, with an 
average score of 4.5. This rating i.s consistent with the result of Berry and Levy (1999: 
65-8), which indicated that the sample of garment and rattan SMEs perceived the high 
cost of credits as their single greatest obstacle. The lack of information on formal 
financial sources for investment and working capital and long and complicated 
application processes for credits have remained unchanged. In addition, the high score 
given by our sample firms may reflect the unfavourable financial situation as a 
consequence of the 1997-98 economic crisis. Since the onset of the crisis, credits from 
banks and other financial institutions became less available (Tambunan 2000: 169, 171-
2). For example, a medium-scale supplier firm producing automotive leaf spring (Firm 
Sl2) was not able to borrow money from its main bank during 1998-99, because the 
economic crisis decreased the ability of the bank to lend money to clients, particularly 
SMEs with less credibility. As a consequence, Firm S12 had much trouble in financing 
the shortage of working capital. 
Market access and market competition were rated at the second and fourth 
highest, with average scores of 4.4 and 4.1, respectively. Many SMEs have not been 
familiar with details of domestic and/or foreign markets for their products, because they 
do not often know how and where to obtain such information. These high scores also 
imply that markets for the sample metalworking and machinery SMEs contracted 
during the economic crisis. A small non-pribumi automotive parts supplier (Firm SI 5) 
had attempted to exploit foreign markets in response to the shrinkage of domestic 
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demand in the crisis. This firm, however, failed to realise this attempt because it could 
not find information on marketing channels to overseas. Firm S41 , a small-scale 
pribumi firm producing simple press parts for vehicles, has battled with competitors in 
terms of price, quality and services, due to the limited size of the market and the 
existence of many similar firms. 
Insufficient production and management technologies appear as the third and 
fifth severest constraints, with average scores of 4.3 and 3.9 , respectively. A need to 
improve technological and managerial capabilities was perceived as one of the most 
challenging problems among metalworking and machinery SMEs in our sample. Firm 
S68 in Surabaya, which supplies valves to a local agricultural machinery manufacturer, 
sought ways to upgrade current technological levels and enter the business of high-
quality automotive parts. This SME also wished to improve its insufficient managerial 
knowledge especially of accounting and the control of employees in order to run the 
company in an efficient way. Procurement of raw materials and intermediate inputs 
was ranked as one of the main problems, which may also be amplified by the adverse 
effects of the recent crisis, as indicated in Chapter 4. A non-pribumi SME (Firm S04) 
has suffered from a sharp rise in the price of imported inputs for automotive mufflers 
due to the depreciation of the rupiah against US dollar. 
Common difficulties are observed in the areas of marketing, technology and 
finance at the start of operations and at present. Chapter 6 will examine how SMEs 
have utilised external sources to overcome these key problems. 
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5.5 Basic Characteristics of the Related Subsectors 
This section presents some information on the basic features of the automobile, 
motorcycle, agricultural machinery and bicycle subsectors in which our sample 
metalworking and machinery SMEs are operating. The description is mainly based on 
the qualitative results of our interview survey as well as on BPS data of the 
manufacturing industry. Table 5.3 summarises the main characteristics of the four 
subsectors, and Table 5 .4 indicates changes in their output. 
For analytical purposes, these four subsectors are often aggregated into two 
groups, 1) automobile and motorcycle and 2) agricultural machinery and bicycle, in the 
following chapters. This is done for the following reasons: 1) significant overlap 
between SMEs producing automotive parts and those producing motorcycle parts; 2) 
different levels of production technologies between automotive/motorcycle parts and 
agricultural machinery/bicycle parts, where the former generally utilises more intricate 
technologies than the latter; and 3) insufficient numbers of sample firms , particularly 
those engaging in the agricultural machinery and bicycle subsectors. 
5.5.1 Automobile Subsector 
As was the case in several other East Asian developing economies, from the onset of 
industrialisation in the late 1960s, the Indonesian government had ambitions to 
establish an automobile industry. This triggered significant and continuous policy 
intervention by the government (Fujita and Hill 1997). For example, CBU (completely 
built-up units) imports had basically been prohibited since the early 1970s. The 
deletion program, which was introduced in 1976 and implemented until 1993, urged 
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players in the automobile subsector to purchase parts and components locally, ranging 
from paint to tires, batteries, brakes, transmissions and engines for commercial 
vehicles.9 An incentive system, which replaced the deletion program in 1993, linked 
the extent of local content to the levels of import duties for parts and components. 
Such measures in favour of domestically manufactured vehicles resulted in an 
inflow of foreign assembler firms. In the late 1990s, around 20 major foreign-affiliated 
assembler firms produced their passenger cars and/or commercial vehicles in Indonesia. 
Roughly half of them were affiliated with Japanese automobile manufacturers such as 
Mitsubishi, Suzuki, Daihatsu, Toyota and Honda, while the remaining were affiliated 
with U.S. and European firms such as GM, Ford, Chrysler, Mercedes-Benz, and Volvo. 
These assembler firms are large-scale enterprises and all located in JABOTABEK. 
According to our estimates, 60 to 100 foreign-affiliated first-tier firms are 
supplying automotive parts and components to the above assembler firms. The firms 
that entered Indonesia in the 1970s were attracted by the less competitive business 
environment in which only a limited number of supplier firms engaged in the 
production of automotive parts and components. The latecomer firms were often 
required by parent firms to start their businesses in Indonesia. Assembler firms wanted 
to enjoy benefits of the incentive system or responded to the rapid expansion of the 
automobile market in the first half of the 1990s. The sizes of foreign-affiliated supplier 
firms vary, but most of them are located in JABOTABEK. About 100 to 150 local 
first-tier firms are producing metalworking and machinery parts in the large cities such 
as Jakarta, Surabaya and Bandung. There are a large number of SMEs that produce 
auto parts as second- and lower-tier supplier firms or as non-subcontracting firms. 
Metalworking and machinery SMEs that serve as lower-layer supplier firms tend to 
9 For details of the deletion programs in the machinery industry, see Thee (1994: 109-11). 
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operate in places not far from their higher-layer customers. On the other hand, SMEs 
that do not engage in subcontracting business and supply non-OEM ( original equipment 
manufacture) products to after-market (spot-basis replacement parts market) are not 
only located in Jakarta and Surabaya but also in other urban and even rural areas. 
The Indonesian automobile industry is focused on the domestic market, which is 
limited in size (e.g., around 390,Q00 units in 1997 as the largest number of sales) and 
fragmented by many brands and models of vehicles. Since the late 1980s, supplier 
firms have developed in response to the expansion of the domestic market. As a 
consequence, localisation of auto parts has accelerated in Indonesia. According to 
Aswicahyono, Basri and Hill (2000), by 1995, the average local content ratios for 
passenger cars and light commercial vehicles were 11 and 40 percent, respectively. The 
difference in these local content ratios may reflect the situation in which the latter group 
uses simpler production technologies, has a relatively larger market, and attracts a 
higher degree of government policy support (e.g., the deletion program) than the former. 
Table 5.4 indicates that, prior to 1997-98, the output in the automobile industry 
increased remarkably at an annual average rate of 18 percent. In this period, the 
automobile subsector occupied roughly one-fifth of output in the machinery industry as 
a whole. However, the automobile industry suffered considerably from the slump in 
demand for new cars in 1998. Sample SMEs in this subsector were generally most 
heavily affected by the recent crisis. 
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Table 5.3 Basic Characteristics of Related Subsectors 
Automobile Motorcycle Agricultural Machinery Bicycle 
Government · strong policy · almost the same as some policy · no significant Intervention & intervention and automobile intervention and intervention and Protection high protection protection protection 
· deletion program deletion program 
· incentive system 
(local content 
programs) 
Assembler Firms · around 20 major · 5 major foreign- · around 30-50 firms · around 30-50 firms 
foreign-affiliated affiliated firms (Jakarta, Surabaya, (Jakarta 30%, Surabaya 
firms (Jakarta) (Jakarta) etc.) 30%, Medan 15%) 
· large-scale firms • large-scale firms small- to large-scale 
. small- to large-scale 
firms firms 
several foreign-
. local, with some 
affiliated, the Taiwan-affiliations 
remaining local 
Supplier Finns · around 60-100 · large overlap with around 20-30 foreign - · around 10-20 foreign -
foreign-affiliated 1st- auto parts supplier affiliated 1st-tier affiliated 1st-tier 
tier firms (Jakarta) firms (more firms firms (Jakarta, firms (Jakarta, 
· around 100-150 than automobile, due Surabaya) Surabaya) 
local 1st-tier firms to simple technology · around 30-50 local • around 30-50 local (Jakarta, Surabaya, and large market 1 st"' ti er firms (Jakarta, 1st-tier firms (Jakarta, 
Bandung) size) Surabaya, other cities) Surabaya, Medan) 
many local 2nd-
· many lower-tier & . many lower-tier & 
/lower-tier & non- non-subcontracting non-subcontracting 
subcontracting firms firms (throughout firms (urban/rural (Jakarta, Surabaya, Indonesia) areas in Java and North 
other urban/rural areas) Sumatra) 
Market Structure · fragmentation in · larger domestic · not large domestic · not large domestic 
limited local market market than demand size demand size 
size automobile domestic-oriented · highly export-
· domestic-oriented · gradually outward- · competition with oriented (low-end) 
after market looking imported low-price · competition with 
large after market Chinese products imported low-price 
Chinese products 
Local Content low for passenger 
· high high 
· high 
cars several critical several critical · several critical 
high for commercial components still components still components still 
vehicles imported imported imported 
Production severely affected by · affected by the crisis, affected by the crisis, · affected by the crisis, Trends the economic crisis but not hard-hit but not hard-hit but not hard-hit 
relative to relative to relative to 
automobile automobile automobile 
· affected by EU's 
antidumping 
sanctions since 1996 
Note: Supplier firms are basically limited to those engaged in metalworking and machinery 
operations. 
Source: Based on author's interview and questionnaire survey during 1999-2000. 
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Table 5 .4 Changes in Output of Related Subsectors 
Automobile Motorcycle 
(38431+32+33) 1) (38441 +42) ! ) 
Gross Output (Rp billion, 1993 prices/) 
1986 1,451.1 778.1 
1990 3,890.3 1,507.0 
1994 6,152.5 5,486.3 
1995 7,268.3 6,613.4 
1996 7,509.9 7,695.9 
1997 6,722.8 6,991.4 
1999 3,364.7 6,316.6 
Growth of Gross Output (%/) 
1986-1996 17.9 25.8 
1996 - 1999 -23.5 -6.4 
1986 - 1999 6.7 17.5 
1994 - 1996 10.5 18.4 
Share of Gross Output in Total Machinery Industry (% )4) 
1986 
1994 
1996 
1999 
20.6 
22.2 
16.9 
10.0 
11.0 
19.8 
17.3 
18.7 
Agricultural 
Machinery 
(MOIT) 1) 
767.2 
1,293.0 
1,719.0 
1,843.8 
49.7 
2.8 
3.9 
Bicycle 
(38443+44) 1) 
40.2 
100.9 
290.4 
438.3 
397.6 
245.9 
321.6 
25.8 
-6.8 
17.4 
17.0 
0.6 
1.1 
0.9 
1.0 
Notes: 1) For automobile, motorcycle and bicycle, the numbers in parentheses correspond to ISIC code. 
Agricultural machinery is exceptionally based on MOIT's internal classification, due to data 
limitations. 
2) Gross output is deflated with the wholesale price index for manufacturing and is demonstrated 
in 1993 prices. 
3) The growth represents annual average growth rates in each period. 
4) The share is calculated as the proportion of respective gross output in the machinery industry as 
a whole. 
Sources: Automobile, motorcycle and bicycle are based on BPS, La,rge and Medium Manufacturing 
Statistics, while agricultural machinery is from MOIT's internal statistical data. 
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5.5.2 Motorcycle Subsector 
The policy environment of Indonesia's motorcycle industry has been almost same as 
that of the automobile industry. A protective environment emerged in the late 1960s. 
Subsequent to restrictions on imports of CBU in 1969, a deletion program for the 
motorcycle subsector was introduced in 1977 to promote the localisation of production 
of parts and components (Thee 1997: 112). During 1993-99, an incentive system, 
which gave reductions of import duties according to the degree of local content of final 
products, replaced the deletion program. 
In contrast to its automobile counterpart, there have only been a limited number 
of firms that actively engaged in assembling operations in the motorcycle industry. 
They consist of five large-scale players (Yamaha, Suzuki, Honda, Kawasaki, and 
Piaggio' s Vespa), all of which are foreign-affiliated and located in Jakarta (including its 
surrounding areas). 
Supplier finns tend to produce both automotive and motorcycle parts. This 
suggests a considerable overlap of the parts producers 1n the two subsectors in 
Indonesia. However, the number of supplier firms in the motorcycle subsector is larger 
than that of the automotive subsector, because of the relatively simpler technologies and 
the larger market size associated with the smaller number of brands and models. These 
circumstances provide motorcycle parts producers with easier market access 
opportunities than in the case of automotive parts (Thee 1997: 117). 
The production volume of motorcycles (e.g., 1,860,000 units in 1997) exceeded 
that of four-wheel vehicles by far. Although most production is for the domestic 
market including significant production for the after-market (the spot-basis market for 
replacement parts), export production has expanded markedly since the early 1990s. 
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Reflecting this larger market size along with some effects of the deletion program and 
incentive system, local content ratios rose significantly from 24 percent in 1979 to 
nearly 90 percent in 1995 (Thee 1997: 105-6). Except for some critical components, 
most items for motorcycles were locally produced by the mid-1990s. 
Table 5.4 shows that the value of gross output in the motorcycle subsector 
increased sharply at more than .25 percent per annum during 1986-96. It equalled 
output in the automobile subsector in 1996. The motorcycle industry was also affected 
by the recent crisis, but less severely than the automobile industry, in terms of changes 
in output, because of its substantially lower prices of products and relatively more 
export-oriented strategy than the automobile subsector. 
5.5.3 Agricultural Machinery Subsector 
Policy intervention existed in the Indonesian agricultural machinery subsector, similar 
to the automobile and motorcycle subsectors. In 1977, the Indonesian government 
selected agricultural machinery as one of the engineering subsectors in the deletion 
programs and promoted the localisation of parts and components for diesel engines. 
Supratikno (1998: 82-3) stated that the government provided the agricultural machinery 
subsector with less policy intervention and support than the automobile and motorcycle 
subsectors. This was probably due to the smaller size of domestic demand, relative to 
that of two- and four-wheel vehicles. In addition to this smaller impact on the economy, 
the agricultural machinery industry does not have a symbolic meaning in the process of 
industrialisation and economic development, compared with the automobile industry. 
The subsector did not rank high in terms of political interest. 
186 
Some five to seven large-scale foreign-affiliated assembler firms have operated 
in the agricultural machinery industry. For example, Yanmar, Kubota and Mitsubishi 
have been involved in this field for a long time. In addition to such foreign-affiliated 
firms, approximately 30 to 40 local firms were engaged in producing a variety of 
agricultural machinery such as tillers, tractors, mowers, sprayers, combines, threshers, 
polishers, dryers, irrigation pumps and diesel engines. These local manufacturers range 
from small-scale to large-scale firms and are located in various areas in Java. In the 
early 1990s, low quality but very cheap imported agricultural machinery products from 
China started to erode local markets. This required Indonesia's assembler and supplier 
firms to improve their efficiency of production to maintain competitive. 
Roughly 20 to 30 foreign-affiliated first-tier firms, most of which are located in 
Jakarta and Surabaya, have supplied parts and components to large-scale agricultural 
machinery assembler firms. Since the size of the domestic market is too small to 
facilitate specialisation in agricultural machinery, many of the foreign-affiliated 
metalworking and machinery producers seem to serve not only this subsector but also 
the automobile or motorcycle subsectors. According to our survey, about 30 to 50 local 
firms act as first-tier supplier firms in the agricultural machinery field. Reflecting the 
prevalence of agriculture activities throughout the country, there are a large number of 
small-scale parts producers that do not supply high quality products to assembler or 
higher-tier firms but sell low quality and non-OEM products to the after-market on a 
spot basis. 
Relatively simpler production technologies and the implementation of a deletion 
program have promoted localisation of parts and components production for 
agricultural machinery and equipment since the late 1970s. According to a large-scale 
local assembler firm in Surabaya, it raised its local content ratio of power tillers 
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(excluding diesel engines) from around 50-60 percent in the mid-1980s to nearly 100 
percent in the mid-1990s, and that of diesel engines for tillers produced by its sister 
company has recently reached nearly 50 percent. Similarly, in the case of tillers, a 
Japanese-affiliated agricultural machinery manufacturer noted that it recorded around 
80 percent of local content ratio, while its sister company specialising in diesel engines 
achieved 60-70 percent. 
Based on the limited information in Table 5 .4, gross output of the agricultural 
machinery and equipment industry was roughly a quarter of that of the automobile or 
motorcycle industries just before 1997-98. Despite such a smaller share, production 
expanded rapidly in the mid-1990s in response to an increase in farm income during the 
high growth period of the economy. It seems that agricultural machinery has not been 
affected very seriously by the current crisis, because the products of this subsector are 
not luxuries but necessities and the agricultural sector suffered far less from the 1997-
98 economic setback than the other sectors. 
5.5.4 Bicycle Subsector 
The Indonesian government has not paid much attention to the bicycle industry. 
Although the bicycle subsector was, from the late 1970s, included as one of the other 
engineering goods subsectors in the deletion programs, there is no evidence that the 
government introduced any explicit policy measures to promote the localisation of parts 
and components of bicycles. Its smaller share in total machinery output (see Table 5.4) 
may have reduced political and policy interests. In contrast to the associations for 
automobile and motorcycle industries, the Association of Indonesian Bicycle Industry 
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(AIPI) seems institutionally weak and may not have been able to influence political and 
policy circles through lobbying activities in any significant manner. 10 
Our field survey suggests that 30 to 50 firms engage in assembling bicycles 
(including tricycles mainly for children). Bicycles have been manufactured by various 
types of assembler firms. Since bicycles can generally be produced with low capital 
intensity and with simple technologies, small-medium enterprises located in areas other 
than Jakarta and Surabaya (e.g., Medan) participate in assembling operations. Many of 
these assembler firms are run by non-pribumi entrepreneurs and tend to have 
relationships with companies in Taiwan, the world ' s centre for bicycle production. 
These relations range from joint ventures to licensing contracts and technical assistance 
agreements. 
Some 10 to 20 foreign-affiliated first-tier supplier firms, mostly located in 
Jakarta or Surabaya, are producing bicycle parts and components. They sometimes 
overlap with producers which supply products to motorcycle assembler firms. Under 
the bicycle assembler firms , roughly 30 to 50 local companies serve as first-layer 
vendor firms. A huge number of micro-, cottage- or small-scale and non-
subcontracting producers are linked to after-market production of low-quality and no 
brand parts. They are scattered throughout Java and North Sumatra, where the market 
size of bicycles is large and the base of the machinery industry is strong relative to 
other areas in Indonesia. 
In order to cope with relatively small domestic demand, Indonesian bicycle 
assembler firms have developed an export promotion strategy which aims at the low 
10 In general, industrial associations in Indonesia do not have the professionalism and accountability to 
gain the confidence of member and/or potential companies in the respective sectors (Berry and Levy 
1999: 70). 
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end of foreign markets , in particular the EU. 11 Table 5.4 indicates that bicycle 
production increased significantly up to 1995, in part due to an increase of exports to 
Europe. However, output value decreased visibly in 1996 and 1997, because the EU 
took antidumping sanctions against Indonesian bicycle exporters in 1996. Major 
Indonesian bicycle manufacturers stopped exports to the EU after surcharges of 22 to 
26 percent were imposed. In 1997-98, the ec_onomic turmoil amplified this setback. 
The bicycle industry has recently attempted to overcome this hindrance, by expanding 
exports to other markets such as the U.S., Canada, Australia and Latin America. 
11 Indonesia can find advantages in the bicycle industry that uses simpler and relatively labour-intensive 
technologies. This seems to be the main reason why it was able to drive bicycle exports to Europe in the 
first half of the 1990s. The features of technologies adopted in the automobile industry are clearly 
different from those of the bicycle industry. 
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Chapter 6 
Support Mechanisms for SME Development in 
Indonesia: Qualitative Evidence from SMEs 
6.1 Introduction 
As described in Chapter 2, the potential advantages of SMEs in developing countries 
include: 1) significant proportion 1n econorrnes; 2) favourable combination and 
utilisation of production factors; 3) foundations for industrialisation; 4) export 
promotion; 5) more equal distribution of income; and 6) flexibility to changing 
economic conditions. However, at the same time, SMEs tend to suffer from common 
problems that limit their potentially positive roles in economies. As discussed in 
Chapters 2 and 5, insufficient entrepreneurial and financial capabilities are typical 
internal constraints to SME growth, while inadequate access to technologies, markets 
and credits and government policies in favour of LEs are common external constraints. 1 
It is difficult for SMEs with limited human and financial resources to acquire 
technology, develop markets and arrange financing by themselves. SMEs cannot rely 
1 Thee (1994) summarised Indonesian SME policies and their effects on the development of SMEs. He 
argued that government policies did not necessarily enable Indonesian SMEs to develop technology, have 
better access to credits and create inter-fmn linkages. 
191 
on their internal resources to the same extent as LEs (Berry, Rodriguez and Sandee 
2001 : 363) . Given such internal constraints, how can SMEs develop in LDCs? 
This chapter looks at the external sources available to SMEs. It examines how 
they work as support mechanisms for the development of SMEs, using the case study of 
metalworking and machinery industry in the automobile, motorcycle, agricultural 
machinery and bicycle subsectors in Indonesia. This corresponds to Question 3 raised 
as one of the seven research questions in Chapter 2. 
There are similar studies on support mechanisms for SMEs. Kojima and Okada 
( 1997) examined how technology-supporting institutions and government policies 
improved technological capabilities of SMEs in the Japanese casting industry .2 Levy et 
al. (1999) documented the roles of the private and government sectors in support 
systems for export-oriented SMEs, covering a wide range of subsectors such as 
garments, leather products, furniture, silverware_, machinery and automotive 
components in Indonesia, Colombia, Korea and Japan. Marsden ( 1984) discussed 
problems SMEs 1n Thailand have encountered in their business and sources of 
assistance they have obtained to cope with such difficulties , focusing on the metal-
processing industry. 
This chapter addresses the following specific questions. 
( 1) What kind of external support mechanisms have SMEs used to improve their 
capabilities? 
(2) How effective have such external sources been for SMEs 1n developing their 
capabilities? 
2 Technology-supporting institutions include national research institutes , prefectural research institutes , 
inter-firm networks , industrial associations , industrial cooperatives, consul ting firms and universities 
(Kojima and Okada 1997: 1). 
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To clarify how or from which sources SMEs have obtained the relevant 
technological , marketing and financial capabilities necessary for corporate management 
would also suggest what kind of future policies or strategies Indonesia should prepare 
and adopt to support SMEs which can potentially stimulate industrialisation and 
economic development. Major external sources for supporting SMEs are broadly 
classified into the following three channels: 1) the private sector (e.g. , assembler or 
parent firms , peer firms in similar business, supplier finns for machinery and equipment, 
supplier firms for input materials , and banks and financial institutions); 2) non-public 
collective institutions (e.g. , industrial associations , chambers of commerce and industry, 
cooperatives, NGOs); and 3) the government or quasi-government sector (e.g. , 
government ministries/agencies and public technical institutions). 
As noted in Chapter 5, this study focuses on small-medium metalworking and 
machinery firms that have supplied their products or processing services to automobile, 
motorcycle, agricultural machinery and bicycle manufacturers. After sample firms 
were identified, we conducted interview surveys with the owners ( or at least directors) 
of 96 (93 local owned and 3 foreign affiliated) SMEs. Table 5.1 in the previous chapter 
presented some of the key characteristics of the sample metalworking and machinery 
SMEs in the automobile, motorcycle, agricultural machinery and bicycle subsectors in 
1998. 
After this introduction, Section 6.2 exarmnes external sources of technical 
support to the sample metalworking and machinery SMEs. Section 6.3 looks into 
channels of marketing support for the sample SMEs and Section 6.4 investigates 
financial sources for their business operations and investment. Finally, Section 6.5 
presents the main findings in this chapter and some remarks about support mechanisms 
for the development of SMEs in Indonesia. 
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6.2 Support Mechanisms of Technology Acquisition for SMEs 
Due to the lack of internal resources , SMEs in general have to use various kinds of 
external resources in order to learn technology and improve production efficiency. 3 
Table 6.1 shows several external sources of technical support available to metalworking 
and machinery SMEs in Indonesia. 
Nearly · 80 percent of the 96 sample SMEs acquired technologies from parent 
firms through subcontracting transactions.4 The statistical tests in Table 6.1 indicate 
that difference in the share of SMEs with technical support from parent firms is 
significant at the 1 percent level between firm groups in subsector categories. SMEs in 
the automobile and motorcycle subsectors had more frequent technological linkages 
with large-scale parent firms than those in the agricultural machinery and bicycle 
subsectors. This clearly reflects the differences in size and technological capabilities 
between the automobile and motorcycle assembler firms and the agricultural machinery 
and bicycle counterparts. Based on our observations in the interview survey of parent 
firms, the former groups generally operate on a larger scale of production and have 
substantially higher technological levels than the latter groups. 5 
3 The meaning of technology varies largely according to the way it is defined. For example, Thee (1997: 
126-31 ) focused on innovative technology in his study of the motorcycle industry in Indonesia. Our 
study, however, considers technology broadly as factors which can improve production efficiency. 
Therefore, technology includes not only purely technical matters but also production manag~ment skills 
such as quality control and delivery time control. Similarly, it encompasses not only innovative and new 
technologies but also adaptive and even basic operational technologies. 
4 Parent or principal firms here include assembler firms and higher-tier supplier finns which contract out 
to sample SMEs through subcontracting transactions. 
5 See Chapter 9, which examines the different features of the parent firms in these two groups. 
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Table 6.1 Channels and Effectiveness of Technology Support iv1echanisms for SMEs 
User Firms Differences in No. of User Firms Mean Scores Differences in Mean Scores 
Channels (N = 96 ) between Groups in Categories of Usefulness between Groups in Categories 
No. of Finns I J Size 2> Ethnicity 3> Subsector 4> Mean 5> Size 6> Ethnicity 7> Sub sector SJ 
(%) Rank p -values p -values p -values (s. d.) Rank F -values t-values t-values 
l. Parent Finns 75 2 
(78.1) 
2. Finns in Similar 62 3 
Business (64.6) 
3. Equipment 79 1 
Suppliers (82.3) 
4. Input Suppliers 5 10 
(5.2) 
5. Foreign 16 8 
Sources (16.7) 
6. Associations 19 7 
(19.8) 
7. Public Technical 30 5 
Institutions (3 1.3) 
8. Universities 22 6 
(22.9) 
9. Technical 38 4 
Literature (39.6) 
10. Other 13 9 
(13.5) 
0.55 
0.00 ** 
(+ ) 
0.81 
0.89 
0.01 ** 
(-) 
0.26 
0.17 
0.02 * 
(+) 
0.98 
0.32 
0.62 
0.02 * 
(+) 
0.79 
0.65 
0.16 
0.19 
0.11 
0.00 ** 
(+) 
0.20 
0.55 
0.00 ** 
(-) 
0.66 
0.40 
1.00 
0.25 
0.11 
0.49 
0.44 
0.66 
1.00 
3.48 1 
(1.25) 
3.31 3 
(1.05) 
2.89 5 
(1.28) 
3.00 4 
(0.71) 
3.44 2 
(0.89) 
2.58 8 
(0.90) 
2.67 6 
(1.24) 
2.27 9 
(1.16) 
2.63 7 
(1.22) 
2.00 10 
(0 .82) 
5.72 ** 
(-) 
1.20 
1.34 
0.44 
0.98 
2.01 
0.11 
1.48 
3.28 ** 
(-) 
0.03 
0.62 
0.94 
2.18 * 
(-) 
2.57 * 
(+) 
0.74 
1.17 
1.68 
0.31 
1.59 
0.94 
1.23 
0.11 
0.20 
1.51 
Notes: 1) Figures in the upper row indicate the number of firms which utilise each channel. Figures in 
parentheses are the share of fi.nns with each channel in the total sample firms. 
2) Differences in frequency ratios between firms with 1-19, 20-49, 50-99, and 100-299 workers, which 
are indicated by p-values of Pearson's chi-square test. ** = significant at the 1 % level, * = 
significant at the 5 % level. When the differences are significant, ( +) = smaller SMEs > larger 
SMEs, (-) = smaller SMEs < larger SMEs. 
3) Difference in frequency ratios between firms of pribumi owners (P) and non-pribumi owners (NP), 
which is indicated by p-values of Fisher's exact test. ** = significant at the 1 % level, * = significant 
at the 5 % level. When the difference is significant,(+)= P SMEs > NP SMEs, (-) = P SMEs < NP 
SMEs. 
4) Difference in frequency ratios between firms engaged in the automobile/motorcycle subsectors 
(AM) and the agricultural machinery/bicycle subsectors (AB) , which is indicated by p-values of 
Fisher's exact test. ** = significant at the 1 % level, * = significant at the 5 % level. When the 
difference is significant, ( +) = AB SMEs > AM SMEs, (-) = AB SMEs < AM SMEs. 
5) Figures in the upper row are the average of scores indicated by firms' rating from 1 (the lowest score 
as not at all effective) to 5 (the highest score as very effective). Figures in parentheses are standard 
deviation. 
6) Differences in mean scores of usefulness between firms with 1-19, 20-49, 50-99, and 100-299 
workers, which are indicated by F-values of ANOV A. ** = significant at the 1 % level, * = 
significant at the 5 % level. When the differences are significant, ( +) = smaller SMEs > larger 
SMEs, (-) = smaller SMEs < larger SMEs. 
7) Difference in mean scores of usefulness between firms of pribumi owners (P) and non-pribumi 
owners (NP), which is indicated by the t-values. ** = significant at the 1 % level, * = significant at 
the 5 % level. When the difference is significant, ( +) = P SMEs > NP SMEs, (-) = P SMEs < :t\TP 
SMEs. 
8) Difference in mean scores of usefulness between firms engaged in the automobile/motorcycle 
subsectors (AM) and the agricultural machinery and bicycle subsectors (AB), which is indicated by 
the t-values. ** = significant at the 1 level, * = significant at the 5 % level. When the difference is 
significant,(+)= AB SMEs > AM SMEs, (-) =AB SMEs < AM SMEs. 
Source: Based on author's interview and questionnaire survey during 1999-2000. 
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This technical support from parent firms was ranked the highest in the listed 
channels, averaging 3.48 on a scale of 1 (the lowest as ineffective or not useful) to 5 
(the highest as effective or useful), although the evaluation varied widely according to 
firm categories of size and ethnic affiliation. Larger SMEs and non-pribumi 
entrepreneurs have been more effective in utilising subcontracting linkages as a tool for 
developing technological capabilities than their counterparts. In general, smaller and 
pribumi SMEs are often second- or third-layer subcontracting firms. They, therefore, 
have direct relationships not with assembler firms but with higher-layer supplier firms 
who cannot necessarily offer reliable technical guidance. In addition, smaller firms are 
sometimes not able to learn and take advantage of technical hints or suggestions that 
their parent firms have provided, because of their limited capacity to absorb. For 
example, Firm S05, a first-tier larger SME in Jakarta, provided technical support 
through subcontracting linkages to Firm S35, a second-tier supplier firm . with only 10 
workers. The latter gave a low score to technical assistance from the former. However, 
this low-rated evaluation seemed to reflect the limited capability of Firm S35 to 
understand and make use of technical advice from Firm S05, rather than the quality of 
technical support itself. Different from Firm S35, Firm S32, an auto parts supplier firm 
with 60 workers, perceived similar assistance from Firm S05 as a major and useful 
source of technical information. 
Our sample SMEs highly appreciated, on average, subcontracting linkages with 
large-scale parent firms as a channel of technology transfer. However, Firm S39, an 
automotive spring producer in Surabaya, noted that assembler firms in Indonesia, even 
large-scale or foreign-affiliated ones, do not necessarily have sufficient expertise in 
every technological field. Therefore, it is necessary to recognise that technical support 
from parent firms is, in some cases, very limited in Indonesia. 
196 
One of the typical technological linkages under subcontracting transactions is, 
according to many SMEs in our sample, the so-called QC audit, through which their 
quality management and production management are periodically assessed at the 
factory by experts dispatched from assembler firms. They give supplier firms 
recommendations on how to improve the quality and delivery time of the products. 6 
More than one third of the sample SMEs have taken part in training programs or 
lectures on a variety of topics offered by parent firms such as dies-making, quality 
control, production management, ISO (international standard developed by the 
International Organization for Standardization) and the JIT (just-in-time) system. 
In addition to such classroom-type training programs, a quarter of the sample 
firms have received practical technical guidance at their factories from experts sent by 
principal f~s. Highly appreciated by some respondents is the plant-tour-type training 
program. It is designed to let supplier firms pay a mutual visit in a group consisting of 
five local and five foreign-affiliated supplier firms , and to let them exchange ideas on 
how to improve the production systems, under the supervision of Firm A08, one of the 
foreign-affiliated motorcycle assembler firms in Indonesia. 
When new models were introduced, many of the sample supplier firms received 
intensive technical guidance on how to produce new parts and components. Such 
technical support has often been extended to supplier firms through cooperation groups 
organised by assembler firms. One of the typical and famous groups is the Toyota 
Manufacturers Club, which was founded in 1987 and has been open to vendors of PT 
Toyota Astra Motor (TAM). There are 89 member firms as of August 1999. Its main 
objective is to promote mutual benefits for members (supplier firms) and TAM by 
improving their technological capabilities through several activities such as providing 
6 Sato (1998b) illustrates the processes of transfer of QC (Quality Control) and TQC (Total Quality 
Control) activities from Toyota (Japan) to core Japanese-affiliated joint venture companies of the Astra 
group and other locally owned companies in the group. 
197 
education and training, organ1s1ng QC competitions among member firms, hosting 
seminars and conferences, planning plant tours and so on. 
In addition to assembler firms, some large-scale and first-layer supplier firms 
(including both local and foreign-affiliated) have recently emerged as an important 
source of technical support. For example, after the acquisition of QS-9000 
(international quality system required by the International Automotive Sector Group) in 
1999 with the assistance of a foreign-affiliated automaker (Firm Al 8), Firm S20, a local 
and first-tier supplier firm producing automotive parts and components, began to give 
lectures on QCD (quality, cost and delivery time) to around 15 second-layer 
subcontractors. 
In our survey, two other inter-firm mechanisms for technology acquisition have 
proved useful. Assistance from similar firms and support from machinery and 
equipment supplier firms were both cited as sources of technology by around 65 percent 
and 82 percent of the respondents, respectively. For example, Firni S16, a small-scale 
and pribumi producer, is located in the small industries estate in Pulogadung, Jakarta 
(PIK Pulogadung) and supplies press parts to motorcycle manufacturers. The 
agglomeration allowed Firm S 16 to share technical information on metal processing 
with neighbouring SMEs under a collaborative environment. The owner of a small and 
pribumi firm (Firm SJ 7) producing press parts for vehicles has absorbed knowledge on 
metalworking technology through exchange of technical information with some 
colleagues who previously worked at the same automobile assembler firm (Firm A02) 
and have currently managed small-scale machinery firms. 
Firm S67, a non-pribumi firm producing casting parts for agricultural machinery, 
expanded production facilities in recent years. This investment has given the foundry 
an opportunity to have a close relationship with firms that supplied machinery and 
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equipment and to continuously receive technical advice on production technologies and 
operation skills from them. Also, a medium-scale firm (Firm S37) engaging in coating 
and painting for automotive parts and a small-scale firm (Firm S75) dealing with 
electroplating for agricultural machinery parts have both acquired technical information 
from equipment supplier firms, because these types of technologies can rarely be 
obtained from other sources including assembler firms in Indonesia. 
Differences in the share of establishments with technical support from peer firms 
are statistically significant between groups of firms according to size and ethnic 
affiliation. Smaller SMEs and pribumi entrepreneurs have relied more on this channel 
than larger SMEs and non-pribumi owners. Compared to the latter SME groups, the 
former have only restricted access to other technology sources in the private sector. 
Also, since economically weaker groups are usually afraid of being dominated and 
exploited by others, they tend to prefer collaboration partners that have equal economic 
power (Berry 1997: 13). These factors may induce smaller and pribumi SMEs to utilise 
horizontal inter-firm linkages as a channel for learning technologies more frequently 
than their counterparts. Technical support from peer firms was ranked high with an 
average score of 3.31, while that from machinery and equipment supplier firms was 
more moderate with an average rating of 2.89. 
Inter-firm technical cooperation with supplier firms of raw materials and 
intermediate inputs was rare among our respondents. Foreign sources, which mainly 
include technology licensors in and technical experts (advisors) from foreign countries, 
were highly appreciated as a channel of learning technologies, with an average rating of 
3.44. Many SMEs in our sample expressed their interest in contracting technical 
assistance agreements with foreign licensors and employing foreign expatriates. 
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However, these foreign sources are limited to larger SMEs that have sufficient financial 
resources and information on these matters. 
Technical institutions in the public sector were referred to as a source of 
technological knowledge by around 31 percent of the sample SMEs. Universities were 
cited as a channel of technical support by approximately 23 percent of the respondent 
firms. Technical assistance from public technical centres was not highly appreciated on 
average with a score of 2.67, while support from universities was ranked the second 
lowest with an average score of 2.27. A non-pribumi and relatively larger auto parts 
producer in Jakarta (Firm S05) stated that public technical institutions are often 
bureaucratic and do not have technologies satisfying needs from the private sector. 
Relative to larger and non-pribumi SMEs, smaller and pribumi firms have frequently or 
effectively utilised technical ties with public institutions or universities. The former 
SME groups generally have several other channels to acquire technology, while the 
latter groups do not have many choices. Also, because of the government or public 
management, these channels provide economically weak or less-developed groups with 
better access to technologies. 
Larger and non-pribumi SMEs in JABOT ABEK have used public technical 
institutions such as Serpong research institutes, SUCOFINDO and the University of 
Indonesia, which are equipped with sufficient facilities. 7 On the other hand, UPTs 
(technical service units) and local universities, which are public institutions with very 
limited facilities and budgets , have also been identified as sources of technical 
At Serpong in Southwestern Jakarta, more than 10 advanced research institutes have been established 
under the coordination of the National Center for Science and Technology Development (Puspiptek). 
Some of these laboratories at Serpong cover modem technologies in the areas of metalworking and 
machinery. PT SUCOFINDO, a state owned enterprise (BUMN) provides parts and components 
producers with various kinds of technical and managerial services such as material testing, mechanical 
testing. chemical analysis, products inspection and QC management training. SUCOFINDO also lends 
money to small-scale enterprises under the special financial scheme. The University of Indonesia 
(Faculty of Technology) can give manufacturers technical advice, testing services and research 
opportunities in the metallurgy and mechanical fields. 
200 
information by smaller and pribu,ni SMEs in rural areas. 8 For instance, despite its 
insufficient human and physical resources, UPT in Sukabumi has played a role in 
disseminating technical information to smaller pribumi SMEs by hosting seminars and 
introducing technical experts from Jakarta or foreign countries. In this sense, it 
functioned as a local information centre. However, due to its severe resource 
constraints for a long time, UPT Sukabumi could not meet the high demand from local 
SMEs for the testing of materials and products, training on basic technology and day-
to-day technical guidance or consultation with industries. 
Industrial associations, chambers of commerce and industry, and cooperatives, 
as collective channels, were cited by less than one fifth of the sample SME producers 
and rated at 2.58 on average. Apparently, technical support from these channels was 
not often used and not highly appreciated. Larger SMEs have used nation-wide 
associations such as GIAMM (Indonesian Automotive Parts and Components Industries 
Association) and APLINDO (Association of Indonesian Metal Foundry), whereas 
smaller SMEs have utilised local- or grass-roots-level organisations such as APIKS 
(Association of Small-scale Metalworking Industries in Sukabumi) and PT Usbersa 
Mitra Logam.9 Very few sample SMEs perceived KADIN (the Indonesian Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry) and KADINDA (the Regional Chambers of Commerce and 
Industry) as sources of technical information. This may be a consequence of the fact 
that these organisations do not have any effective channels and institutional devices for 
collecting needs from local industries and disseminating national policies to them. 10 
8 Concerning the basic features of UPTs, see Chapter 4. 
9 PT Usbersa Mitra Logam (UML, originally Usaha Bersama Kelompok Logam) was founded in 1992 at 
SUIK Pulogadung (industrial facilities for small-scale industries in Pulogadung), with assistance from 
Yayasan Dharma Bhakti Astra (Astra Foundation). This private group, which consists of 10 small-scale 
metalworking and machinery firms in SUIK, aims to function as an industrial cooperative through 
collective activities. UML intends to jointly acquire technology and enhance access to market and 
financing sources. For further details, see Sato (1998a: 137-40). 
10 For instance, the local chambers of commerce and industry in Japan usually have permanent experts 
specialising in instructing corporate and technology management. The experts also function well in 
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Information from technical literature was cited by nearly 40 percent of the 
sample SMEs, but with an average rating of 2.63. Other sources, which mainly include 
support from NGOs, were utilised by a limited number of SMEs and considered 
ineffective channels .11 
The results of our interview survey indicate that linkages in the private sector 
through principal firms under subcontracting transactions, peer firms in similar business 
activities and supplier firms for machinery and equipment have been the main and most 
useful channels of technology acquisition for SMEs. In particular, vertical inter-firm 
relationships with parent firms were noted as being extremely effective in improving 
technological capabilities of small-medium metalworking and machinery firms. 
This observation seems different from the prevailing ideas that subcontracting 
linkages have been very weak and limited in Indonesia and that parent firms have not 
been able to extend effective technical support to their supplier firms ( e.g. , Goeltom 
1997: 170-1; Hill 1997: 214-5; Thee 1985). Our findings reveal that inter-firm 
relationships through subcontracting linkages in Indonesia have started to create 
opportunities for SMEs to upgrade technological capabilities, although access to and 
the effectiveness of these linkages differ between groups of firms according to size, 
ethnic affiliation and subsector. On the other hand, public and collective channels such 
as public technical institutions and industrial associations are clearly less useful than 
private channels. 
There are some contrasts between the sources of technical support of smaller and 
larger SMEs, of pribumi and non-pribumi SMEs, or of SMEs in the automobile and 
gi ing MITI ' s new policies and programs to and receiving needs from small-medium firms in local areas. 
In the case of Indonesia, there is no such intermediate device under KADINDA with limited human and 
financial resources . 
11 Sato (2000a) reports that technical assistance extended by GOs (private institutions such as the Astra 
Foundation) was evaluated as the most effective way by her sample SMEs in Ceper, a rural metal-casting 
cluster in Central Java. The difference may be a consequence of the different characteristics of the 
sample firms in Sato and this study for example, regarding the level of product quality required, type of 
customers, and access to or relationships with other sources of technical support. 
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motorcycle subsectors and those in the agricultural machinery and bicycle subsectors. 
Such differences indicate that approaches to the acquisition of technologies vary 
according to firm size, ethnic affiliation and subsector. Smaller and pribumi SMEs 
have collaborated on the learning of technology with firms in similar lines of business 
more frequently than their counterparts. Also, compared to the latter groups, the former 
groups tend to take advantage of services provided by public technical institutions and 
universities in order to obtain technical information. In contrast, larger SMEs, non-
pribumi owners, and firms in the automobile and motorcycle subsectors have had better 
access to technical assistance from parent firms and have used it more effectively, 
compared with their counterpart SMEs. 
6.3 Support Mechanisms of Marketing for SMEs 
Table 6.2 shows the key channels and effectiveness of marketing support for 
metalworking and machinery SMEs in the automobile, motorcycle, agricultural 
machinery and bicycle subsectors. Marketing support here means the provision of 
market information, intermediary functions or markets for products. 
Among the private sources, subcontracting relationships were the most dominant 
marketing channel. Nearly 100 percent of the sample SMEs have linked their products 
to markets through subcontracting transactions, which were rated at the highest average 
score of 3.76 in the listed marketing channels. This would be a consequence of the 
following characteristics of the subsectors: the necessity to ensure a considerable 
number of high quality parts through assembler-supplier networks (e.g. , Odaka, Ono 
and Adachi 1988: v) ; and the dominance of subcontracting-oriented Japanese assembler 
firms in the Indonesian machinery industry. 
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However, the evaluation of the effectiveness of marketing channels through 
subcontracting ties varies remarkably between groups of firms according to categories 
of size, ethnicity and subsector. Statistical tests show that larger SMEs, non-pribumi 
owners and producers in the automobile and motorcycle subsectors appreciated the 
market function of subcontracting business more highly than smaller SMEs, pribumi 
owners and producers in the agricultural machinery and bicycle subsectors. Since 
larger firms are likely to have more advanced skills and technologies with modern 
production facilities , they tend to attract orders from parent firms. Because of strong 
inter-personal connections in the ethnic Chinese society, non-pribumi supplier firms 
may easily have good business relations with non-pribumi parent firms and secure 
larger or stable orders through subcontracting transactions. Also, differences in the size 
of the market between the automobile and motorcycle subsectors and the agricultural 
machinery and bicycle subsectors are attributed to differences in the evaluation of 
marketing support through subcontracting linkages between SMEs in these two 
l? 
subsector groups. -
Support from peer firms in similar business fields has also been important in 
developing markets. Approximately 80 percent of the sample SMEs cited information 
from similar firms as a marketing channel and ranked it high, with an average score of 
3.38. For example, Finn S52 and Finn S55, both of which are smaller and pribumi 
firms located in Sukabumi, have from time to time shared orders from the spot-basis 
press parts market between them, according to their work volume. Horizontal networks 
among pribumi SMEs have functioned to a certain extent in this marketing support 
12 According to BPS's Large and Medium Manufacturing Statistics 1997, gross output of the automobile 
and motorcycle subsectors in 1997 amounted to 18,103 billion rupiah, while that of the agricultural 
machinery (including diesel engine) and bic cle subsectors was 764 billion rupiah. This significant 
difference in the scale of output suggests that SMEs in the former subsectors were in a better position to 
enjoy large and/or stable orders from subcontracting ties than the latter. 
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area. 
13 A larger and non-pribumi parts producer (Firm S79) 1n Bandung has also 
developed many clients, taking advantage of the close networks in the ethnic Chinese 
community in Indonesia. Statistical results indicate that there were no significant 
differences in the utilisation and evaluation of marketing support from peer firms 
between smaller and larger SMEs, between pribumi and non-pribumi firms, and 
between SMEs producing automobile and motorcycle parts and those supplying 
agricultural machinery and bicycle parts. 
As another private channel, traders or trading houses have a modest role in 
finding and developing markets. Around half of the respondent SMEs have utilised 
these trader channels for marketing and gave· them an average score of 2.82. The role 
of traders may be less important than that of the above channels, due to the special 
patterns of trading in the machinery industry, particularly the automobile and 
motorcycle subsectors. The OEM (original equipment manufacture) parts tend to be 
supplied in the subcontracting chain without trading agents. However, traders or 
trading houses can play an active role in channelling non-OEM products to the after-
market (spot-basis replacement parts market). In fact, Firm S34, a larger SME 
producing press parts for vehicles and motorcycles, reported the frequent use of traders 
for selling its no-brand products to the replacement market. 
13 Since markets for the subsectors in this study are mainly domestic-oriented, pribumi networks can 
function in linking products to markets. However, if export-oriented products are selected, pribumi and 
non-pribumi networks work very differently. For export marketing, international connections established 
by ethnic Chinese business people seem much more effective (Berry and Levy 1999: 43). 
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Table 6.2 Channels and Effectiveness of Marketing Support Mechanisms for SMEs 
User Firms Differences in No. of User Firms Mean Scores Differences in Mean Scores 
Channels (N = 96) between Groups in Categories of Usefulness between Groups in Categories 
No. of Firms ll Size 2l Ethnicity 3l Subsector 4l Mean S) Size 6) Ethnicity 7l Subsector S) 
(%) Rank p-values p-values p-values (s.d.) Rank F -values t-values t-values 
1. Parent Firms 95 1 0.41 1.00 1.00 3.76 1 2.78 * 3.04 ** 3.42 ** 
(99.0) (1.18) (-) (-) (-) 
2. Finns in Similar 77 2 0.54 0.12 0.17 3.38 2 0.99 1.31 1.59 
Business (80.2) (1.08) 
3. Traders 49 3 0.76 0.67 1.00 2.82 4 0.92 0.50 0.02 
(51.0) (1.11) 
4. Input Suppliers 2 7 0.54 0.14 1.00 2.00 6 
(2.1) (1.41) 
5. Associations 27 4 0.12 0.48 0.03 * 2.85 3 1.09 0.10 0.93 
(28.1) (-) (0.82) 
6. Government 25 5 0.11 0.10 0.80 2.24 5 1.48 1.55 1.26 
(26.0) (0.83) 
7. Other 8 6 0.49 0.00 ** 0.43 2.00 6 
(8.3) (+) (0.93) 
Notes: 1) Figures in the upper row indicate the number of firms which utilise each channel. Figures in 
parentheses are the share of firms with each channel in the total sample firms. 
2) Differences in frequency ratios between firms with 1-19, 20-49, 50-99, and 100-299 workers, which 
are indicated by p-values of Pearson's chi-square test. ** = significant at the 1 % level, * = 
significant at the 5 % level. When the differences are significant, ( +) = smaller SMEs > larger 
SMEs, (-) = smaller SMEs < larger SMEs. 
3) Difference in frequency ratios between firms of pribumi owners (P) and non-pribumi owners (NP), 
which is indicated by p-values of Fisher's exact test. ** = significant at the 1 % level, * = significant 
at the 5 % level. When the difference is significant, ( +) = P SMEs > NP SMEs, (-) = P SMEs < NP 
SMEs. 
4) Difference in frequency ratios between firms engaged in the automobile/motorcycle subsectors 
(AM) and the agricultural machinery/bicycle subsectors (AB), which is indicated by p-values of 
Fisher's exact test. ** = significant at the 1 % level, * = significant at the 5 % level. When the 
difference is significant, ( +) = AB SMEs > AM SMEs, (-) = AB SMEs < AM SMEs. 
5) Figures in the upper row are the average of scores indicated by firms' rating from 1 (the lowest score 
as not at all effective) to 5 (the highest score as very effective). Figures in parentheses are standard 
deviation. 
6) Differences in mean scores of usefulness between firms with 1-19, 20-49 , 50-99, and 100-299 
workers, which are indicated by F-values of ANOV A. ** = significant at the 1 % level, * = 
significant at the 5 % level. When the differences are significant, ( +) = smaller SMEs > larger 
SMEs, (-) = smaller SMEs < larger SMEs. 
7) Difference in mean scores of usefulness between firms of pribumi owners (P) and non-pribumi 
owners (NP), which is indicated by the t-values. ** = significant at the 1 % level, * = significant at 
the 5 % level. When the difference is significant, ( + ) = P SMEs > NP SMEs, (-) = P SMEs < NP 
SMEs. 
8) Difference in mean scores of usefulness between firms engaged in the automobile/motorcycle 
subsectors (AM) and the agricultural machinery and bicycle subsectors (AB), which is indicated by 
the t-values. ** = significant at the 1 level , * = significant at the 5 % level. When the difference is 
significant, ( +) = AB SMEs > AM SMEs, (-) =AB SMEs < AM SMEs. 
Source: Based on author's interview and questionnaire survey during 1999-2000. 
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Industrial associations, chambers of commerce and industry, and cooperatives, 
as collective sources of support, have played a modest role in promoting marketing. 
Nearly 30 percent of the sample firms have used marketing services provided by these 
organisations and assigned them an average score of 2.85. Smaller SMEs have taken 
advantage of marketing information and joint marketing functions provided by local or 
grass-roots organisations such as the aforementioned APIKS in Sukabumi and PT 
Usbersa Mitra Logam in Jakarta. Larger SMEs have obtained information on new 
business opportunities, by taking part in exhibitions organised by national-level 
associations such as GIAMM and APLINDO. Since GIAMM is relatively well 
managed in Indonesia, SMEs in the automobile and motorcycle subsectors can have 
better access to these collective sources, compared to those in the agricultural 
machinery and bicycle subsectors. 
The government sector also assisted SMEs in linking their products to markets, 
by organising exhibitions and trade fairs. A quarter of the sample firms used the 
government channels and gave them a low score of 2.24. A non-pribumi auto parts 
supplier firm in Jakarta (S04) pointed out that exhibitions organised by nation-wide 
associations often attract a larger number of potential customers, relative to those 
organised by government agencies such as NAFED (National Agency for Export 
Development of the Indonesian Ministry of Industry and Trade). This is probably 
because the former is more business-oriented and has better information on potential 
buyers, compared to the latter. Other sources include marketing channels through 
NGOs, which have extended their assistance to pribumi SMEs. 14 
Private channels have played a significant role in establishing market linkages 
for SMEs. In particular, subcontracting relationships are the most helpful and 
14 In Indonesia, NGOs tend to limit beneficiaries of their SME support to pribumi firms which are 
perceived as an economically weaker group. 
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influential channels among the vanous forms of marketing support available to the 
metal working and machinery SMEs in our sample. Public and collective sources have, 
in contrast, provided limited marketing support, although some types of support are 
useful to a certain extent. Examples are joint marketing and information dissemination 
dealt with by local- or grass-roots-level associations, and exhibitions and trade fairs 
organised by national associations and central government agencies. 
6.4 Support Mechanisms of Financing for SMEs 
As already observed in Chapter 5, access to capital is one of the largest constraints 
which SMEs face in initiating their business and expanding their production capacity. 
Insufficient information on formal financial sources for investment and working capital 
and long and complicated processes for credits have been a major obstacle for the 
development of SMEs. Table 6.3 shows the key sources metalworking and machinery 
SMEs in our sample have used to finance their business and how they evaluated such 
financing sources. 
In contrast to technological and marketing support, subcontracting linkages were 
of minor significance in providing financial assistance to small-medium supplier firms. 
Nearly 40 percent of the sample SMEs received financial support from principal firms, 
but they assigned it the second lowest average score of 2.16. Financial assistance from 
parent firms has been limited mostly to the setting of better payment conditions ( e.g., 
down payment, frequent instalments and quick payment after delivery) and the 
provision of raw materials, dies or molds. This support tends to be directed to smaller 
SMEs rather than their larger counterparts. It is not easy for many smaller SMEs to 
purchase input materials and produce parts and components, if they do not have such 
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financial support. Firm AO 1, one of the major automobile assembler firms in Indonesia, 
assisted in the establishment of some supplier firms through equity participation. 15 The 
same assembler firm gave a guarantee for bank loans to Firm S42, one of its main 
supplier firms. These supplier firms, of course, gave the highest score of 5 to such 
financial support from their parent firms. These cases were, however, exceptional. 
Subcontracting linkages have not generally worked well in providing SMEs with 
sufficient financial support. Another inter-firm channel through input supplier firms 
also did not provide SMEs with sufficient financial arrangements. 
There are some possible reasons why subcontracting linkages are not effective in 
providing financial support for small-medium producers. Several assembler firms 
noted in our interview survey that, since capital is not necessarily an abundant 
production factor even for large-scale parent firms in Indonesia, they cannot easily use 
such a limited resource to support supplier SMEs. Underdeveloped legal systems 
concerning business and contracting in Indonesia have also prevented principal firms 
from providing SMEs with financial assistance (UNIDO 2000: 209). As will be 
observed in Chapter 8, intimate ties between parent firms and subcontracting SMEs like 
in Japan's vertical keiretsu groups, which may relieve the shortcomings of imperfect 
information and absorb the risks of opportunistic behaviour, do not exist in Indonesia. 
Without such organisational devices, it may be difficult for parent firms to extend 
capital as a precious resource to small-medium supplier firms. 
15 As already explained in Section 2.3, this case is classified as establishment linkages, which are one of 
the ten linkage categories listed by Lall based on his field survey in India (1980: 208-9 and 214-5). 
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Table 6.3 Channels and Effectiveness of Financing Support Mechanisms for SMEs 
User Firms Differences in No. of User Firms Mean Scores Differences in Mean Scores 
Channels (N = 96 ) between Groups in Categories of V sefulness between Groups in Categories 
No. of Firms Il Size 2) Ethnicity 3l Subsector 4l Mean 5l Size 6l Ethnicity ?) Subsector 8) 
(%) Rank p-values p-values p-values (s.d.) Rank F -values t-values r-values 
l . Parent Firms 37 3 0.04 * 0.20 0.19 2.16 7 1.98 0.20 1.53 
(38.5) (+) ( 1.21) 
2. Input Suppliers 4 7 0.57 1.00 1.00 2.00 8 
(4.2) (0.00) 
3. Banks, Financial 68 2 0.01 ** 0.11 0.09 2.66 6 6.91 ** 2.07 * 0.30 
Institutions (70.8) (-) (0.84) (-) (-) 
4. Financing from 9 6 0.03 * 1.00 0.26 4.67 1 0.56 1.53 1.53 
Abroad (9.4) (-) (0.50) 
5. Informal 34 4 0.16 1.00 0.01 ** 3.44 5 0.19 1.50 0.68 
Financing (35.4) (+) (1.26) 
6. Government 12 5 0.00 ** 0.00 ** 0.33 4.08 3 0.74 0.90 0.63 
Credits (12.5) (+) (+) (1.00) 
7. Self-financing 94 1 0.58 1.00 0.54 4.35 2 1.69 0.17 2.10 * 
(97.9) (0.91) (+) 
8. Other 2 8 0.54 1.00 1.00 3.50 4 
(2.1) (0.71) 
Notes: 1) Figures in the upper row indicate the number of firms which utilise each channel. Figures in 
parentheses are the share of firms with each channel in the total sample firms. 
2) Differences in frequency ratios between firms with 1-19, 20-49, 50-99, and 100-299 workers, which 
are indicated by p-values of Pearson's chi-square test. ** = significant at the 1 % level, * = 
significant at the 5 % level. When the differences are significant, ( +) = smaller SMEs > larger 
SMEs, (-) = smaller SMEs < larger SMEs. 
3) Difference in frequency ratios between firms of pribumi owners (P) and non-pribumi owners (NP), 
which is indicated by p-values of Fisher's exact test. ** = significant at the 1 % level, * = significant 
at the 5 % level. When the difference is significant, ( +) = P SMEs > NP SMEs, (-) = P SMEs < NP 
SMEs. 
4) Difference in frequency ratios between firms engaged in the automobile/motorcycle subsectors 
(AM) and the agricultural machinery/bicycle subsectors (AB), which is indicated by p-values of 
Fisher's exact test. ** = significant at the 1 % level, * = significant at the 5 % level. When the 
difference is significant, ( +) = AB SMEs > AM SMEs, (-) = AB SMEs < AM SMEs. 
5) Figures in the upper row are the average of scores indicated by firms' rating from 1 (the lowest score 
as not at all effective) to 5 (the highest score as very effective). Figures in parentheses are standard 
deviation. 
6) Differences in mean scores of usefulness between firms with 1-19, 20-49, 50-99, and 100-299 
workers, which are indicated by F -values of ANOV A. ** = significant at the 1 % level, * = 
significant at the 5 % level. When the differences are significant, ( +) = smaller SMEs > larger 
SMEs, (-) = smaller SMEs < larger SMEs. 
7) Difference in mean scores of usefulness between firms of pribumi owners (P) and non-pribumi 
owners (NP), which is indicated by the t-values. ** = significant at the l % level , * = significant at 
the 5 % level. When the difference is significant, ( +) = P SMEs > NP SMEs, (-) = P SMEs < NP 
SMEs. 
8) Difference in mean scores of usefulness between firms engaged in the automobile/motorcycle 
subsectors (AM) and the agricultural machinery and bicycle subsectors (AB), which is indicated by 
the t-values. ** = significant at the 1 level, * = significant at the 5 % level. When the difference is 
significant, (+)=AB SMEs > AM SMEs , (-)=AB SMEs < AM SMEs. 
Source: Based on author's interview and questionnaire survey during 1999-2000. 
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Around 70 percent of the sample parts supplier firms have had access to state 
and private banks or financial institutions. 16 However, financing from these formal 
banks and financial institutions was rated low at 2.66 on average. The utilisation and 
evaluation of these formal channels were different according to firm groups in size and 
ethnic categories. For smaller SMEs in particular, these financial sources were not 
easily accessible. Many of the smaller and pribumi SMEs claimed that they faced a 
lack of information on banks and their financial services. They also mentioned 
problems of high financial transaction costs, including high interest rates ( especially in 
the crisis period and thereafter), high collateral rates (100 to 200 percent) and high 
unofficial commissions. 17 
Moreover, under increased pressure for greater prudential soundness after the 
1997-98 economic crisis, it has been difficult for banks and financial organisations to 
lend money to SMEs with low creditworthiness, in part as a consequence of the absence 
of any institutional devices such as credit guarantee systems or special targeted 
programs. These observations correspond with Akatiga's study (1999), which 
concluded that the main issues of SME financing are 1) the limited information 
regarding formal financial institutions and available services from them, and 2) inability 
of SMEs to gain access to formal financial institutions due to low creditworthiness of 
SMEs and the complex and time-consuming lending procedures set by formal financial 
institutions. Compared with smaller and pribumi SMEs, larger and non-pribumi groups 
have had relatively better access to and better services from banks and financial 
16 Among these, there are more than 10 SMEs that have used banks primarily for receiving credit funds 
under government programs. Apart from such directed credit programs, they seem not to have had access 
to banks. Also, several of the respondents with access to formal financial institutions have had 
transactions for personal purposes not purely for corporate usage, even though it is difficult to distinguish 
exactly between the two. 
17 One venture capital company dealing with SME finance as one of its tasks pointed out that, due to the 
lack of information, financial institutions also need to bear high transaction costs. The costs include the 
assessment of financial capabilities of SME borrowers, preparations for voluminous documents and 
monitoring of business performance. These costs are high relative to loan size. 
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institutions. However, this does not necessarily mean that financial access of larger and 
non-pribumi SMEs has been sufficient. Loans from formal financial sources available 
to larger and non-pribumi SMEs often require those firms to bear high transaction costs. 
A few of them have mobilised their capital from abroad. 18 
In addition to the above channels in the private sector, 12 percent of the sample 
supplier firms have utilised government credit programs designated for SMEs. Due to 
the government's definition of SMEs, the establishments that have used such directed 
credit schemes were mostly smaller and pribumi SMEs. 19 The main credit programs 
used by the sample firms are: loans from state-owned enterprises (SOEs or BUMN) 
which have been required by the Indonesian government to put aside 1 to 5 percent of 
their net profits to help SMEs; and loans under the KUK ( credit for small businesses) 
scheme, in which banks in Indonesia are required to allocate 20 percent of their lending 
to small-scale firms. 20 
According to Patten, Rosertgard and Johnston (2001: 1057, 1062), the Bank 
Rakyat Indonesia (BRI), one of three state-owned commercial foreign exchange banks 
in Indonesia, provided credit products to microenterprises and SMEs even during the 
crisis years. After the reorganisation of BRI in 1997, its newly established strategic 
business unit (SBU) for retail banking provides small and medium business loans up to 
Rp 3 billion (US$ 430,000), while SBU for microbanking extends loans of Rp 25,000 to 
Rp 25 million (US$ 3-3,500) to various kinds of enterprises and business activities such 
18 Such SMEs are generally larger non-pribumi firms that have special channels with overseas financial 
institutions through joint venture partners, technical assistance partners, or technical licensors. 
19 Such credit programs often use the definition of the Ministry of Finance and Bank Indonesia (the 
central bank). They define SMEs as those firms whose production assets (excluding land and building) 
are less than Rp 200 million, with some preference given to pribumi firms. This is the reason why credits 
through targeted credit programs were hardly used by larger and non-pribumi SMEs. 
20 Significant among BUMNs is the role of PT SUCOFIND in lending money to SMEs. More than half 
of the sample SMEs with access to government credit programs have been financed by it. As an 
intermediate, APLINDO (Association of Indonesian Metal Foundry) played a crucial role in channelling 
potential and reliable member firms as borrowers to SUCOFINDO as a lender. In the latter scheme, 
commercial conditions, not preferential ones, were applied to KUK loans. 
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as agriculture, fish production, trading, handicraft or small industrial production, and 
services. However, very few SMEs in our sample took advantage of these finance 
opportunities offered by BRI. This may suggest that insufficient information prevents 
SMEs from gaining access to formal sources , even if necessary financial services 
become available. 
Informal financing in the form of borrowing from friends and informal creditors 
was observed in more than one-third of our surveyed SMEs. Almost all of the sample 
firms have financed part or all of their business operations by themselves, even though 
this is not an external source. This form of financing was given the highest score of 
4.35 on average, except for the rare financing tool of foreign finance. This indicates 
that SME owners have mainly met their financial demands with their own resources. 
These results help us understand that parent firms through subcontracting 
linkages were not in a position to help small-medium supplier firms overcome financial 
constraints to any significant degree. Commercial loans from formal banks and 
financial institutions have been popular among larger SMEs, while government credit 
programs have been utilised by smaller and pribumi SMEs. However, neither of the 
financing sources were necessarily sufficient. The former imposed high transaction 
costs even on larger SMEs and did not serve smaller and pribumi SMEs well . The 
latter tended not to be available to larger and non-pribumi SMEs. Informal financing 
and self-financing have, to an extent, supplemented the shortcomings of such formal 
and external financial support. 
To cope with the financial consequences of the economic crisis since the middle 
of 1997, the Indonesian government accelerated the restructuring of banks and other 
financial institutions. This streamlining may rebuild the Indonesian banking sector, 
reduce high transaction costs and make it more reliable and efficient. In promoting the 
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reconstruction, it would be appropriate, at the same time, to pay attention to some 
adverse effects on SME financing. Most of the financial schemes specifically for SMEs 
in the manufacturing sector disappeared by 2000, as a consequence of an agreement 
between the Indonesian government and the IMF. 21 As Berry and Levy (1999: 69) 
pointed out, it is difficult for banks and other formal financial organisations, 
particularly in the aftermath of the economic crisis, to allocate their lending to the SME 
sector in the absence of special devices for guaranteeing the low financial confidence of 
SMEs and reducing the high costs of small-scale lending. Without any considerations, 
financial access of the SME sector, particularly smaller and pribumi SMEs in the 
manufacturing industry, may deteriorate. 
6.5 Subcontracting Linkages as Support Mechanisms of SME 
Development 
The previous sections investigated what kind of external sources SMEs utilised as 
support mechanisms to improve their insufficient technical, marketing and financing 
capabilities and how useful such external channels were for SMEs in complementing 
their deficient internal resources. Based on the findings in the previous sections, this 
section presents some concluding remarks about support mechanisms for metalworking 
and machinery SMEs in the Indonesian automobile, motorcycle, agricultural machinery 
and bicycle subsectors. Table 6.4 summarises the main findings in this chapter. 
2 1 This is mainly based on the Letter of Intent in January 2000 that was prepared by the Indonesian 
government and addressed to the IMF. The government already made a decision to remove the KUK 
(credit for small businesses) scheme. Accordingly, the financing programs currently available to SMEs 
are microfinance and SME finance that have been provided by BRI and the Liquidity Credit Scheme that 
restarted in 1998 and has provided credits to farmers , cooperatives and small businesses. For further 
details , see Urata (2000: 16-32). 
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Table 6.4 
Private 
Channels 
Non-Public/ 
Collective 
Channels 
Public 
Channels 
Main Findings: Support Mechanisms for SME Development in Indonesia 
Technological Support 
- Private channels through subcontracting with 
parent firms, peer firms and equipment suppliers 
were the main sources. 
- Assembler/higher-tier supplier firms through 
subcontracting transactions were very important. 
- The effectiveness varied according to firm size 
and ethnic affiliation. 
- Associations, KADIN/KADINDA, cooperatives 
and NGOs were not often utilised and not very 
effective. 
- Larger SMEs utilised nation-wide organisations, 
while smaller SMEs used local- or grass-roots-
lcvcl organisations. 
- Public technical institutions were utilised by more 
than one-third of the sample firms, but they were 
not effective. Their contribution differed 
according to firm size and ethnic affiliation. 
- Larger and non-pribumi SMEs used large and 
well -equipped technical institutions in 
JABOTABEK, while smaller and pribumi SMEs 
utilised UPTs and local universities. 
Marketing Support 
- Private channels played a significant role in 
establishing market linkages for SMEs. 
- Subcontracting relationships were most helpful. 
- Public/collective sources provided limited 
marketing support. 
- Among them, useful were 1) joint marketing and 
information dissemination provided by local 
associations for smaller SMEs, and 2) exhibitions 
and trade fairs organised by national associations 
and central government agencies for larger SMEs. 
Financing Support 
- Support from parent firms through subcontracting 
linkages did not function well. 
- Commercial loans from formal banks/ financial 
institutions were utilised, but they imposed high 
transaction costs even on larger SMEs and did 
not serve smaller firms well. 
- Self-financing was the main financial source and, 
together with informal financing, supplemented 
formal and external financial support. 
- Government credit programs were appreciated by 
smaller and pribumi SMEs, but they were not 
available to larger and non-pribumi SMEs. 
First, this chapter reveals the positive contribution of inter-firm linkages in the 
development of SMEs. Roughly 65-80 percent of metalworking and machinery SMEs 
in our sample used relationships with parent firms, peer firms and machinery/equipment 
supplier firms to upgrade their technological capabilities. Almost all of them utilised 
vertical ties with principal firms and about 80 percent also used horizontal relations 
with peer firms to develop access to markets for their products. Our sample SMEs 
appreciated these private channels through inter-firm networks as effective support 
mechanisms for their technological and marketing development. In particular, 
subcontracting linkages have played a significant role in improving technological 
capabilities and linking products to markets. 
Compared with those inter-firm linkages in the private sector, the public and 
collective channels were of minor significance in enhancing capabilities of SMEs. 
Government agencies, industrial associations or similar organisations were not 
frequently utilised by our sample SMEs as effective support mechanisms for learning 
technologies and expanding markets. 
Certainly, as Thee (1985) already pointed out, subcontracting networks in 
Indonesia are not so strong and are limited in terms of size and function, compared with 
those in Japan, as already observed in Chapter 3. However, vertical inter-firm linkages 
through commercial transactions in the automobile, motorcycle, agricultural machinery 
and bicycle subsectors seem to have started to provide the SME sector in Indonesia 
with a chance to complement their insufficient technological and marketing capabilities. 
The rapid expansion of these markets during the late 1980s and the 1990s encouraged 
large-scale assembler firms to boost subcontracting transactions with small-medium 
supplier firms and provide support mechanisms through collaborative subcontracting 
ties that can help SMEs improve weak technological and marketing capabilities. 
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Secondly, there are interesting contrasts in the sources of technical and 
marketing support between smaller and larger SMEs, between pribumi and non-pribumi 
SMEs and between SMEs in the automobile and motorcycle subsectors and those in the 
agricultural machinery and bicycle subsectors. Larger SMEs, non-pribumi 
entrepreneurs and firms in the automobile and motorcycle subsectors can take better 
advantage of technical and marketing support mechanisms through subcontracting 
relations than smaller SMEs, pribumi entrepreneurs and firms in the agricultural 
machinery and bicycle subsectors. On the other hand, smaller and pribumi SMEs tend 
to utilise technical collaboration with peer firms through horizontal inter-firm linkages 
more frequently than their larger and non-pribumi counterparts. This reveals that the 
usefulness of support channels in the private sector for the improvement of 
technological and marketing capabilities vary according to firm groups in size, ethnic 
affiliation and subsector categories. 
Our findings also indicate that public and collective support in technological and 
marketing fields may supplement private support to some extent and help smaller and 
pribumi firms upgrade their capabilities. The provision of technical support through 
public technical institutions, for instance, is useful to a certain extent for the 
development of smaller and pribumi SMEs. Such support may, then, enable them to 
improve access to private channels of technical and marketing support and to 
effectively acquire technological and marketing capabilities through useful inter-firm 
linkages. Therefore, there is a possibility that neglect of the weak capabilities of public 
and collective organisations such as technical institutions for SMEs (e.g. , UPTs), 
KADIN(DA) and industrial associations will constrain the development of SMEs. 
Finally, financial support mechanisms for SMEs through vertical inter-firm 
linkages have not worked well, compared with technological and marketing support. 
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Only less than 40 percent of metalworking and machinery SMEs in our sample received 
financial support from parent firms through subcontracting, which was not perceived as 
very effective assistance. Around 70 percent of sample SMEs had access to banks and 
financial institutions, but many of them did not highly appreciate these formal financial 
channels. Almost all of the sample producers partly or fully financed their business 
operation and investment by themselves. 
As discussed in Chapter 4, most of the SME credit programs introduced by the 
Indonesian government from the early 1970s did not yield fruit. McLeod (1991: 208-9) 
already argued that the lack of finance for SMEs was due to the shortage of 
entrepreneurial capabilities rather than the absence of SME credit schemes. However, 
in general, financial and non-financial sources in the business sector appeared not to 
have worked well in financing SMEs in Indonesia. Therefore, it seems recommendable 
for the government to take measures to help SMEs improve their access to useful and 
economical financial services, not by using regulation but by reducing transaction costs 
for both borrowing and lending parties. 
The main finding in this chapter is that subcontracting ties with parent firms 
have functioned effectively in improving technological and marketing capabilities of 
our sample metalworking and machinery SMEs. This result supports our hypothesis in 
Chapter 2 that vertical inter-firm linkages through subcontracting transactions can 
encourage SMEs with limited internal sources to upgrade their capabilities. The next 
three chapters will therefore focus on subcontracting issues in the context of SME 
development, based on micro-level evidence in the Indonesian metalworking and 
machinery industry. 
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Chapter 7 
The Role of Subcontracting in SME Development 
in Indonesia: Quantitative Evidence from SMEs 
7.1 Introduction 
According to Berry (1997: 7), insufficient capabilities of SMEs, as discussed in Chapter 
2, ma.~e the assistance from and collaboration with LEs imperative. The typical 
economic logic for inter-firm cooperation between LEs and SMEs is found in the fact 
that LEs can do some things more efficiently than SMEs. Berry (1997: 6) pointed out 
that, apart from fostering entrepreneurial capabilities, one of the main determinants for 
the success of SME development is the establishment of useful linkages between SMEs 
and LEs through subcontracting arrangements. He emphasised that this kind of 
"linkage-inducing" arrangement is, mostly and in most places, a new and experimental 
issue with considerable potential. 
The previous chapter clarified channels and usefulness of external support for 
SMEs. This qualitative survey on metalworking and machinery enterprises in the 
Indonesian automobile, motorcycle, agricultural machinery and bicycle industries found 
that subcontracting cooperation through commercial transactions was perceived as one 
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of the most effective sources of technical and marketing support to SMEs. The finding 
indicated the positive role of subcontracting ties in improving technological and 
marketing capabilities of SMEs. 
By implication, it is possible to hypothesise that subcontracting transactions 
contribute to the improvement of productivity of SMEs. This study assumes that 
causality runs from subcontracting to firm performance. Certainly, it can work the 
other way because parent firms may prefer more efficient SMEs as their subcontracting 
firms. However, many of the local SMEs in our survey established their subcontracting 
linkages with principal firms when they were still not fully efficient in production and 
technology. These SME respondents acknowledged themselves that they achieved 
improvements in technological, managerial and other capabilities through close 
interactions with parent firms under subcontracting transactions. The qualitative 
evidence from our interview survey supports the direction of causality from 
subcontracting to productivity. For example, Firm S42 is a non-pribumi parts supplier 
firm in Jakarta and engages in stamping seats and bodies for vehicles and sub-
assembling mufflers for commercial trucks. Before commencing the production of 
mufflers and seats, the firm was a cottage industry, which produced only small 
quantities of metal pallets for delivery in a very primitive way. Since the establishment 
of Firm S42 in 1975, the founder and later the current president continuously improved 
production performance, taking advantage of technical support from Firm AO 1, an 
automobile assembler firm, through subcontracting linkages. 
This chapter seeks to establish in a quantitative way that subcontracting linkages 
are an important support mechanism for the development of SMEs in Indonesia. More 
specifically, the study attempts to answer the following question: 
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(1) Can subcontracting improve production efficiency of SMEs in Indonesia? Or, does 
subcontracting cooperation with LEs have a positive impact on the productivity of 
SMEs? 
In addition to this main question, the study also seeks to answer the following two 
supplementary questions: 
(2) What major factors facilitate subcontracting business with large-scale parent firms? 
(3) Are there any differences in the levels of productivity and subcontracting between 
different firm groups within each firm category in terms of firm size, ethnic 
affiliation of ownership and subsector? 
To answer these questions quantitatively, our study estimates production 
functions and calculates indices of total factor productivity (TFP) based on micro-level 
data. According to Kalirajan, Obwona and Zhao (1996: 331-5), TFP growth, the 
growth in output not explained by input growth, can be decomposed into technical 
progress and technical efficiency improvement. The former, technological progress, is 
either capital-intensive or labour-intensive. For low income and labour-abundant 
countries like Indonesia, it is better for technological progress to be labour-intensive. 
The latter, technical efficiency change, concerns the efficient allocation of all inputs, 
and labour is crucial. Labour productivity is, therefore, a very important component of 
TFP. This is the reason why our study employs labour productivity as a measure of the 
contribution of subcontracting to efficiency improvement of SMEs. 
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As observed in Chapter 4, there are several studies which focused on 
subcontracting linkages in Indonesia in the context of SME development. 1 Thee 
(1985: 219-31) and his colleagues (Erfanie 1985: 275-88; Hamid 1985: 233-51; 
Sudjono 1985: 253-74), pioneers in this field, analysed vertical inter-firm networks 
between large assembler firms and small-medium metalworking supplier firms mainly 
in the diesel machine industry. rheir findings in the early 1980s were that relations 
between LEs and SMEs in Indonesia were sparse and types of their linkages limited. 
They concluded that subcontracting ties in Indonesia were still weak and did not 
function well in extending assistance to SMEs. 
However, recent studies tend to document a positive role of subcontracting 
linkages in the development of SMEs in Indonesia. Berry and Levy (1999: 50) pointed 
out that subcontracting relationships provided SMEs in Indonesia with an important 
opportunity to learn technology, referring to the . results of their case studies in rattan 
furniture, wooden furniture and garment sectors. In an analysis of parent firms in 
bicycle and engineering sectors, Harianto (1996: 52-66) found benefits to SMEs from 
intensive technical linkages in subcontracting ties. Sato (1998a: 134-7) illustrated a 
case in which a higher-layer supplier firm in the Indonesian motorcycle industry 
fostered its supplier SMEs through the provision of production facilities and training 
programs on technology and management. 
The available literature on the Indonesian SMEs has dealt with subcontracting 
issues in a qualitative way. This study attempts to provide a new type of evidence 
based on a quantitative analysis , and to statistically examine the current roles of 
subcontracting linkages in the development of SMEs in Indonesia. Unlike the 
preceding chapter, however, this chapter is designed not to compare subcontracting 
1 See, for example, Berry and Levy (1999), Erfanie (1985), Goeltom (1997), Hamid (1985), Harianto 
(1996), Sato (1998a, 2000a), Sudjono (1985), Supratikno (1998), Thee (1985) and Witoelar (1983). Hill 
(1997, 2001) provides an overview of the literature on subcontracting issues in Indonesia. 
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transactions to other possible supportive sources but to examine relationships between 
productivity of our sample SMEs and their reliance on subcontracting business. 
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 7 .2 gives a brief 
explanation of the sampling procedures and an overview of the characteristics of sample 
SMEs. Section 7 .3 sets forth our analytical framework and Section 7 .4 analyses the 
role of subcontracting transactions in the improvement of labour productivity of SMEs 
based on the results of estimating production functions. Section 7 .5 compares TFP 
indices among different types of sample finns and also discusses the relationships 
between TFP and subcontracting. Section 7 .6 as the conclusion answers the three 
questions raised above. 
7 .2 Survey Method and Characteristics of the Sample SMEs 
This section describes the survey method and features of the sample SMEs. Since the 
overall explanation of these issues was already stated in Chapter 5, this section focuses 
on issues specifically related to this chapter. Some firm-level statistical data are also 
analysed as basic characteristics of our sample SMEs. 
7 .2.1 Survey Method 
Our field research in Indonesia was carried out during 1999-2000 to obtain firm-level 
data and information on SMEs, which were collected through interview and 
questionnaire surveys. Based on several criteria and information sources explained in 
Chapter 5, 205 firms were identified by the purposive sampling method and these were 
contacted by telephone and/or facsimile. Subsequently, our interview surveys with 
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owners ( or at least directors) were carried out among 96 (93 local owned and 3 foreign 
affiliated) SMEs.2 Most of the remaining 108 firms did not accept our visit. 
Two main reasons for their refusal to receive us were identified in our initial 
telephone contact with such firms. Many of these firms rejected our request because 
they found no direct benefits from our survey. Unwillingness to reveal firm 
performance was also expressed as a reason. Even though this kind of nonresponse 
generates a bias, there are no clear indications of the direction of how nonresponse is 
related to firm performance. Also, response rates to our interview and questionnaire 
were around 50 percent and 30 percent, respectively, which were reasonably high. 
Therefore, nonresponse bias does not seem serious in this study. 
After a 2- to 3-hour interview together with an inspection of the production 
facilities , our full questionnaire was submitted to owners ( or directors). Of the 96 firms, 
60 (57 local and 3 foreign-affiliated) firms returned the completed questionnaires. 3 
When the questionnaires were collected, the main items were checked, and incomplete, 
inconsistent or unclear answers were corrected on the spot on the basis of explanations 
given by owners (or directors). The purpose of this intensive and face-to-face contact 
was to increase confidence in the data and the information collected. 
7 .2.2 Characteristics of the Sample SMEs 
Table 7 .1 presents some of the key features of the sample of metal working and 
machinery SMEs in the automobile, motorcycle, agricultural machinery and bicycle 
subsectors in 1998. These characteristics are almost same as those indicated in Table 
2 Originally, 97 firms gave us permission to carry out our interview survey. Among them, however, one 
foreign-affiliated SME refused to respond to our questions after we visited its factory. 
3 Of the 37 firms which were not used as our sample in this chapter, 14 firms returned incomplete or 
unusable questionnaires, whereas the remaining 23 firms did not fill in the questionnaires. 
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5.1, although the sample size here is smaller than that in Chapter 5. Inquiry items 
designed for this chapter contained the sensitive data related to accounting and taxation. 
This likely explains a lower response rate to our questions specific to this chapter, 
relative to other chapters. 
Table 7 .1 Profile of 60 Sample SMEs in 1998 
l. Size: Number of Workers 
1) 1 - 19 
2) 20 - 49 
3) 50 - 99 
4) 100 - 299 
2. Ethnic Group of Entrepreneurs 
1) pribumi 
2) non-pribumi 
3. Location 
1) Jakarta (and surrounding areas) 
2) Surabaya (and surrounding areas) 
3) Sukabumi 
4. Subsector 
1) automotive/motorcycle 
2) agricultural machinery 
3) bicycle 
5. Year Established 
1) - 1979 
2) 1980 - 1989 
3) 1990 -
6. Education Levels of Skilled Employees (average ) 
1) high school or less 
2) university (including D3)* 
Note: * D3 represents polytechnic (or equivalent level) graduates. 
Source: Based on author's interview and questionnaire survey during 1999-2000. 
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25% 
30% 
23% 
22% 
42% 
58% 
72% 
23% 
5% 
75% 
18% 
7% 
15% 
33% 
52% 
73% 
27% 
The benchmark years in this chapter include 1998, the midst of the economic 
cns1s. Therefore, many of our data do not show stable growth trends between 1993 and 
1998. In principle, flow data in our survey cover one year from January to December in 
each benchmark year, while stock data are as of the end of each year. This means that 
our 1998 data were exposed to the crisis and that the trend in the data is different from 
those in 1993 and 1996. In order to alleviate this problem, this chapter analyses SMEs 
and subcontracting issues mainly in each benchmark year rather than over time. 
As already observed in Chapters 4 and 5, the recent economic crisis damaged the 
Indonesian economy significantly. The manufacturing industry showed, in general, a 
decline in output during this period. However, as Sato (2000b) suggested, we also have 
to note that an evaluation of the damage caused by the crisis to the SME sector is not 
easy, because insufficient statistical data for small firms with 19 or less employees are 
available and the impact on SMEs is quite heterogeneous according to factors such as 
firm size (even within SMEs), sector, location and market orientation. 
Table 7.2 indicates average labour productivity (Y/L), average capital-labour 
ratio (KIL) and average subcontracting ratio in 1993, 1996 and 1998 by different 
categories of sample SMEs. Y stands for value added, L the number of employees, and 
K capital stock in terms of tangible fixed assets consisting of machinery/equipment and 
buildings for productive use based on the book value of balance sheets. 4 The 
subcontracting ratio represents the share of sales through subcontracting transactions in 
the total turnover. 
4 In this section, value added and capital stock are expressed in current prices. In Sections 7.4 and 7 .5, 
however, the study measures them in constant prices. On the definition of the main data in this chapter, 
see Appendix. 
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Table 7.2 Average Labour Productivity, Average Capital-Labour Ratio and Average 
Subcontracting Ratio by Firm Size, Ethnic Affiliation of Entrepreneurs and 
Subsector in 1993, 1996 and 1998 (Current Prices) 
1993 1996 1998 
Labour Productivity (YIL ) 
(Rp thousand/person) 
size 
1 - 19 10,657 13,071 17,259 
20 - 49 6,544 9,407 13,611 
50 - 99 16,673 14,423 16,876 
100 - 299 27,336 30,118 25 ,257 
ethnicity 
pribumi 14,363 14,490 14,460 
non-pribumi 17,705 18,032 20,200 
sub sector 
automobile/motorcycle 20,328 18,956 19,821 
agricultural machinery/bicycle 7,298 7,712 11 ,770 
Capital-Labour Ratio (KIL ) 
(Rp thousand/person) 
size 
1 - 19 12,542 18,063 62,155 
20 - 49 10,092 22,837 96,988 
50 - 99 41 ,400 31,208 70,937 
100 - 299 29,689 34,942 67,407 
ethnicity 
pribumi 13,323 18,798 42,211 
non-pribumi 32,868 32,434 99 ,778 
subsector 
automobile/motorcycle 27,151 28 ,834 88 ,443 
agricultural machinery/bicycle 22,013 17,762 37,838 
Subcontracting Ratio (%) 
size 
1 - 19 66.0 71.8 66.3 
20 - 49 5'"',., 
.) . .) 62.0 74.1 
50 - 99 77.5 84.9 80.1 
100 - 299 85.9 88.7 81.3 
ethnicity 
pribumi 60.0 66.3 65.2 
non-pribumi 79.8 83.9 82.2 
sub sector 
automobile/motorcycle 81 .4 82.0 78.0 
agricultural machinery/bicycle 51.3 55.4 66.7 
Source: Based on author's interview and questionnaire survey during 1999-2000. 
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Average labour productivity (YIL) is described as nominal value added per 
employee by firm size, ethnic affiliation of owners, and subsector. Labour productivity 
rose with firm size, albeit that SMEs with 20 to 49 employees seem an exception. This 
is consistent with our observations in Chapters 3 and 4, where labour productivity, 
capital intensity and wages in Japan and Indonesia based on the national-level statistical 
data rise with firm size, with some exceptional cases. SMEs run by non-pribumi 
entrepreneurs and engaged in the automobile and motorcycle subsectors had a higher 
labour productivity than those managed by pribumi entrepreneurs and operating in the 
agricultural machinery and bicycle subsectors. Productivity in SMEs with 49 or less 
employees showed an upward trend over time, relative to productivity of those with 50 
or more employees. This may imply that smaller firms suffered less during the 1997-98 
crisis than larger counterparts. Stagnation of labour productivity among firms in the 
automobile and motorcycle industries suggests that they suffered more during the crisis 
than those in the agricultural machinery and bicycle industries. 
Average capital-labour ratio (KIL) in Table 7.2 is presented in terms of nominal 
values of tangible fixed assets per employee. In this micro-level survey, larger SMEs 
had a higher capital intensity than smaller counterparts, except for some irregular cases 
in 1993 and 1998. This feature is basically similar to that of Japan and Indonesia based 
on the national-level data in Chapters 3 and 4. SMEs managed by non-pribumi owners 
and engaged in the automobile and motorcycle subsectors had a higher capital intensity 
in all benchmark years than those owned by pribumi entrepreneurs and operating in the 
agricultural machinery and bicycle subsectors. The likely explanation for the increase 
in capital intensity in 1998 are the effect of inflation, and large investments in plant and 
equipment in response to rapidly growing demand in 1996 and 1997, just before the 
cns1s. 
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Table 7 .2 also contains the average subcontracting ratio. Between 1993 and 
1998, larger manufacturers with 50 or more employees relied more on subcontracting 
business than those with 49 or less employees. Similarly, firms run by non-pribumi 
owners and producing automotive and motorcycle parts had a higher subcontracting 
ratio than those managed by pribumi entrepreneurs and those processing agricultural 
machinery and bicycle parts. On the whole, the subcontracting ratio increased between 
1993 and 1996, while it declined between 1996 and 1998. The decline in the 
subcontracting ratio seems to reflect sudden shrinkages in market size during the 
econormc cns1s. 
Table 7 .3 Average Annual Wages, Average Income Share of Labour and Average 
Rate of Returns to Capital by Firm Size, Ethnic Affiliation of Entrepreneurs 
and Subsector in 1998 
Size 
1 - 19 
20 - 49 
so - 99 
100 - 299 
Ethnicity 
pribumi 
non-pribumi 
Subsector 
automobile/motorcycle 
agricultural machinery/bicycle 
(1) 
(cv)l ) 
(Rp thousand/person) 
5,102 
5,586 
6,003 
8,714 
5,796 
6,557 
6,975 
4,033 
(2) 
(cvUY)2) 
-(%) 
52.1 
50.7 
48.9 
42.5 
59.9 
41.0 
49.8 
46.0 
Notes: 1) cv indicates average annual wages (only monetary portion) per worker. 
2) wVY indicates average income share of labour in value added. 
3) 7r indicates average rate of return to capital. 
Source: Based on author's interview and questionnaire survey during 1999-2000. 
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(3) 
(%) 
41.2 
30.5 
,, 6 ..., 
.) . .) 
65.1 
38.4 
44.6 
39.2 
50.4 
Table 7 .3 illustrates average annual wages (cv ), average factor proportion of 
labour (cvUY) and average rate of return to capital (n:) in 1998 by firm size, ethnicity 
and subsector. Annual wages and factor share of labour reveal clear trends. Similar to 
labour productivity and capital intensity, annual wages per employee rise with firm size, 
as theoretically expected. Also, SMEs owned by non-pribumi entrepreneurs and 
producing automotive and motorcycle parts had a higher wage rate than their 
counterpart groups. The indicator (cvUY) shows the opposite tendency to the average 
annual wages ( cv ). Smaller and pribumi firms in the sample had a higher factor 
proportion of labour than their larger and non-pribumi counterparts, because, as 
observed above, the former groups are generally more labour-intensive than the latter. 
These patterns of annual wages and average factor proportion of labour are also similar 
to those based on the national-level data of Japan and Indonesia in Chapters 3 and 4. 
This study uses the following formula as an indicator to measure profitability: 
(Y -mL) 
1[=---
K 
(7.2.1) 
where n:, Y, wL, and K stand for the rate of return to capital, value added, wage costs 
and capital stock, respectively. The rate of return to capital (n:) represents the degree of 
profitability with regard to capital stock for productive use. 5 Table 7 .3 shows that 
larger SMEs tend to have a higher rate of return than smaller SMEs, except for the 
irregular case of those with 19 or less employees. 6 SMEs directed by non-pribumi 
5 This figure is not identical to 'rate of return to capital' in an accounting or management sense, because 
profit does not represent net operating surplus and the definition of capital is limited to only capital stock 
such as machinery, equipment and buildings . In addition, capital is in terms of the nominal book value in 
each year. However, it can be used to compare the levels of profitability in terms of capital stock 
between different firm groups. See Hondai (1992: 133). 
6 This increase in the profitability with firm size in our survey is similar to the patterns of India, the 
Philippines and Taiwan in the studies of Ohkawa and Tajima (1976) and Tajima (1978). 
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entrepreneurs had a higher profitability than those managed by pribumi entrepreneurs. 
In our sample survey, larger and non-pribumi SMEs have achieved higher returns to 
capital, compared with the smaller and pribumi SMEs. 
7 .3 Framework of Statistical Analysis: Estimates of Production 
Functions 
In order to confirm the effects of subcontracting transactions on production efficiency, 
this chapter estimates production functions that include the subcontracting ratio as one 
of the explanatory variables. Based on the approach taken by Murakami, Liu and 
Otsuka (1996), we use the following Cobb-Douglas form as the production function: 
Y = AKi~ If/r • exp (y (SUBCON)it + I: 51 (EF) fr) (7.3.1) j = I 
where small-medium finn i produces value added Y, using capital stock Kand labour 
(the number of employees) L as the set of inputs in year t (hereinafter i and t are not 
used for simplification).7 Also , S UBCON represents subcontracting ratio and EFj (j = 1, 
2, ····· , m) refers to m kinds of other factors which are likely to affect the level of labour 
productivity of SMEs. This EF includes the following dummy variables: 
7 As the measure of labour inpu~ this study uses the total number of persons engaged in corporate 
acti ities. Because no detailed information about working hours (actual) , education , occupation or skill levels are available, it is not possible to adjust the amount of labour input according to such factors. Instead, our model introduces a dummy variable representing average educational levels of skilled 
workers. Also, this study may capture some variation in quality of labour between regions (urban-rural). The coefficients of these educational and locational dummy variables are expected to reflect some effects 
of variations in labour quality. 
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l) EDU-Worker: educational level of skilled workers (0 = firms in which 
average educational level of skilled workers is senior high school education 
or less , 1 = firms in which average educational level of skilled workers is 
university education including D3 (polytechnic) level);8 
2) FINANCE: access to financial sources except for their own (0 = firms which 
face problems in having . access to financial sources, 1 = firms which do not 
face difficulties in having access to financial sources); 
3) SECTOR: a subsector dummy (0 = firms which supply their products mainly 
to automobile and motorcycle subsectors, 1 = firms which supply their 
products primarily to agricultural machinery and bicycle subsectors); and 
4) AREA: a locational dummy (0 = firms located in urban areas, 1 = firms 
located in rural areas).9 
Higher educational levels of skilled workers and better access to financial 
sources may enable SMEs to improve productivity. SMEs producing automotive and 
motorcycle parts, which usually have better production facilities and higher awareness 
of quality, are expected to show higher productivity. Firms located in urban areas, 
which are generally in more favourable circumstances in terms of markets for outputs 
and inputs, communication and transport and other infrastructure, may have higher 
productivity. 
Through these dummy variables, this study attempts to consider differences in 
productivity between firms with different human resources (EDU-Worker), between 
8 Since KIL ( capital-labour ratio), that is, factor allocation, may incorporate the influence of human 
resources of entrepreneurs, this study does not include the educational level of owners in the explanatory 
variables. 
9 It is possible to use a sales orientation variable (export market/domestic market), instead of the urban-
rural dummy variable. However, almost all of metalworking and machinery firms in our sample, except 
for the very limited number of SMEs in the bicycle subsector, are not export-oriented but produce for 
local assembler firms. Therefore, this study adopts the urban-rural dummy variable in the present model. 
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those with different financial conditions (FINANCE) , between those in different 
subsectors (SECTOR) and between those in different areas (A.KEA). Parameters a. and /3 
indicate production elasticity of capital and labour, respectively, and A , y, and 6j are 
other parameters of the production function to be estimated. 
By dividing both sides of equation (7.3.1) by L and taking the logarithm with 
some modification, the Cobb-Douglas production function can be written as: 
1n (YIL) = lnA + o. ln (KIL)+ (a.+ /3-1) 1n (L) + y (SUBCON) 
+ 61 (EDU-Worker)+ 62 (FINANCE)+ 63 (SECTOR)+ 64 (A.KEA) 
+ t: (7.3.2) 
where £ represents error term. In this equation (7.3.2) , if (a. + J3 - 1) > 0, increasing 
returns to scale exist; ( a. + J3 - 1) = 0 indicates constant returns to scale; and ( a. + J3 - 1) 
< 0 suggests decreasing returns to scale. The coefficient of labour, (a. + J3 - 1), is 
expected to display the existence of scale economies ( or diseconomies) in metalworking 
and machinery SMEs. 
Our hypothesis is, based on the results of Chapter 6 in this study, that the effects 
of vertical inter-firm networks on production performance are positive, because 
subcontracting ties with large-scale parent firms will provide SMEs with not only 
commercial chances but also day-to-day stimulation and guidance in upgrading 
technological and marketing capabilities. In the above equation, coefficient y tests this 
hypothesis. A positive y indicates the contribution of subcontracting to the 
improvement of labour productivity of SMEs. Because of data constraints, effects of 
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the qualitative intensity of subcontracting on firm performance are not explicitly taken 
into account in this model, except for a lagged variable of subcontracting ratio as a 
proxy for the length of linkages introduced in the following equation (7.3.3). This 
qualitative issue is dealt with in Chapter 8, which examines subcontracting mechanisms 
in Indonesia in a comprehensive way and reveals several elements for the better 
functioning of subcontracting link<;1ges. 
A positive sign of 61 will illustrate the effects of human resources measured by 
average educational levels of employees on firms' productivity. Also, 62 > 0 indicates 
the important role of financial access to external sources in SME operation. The 
parameter 63 < 0 will suggest higher productivity of SMEs engaged in the automobile 
and motorcycle subsectors than SMEs in the agricultural machinery and bicycle 
subsectors, while 64 < 0 ~ill explain locational advantages of urban compared to rural 
SMEs. 
Equation (7.3.2) is first estimated, using the ordinary least squares method 
(OLS). However, there is a possibility that simultaneous equation biases will appear, if 
the subcontracting ratio (SUBCON) is an endogenous variable. In addition, because our 
focus is on vertical inter-firm linkages, we would like to identify the factors that explain 
the establishment and expansion of subcontracting transactions for SMEs. Taking these 
into account, our study also estimates a production function in which the subcontracting 
ratio (SUBCON) is an endogenous variable by applying the two-stage least squares 
method (2SLS). At the first stage, the subcontracting ratio function is estimated as 
follows : 
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(SUBCON) = b0 + b1 In (KIL)+ b2 In (L) + b3 (EDU-Worker) 
+ b4 (FINANCE)+ bs (SECTOR)+ b6 (AREA) 
+ b7 (ETHNICITY) + bs (SUBCON)c-1) + t: (7.3.3) 
where (ETHNICITY) is a dummy variable that takes a value of O for pribumi 
entrepreneurs and a value of 1 for non-pribumi counterparts, (SUBCON)(-l) indicates a 
lagged variable of subcontracting ratio, and bk (k = 1, 2, ·····, 8) refers to parameters to 
be estimated.10 
In equation (7 .3.3), b4 > 0 suggests that stable production and reasonably 
equipped facilities through better financial access can increase subcontracting orders 
from assembler or higher tier supplier firms. The parameter b3 > 0 implies that the 
educational levels of skilled workers are positively associated with subcontracting 
activities. This may reflect assemblers' preference of supplier firms which have higher 
levels of human resources and, the ref ore, have the potential to supply products of 
sufficient quality on time. 
Similarly, b5 < 0 suggests that subcontracting networks in the agricultural 
machinery and bicycle subsectors are less developed than those in the automobile and 
motorcycle subsectors. The parameter b6 < 0 indicates that SMEs located in rural areas 
face difficulties in building close relationships with assembler firms, compared with 
their counterparts in urban areas. Also, b7 > 0 shows that non-pribumi firms are likely 
10 This lagged variable, (SUBCON)(-l), is the subcontracting ratio in the previous benchmark year. (SUBCON)c-i) in 1998 refers to subcontracting ratio in 1996 and (SUBCON)(-l) in 1996 refers to that in 
1993. For firms which do not have a subcontracting ratio in 1996 or 1993, we used the data in the nearest 
and available years to such particular benchmark years. If firms started their operations just in 1998 or 
1996 and did not conduct subcontracting business before these years, this study used O as the 
subcontracting ratio in the previous benchmark years. 
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to have a chance to get large subcontracting orders through their strong business 
networks, in comparison with those of pribumi entrepreneurs. If b8 > 0, the continuity 
of transactions with clients would be an important factor in the expansion of 
subcontracting business. 
Based on the above specifications and pnmary data obtained from our 
questionnaire and interview survey, this study estimates equation (7.3.2) in 1993, 1996 
and 1998 and equation (7.3.3) in 1996 and 1998. Between these benchmark years, 
particularly between 1996 and 1998, Indonesia experienced significant rates of inflation. 
This is reflected in, for example, an increase in the capital-labour ratio in 1998 (Table 
7 .2). For that reason, this study uses real value added and capital stock to estimate the 
production functions and subcontracting ratio functions, even though our adjustment to 
real values is not complete, due to data lirni tations ( see Appendix 7 .1). 
7 .4 Results of Statistical Analysis 
Column ( 1) in Table 7 .4 summarises the statistical results of production function in 
1998 that is based on equation (7 .3.2) and estimated with the ordinary least squares 
(OLS) method. The values in parentheses below the coefficients are t-values, whereas 
adjusted R2 represents the coefficient of determination adjusted for the degrees of 
freedom. 
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Table 7 .4 Estimation Results of Production Functions and Subcontracting Ratio 
Func1ion in 1998 
Constant 
ln (KIL ) 
ln (L ) 
Subcontracting ratio (SUBCON) 
Worker education (EDU-Worker ) 
Financial access (FINANCE ) 
Subsector (SECTOR ) 
Location (AREA ) 
Ethnicity (ETHNICITY ) 
Subcontracting ratioc-1) (SUBCO c-1)) 
Adjusted R 2 
(1 ) 
(3-2) 
ln (YIL ) 
OLS 
6.58*** 
(10.28) 
0.16 *** 
(2.93) 
-0.04 
(-0.63) 
1.50*** 
(5.92) 
0.22+ 
(1.40) 
0_55*** 
(3.44) 
0.08 
(0.44) 
-0.04 
(-0.21 ) 
60 
0.689 
(2) 
(3 -3) 
SUBCON 
OLS 
0.28 
(1 .04) 
0.004 
(0.20) 
-0.05 * 
(-1.77) 
-0.01 
(-0.16) 
0.19*** 
(2.96) 
0.10 
(1.34) 
0.06 
(0.86) 
0.13** 
(2.23) 
0_59*** 
(6.14) 
60 
0.532 
ates: Figures in parentheses are t-values. *** indicates significance at the 1 % level. 
(3) 
(3-2) 
ln (YIL ) 
2SLS 
6.sf** 
(10.25) 
*** 0.16 
(2.91 ) 
-0.04 
(-0.65) 
1 .42*** 
(3.75) 
0.23+ 
(1.42) 
*** 0.57 
(3.32) 
0.08 
(0.46) 
-0.04 
(-0.23) 
60 
** indicates significance at the 5% level. * indicates significance at the 10% level. 
++ indicates significance at the 15% level. + indicates significance at the 20% level. 
Source: Based on author's interview and questionnaire survey during 1999-2000. 
Column (1) in Table 7.4 shows a high adjusted R2 , which indicates that the 
model accounts for 69 percent of the variation in labour productivity, 1n (Y/L). The 
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Goldfeld-Quandt test was performed to detect the presence of heteroscedasticity of the 
error terms, which is a common problem with cross-sectional studies, by sorting the 
sample data according to firm size suspected responsible for heteroscedasticity. The 
result of the test for 1998 suggests that the errors are homoscedastic and that the 
consequence of our OLS estimation is efficient parameter estimates of the regression 
equation. Similarly, according t? the result of the test for 1996 and 1993, the null 
hypothesis that the errors are homoscedastic cannot be rejected and our model does not 
contain heteroscedastic errors. All of the coefficients, except for that of subsector 
(SECTOR), indicate the same direction of signs as this study expected a priori and four 
of them are statistically significant at the 1 percent level. 
The parameter of capital-labour ratio (In (KIL)) is statistically significant at the 1 
percent level. However, the estimated value, 0.16, which represents the production 
elasticity of capital, is very small. On the other hand, the coefficient of labour (ln (L)) 
is statistically insignificant and close to zero, suggesting that the production processes 
in the sample SMEs are not subject to scale economies or diseconomies. This can be 
considered as a statistical testing of the constant returns to scale. Our result is 
consistent with the findings of Tybout (2000: 18-9) that returns to scale are generally 
close to unity in studies of SMEs that estimate production functions. The value of -0.04 
as the parameter of labour means that the production elasticity of labour is 0.80 ( or 80 
percent). This is, however, not consistent with the average factor share of labour of 
around 50 percent as shown in Table 7 .3 .11 
11 Under the assumption of competitive equilibrium in factor markets (labour and capital), the wage rate 
should be equal to labour' s marginal productivity and the profit rate equal to capital's marginal 
productivity. This means the equivalence between the production elasticities and income shares of 
production factors . For practical purposes, the income shares of labour and capital are conventionally 
regarded as equivalent with production elasticities of labour and capital. See, for example, Hayam.i 
(1997: 118-9). 
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Griliches and Rings tad ( 1971) stated that the estimated production elasticity of 
labour largely exceeded the average factor share of labour in the Norwegian 
manufacturing industry. They concluded that measurement errors in capital stock 
caused underestimation of capital elasticity and overestimation of labour elasticity. Our 
study also shows differences between the production elasticity of labour (80 percent) 
and the income shares of labour (50 percent). The differences imply that, similar to 
Griliches and Ringstad, our production elasticity of labour is overestimated, whereas 
production elasticity of capital is underestimated, possibly because of measurement 
errors in capital stock caused by the lack of annual investment data and the incomplete 
calculation of real values. It is necessary to be aware of the possibility that such 
measurement errors in capital stock would result in biases in the estimates of production 
functions through underestimation of capital elasticity. 
The coefficient of the subcontracting ratio (SVBCON) 1s positive and highly 
significant at the 1 percent level. In column (1), the proportion of subcontracting orders 
in total sales (SUBCON) is the dominant variable in explaining variation in labour 
productivity. This outcome supports our hypothesis that SMEs can upgrade their labour 
productivity through subcontracting business \Vith LEs. It is consistent with the 
observation in Chapter 6 that a large share of sample SMEs mentioned subcontracting 
linkages with clients as the most effective way to improve their technological and 
marketing capabilities. 
The human resource variable (EDU-Worker) indicates some positive effects of 
school education for skilled employees on production performance. In our field survey, 
many entrepreneurs expressed the need to have well-educated employees in order to 
develop production technology within their firms and take advantage of technical 
support from outside. The coefficient of external financial access (FINANCE) is 
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positive and statistically significant. This means that firms capable of financing 
investment show better production performance than those not capable of obtaining 
finance. 
The coefficient of subsector (SECTOR) rs positive and not significant. This 
positive sign is different from our expectation that SMEs producing automotive and 
motorcycle parts are more effici~nt than those handling agricultural machinery and 
bicycle parts in the light of differences of characteristics, in particular quality, of 
products required by each subsector. This may be due in part to the special business 
circumstances in 1998, when the crisis damaged the automobile and motorcycle 
industries more than the agricultural machinery and bicycle industries. The parameter 
of location (AREA) is negative as was expected, suggesting that SMEs located in rural 
areas tend to find increasing labour productivity more difficult than their counterparts in 
urban areas. However, this variable is statistically insignificant. 
Using the subcontracting ratio (SUBCON) as an endogenous variable and 
applying the 2SLS method, the simultaneous equation model in 1998 given by 
equations (7.3.2) and (7.3.3) is estimated. Column (2) in Table 7 .4 as the 
subcontracting ratio function explains 53 percent of the variation 1n subcontracting 
transactions for sample SMEs. The coefficient of the capital-labour ratio (ln (KIL)) is 
almost zero and not statistically significant, and that of labour (ln (L)) is very small. 
Both indicate that capital intensity and scale effects do not have a large impact on the 
expansion of subcontracting transactions with assembler or higher-tier supplier firms. 
The variable of external financial access (FINANCE) is positive and significant 
at the 1 percent level. This implies that SMEs with sufficient financing capabilities can 
more easily exploit subcontracting relationships with LEs than those without such 
capabilities. This is consistent with findings in our firm-visit survey that sample SMEs 
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with poor financial access often faced difficulties in stabilising production and having 
sufficient production facilities. Stable production and sufficient production facilities 
are usually required by clients as necessary conditions for long-term business relations. 
As a consequence of these problems, such firms often failed to increase subcontracting 
orders from assembler firms . 
The lagged variable of the subcontracting ratio (SUBCONc-i)) in column (2) is 
also positive and statistically significant at the 1 percent level. This suggests that 
continuity of relationships is very important to keep and further expand subcontracting 
transactions with customers. SMEs have to gain trust from and build long-term 
relationships with assembler or higher-layer supplier firms in the development of 
cooperative subcontracting ties. 
The coefficient of owners ' ethnic affiliation (ETHNICITY) in column (2) is 
positive and statistically significant at the 5 percent level. This implies that, because of 
close contacts in the ethnic Chinese community, non-pribumi entrepreneurs tend to 
establish subcontracting relationships more easily than their pribumi counterparts. The 
parameters related to human resources (EDU- Worker) and location (AREA) are 
statistically insignificant, and their signs are not consistent with our expectations. 
The statistical results of column (3) in Table 7 .4 are similar to those of column 
(1). Equation (7.3.2) is reestimated by using the subcontracting ratio (SUBCON) as an 
instrumental variable and applying the two-stage least squares (2SLS) method. Such 
similar results imply that serious simultaneous biases do not exist in equation (7 .3.2) 
estimated with OLS. 
However, the coefficient of the capital-labour ratio (ln (K/L)) in column (3) is 
statistically significant but small (0.16), and the same as in column (1). The value of 
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the labour coefficient (In (L)) implies that there are no scale economies or diseconomies 
in this production function. 
The coefficient of subcontracting ratio (SUBCON) in column (3) is slightly 
lower in terms of statistical significance than in column ( 1 ), but still significant at the 1 
percent level. Thus, the estimation results using 2SLS confirm our hypothesis that 
SMEs can improve their labour productivity through subcontracting linkages with LEs. 
Similarly, financial access (FINANCE) and worker education (EDU-Worker) affect 
labour productivity of SMEs positively. 
Table 7 .5 presents the estimation results of production function and 
subcontracting ratio function in 1996, when the Indonesian manufacturing sector was 
expanding rapidly. Column (1) explains 77 percent of the variation in labour 
productivity (ln (YIL)) in 1996. The adjusted coefficient of determination and most oft-
values in column (1) of 1996 are higher than those of 1998. This is partly because 
normal economic activities of producers in a growing market are reflected in the 
production function for 1996. The signs of all coefficients in the 1996 model are 
consistent with our a priori expectations. Five parameters are statistically significant at 
the 1 or 5 percent level. 
In column (1), the coefficient of capital-labour ratio (ln (KIL)), which means the 
production elasticity of capital, is positive and statistically significant at the 1 percent 
level. However, similar to the results in 1998, its value is small (0.20), probably due to 
measurement errors in fixed capital assets. The coefficient of labour (ln (L)) is almost 
zero and statistically insignificant, suggesting that scale economies or diseconomies do 
not exist in this production function. 
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Table 7 .5 Estimation Results of Production Functions and Subcontracting Ratio 
Function (1998 constant prices) in 1996 and 1993 
Constant 
ln (KIL) 
In (L) 
Subcontracting ratio (SUBCON) 
Worker education (EDU-Worker) 
Financial access (FINANCE) 
Subsector (SECTOR) 
Location (AREA) 
Ethnicity (ETHNICITY) 
Subcontracting ratioc-1 ) (SUBCON c-1 )) 
N 
Adjusted R 2 
(1) 
(3-2) 
In (Y/L) 
OLS 
6.71 *** 
(10.09) 
0.20 *** 
(2.82) 
-0.003 
(-0.06) 
1.34 *** 
(5.36) 
0.32 ** 
(2.35) 
0.40 *** 
(2.91) 
-0.04 
(-0.27) 
-0.07 
(-0.50) 
54 
0.771 
1996 
(2) 
(3-3) 
SUBCON 
OLS 
-0.18 
(-0.54) 
0.07 ** 
(2.15) 
-0.02 
(-0.86) 
0.12 * 
( 1.67) 
0.10+ 
(1.39) 
-0.14++ 
(-1.64) 
0.07 
(0.89) 
0.01 
(0.14) 
0.36*** 
(4.24) 
54 
0.513 
(3) 
(3-2) 
ln (YIL) 
2SLS 
6.71 *** 
(10.05) 
0.20 *** 
(2.49) 
-0.002 
(-0.06) 
1.35 *** 
(2.88) 
0.32 ** 
(2.16) 
0.40 *** 
(2.69) 
-0.04 
(-0.25) 
-0.07 
(-0.50) 
54 
Notes: Figures in parentheses are t-values. *** indicates significance at the 1 % level. 
1993 
(4) 
(3-2) 
ln (Y/L) 
OLS 
6.98 *** 
(6.58) 
0.20* 
(1.70) 
-0.03 
(-0.29) 
1.56 *** 
(3.56) 
0.01 
(0.03) 
0.51 ** 
(2.20) 
-0.20 
(-0.63) 
-0.03 
(-0.10) 
27 
0.750 
** indicates significance at the 5% level. * indicates significance at the 10% level. 
++ indicates significance at the 15% level. + indicates significance at the 20% level. 
Source: Based on author's interview and questionnaire survey during 1999-2000. 
The coefficient of subcontracting ratio (SUBCON), which is our focal point, also 
has a positive and statistically significant value. Column (1) in Table 7.5 indicates that 
243 
subcontracting ratio (SUBCON) is the key variable in explaining the variation in labour 
productivity. This answers our first and main question on subcontracting and 
productivity of SMEs. 
The parameter of formal education for skilled labour (EDU-Worker) is positive 
and significant at the 5 percent level. The result indicates that higher educational levels 
of SME workers tend to result in h~gher labour productivity. The statistical results also 
reveal that financial access (FINANCE) is positively related to the level of labour 
productivity. 
The subsector (SECTOR) and locational (AREA) variables are not statistically 
significant. The signs of their coefficients imply that firrµ_s engaged in agricultural 
machinery and bicycle subsectors and firms located in rural areas experience some 
disadvantages in raising labour productivity, compared with their counterparts in the 
automobile and motorcycle subsectors and in urban areas. 
Column (2) in Table 7 .5 displays the estimated results of subcontracting ratio 
function of 1996, which are basically similar to those of 1998. The parameters of 
capital-labour ratio (In (KIL)) and labour (ln (L)) suggest that firms with a higher capital 
intensity tend to have a higher subcontracting ratio, while scale econorrues or 
diseconomies are not necessarily relevant to the expansion of subcontracting 
transactions . 
In column (2), the coefficient of lagged subcontracting ratio (SUBCONc-1)) is 
positive and statistically significant at the 1 percent level. This result implies that a 
continuous relationship promotes subcontracting business with large-scale parent firms. 
The parameters of worker education (EDU-Worker), external financial access 
(FINANCE) and ethnic affiliation of owners (ETHNICITY) are positive. Their signs are 
all consistent with our expectations that human capital, financing capabilities and 
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networking among the ethnic Chinese have a positive impact on the development of 
vertical inter-firm linkages. 
Column (3) in Table 7 .5 exhibits the results of estimating a production function 
for 1996, using the estimated value of subcontracting ratio (SUBCON) in column (2) as 
an endogenous variable. The estimation results obtained from this 2SLS model are 
similar to those from OLS in column (1). The similarity suggests that there are no 
serious simultaneous equation biases for 1996, as for 1998. 
Statistically significant in column (3) are the coefficients of the capital-labour 
ratio (In (KIL)) , subcontracting ratio (SUBCON), educational attainment of employees · 
(EDU-Worker) and financial access to external sources (FINANCE) , all of which show 
almost the same values and signs as in column (1) in Table 7.5. 
The subcontracting ratio function by using OLS and the production function by 
using 2SLS for 1993 could not be estimated, due to insufficient data. Column ( 4) in 
Table 7 .5 illustrates the estimation results of production function by OLS in 1993, 
which yields results similar to those in 1996 and 1998. Although the t-values for 
several variables are low, the adjusted coefficient of determination is still 0.75. The 
results in 1993 demonstrate statistical significance in the parameters of the capital-
labour ratio (ln (KIL)), subcontracting ratio (SUBCON) and financial access dummy 
(FINANCE) . The results reconfirm the significant roles of subcontracting linkages in 
raising labour productivity for metalworking and machinery SMEs. 
7.5 Comparison of Total Factor Productivity 
The estimated production functions in the previous section do not show the levels of 
productivity or production efficiency in the three different year·s and in the different 
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firm groups within each category by size, ownership and subsector. To examine these, 
this section estimates indices of total factor productivity (TFP), using the results of our 
production functions. This conventional method is suggested by, for example, 
Christensen, Cummings and Jorgenson (1981) and Murakami, Liu and Otsuka (1996), 
and can simply indicate the levels of residual, in a relative sense, that cannot be 
explained by input increases. In a~dition, based on TFP indices, this section examines 
relationships between TFP and subcontracting linkages. 
First, we estimate the TFP indices for sample SMEs as a whole for the 
benchmark years of 1993, 1996 and 1998, by using the following formula: 
ln (TFP)i = (ln (Y/L)r - ln (YIL)o) - a (ln (KIL)t - ln (K/L)o) 
- (a+ /3 - 1) (ln (L)i- ln (L)o) (7.5.1) 
where subscript O depicts the base year of comparison, subscript t illustrates other years 
to be compared, and (TFP) represents the index of TFP calculated with respect to the 
base year. Our simple approach to measuring TFP as the residual implicitly assumes 
that SMEs are technically efficient and operate on their production frontier (Kalirajan, 
Obwona and Zhao 1996: 333-4). 
Next, similar to (7.5.1): 
ln (TFP)8 = (ln (Y/L)g - ln (YIL)o) - a (ln (KIL)g - ln (KJL)o) 
- (a + J3 - 1) (ln (L )g- ln (L)o) (7.5.2) 
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where subscript O is the base of calculation (i.e. firms with 1-19 workers , firms of 
pribumi owners, or firms producing agricultural machinery/bicycle parts) in each SME 
category, subscript g displays other firm groups to be compared, and (TFP) here is the 
index of TFP calculated with respect to the base group O in each benchmark year. 
According to our OLS estimates of production functions in Tables 7.4 and 7.5, 
coefficients of a are 0.20, 0.20 and 0.16 in 1993, 1996 and 1998, respectively, while 
those of (a + fJ - 1) are -0.03 , 0 and -0.04 in 1993, 1996 and 1998, respectively. 
Geometric means are used to calculate average values of variables in the above 
equations (7.5.1) and (7.5.2). 
Then, the relationships between differences in TFP and those in subcontracting 
are investigated, by applying the following formula (Murakami, Liu and Otsuka 1996: 
274-5): 
ln (TFP*)g = y ((SUBCON)g - (SUBCON)o) (7.5.3) 
* where (TFP ' ) represents the index of the contribution of subcontracting to TFP, which 
reflects differences in the degree of subcontracting linkages. It is calculated with 
respect to the base group 0. Coefficients of the subcontracting ratio (SUBCON) in 
Tables 7.4 and 7.5 , which are 1.56, 1.34 and 1.50 in 1993, 1996 and 1998, respectively, 
are used for the above equation (7.5.3). 
Table 7 .6 compares TFP indices , which are expressed relative to 1998 on the 
basis of equation (7 .5 .1). The comparison over time reveals that TFP for sample firms 
as a whole did not grow from 1993 to 1998. However, in consideration of negative 
effects caused by the crisis in 1998, the stagnant situation between 1996 and 1998 
seems understandable. 
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Table 7 .6 Comparison of Index of Total Factor Productivity (TFP) over time in 1993, 
1996 and 1998 1) 
1993 1996 1998 
Comparison over time 
TFP Index (1998 = 100)2) 102.3 100.2 100.0 
Notes: 1) This index is calculated based on 1998 constant prices. 
2) 1998 is used as the base of comparison between different years. 
Source: Based on author's interview and .questionnaire survey during 1999-2000. 
Table 7 .7 Comparison of Indices of Total Factor Productivity (TFP) and Indices of 
Contribution of Subcontracting to TFP by Firm Size, Ethnic Affiliation of 
Entrepreneurs and Subsector in 1993, 1996 and 1998 1) 
Indices of 
Total Factor Productivity 
1993 
Comparison within each category in each year 
szze (1-19 = 100)2) 
1 - 19 
20 - 49 
50 - 99 
100 - 299 
ethnicity (Pribumi = 100)3) 
pribumi 
non-pribumi 
100.0 
98.1 
104.6 
113.8 
100.0 
107.4 
subsector (agricultural machinery/bicycle= 100)4) 
automobile/motorcycle 
agricultural machinery/bicycle 
112.3 
100.0 
1996 
100.0 
95.6 
100.4 
108.0 
100.0 
104.3 
109.9 
100.0 
1998 
100.0 
100.0 
102.4 
107.4 
100.0 
106.3 
104.8 
100.0 
Indices of Contribution of 
Subcontracting to TFP 
1993 
100.0 
82.0 
119.7 
136.4 
100.0 
136.2 
159.9 
100.0 
1996 
100.0 
87.7 
119.2 
125.4 
100.0 
126.6 
142.8 
100.0 
1998 
100.0 
112.4 
123.0 
125.2 
100.0 
129.1 
118.5 
100.0 
Notes: 1) The indices in this table are calculated based on 1998 constant prices. 
2) The group of firms with 1-19 employees is used as the base of comparison between different 
size of SMEs in each year. 
3) The group of firms owned by pribumi entrepreneurs is used as the base of comparison between 
different ethnic affiliation of SMEs in each year. 
4) The group of firms producing agricultural machinery/bicycle parts is used as the base of 
comparison between different subsector of SMEs in each year. 
Source: Based on author's interview and questionnaire survey during 1999-2000. 
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The first three columns in Table 7 .7 compare TFP indices , which are expressed 
relative to the base group within each firm category in each year based on the results of 
equation (7.5.2). This indicates that larger SMEs, non-pribumi SMEs and SMEs in the 
automobile and motorcycle subsectors have generally recorded higher TFP than their 
counterparts, the smaller SMEs, pribumi SMEs and SMEs in the agricultural machinery 
and bicycle subsectors, in each year. These results may suggest that the former SME 
groups have produced their parts and components more efficiently than the latter groups. 
In other words, SMEs with a larger share of orders from subcontracting tend to have 
higher total factor productivity. 
The next three columns in Table 7. 7 show indices of the contribution of 
subcontracting to TFP, which are expressed relative to the base group within each firm 
category in each year based on the results of equation (7.5.3). This comparison of TFP 
attributable to the dependence on subcontracting business between different firm groups 
shows almost the same trends compared to the results of the first three columns. The 
influence of subcontracting on TFP has generally been more significant in larger SMEs, 
SMEs run by non-pribumi owners and SMEs producing automotive and motorcycle 
parts than in smaller SMEs, SMEs managed by pribumi entrepreneurs and SMEs 
supplying agricultural machinery and bicycle parts. SMEs with a larger contribution of 
subcontracting to TFP are SMEs that have higher TFP. Overall, these observations in 
this section imply that subcontracting transactions are very likely to improve the 
productivity of SMEs. 
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7 .6 Subcontracting and Productivity of SMEs 
As indicated above, due to measurement errors in capital stock, the production elasticity 
of capital may be underestimated, which results in biases in the estimated production 
functions. Besides, the sample size was relatively small and some of the data obtained 
from our field survey were affected by the crisis. 12 Despite these shortcomings, our 
micro-level evidence from the metal working and machinery industry yields the 
following findings , which allow us to answer the three questions set forth in Section 7 .1 
of this chapter. 
With regard to the first and main question, this chapter found that the role of 
subcontracting linkages in improving labour productivity of SMEs is pivotal. 
According to the estimated production functions , the subcontracting ratio is the 
dominant variable in explaining variation in labour productivity. Also, indices of TFP 
vary in line with the reliance on subcontracting. These findings confirm our hypothesis 
that vertical inter-firm cooperation through subcontracting ties can increase productivity 
in small-medium metalworking and machinery firms in Indonesia. 
Earlier research represented by Thee and his colleagues (1985) argued that 
subcontracting networks in the Indonesian machinery industry were weak and did not 
provide SMEs with opportunities to sufficiently improve technical and other 
capabilities. Our findings point to a different conclusion. They indicate that 
subcontracting linkages have strengthened and are beneficial to SMEs in improving 
their productivity. These results quantitatively support recent studies by, for instance, 
Berry and Levy (1999), Harianto (1996), Sato (1998a) and Thee (1997), which 
12 Some effects of the crisis are reflected in the sign of the dummy variable for sector in 1998. However, 
this chapter cannot examine in detail the complicated effects of the crisis on SMEs and on subcontracting 
in the 1998 data set, because that was beyond the scope of our study. 
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observed the development of subcontracting networks and the provision of support to 
SMEs through such linkages in the process of industrialisation in Indonesia. 
The difference between Thee' s findings in the 1980s and ours in the 1990s could 
be attributed to the progress of industrialisation in Indonesia and changes in industrial 
organisation since the mid- l 980s, when the pace of industrialisation accelerated. 13 Also, 
it is possible that such different conclusions were reached because the two parties 
analysed different SME groups. Thee and his colleagues focused on smaller SMEs in 
the diesel machinery subsector, while this study covered not only smaller SMEs in the 
agricultural machinery subsector but also larger SMEs in the automobile and 
motorcycle subsectors. This issue will be addressed below in our answer to the third 
question. 
The estimated production functions provided additional findings in relation to 
factors for increasing labour productivity. Higher levels of formal education for skilled 
workers and better access to financial sources are positively related with labour 
productivity of SMEs. 
Concerning our second question, the estimation of subcontracting ratio functions 
reveals that better financial access and business continuity are important in facilitating 
subcontracting transactions, which can provide SMEs with the support they require in 
order to improve their productivity. These findings imply that financial capabilities and 
creditworthiness are required to expand subcontracting transactions. Parent firms are 
likely to prefer supplier firms that are reliable, are able to maintain production at a 
stable level and have reasonably modem production facilities. 
13 Hill (2001: 263) suggested that the results of Thee' s study reflected the nature of Indonesian 
industrialisation in the early 1980s, when the country was still in its industrial infancy, while 
subcontracting linkages have generally become stronger over time in the 1990s, when firms in the 
modern sector have moved rapidly into more sophisticated areas of industrialisation. 
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On the last question, the estimated subcontracting ratio functions illustrate that 
non-pribu,ni owners expand subcontracting business more easily than their pribumi 
counterparts. While different firm groups in other firm categories (i.e. firm size and 
subsector) did not significantly affect the levels of labour productivity and 
subcontracting transactions, most of the signs of the coefficients related to such firm 
categories were consistent with the initial expectations. Based on the comparison of 
TFP indices, larger SMEs, non-pribumi SMEs and SMEs supplying automotive and 
motorcycle parts have, in general, a higher TFP than smaller SMEs, pribumi SMEs and 
SMEs producing agricultural machinery and bicycle parts. The results indicate that 
there are differences in the level of total factor productivity between the former and the 
latter SME groups in each firm category of firm size, ethnic affiliation of entrepreneurs 
and subsector. 
These differences are consistent with the conclusions of Berry and Levy (1999: 
70) and Chapter 6 of this study. They pointed out that, compared with their 
counterparts, larger SMEs and non-pribumi SMEs have better access to support 
mechanisms in the private sector, in particular subcontracting linkages, which improve 
technological and marketing capabilities of SMEs and reduce the transaction costs that 
SMEs face . Different SME groups have uneven access to subcontracting networks and 
this may be one of the key factors that explain differences in the efficiency of 
production. 
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Appendix 7.1 Description of the Main Data 
Our questionnaire survey provides data and information on input and output variables 
in 1993, 1996 and 1998: expenditures on intennediate inputs and direct costs; 
employment; book value of fixed assets; and sales. Using such data and information in 
the following way, this study estimated the production functions and subcontracting 
ratio functions at firm level. 
The data on expenditures for productive use include 1) raw materials and 
intermediate inputs, 2) utilities (water, fuel, electricity and gas), and 3) other direct 
costs (spare parts, consumable materials, packaging materials and so on). Raw 
materials and intermediate inputs are deflated by a composite wholesale price index of 
metal and machinery, which was obtained from the Buletin Statistik Bulanan: lndikator 
Ekonomi ( or Monthly Statistical Bulletin: Economic Indicators, hereinafter referred to 
as the Bulletin), published by the Indonesian Central Bureau of Statistics (BPS). 
Expenditure on utilities is deflated by a consumer price index of fuel, electricity and 
water from the Bulletin. Due to a lack of adequate price indices, other direct costs are 
deflated by the general wholesale price index for the manufacturing sector from the 
Bulletin. These three expenditures are aggregated into total firm expenditures. 
Total firm sales are deflated by a composite producer price index of machinery 
and transport equipment, which is calculated from the Bulletin. Value added (Y) as 
output data in this study is defined as total firm sales minus total firm expenditures, 
both of which are deflated by different price indices (see above) according to the 
double-deflation method. 
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The subcontracting ratio (SUBCON) is defined as the share of sales through 
subcontracting transactions in total firm sales. The labour input (L) is measured as the 
number of production and non-production employees. 
Capital stock is measured on the basis of data for tangible fixed assets for 
productive use consisting of 1) machinery and equipment and 2) buildings in 1993, 
1996 and 1998 in terms of nominal book value (after the deduction of depreciation 
expenses) on firms' balance sheets. Assuming that annual net fixed capital investments 
were made to the same amount in each year between 1993 and 1996 and between 1996 
and 1998, yearly net investment values for machinery & equipment and buildings 
during 1993-1998 were calculated. Annual net investment values for machinery and 
equipment are deflated by a wholesale price index of machinery from the Bulletin. 
Those for buildings are also deflated by a wholesale price index of construction 
materials for other buildings from the same source. Under the assumption of no price 
change in capital goods before 1993, we add up such real values of annual net 
investment on nominal values of fixed capital assets in 1993 to obtain real values of 
capital stock (K) for the analytical purpose of this study. 14 
It is acknowledged that biases may arise from measurement errors caused by this 
method of measuring capital stock in constant prices and the calculation of capital stock 
without exact data on annual investment. Incomplete price adjustment to capital stock, 
in particular before 1993, may result in an underestimation of the production elasticity 
of capital and, therefore, lead to biases of not only the coefficients for capital-labour 
ratio (ex and b1) but also those for other variables in equations (7.3 .2) and (7.3.3). 
However, according to Griliches and Ringstad (1971), these biases are not likely to be 
14 In the case of firms which were established after 1993 or whose data were available only after 1993, 
this study adopts a similar procedure: assuming that nominal fixed investments were made equally in 
each year during the period when the data were available, such annual investment values are deflated by 
the above price indices and added to tangible fixed asset values in the year available. 
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significant, because measurement errors in capital stock would not seriously bias the 
estimate of the scale effect. 
255 
Chapter 8 
Subcontracting Linkages and SME Development 
in Indonesia: Qualitative Evidence from SMEs 
8.1 Introduction 
The potential role of subcontracting relationships in the development of SMEs was 
discussed in Chapter 2. Chapter 6 confirmed that subcontracting linkages with LEs 
have been one of the most important sources in improving technological and marketing 
capabilities of Indonesian metalworking and machinery SMEs. Chapter 7, based on the 
estimates of the production function and TFP indices of a sample of firms, suggested 
that the existence of subcontracting transactions is likely to increase productivity of 
SMEs. 
This chapter explores the detailed characteristics and functions of subcontracting 
linkages from the perspective of SMEs. It examines subcontracting relations in the 
Indonesian metalworking and machinery industry with the aim of understanding how 
they support the development of SMEs. This chapter addresses the following 
questions: 
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(1) Why do SMEs exploit subcontracting transactions with large-scale parent firms? 
(2) How do SMEs initiate business relationships with LEs? 
(3) What type of linkages with LEs do SMEs have through subcontracting business? 
(4) What kind of costs and benefits have SMEs borne that are associated with and 
obtained from subcontracting transactions? How significant are they? 
(5) What are the conditions for larger gains from subcontracting ties? 
In answering these questions, this study will describe the mechanisms of subcontracting 
linkages that existed in Indonesia at the time of our survey. 
The questions 1, 3 and 4 were already formulated in Chapter 2, particularly 
Section 2.3, on the basis of the existing literature. 1 Reflecting the discussion in Chapter 
2, Table 8.1 identifies main possible motivations for, benefits from, costs associated 
with and linkage types of subcontracting transactions with LEs. Each of these 
categories will be discussed in more detail in Sections 8.3-8.6. 
The second question has not been discussed in Chapter 2 in an intensive way. 
On this issue, Nabi (1985: 12-3) observed in his case study of the agricultural 
machinery industry in Pakistan how SMEs approached parent firms to initially establish 
subcontracting relations. He concluded that, relative to impersonal links, personal 
contacts between the two parties were important in the initiation of subcontracting 
business. Contracts tended to be awarded by principal firms to SMEs with owners who 
previously worked for parent firms , and to those who had relatives with close relations 
to parent firms. Our case study may confirm this. 
1 In addition to our discussion in Chapter 2, this study refers to Hill (1985 : 250-5) and Thee (1985: 229-
30) for the third question, and Berry (1997: 20-1 ), Lall (1980: 224), and the Japanese Small and Medium 
Enterprise Agency (1967 : 289, 1998: 98) for the fourth question. 
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Table 8.1 Description of Items Listed in Motivations, Benefits, Costs and Linkage 
Types: Subcontracting with Large-scale Parent Firms 
Items Description 
Motivations for and Benefits to SMEs 
1. Lower Costs associated the reduction of costs such as the collection of information on 
with Contracting/Business potential parent firms, negotiation of contracts, adjustment of 
contracts, and concern about opportunistic behaviours of parent 
firms, by establishing close relations with parent firms. 
2. Technical Support vario,us types of technical support from parent firms. 
3. Managerial Support various types of managerial support from parent firms. 
4. Provision of Large/Stable large and/or stable order from parent firms over a long term. 
Orders 
5. Financial Support 
(except for 6. below) 
6. Provision of Inputs and 
Tools 
7. Specialisation 
Costs for SMEs 
1. Initial Finding of Parent 
Firms 
2. Competition 
3. Small Markets 
4. Penalty 
5. Quick Response 
6. Shift of Loss 
7. High Quality 
8. High technology 
financial support from parent firms in the forms of credit, bank 
guarantees, reasonable payment conditions for SMEs, etc. 
the use of input materials and tools (e.g., die and mold) supplied by 
parent firms. 
the specialisation in particular processes ( e.g., casting, machining, 
stamping) and the realisation of efficient resource allocation. 
search for potential parent firms under the conditions of limited 
information. 
competition with rival SMEs for seats as supplier firms. 
difficulties in enjoying economies of scale due to relatively small and 
segmented markets. 
penalty imposed by parent firms for SMEs' failure to satisfy their 
requirements. 
efforts to quickly respond to instructions/claims from parent firms. 
transfer of loss from parent firms without reasonable explanation. 
required high quality levels (low defect ratios). 
required high levels of production technologies and skills in the areas 
of process design, process technology, die/mold making, production 
line arrangements, etc. 
9. Low Prices required lower prices of products. 
10. Strict Delivery Timing arrangements to satisfy required delivery timing. 
11. Large Production Capacity expansion of production capacity to meet required quantity of output. 
12. Expensive Input Materials purchasing of raw materials and intermediate inputs that are often 
expensive and difficult to obtain domestically. 
13. R&D implementation of costly and difficult R&D activities . 
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Table 8.1 Description of Items Listed in Motivations, Benefits, Costs and Linkage 
Types: Subcontracting with Large-scale Parent Firms ( continued) 
Items Description 
Linkage Types SMEs have with Parent Firms 
1. Support of Establishment 
2. Large/Stable Orders 
3. Technical Specifications 
4. Lending of Tools 
5. Advice on Machinery 
6. Provision of Used 
Machinery 
7. QC Support 
8. Production Technology 
Support 
9. Joint Design 
assistance from parent firms in establishing new supplier firms 
through the provision of credit, capital participation, guarantee of 
order, etc. 
large and/or stable order over a long term (with some exceptions 
during an economic fluctuation period). 
detailed technical specifications (including detailed technical 
instruction and drawing). 
the use of tools ( e.g., dies and molds) supplied by parent firms. 
advice on the selection and layout of machinery and equipment. 
the purchasing of second-hand machinery and equipment at cheaper 
pnces. 
transfer of QC technique (including testing/inspection methods and 
acquisition of industrial standards) through expert dispatch, training, 
etc. 
transfer of production technologies and skills in the areas of process 
design, process technology, die/mold making, production line 
arrangements, etc. through expert dispatch, training, etc. 
joint activities between parent firms and SMEs in the area of product 
design and development. 
10. Managerial Support transfer of managerial skills such as managerial planning, sales 
management, procurement management, human resource 
management, financial management, accounting, etc. 
11. Provision of Inputs the use of input materials supplied by parent firms. 
12. Provision of 
Credit/Guarantees 
financial support, such as credit and bank guarantees, provided by 
parent firms. 
13. Reasonable Payment 
Conditions 
reasonable payment conditions for SMEs (e.g., down payment, and 
accelerated payment) arranged by parent firms. 
14. Price Negotiations reasonable negotiation with parent firms to determine pnces of 
products and services. 
15. Market Information the use of information on new markets (products, clients, etc.) given 
by parent firms. 
Note: Several contradictory items are included in the table. For example, Provision of Large/Stable 
Orders in motivations and benefits and Small Markets in costs contradict each other. It is 
possible that some auto parts supplier finns have a large and stable order through 
subcontracting transactions with parent firms within the limits of the current smaller 
automobile market. However, they may consider that the subcontracting market of auto parts 
and components is so small that they cannot necessarily enjoy economies of scale and that, if 
the market size had been larger, they would have had a larger order. In this way, the degree of 
merits and demerits of subcontracting with parent finns in the above list is not an absolute 
indication but relative one. 
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The last question also requues further introduction. Berry (1997: 10, 20) 
explained that subcontracting linkages rest on elements of: 1) human infrastructure and 
the capacity of firms to interact efficiently; 2) mutual trust, mutual interest and inter-
personal respect; 3) cultural and ethnic groups; 4) quality of markets and information; 
and 5) physical infrastructure. These factors affect the establishment and functioning of 
vertical inter-firm cooperation. B~ranson (1967: 68-9) perceived low skills of workers 
and lack of industrially disciplined small-scale entrepreneurs as the key factors that 
prevented SMEs in the Indian diesel machine industry from establishing effective 
subcontracting ties. In addition, Lall (1980: 222) suggested that firm size was one of 
the important determinants of the nature and strength of linkages. Odaka (1983: 354-5) 
pointed out that characteristics of the subsector such as the length and divisibility of 
production processes and expected quality levels of products would differentiate the 
intensity of subcontracting relations between large-scale assembler firms and small-
medium supplier firms. Longer and divisible processes and higher quality levels of 
products would intensify subcontracting ties between LEs and SMEs. Nabi (1985: 17-
8) implied that location of SMEs was one of the factors for characterising 
subcontracting transactions. He described the importance of locational proximity and 
good access to parent firms, material supplier firms and information sources. 
In this chapter, Section 8.2 briefly explains the sampling method and the main 
characteristics of our sample SMEs. Section 8.3 shows why SMEs exploit 
subcontracting with parent firms and how SMEs initially established business linkages 
with them. Section 8.4 indicates the linkage types that SMEs have through 
subcontracting with LEs. Section 8.5 examines revealed benefits that SMEs actually 
obtained from subcontracting transactions with LEs, after an investigation of the costs 
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associated with subcontracting business. 2 Section 8.6 explores conditions for larger 
gains from subcontracting cooperation. Based on the analysis in the prior sections, this 
chapter concludes with answers to the five questions raised in the introduction. 
8.2 Survey Method and Characteristics of the Sample SMEs 
Of the 96 (93 local and 3 foreign-affiliated) metalworking and machinery SMEs in the 
automobile, motorcycle, agricultural machinery and bicycle subsectors, 73 (70 local and 
3 foreign-affiliated) firms responded to questions in our interview and questionnaire 
necessary for the analysis of this chapter. The remaining 23 sample SMEs did not 
provide us with sufficient data and information. 3 Table 8.2 shows the basic . 
characteristics of 73 sample SMEs in 1998, which are almost the same as those 
indicated in Chapter 5. 
Figure 8.1 shows an example of current subcontracting networks in the 
Indonesian automobile and motorcycle subsectors, based on our survey of SMEs and 
parent firms. Most of the first-tier supplier firms are larger-scale foreign-affiliated 
companies, while their second- and third-tier counterparts are smaller-scale local 
producers. As already discussed in Chapter 5, assembler firms even in the automobile 
and motorcycle subsectors do not necessarily have a large number of supplier firms. 
Larger-scale first-layer producers also do not have many smaller lower-tier 
subcontracting supplier firms. Our field observations lead us to conclude that vertical 
keiretsu subcontracting groupings have not emerged in Indonesia, and that almost all of 
2 Due to data limitations, in Chapters 8 and 9, benefits from and costs associated with subcontracting are 
analysed not in monetary terms, but in a qualitative way. This is different from the conventional cost-benefit analysis. Benefits may be understood as "advantages" and costs as "disadvantages." 3 Since this chapter does not require the specific data related to accounting and taxation, the number of 
respondents here is larger than that in the sample used in Chapter 7. The 23 firms that did not answer our 
questions stated that they did not find benefits from our survey or were not willing to disclose their firm 
activities. 
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subcontracting firms do not have a single assembler firm as a client but tend to supply 
products to several parent firms, reflecting the limited market size in Indonesia. 
Table 8.2 Profile of 73 Sample SMEs in 1998 
1. Size: Number of Workers 
1) 1 19 
2) 20 - 49 
3) 50 - 99 
4) 100 - 299 
2. Ethnic Group of Entrepreneurs 
l) pribumi 
2) non-pribumi 
3. Location 
1) Jakarta ( and surrounding areas) 
2) Surabaya (and surrounding areas) 
3) Sukabumi 
4) Bandung 
4. Subsector 
1) automotive/motorcycle 
2) agricultural machinery 
3) bicycle 
5. Major Manufacturing Processes l ) 
1) multi-processes 
2) casting 
3) for 0 in ° 0 0 
4) machining 
5) press/stamping 
6) others 
6. Year Established 
1) - 1979 
2) 1980 - 1989 
3) 1990 -
7. Educational Levels of Entrepreneurs 
1) high school or less (including D3)2l 
2) university 
8. Educational Levels of Skilled Employees (a verage ) 
I ) hjgh school or less 
2) uni versity (including D3) I) 
26% 
26% 
23% 
25% 
40% 
60% 
74% 
21 % 
4% 
1% 
74% 
19% 
7% 
27% 
7% 
2% 
29% 
27% 
8% 
18% 
33% 
49% 
58% 
42% 
78% 
22% 
Notes: 1) Major manufacturing processes represent main technological activities or areas that each firm 
deals with in subcontracting business. Multi-processes indicate two or more technological 
areas among 2) casting to 6) others and sub-assembling of parts/components. Others include 
plating, heat treatments, surface treatments , welding and painting. 
2) D3 represents polytechnic (or equivalent level ) graduates. 
Source: Based on author's interview and questionnaire survey during 1999-2000. 
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In comparison with a typical Japanese case, as summarised in Figure 3.3, the 
scale of subcontracting in Indonesia is still very limited. The subcontracting structure 
in the Indonesian automobile and motorcycle subsectors has been underdeveloped in 
depth and size. However, as Sato (1998a) noted, subcontracting networks in these 
subsectors have expanded in recent years. This study found at least three-tier 
subcontracting chains under large assembler firms. 
8.3 Motivations for and Initiation of Subcontracting Linkages with 
Parent Firms 
This section examines the first and second questions raised above. It investigates what 
benefits the sample SMEs expected from subcontracting business with LEs and how 
they initially had access to parent firms. 
8.3.1 Motivations for Subcontracting Linkages with Parent Firms 
Table 8.3 shows the main reasons why the sample SMEs started to conduct 
subcontracting transactions with large-scale assembler firms. The table contains the 
degree of their expectations of the benefits from subcontracting transactions with LEs 
and the differences in its mean scores between groups in firm categories of size, ethnic 
affiliation and subsector. The meanings of listed motivations for subcontracting 
business are explained in Table 8.1. 
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Table 8.3 Motivations for Subcontracting Transactions with Parent Firms 
Mean Scores l ) and Rank Differences between Groups in Firm Categories 
Motivations All Rank Size 2) Ethnicity 3) Subsector 4) 
(s.d.) F -values t -values t-values 
1. Lower Costs associated 3.18 3 2.70 0.61 4.41 ** 
with Contracting/Business (0.84) (-) 
2. Technical Support 4.14 2 0.56 0.65 1.50 
(1.08) 
3. Managerial Support 2.79 5 0.44 1.85 1.28 
(1.44) 
4. Provision of Large/Stable 4.70 1 0.52 0.53 0.86 
Orders (0.57) 
5. Financial Support 2.53 7 5.88 ** 6.69 ** 2.36 * 
(except for 6. below) ( 1.29) (+) (+) (+) 
6. Provision of Inputs and 2.67 6 4.41 ** 3.68 ** 0.51 
Tools ( 1.43) (+) (+) 
7. Specialisation 2.97 4 0.11 1.01 3.33 ** 
(0.90) (-) 
Number of Sample Firms 73 
Notes: 1) Figures in the upper row are the average of scores indicated by firms' rating from 1 (the lowest 
score as not at all important) to 5 (the highest score as very important). Figures in parentheses 
are standard deviation. 
2) Differences in mean scores between firms with 1-19, 20-49, 50-99, and 100-299 workers, 
which are indicated by F-values of ANOV A. ** = significant at the I % level, * = significant 
at the 5 % level. When the differences are significant, ( +) = smaller SMEs > larger SMEs, (-) = 
smaller SMEs < larger SMEs. 
3) Difference in mean scores between firms of pribumi owners (P) and non-pribumi owners (NP), 
which is indicated by the t-values. ** = significant at the 1 % level, * = significant at the 5 % 
level. When the difference is significant, ( +) = P SMEs > NP SMEs, (-) = P SMEs < NP SMEs. 
4) Difference in mean scores between firms engaged in the automobile/motorcycle subsector 
(AM) and the agricultural machinery and bicycle subsector (AB), which is indicated by the t-
values. ** = significant at the I level, * = significant at the 5 % level. When the difference is 
significant, (+)=AB SMEs > AM SMEs, (-) = AB SMEs < AM SMEs. 
Source: Based on author's interview and questionnaire survey during 1999-2000. 
Provision of large and/or stable orders was rated at the highest average score of 
4.7 on a five-point Likert-type scale, where "5" represents the highest degree of 
expectation and "1" the lowest. Without any significant differences between groups in 
firm categories of size, ethnic affiliation of owners, and subsector, most of the surveyed 
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SMEs had hoped that subcontracting transactions would work as devices to have a 
large/stable amount of orders and to avoid an excess of competition in markets. The 
small-medium producers were counting on parent firms through subcontracting 
relations to help them overcome difficulties in establishing a large/stable market, which 
Table 5 .2 of Chapter 5 identified as one of the main problems at the start of operations 
and at present. 
For example, Firm S 12 has produced leaf springs for vehicles in Jakarta since 
1977. It largely expected subcontracting relations to stabilise the volume of orders. 
The firm has hoped that subcontracting transactions would reduce uncertainties about 
future demand conditions and would enable it to make long-term commitments to leaf 
spring production associated with fixed investment in specialised equipment. Firm S85 
in Surabaya reduced the share of spot-basis transactions in the middle of the 1990s and 
substantially increased that of subcontracting business with a non-affiliated Indonesian 
bicycle manufacturer (Firm Al 2), with the expectation of raising and stabilising sales. 
Technical support was raised as the second most important inducement to start 
and continue subcontracting transactions with large-scale principal firms. An average 
score of 4.14 indicates that the sample SMEs largely expected subcontracting linkages 
to function as a channel for technical assistance. Similar to the market problems 
mentioned above, limited access to production technology is one of the most serious 
problems SMEs faced at the initial stage and at present (see Table 5.2). Regardless of 
sub-categories, the sample SMEs expected that subcontracting relationships would 
provide them with an opportunity to improve their technological capabilities in the form 
of several linkages that will be observed below in Section 8.4. For example, a press 
parts supplier firm (Firm S48) in Jakarta stated that it was keen to take advantage of 
technological support offered by large-scale automobile and motorcycle assembler 
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firms through vertical inter-firm relations, because there were very few other sources 
that could provide it with sufficient technical guidance in the subsectors. Another SME 
(Finn S68) in Surabaya, which supplies valves to a local agricultural machinery 
assembler firm (Finn Al 0), wanted to establish subcontracting linkages with 
automobile manufacturers in order to acquire more advanced knowledge on production 
technologies. 
With regard to managerial technology, however, the metalworking and 
machinery SMEs we surveyed did not have high expectations of the support they could 
possibly receive through subcontracting cooperation. Firm S86, which produces 
bicycle parts in Surabaya, expressed unwillingness to open its internal management 
activities to the scrutiny of customers. This is a possible reason why sample SMEs did 
not raise managerial assistance from parent firms as main motivations for 
subcontracting. 
Lower costs associated with contracting and business and higher specialisation 
in certain manufacturing products or processes ( e.g., casting, machining, press/stamping 
or sub-assembling of parts) were ranked third and fourth as motivations for having 
subcontracting ties, with average scores of 3.18 and 2.97, respectively. Our sample 
SMEs expected that subcontracting business would reduce transaction costs associated 
with the collection of information, uncertainties and risks, bargaining and decision-
making, and preparation for and enforcement of contracts. They also expected that 
vertical inter-firm linkages would promote specialisation in particular production 
activities leading to better resource allocation. SMEs in the automobile and motorcycle 
subsectors emphasised these two motivations more strongly than those in the 
agricultural machinery and bicycle subsectors. The t-tests indicate that the differences 
between the two groups are statistically significant at the 1 percent level. The 
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automobile and motorcycle subsectors tend to have more complicated business 
practices and a wider range of manufacturing processes than the agricultural machinery 
and bicycle subsectors. 3 The former group is, therefore, more conscious of costs 
associated with contracting and business and of the scope of technological activities 
than the latter group. 
A small-scale firm (Finn SJ 6), located 1n the small industries estate · in 
Pulogadung, Jakarta (PIK Pulogadung), initiated the production of press parts for 
motorcycles sold to the after-market (spot-basis replacement parts market) in 1990. 
Since such one-off exchanges were time-consuming and costly in arranging business, 
Firm S 16 started subcontracting transactions with large-scale automobile and 
motorcycle assembler firms in the mid- l 990s. Finn S48, the press parts supplier firm, 
wanted to concentrate on the production of specific products to enjoy economies of 
scale and efficient allocation of factor resources. The firm, therefore, expanded the 
degree of subcontracting business with large-scale automobile assembler firms over 
time. 
The supply of input materials and tools and the provision of financial support 
were deemed less important, with average scores of 2.67 and 2.53, respectively. The 
ratings in these motivations varied considerably according to size, ethnic affiliation and 
subsector of firms. A small-scale pribumi firm (Firm S93) producing stamping parts 
for bicycles reported that it expected financial assistance through vertical inter-firm 
linkages. This firm attempted to increase the share of subcontracting business, because 
it expected from parent firms some financial arrangements such as better payment 
conditions and the supply of input materials, which could not generally be provided 
3 For example, assembler firms in the automobile and motorcycle subsectors often need appraisals of 
capabilities of supplier firms that delay the start of business. Transactions in the automobile and 
motorcycle subsectors require supplier firms to prepare data, information or documents for such appraisal 
activities. Once subcontracting transactions start, supplier firms are generally able to continue business 
without much additional costs for new contracts . 
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through one-off transactions in the spot market. The ANOV A and t-tests show that 
smaller SMEs, pribumi entrepreneurs and firms engaged in the agricultural machinery 
and bicycle subsectors expect more of such input procurement and financial support 
from parent firms than larger SMEs, non-pribumi entrepreneurs and firms engaging in 
the automobile and motorcycle subsectors. This indicates that the former types of 
SMEs do not have good access to alternative financial sources, compared with the latter 
types. 
To simplify the motivations of SMEs for engaging in subcontracting business 
with large-scale assembler firms shown in Table 8.3, this study employs factor 
analysis.4 This technique can identify a relatively small number of principal factors, 
based on correlations among a set of variables. In other words, it translates a large 
number of variables into a smaller number of derived factors. Variables with high 
loading values on a factor tend to be highly correlated with each other and those with 
low loading values tend to be less co~elated. Each factor is interpreted according to a 
combination of variables with high loading values within it. 
Operationally, the computations of factor analysis here were performed using a 
principal components extraction with varimax rotation. Table 8.4 presents a matrix of 
factor loadings concerning the reasons why SMEs have conducted subcontracting 
transactions with parent firms, together with Eigen values and the percentage of 
explainable variance in the total sample variance. The selection of factors to be 
extracted and listing of loading values were based on the criteria of eigen values greater 
than one and factor loadings greater than 0.4, respectively. The reliability of each 
factor in this chapter was assessed with the Cronbatch coefficient, with the commonly 
used criteria of its value being higher than 0.70. 
4 For example, Rabellotti and Schmitz (1997) investigated the heterogeneity of SMEs belonging to the 
same cluster in Italy, Brazil and Mexico, based on factor analysis. 
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Table 8.4 Matrix of Factor Loadings: Motivations for Subcontracting Transactions 
with Parent Firms 
Factor 1 Factor 2 
Motivation Variables Financial Support 
Factor 3 
Specialization 
and 
Technical 
and 
Marketing Support Lower Transaction Costs 
l. Technical Support 0.87 
2. Managerial Support 0.66 
3. Provision of Large/Stable Orders 0.58 
4. Financial Support 0.84 
5. Provision of Inputs and Tools 0.73 
6. Lower Costs associated with 0.79 
Contracting and Business 
7. Specialisation 0.75 
Eigen Value 1.93 1.43 1.15 
Percentage of Variance Explained(%) 27.5 20.4 16.4 
Cumulative Percentage(%) 27.5 47.9 64.3 
Number of Sample Firms = 73 
Note: Loading values are not listed if they are smaller than 0.40. 
Source: Based on author's interview and questionnaire survey during 1999-2000. 
As a result of factor analysis, three principal factors were extracted, which 
together accounted for 64.3 percent of the total sample variance. The first factor 
explains 27.5 percent of the variance and is labelled Technical and Marketing Support, 
which is a combination of three variables of technical support (with a factor loading of 
0.87), managerial support (0.66) and provision of large/stable orders (0.58). This factor 
is crucial, because it includes two variables with the first and second highest mean 
scores of motivations for subcontracting shown in Table 8.3. The second factor 
Financial Support accounts for 20.4 percent of the variance. This is derived from a 
combination of two variables: financial support (0.84) and provision of inputs and tools 
(0.73), reflecting limited access of SMEs to external financial sources. The third factor 
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Specialisation and Lower Transaction Costs explains 16.4 percent of the total variance. 
It is composed of two variables: lower costs associated with contracting and business 
(0.79) and specialisation (0.75). 
8.3.2 Initiation of Subcontracting Linkages with Parent Firms 
Our survey questioned sample SMEs on how they initiated subcontracting transactions 
with large-scale assembler firms. Table 8.5 indicates the number and share of 
metal working and machinery SMEs that used each intermediary channel for the 
establishment of subcontracting relationships with main principal firms. 
The sample SMEs relied significantly on personal linkages when they 
approached their main customers and started subcontracting transactions. More than 70 
percent of the sample SMEs used relationships with family , relatives or friends to 
initiate contacts with parent firms and commence business with them. Most of the 
sample firms that utilised this personal channel said that they could not have started the 
subcontracting business successfully if they had contacted parent firms without any 
special recommendation from family, relatives or friends. These sample SMEs claimed 
that, without such informal or private intermediaries, it was difficult for small-medium 
producers to identify large-scale assembler firms with business opportunities and 
contact them. 
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Table 8.5 Intermediary Channels for the Commencement of Subcontracting Business 
with Main Parent Firms 
No. of Firms I ) and Rank Differences between Groups in Firm Categories 
Channels All Rank Size 2) Ethnicity 3) Subsector 4) 
(%) p -values p-values p-values 
l. Owners who Previously 11 4 0.77 0.02 * 1.00 
Worked for Parent Firm(s) (15.1) (+) 
2. Firms in Similar Business 35 2 0.00 ** 0.06 0.02 * 
(47.9) (+) (+) 
3. Traders or Trade Agents 6 6 0.30 1.00 0.18 
(8.2) 
4. Input Mate rials and 1 10 0.41 0.40 1.00 
Equipment Supplier Firms (1.4) 
5. NGOs 5 7 0.15 0.01 ** 0.32 
(6.8) (+) 
6. Industrial Associations, 10 5 0.56 0.18 0.44 
KADIN and Cooperatives (13.7) 
7. Government/Public 2 8 0.12 0.15 0.46 
Institutions (2.7) 
8. Family, Relatives and 52 1 0.39 0.00 ** 1.00 
Friends (71.2) (-) 
9. Banks/Financial 2 8 0.10 0.51 1.00 
Institutions (2.7) 
10. Own Efforts without Prior 23 3 0.00 ** 0.00 ** 0.78 
Relationships (31.5) (-) (-) 
Number of Sample Firms 73 
Notes 1) Figures in the upper row indicate the number of firms which used each intermediary channel 
for the establishment of subcontracting ties with main parent firms. Figures in parentheses are 
the share of finns with each channel in the total sample finns. 
2) Differences in frequency ratios between firms with 1-19, 20-49, 50-99, and 100-299 workers, 
which are indicated by p-values of Pearson's chi-square test. ** = significant at the 1 % level , * 
= significant at the 5 % level. When the differences are significan~ ( +) = smaller SMEs > 
larger SMEs, (-) = smaller SMEs < larger SMEs. 
3) Difference in frequency ratios between firms of pribumi owners (P) and non-pribumi owners 
(NP) , which is indicated by p-values of Fisher's exact test. ** = significant at the 1 % level , * = 
significant at the 5 % level. When the difference is significant, ( +) = P SMEs > NP SMEs, (-) = 
P SMEs < NP SMEs. 
4) Difference in frequency ratios between firms engaged in the automobile/motorcycle subsector 
(AM) and the agricultural machinery/bicycle subsector (AB), which is indicated by p-values of 
Fisher's exact test. ** = significant at the 1 % level, * = significant at the 5 % level. When the 
difference is significant, ( +) = AB SMEs > A.\1 SMEs, (-) = AB SMEs < Al\1 SMEs. 
Source: Based on author's interview and questionnaire survey during 1999-2000. 
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One non-pribumi parts supplier firm (Firm S42 ), which engages in stamping of 
seats and bodies for vehicles and welding and sub-assembling of mufflers for 
commercial trucks, kept close relationships with an automobile assembler firm (Firm 
AO 1) since the start of its operation in 197 5. According to its current president, his 
father, the founder and former president, had an intimate personal friendship with the 
management of Firm AOJ. He was encouraged by Firm AOJ to change his original 
business from the micro-scale production of metal pallets for delivery to the 
commercial · production of mufflers and seats for vehicles. After the establishment of 
Firm S42, the founder soon received a stable and reasonable amount of orders from 
Firm AOJ under subcontracting arrangements. Statistical tests in Table 8.5 show that 
non-pribumi SMEs took advantage of these personal connections more often than 
pribumi SMEs, reflecting the close networks that exist in the ethnic Chinese community 
in Indonesia. 
About 15 percent of the firms in our survey reported that they successfully 
reached a subcontracting agreement because the owners previously worked for their 
current principal firms. For example, a former director of a foreign-affiliated 
automobile assembler firm (Firm A05) established his independent company (Firm 
SJ 1) in Jakarta. His former position gave him good access to Firm A05. Firm SJ 1 
easily commenced subcontracting business with the auto manufacturer and engaged in 
machining of cooling fans for vehicle engines and covers for cylinder heads. Similarly, 
the owner of Firm S69 had a working experience at Firm Al 0, the agricultural 
machinery manufacturer in Surabaya, up to 1989. Soon after his retirement, he 
established an independent and small supplier firm in 1990 and started to receive orders 
for press parts from Firm Al O under subcontracting arrangements. 
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Nearly half of the sample SMEs established their initial contacts with parent 
firms through peer firms in similar lines of business. Firm SJ 6 provided stamping work 
for automotive and motorcycle parts. A peer firm producing stamping dies introduced 
it to some automobile and motorcycle manufacturers. As a result, the small-scale press 
firm started direct business with some of the introduced assembler firms. In Table 8.5, 
Fisher's exact test indicates that assistance from similar firms in approaching large-
scale assembler firms was more popular among smaller SMEs and those 1n the 
agricultural machinery and bicycle subsectors than larger SMEs and those 1n the 
automobile and motorcycle subsectors. This implies that SMEs in the former group 
rely more on cooperative relationships among themselves than the latter. 
Industrial associations, chamber of commerce and industry (KADIN) and 
cooperatives were cited by only 14 percent of the SME respondents. Roughly 40 
percent of the SMEs that used these collective channels raised national-level 
associations such as GIAMM (Indonesian Automotive Parts and Components Industries 
Association) and ASPEP (Association of Metalworks and Machinery) as intermediaries 
for the creation of initial opportunities to approach main parent firms. The remaining 
60 percent stated local- and grass-roots-level organisations such as APIKS (Association 
of Small-scale Metalworking Industries in Sukabumi) and PT Usbersa Mitra Logam, 
which were already explained in Section 6.2. 
Few other external channels were mentioned 1n our survey. Traders, input 
materials and equipment supplier firms, and financial institutions did not play a crucial 
role in connecting SMEs to LEs. NGOs have linked SMEs to large manufacturers in 
Indonesia, but the beneficiaries of their intermediary services are limited to certain 
SME groups, as noted in Section 6.3. Table 8.5 indicates that pribumi SMEs were the 
beneficiaries, not non-pribumi SMEs. It appears that the efforts by the Indonesian 
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government in providing small-medium supplier firms with opportunities to establish 
subcontracting linkages with large assembler firms were largely unsuccessful. 5 
Approximate! y one third of the surveyed metal working and machinery producers 
contacted main parent firms without prior direct or indirect relationships. Statistical 
tests shown in Table 8.5 reveal that smaller and pribumi SMEs established 
subcontracting linkages with main principal firms by their own effort less frequently 
than larger and non-pribumi counterparts. For example, a pribumi supplier firm (Firm 
S66) with only six employees has had only one parent firm since its establishment in 
1980. The first and only subcontracting business was initiated through the intermediary 
of a close friend working at Firm Al 0, the non-affiliated Indonesian agricultural 
machinery manufacturer. Since the commencement of subcontracting with Firm Al O in 
1980, Firm S66 has not succeeded in establishing subcontracting transactions with other 
principal firms. The current owner of Firm S66 attributed the difficulty in approaching 
parent firms to a lack of personal linkages. 
8.4 Types of Subcontracting Linkages with Parent Firms 
As stated before, Lall ( 1980: 208-9, 213-22) identified ten categories of key linkages in 
his case study of two truck manufacturers with their parts supplier firms in India. This 
study raises 15 types of relationships with large-scale parent firms, which reflect our 
previous discussion in Chapter 2 and are listed in Table 8.1, and investigates the 
existence of these subcontracting linkages in the Indonesian metalworking and 
machinery industry. 
5 Chapter 6 observed that the Indonesian government did not significantly support metalworking and 
machinery SMEs in channelling them to potential markets including subcontracting business. 
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Table 8.6 Types and Utilisation of Subcontracting Linkages 
No. of User Firms I ) and Rank Differences between Groups in Firm Categories 
Linkage Types All Rank Size 2) Ethnicity 3) Subsector 4) 
(%) p -values p-values p -values 
l . Support of Establishment 6 13 0.58 0.21 0.33 
(8.2) 
2. Large/Stable Orders 73 1 
(100) 
3. Technical Specifications 69 2 0.59 1.00 0.00 ** 
(94.5) (-) 
4. Lending of Tools 30 8 0.73 0.47 0.01 ** 
(41.1) (-) 
5. Advice on Machinery 14 11 0.13 0.22 0.10 
(19.2) 
6. Provision of Used 5 15 0.28 0.08 1.00 
Machinery (6.8) 
7. QC Support 65 3 0.59 0.71 0.00 ** 
(89.0) (-) 
8. Production Technology 59 4 0.00 ** 0.00 ** 0.01 ** 
Support (80.8) (-) (-) (-) 
9. Joint Design 10 12 0.04 * 0.01 ** 0.05 * 
(13 .7) (-) (-) (-) 
10. Managerial Support 41 6 0.55 1.00 0.18 
(56.2) 
11. Provision of Inputs 31 7 0.10 0.23 0.01 ** 
(42.5) (+) 
12. Provision of Credit/ 6 13 0.34 0.68 0.33 
Guarantees (8.2) 
13. Reasonable Payment 18 9 0.77 0.78 0.06 
Conditions (24.7) 
14. Price Negotiations 58 5 0.13 0.04 * 0.00 ** 
(79.5) (-) (-) 
15. Market Information 16 10 0.65 0.15 0.33 
(21.9) 
Number of Sample Firms 73 
Notes: l)Figures in the upper row indicate the number of firms which utilise each subcontracting linkage. 
Figures in parentheses are the share of firms with each linkage in the total sample. 
2) Differences in frequency ratios between firms with 1-19, 20-49, 50-99, and 100-299 workers , 
which are indicated by p-values of Pearson's chi-square test. ** = significant at the 1 % level, 
* = significant at the 5 % level. When the differences are significant, ( +) = smaller SMEs > 
larger SMEs, (-) = smaller SMEs < larger SMEs. 
3) Difference in frequency ratios between firms of pribumi owners (P) and non-pribumi owners 
(NP), which is indicated by p-values of Fisher's exact test. ** =significant at the 1 % level , * = 
significant at the 5 % level. When the difference is significant, ( +) = P SMEs > NP SMEs, (-) = 
P SMEs < NP SMEs. 
4) Difference in frequency ratios between firms engaged in the automobile/motorcycle subsector 
(AM) and the agricultural machinery/bicycle subsector (AB ), which is indicated by p-values of 
Fisher's exact test. ** = significant at the 1 % level , * = significant at the 5 % level. When the 
difference is significant,(+) = AB SMEs > AM SMEs, (-) =AB SMEs < AM SMEs. 
Source: Based on author's interview and questionnaire survey during 1999-2000. 
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Table 8.6 shows the number and share of sample firms which have utilised each 
of the 15 linkages under subcontracting ties with large parent firms. All SMEs 
experienced large and/or stable orders provided by assembler firms under vertical inter-
firm relationships, although the extent of benefits from this type of linkage varies 
according to economic conditions ( e.g., high economic growth period, economic crisis 
period) and situations or characteristics of individual firms ( e.g., firm size, ethnic 
affiliation of owners, and subsector), which will be explained in Section 8.5. In 
contrast, market information on potential products or customers was raised by only 20 
percent of the SMEs. In an environment of imperfect information, even large-scale 
assembler firms tend to have insufficient market information outside their own 
organisations. 
Firm S 12, a leaf spring producer in Jakarta, has received a series of orders from 
several automobile manufacturers. It noted that such constant orders were an important 
factor for the stable growth of the company. According to a non-pribumi firm (Firm 
S40) producing disk wheels for medium- and large-sized vehicles in Surabaya, its main 
parent firm, a large automobile manufacturer (Firm AOJ), regularly issues 6-month 
order forecasts, which help Firm S40 stabilise operations. Another medium-scale firm 
(Firm S25), engaged in machining operations in Jakarta, receives three-year production 
forecasts by a foreign-affiliated motorcycle assembler firm (Firm A08). 
Quality control (QC) support and production technology support were also very 
common linkages. QC support was utilised by nearly 90 percent of the surveyed SMEs 
and production technology support by more than 80 percent. The statistical tests in 
Table 8.6 indicate that differences in the share of SMEs with linkages of production 
technology support between groups in firm categories of size, ethnicity and subsector 
are significant at the 1 percent level. Similarly, the proportion of firms with linkages of 
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QC support is also statistically different between the two subsector groups at the 1 
percent level. Larger SMEs, non-pribumi owners and firms producing automotive and 
motorcycle parts have developed such technological linkages with large-scale parent 
firms more than smaller SMEs, pribumi owners and firms producing agricultural 
machinery and bicycle parts. The former SME groups tend to seek technological 
interactions with LEs more strongly than the latter groups, while parent firms can 
establish closer and denser technical ties with the former groups than with the latter. 
This may reflect higher technical awareness and absorption capabilities of the former 
groups relative to the latter. In addition, assembler firms in the automobile and 
motorcycle subsectors generally have higher levels of technologies and, therefore, can 
more easily extend technical assistance including QC support to small-medium supplier 
firms than those in agricultural machinery and bicycle subsectors. Also, because of 
differences in the precision of final products, automotive and motorcycle parts and 
components need higher quality supported by higher technology than agricultural 
machinery and bicycle ones. Consequently, assembler firms in the automobile and 
motorcycle subsectors have to pay more attention to improvements in the quality and 
production technology of supplier firms than those in the agricultural machinery and 
bicycle subsectors. 
An example is a larger SME (Firm S05), which engages in forging , stamping, 
machining and sub-assembling of automotive parts in Jakarta. It is technically audited 
once a year by several principal firms and has utilised this annual assessment as an 
opportunity to upgrade the levels of quality, technology and management. Under 
subcontracting ties with the largest auto manufacturer (F irm A03) in Indonesia, Firm 
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S05 has acquired the Toyota Production System (TPS) and has improved the quality of 
its products and its production systems as a whole. 6 
Another example is a press parts supplier firm (Firm S09) in Jakarta. It has 
learned Total Productive Maintenance (TPM) from the foreign-affiliated motorcycle 
assembler firm (Firm A08). 7 Firm A08 offers training programs on TPM, by both 
inviting vendor firms to classroom lectures and dispatching TPM experts to the 
factories of supplier firms. As already explained in Chapter 6, Firm A08 has also 
organised a plant-tour-type study program, which aims to let supplier firms pay a 
mutual visit in a group consisting of five local and five foreign-affiliated supplier firms, 
and to let them exchange ideas on how to improve the management capabilities of 
quality, technology and delivery time. Firm S09 has gained much knowledge on 
quality and technology through these TPM training and plant-tour-type study programs. 
Our survey observed the Purchased Input Concept Optimisation with Supplier 
(PICOS) program, which is a quality and productivity improvement program introduced 
by General Motors in the early 1990s to support auto parts supplier firms in upgrading 
capabilities of quality, technology and management. Firm Al 8, a U.S.-affiliated 
automobile manufacturer, extended a 16-step quality improvement program under the 
PICOS scheme to one of the larger subcontracting SMEs (Firm S20) producing press 
parts and components in Jakarta. This support from Firm Al 8 enabled Firm S20 to 
6 The Toyota Production System (TPS), which was originated and developed by Toyota Motor Company 
in Japan, is a technology of comprehensive production management that enabled Toyota and many other 
companies to achieve improvements in quality and productivity. TPS considers how to adapt production 
schedules to the demand changes in the market while pursuing the goals of low cost, high quality, timely 
delivery and improved worker morale. It is built on the "just-in-time (TIT)" production system, which 
means producing only necessary units in a necessary quantity at a necessary time. Under subcontracting 
relationships with Firm A03, Firm SOS and many other supplier firms have a chance to improve their 
quality, productivity, technology, and production management through transfer of "TPS." For further 
details on the Toyota Production System, see Daimon (1998). 
7 Total Productive Maintenance (TPM) is a maintenance program which is carried out by all employees 
through small group activity and leads to the establishment of an efficient production system. The 
implementation of TPM results in increased productivity of the machinery and considerable cost savings 
through positive equipment maintenance activities that can realise easy, effictent and safe operation. See 
Nakajima (1994) and Takahashi and Osada (1990). 
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qualify for QS-9000 series in 1999 and to start, as a first-tier supplier firm, the supply 
of parts and components to Firm Al8.8 Subsequently, Firm S20 began to give lectures 
on QS-9000 to around 15 second-tier subcontractors. 
Under subcontracting ties, Firm A05, the foreign-affiliated automaker, has 
rendered opportunities for technical training to vendor firms. Firm SJ 1, a small non-
pribumi firm, often sent its engineers to Firm A05 and let them learn advanced skills 
and technologies, especially when it had to handle unfamiliar machining processes. 
One small-scale second-tier SME (Firm S46) producing motorcycle stamping parts has 
also sent its staff members to training programs on production technology and the just-
in-time system offered by a foreign-affiliated, large first-tier supplier firm (Firm Al 7). 
According to Firm S46, technical advice and guidance on dies-making given by Firm 
Al 7, a shock absorber manufacturer, are particularly beneficial. · 
Technical linkages through detailed specifications prevail in around 95 percent 
of the sample SMEs. However, the share of firms with technical specifications is 
significantly different at the 1 percent level between SMEs in the automobile and 
motorcycle subsectors and those in the agricultural machinery and bicycle subsectors. 
All of the SMEs in the former group have produced parts and components based on 
technical specifications, while less than 80 percent of SMEs in the latter group have 
referred to the specification documents and the remaining 20 percent have supplied 
their products and services without technical specifications. For example, Firm S93, a 
micro enterprise in Jakarta, produces press parts for bicycles without technical 
specification documents from assembler firms because the products are technologically 
8 The Quality System Requirements QS-9000 was developed by "Big 3" automobile manufacturers in the 
U.S. (i.e. General Motors, Ford and Chrysler), as a common supplier quality standard instead of their 
previous individual quality requirements. QS-9000 is based on ISO 9001 and consists of two sections: 
ISO-based quality requirements and customer-specific quality requirements. 
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simple and not required to be extren1ely precise. The small firm was also not 
accustomed to reading detailed technical documents. 
Linkages of advice on the layout and selection of machinery/equipment and joint 
design were not very popular among our sample firms. Technical linkages through 
advice on machinery/equipment appeared in less than 20 percent of the sample SMEs, 
and those through joint design in only 14 percent. The former type of linkages does not 
often function well without finance for the purchase of recommended equipment, while 
the latter type generally requires higher technological capabilities of supplier firms. 
Also, compared with their headquarters or joint venture partners, foreign-affiliated 
assembler firms in Indonesia do not have an opportunity to develop new parts and 
components to be incorporated in their final products. Therefore, both types were not 
often mentioned as subcontracting linkages by our sample SMEs. 
An example is a larger non-pribumi SME (Firm S02), which produces steel rims 
for vehicles. It has a research and development (R&D) division in its organisation. 
Engineers in this division have carried out product development activities jointly with 
Firm AOI, the above-mentioned · auto manufacturer. Similarly, Firm S05, which is a 
larger non-pribumi SME in Jakarta, has often conducted product design in cooperation 
with automobile assembler firms, particularly when new models (including minor 
changes) of cars were launched. Differences in the share of SMEs dealing with joint 
designs are statistically significant at the 1 to 5 percent level between groups in firm 
categories by size, ethnicity and subsector. None of the pribumi entrepreneurs and 
SMEs in the agricultural and bicycle subsectors has engaged in joint design and 
development. As explained above, SMEs in these groups did not have sufficient 
capabilities to handle this kind of high-level interaction with large-scale parent firms. 
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Support for managerial technology from large-scale parent firms was found in 
more than 55 percent of the sample SMEs. Differences in the share of establishments 
with managerial assistance are not statistically significant between groups in firm 
categories of size, ethnic affiliation of entrepreneurs and subsector. Many of the sample 
SMEs that experienced managerial assistance learned techniques of specific 
management areas such as quality, technology, production and maintenance from large-
scale parent firms through subcontracting ties. For instance, the transfer of the 5S 
management approach was frequently observed as a form of managerial support.9 
Under subcontracting ties, reasonable payment conditions for supplier firms 
such as downpayment and quick payment after delivery were arranged in a quarter of 
the sample SMEs. Raw materials, intermediate goods and tools (e.g., dies and molds) 
were supplied through subcontracting relationships to roughly two-fifths of our sample 
producers. These financial linkages can supplement shortages of working capital that 
SMEs often faced. 
For example, a small-scale pribumi firm (Firm S50) in Jakarta engages in dies-
making and machining mainly in the motorcycle subsector. Through subcontracting 
linkages with the largest motorcycle manufacturer (Firm Al 6) in Indonesia, Firm S50 
has often been offered frequent payment conditions: downpayment (30 percent of the 
total contract amount) , progress payment ( 40 percent) , payment on delivery (20 
percent) and final payment after examination of products (10 percent). Firm S93 , a 
small pribumi supplier firm producing washer rings for bicycles, has often received 20-
30 percent of the contract amount as downpayment from assembler firms. This small 
enterprise is also given metal sheets as raw material for bicycle press parts through 
9 
"SS" comes from the first letters of the Japanese terms for Organisation (Seiri), eatness (Seiton) , 
Cleaning (Seiso), Standardisation (Seiketsu) and Discipline (Shitsuke). The 5S ' s is the basic philosophy 
of factory management focusing on effective work place organisation and standardised work procedures. 
The 5S ' s simplifies the work environment and reduces waste and non-value activities while improving 
quality, productivity and safety. On the 5S concept, see Osada (1991). 
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subcontracting linkages with large-scale bicycle manufacturers. Dies for automotive 
and motorcycle press parts have been lent to Firm S16 and Firm S17, both of which are 
small pribumi firms in Jakarta, under subcontracting transactions with large-scale 
parent firms. These two SMEs admitted that it was difficult for them to produce or 
purchase precise and expensive stamping dies for automotive and motorcycle parts 
without support from principal firms. 
Statistical differences in the proportion of firms that were provided with support 
for input materials and tools appear between SMEs in the automobile and motorcycle 
subsectors and those in the agricultural machinery and bicycle subsectors. As 
illustrated above, raw materials and intermediate inputs are provided more frequently to 
SMEs producing agricultural machinery and bicycle parts than to their counterparts. By 
contrast, tools like dies and molds are lent to SMEs in the automobile and motorcycle 
subsectors more often than their counterparts. This contrast may largely be explained 
by differences in the sectoral characteristics. Compared with sample SMEs in the 
automobile and motorcycle subsectors, those in the agricultural machinery and bicycle 
subsectors often engage in simple metal processing services which include machining 
or electroplating of incomplete parts provided by parent firms. Also, the sample SMEs 
in the agricultural machinery and bicycle subsectors are financially weaker than their 
counterparts, and tend to face difficulties in purchasing materials by themselves, due to 
the lack of working capital. 10 On the other hand, SMEs in the automobile and 
motorcycle subsectors are often required to produce more precise parts and components, 
10 In general, less developed firms can more easily serve as vendor firms in the agricultural and bicycle 
subsectors than in the automobile and motorcycle subsectors, because, relative to the latter subsectors, the 
former subsectors are not likely to require supplier firms to carry out complicated production and 
business operations. In fact, among our respondents, there were more SMEs with lower technical , 
financial and other related capabilities in the agricultural machinery and bicycle subsectors than in the 
automobile and motorcycle subsectors. 
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compared to those in the agricultural machinery and bicycle subsectors. Production of 
more precise products requires precise and expensive tools like dies and molds. 
Other types of financial linkages, which can alleviate the lack of investment 
capital, are less generally observed in subcontracting relationships. Credit/financial 
guarantees and second-hand machinery/equipment were provided to only a limited 
number of SMEs under subcontracting arrangements. Assistance in establishing firms 
through subcontracting relationships was rarely observed. Firm S26 located in Jakarta 
is one of the exceptions. After working at the largest motorcycle assembler group in 
Indonesia (Firm Al 6) for 15 years, the owner of Firm S26 left his job and founded his 
own firm. I I Because of the close relations between the motorcycle principal firm and 
the former employee, the assembler firm guaranteed long-term contracts to Firm S26. 
Accordingly, Firm S26 performed well since its establishment in 1985, mainly serving 
Firm Al 6 as a supplier of parts and components. Another exceptional case was Firm 
S06, which is located in Jakarta and produces brake drums and brake hubs for vehicles. 
Firm S06 was established in 1986 through joint investment by a local conglomerate 
group and Firm AOJ (the foreign-affiliated automaker). Most of the machinery and 
equipment in the factory of Firm S06 were purchased with credit from Firm AOJ. 
However, this case is an exception. The provision of credit/financial guarantees and 
support for the establishment of supplier firms under vertical inter-firm linkages were 
reported by only 8 percent of the surveyed firms. As previously explained, without the 
equivalent of vertical keiretsu groups and in an environment with imperfect information, 
it is not easy for principal firms to provide SMEs with capital. 
11 Firm S26 has , in tum, allowed its employees to leave and establish new enterprises which can serve it 
as supplier firms. It has provided such spin-off supplier finns with various kinds of assistance including 
technical, managerial , marketing and financial support. Sato (1998a: 134-7) discussed the details of Firm 
S26 for the development of its own vendor finns . 
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Nearly 80 percent of the sample SMEs have had opportunities to negotiate prices 
with parent firms for their products and services based on a cost breakdown. The 
proportion of SMEs that have experienced price negotiations is significantly different 
between groups in firm categories by ethnic affiliation and subsector. Open discussion 
of price levels with parent firms is more popular among SMEs in the automobile and 
motorcycle subsectors than in their counterpart subsectors. This reflects differences in 
the extent of modernisation and financial strength between automobile and motorcycle 
assembler firms and agricultural machinery and bicycle counterpart firms. 
Our interview survey found several cases where, after price negotiation between 
the two parties, prices were not necessarily set based on a cost breakdown, particularly 
during the recent crisis period. For example, Firm S05, a larger non-pribumi auto parts 
SME, stated that one large-scale automobile assembler firm as its main customer 
sometimes required it to reduce prices to such low levels that it could not cover even 
the cost of its products at the height of the 1997-98 economic crisis. In this case, 
subcontracting linkages with Firm S05 function as a shock absorber for the parent firm. 
This will be observed in more detail in Chapter 9. However, Firm S05 added that, in 
the years up to the late 1997, prices were occasionally set at levels that contained 
sufficient profit after discussion with the parent firm. 
8.5 Costs of and Benefits from Subcontracting Linkages with Parent 
Firms 
The second half of this section will indicate that SMEs have obtained several kinds of 
benefits through subcontracting linkages with LEs. The promotion of beneficial 
subcontracting relations may facilitate the further development of SMEs. Together 
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with benefits, however, it is also necessary to probe the costs that SMEs have to bear in 
subcontracting transactions. This section, therefore, examines both the costs of and 
benefits from subcontracting ties with LEs from the point of view of small-medium 
supplier firms. An explanation of cost and benefit items can be found in Table 8.1. 
8.5.1 Costs Associated with Subcontracting Linkages with Parent Firms 
Table 8.7 shows the extent of costs associated with subcontracting business and the 
differences of such burdens between firm categories. High quality levels of products 
required by parent firms were rated at the highest average score of 4.32 among 13 kinds 
of costs listed in the table. It is apparently difficult for the small-medium producers to 
satisfy the levels of product quality required by large-scale assembler firms. Statistical 
tests show differences in mean scores between pribumi and non-pribumi entrepreneurs. 
Several pribumi owners mentioned that they are not accustomed to paying much 
attention to the quality of their products and, therefore, need to make greater efforts to 
achieve the required product quality than non-pribumi counterparts. 
Firm SJ 6 and Firm 17 are both small-scale pribumi press parts supplier firms. 
They provided examples of the burdens on SMEs associated with a need to satisfy 
product quality. Evaluation sheets on quality and delivery time are sent every three 
months by a foreign-affiliated motorcycle manufacturer (Firm A07) to Firm SJ 6. 
Similarly, Firm SJ 7 was assessed regularly by Firm A08, the large-scale motorcycle 
assembler firm, from the viewpoint of quality and delivery timing. Although the two 
supplier firms felt that such periodical audit programs were useful , they acknowledged 
at the same time that these required them to spend a large amount of resources to 
maintain and further upgrade the levels of product quality and delivery time. 
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Table 8.7 Costs of Subcontracting Transactions with Parent Firms 
Mean Scores I ) and Rank Differences between Groups in Firm Categories 
Costs All Rank Size 2) Ethnicity 3) Subsector 4) 
(s.d.) F -values t -values t-values 
1. Initial Finding of Parent 3.45 7 5.45 ** 2.63 ** 1.59 
Firms (0.75) (+) (+) 
2. Competition 3.53 6 3.06 * 2.59 ** 1.66 
(0.63) (+) (+) 
3. Small Markets 3.68 5 1.00 1.25 0.85 
(0.62) 
4. Penalty 2.79 12 8.72 ** 1.88 3.53 ** 
(0.64) (+) (+) 
5. Quick Response 3.23 10 2.09 0.81 1.96 * 
(0.64) (+) 
6. Shift of Loss 3.10 11 7.57 ** 2.52 ** 3.38 ** 
(0.69) (+) (+) (+) 
7. High Quality 4.32 1 2.39 2.34 * 1.87 
(0.72) (+) 
8. High Technology 4.00 2 2.21 0.60 1.00 
(0.80) 
9. Low Prices 3.99 3 0.69 0.89 0.08 
(0.70) 
10. Strict Delivery Timing 3.89 4 2.80 * 2.34 * 0.38 
(0.76) (+) (+) 
11. La.rge Production 3.26 9 4.74 ** 1.92 1.95 
Capacity (0.58) (-) 
12. Expensive Input 3.34 8 0.31 0.39 0.62 
Materials (0.65) 
13. R&D 1.68 13 10.74 ** 3.69 ** 2.99 ** 
(0.98) (-) (-) (-) 
Number of Sample Finns 73 
Notes: 1) Figures in the upper row are the average of scores indicated by firms' rating from 1 (the lowest 
score as very small) to 5 (the highest score as very large). 
2) Differences in mean scores between firms with 1-19, 20-49, 50-99, and 100-299 workers, 
which are indicated by F-values of ANOV A. ** = significant at the I % level, * = significant 
at the 5 % level. When the differences are significant, ( +) = smaller SMEs > larger SMEs, (-) = 
smaller SMEs < larger SMEs. 
3) Difference in mean scores between firms of pribumi owners (P) and non-pribumi owners (NP), 
which is indicated by the t-values. ** = significant at the 1 % level, * = significant at the 5 % 
level. When the difference is significant, ( +) = P SMEs > NP SMEs, (-) = P SMEs < NP SMEs. 
4) Difference in mean scores between firms engaged in the automobile/motorcycle subsector 
(AM) and the agricultural machinery/bicycle subsector (AB), which is indicated by the t-values. 
** = significant at the 1 % level, * = significant at the 5 % level. When the difference is 
significant, ( +) = AB SMEs > AM SMEs, (-) = AB SMEs < AM SMEs. 
Source: Based on author's interview and questionnaire survey during 1999-2000. 
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Levels of production technologies required were ranked the second highest, with 
an average score of 4.00. The costs for meeting the high levels of technologies 
requested by large parent firms are substantial for the sample small-medium enterprises. 
For example, Firm SJ 1, a small-scale non-pribumi firm, has supplied very precise 
products such as crankshafts, cooling fans of engine hubs and cylinder head covers to 
Firm A05, the auto manufacturer. To process these precision parts, Firm SJ 1 has to 
adopt the CPMFG processing method, which involves highly advanced machining 
technology and requires the firm to make great efforts to master it, despite the fact that 
Firm A05 extends technical support. 
The sample firms assigned a high average score of 3.99 to low prices of parts 
and components they produced. 12 Low prices requested by parent firms are clearly 
perceived as a heavy burden on SMEs in subcontracting relations. For example, a 
small-scale electroplating firm (Firm S75) in Surabaya mentioned that it was sometimes 
requested by parent firms to accept low prices without consideration, even though the 
two parties had previously discussed price levels based on cost breakdowns. 
Strict delivery timing was also cited as a significant cost in subcontracting 
transactions, with an average rating of 3.89. This burden was already observed above 
in the cases of Firm SJ 6 and Firm SJ 7, both of which were under pressure to keep strict 
delivery schedules through periodical audit programs by principal firms. A non-
pribumi auto parts supplier firm (Firm S07) pointed out that vendor firms needed to 
have a 3-month stock of raw materials to assist assembler firms in implementing the 
just-in-time (JIT) system. Firm S07 mentioned that automobile manufacturers 
instructed supplier firms to adopt the just-in-time delivery method in production 
processes of supplier firms themselves. However, it is very difficult in practice for 
12 Low prices here mean price levels lower than cost plus minimum margin for products produced by 
supplier firms. 
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Firm S07 to reduce the amount of stock in its workshops of vendor firms, because 
domestic upstream industries such as the iron and steel, the non-ferrous metal and the 
basic chemical industries are not well-developed in Indonesia and their produce cannot 
be purchased in a timely fashion. Differences in average scores of delivery time were 
statistically significant at the 5 percent level between groups in size and ethnic 
categories. Smaller SMEs and pribumi owners felt the difficulties in delivering their 
products on time more strongly than their counterparts. Relative to the latter groups, 
the former groups may not be familiar with the importance of delivery timing. They 
therefore perceive it as a burden. 
The next group of burdens associated with subcontracting concerns market-
related issues. Small markets and severe competition in the market were rated high at 
average scores of 3.68 and 3.53, respectively. 13 Initial finding of parent firms was also 
given a high average score of 3.45. Firm S20, a larger and first-tier SME in Jakarta, 
stated that the small market size of the Indonesian automobile industry limited the 
opportunities of fostering small-medium supplier firms. As a consequence of the 
relatively small demand for vehicles, assembler firms cannot contract out a large 
amount of parts and components and thus SMEs are not able to expand their 
manufacturing operations. Finn S20 pointed out that, for auto parts producers, the 
after-market (spot-basis replacement parts market) has been larger than the 
subcontracting market. 
Similarly, a non-pribumi bicycle parts supplier firm (Firm S86) in Surabaya 
mentioned that the spot-basis replacement parts market for bicycles in Indonesia is a 
13 The small size of markets for the related subsectors was observed in Section 5.5. Parts and 
components produced by Indonesian small-medium supplier firms in these subsectors have not been 
competitive in terms of quality and prices in the international market. Also, different from some other 
Asian economies such as Taiwan, trade policies in Indonesia have been biased against SMEs (Hill 2001: 
253). These factors keep SMEs in the subsectors inward-looking for a long time and prevent them from 
being involved in international subcontracting linkages that may enlarge their markets and also encourage 
them to improve the quality of products further. 
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larger source of demand than the subcontracting market. Different from the latter 
market, the former does not require high quality, high technology and strict delivery 
timing. Firm S86 indicated that the smaller subcontracting market made severe 
requirements concerning quality and delivery time very costly. A small-scale pribumi 
firm (Firm S41) in Jakarta explained that competition in terms of price, quality and 
services was quite strong among SMEs producing non-precision-type press parts for 
automobile and motorcycle assembler firms, because of the limited volume of demand 
and the existence .of many similar supplier firms. Also, Firm S24, a small-scale pribumi 
press parts supplier firm in Jakarta, stated that it is costly to initially approach 
automobile and motorcycle manufacturers as potential buyers. As described before, it 
is not easy for SMEs to start subcontracting business with large parent firms without 
references through inter-personal or inter-firm relationships. 
In short, SMEs in Indonesia have to compete with rival enterprises in finding 
and maintaining customers in a relatively small market. Statistical tests show that 
average scores of competition and the finding of parent firms were significantly 
different at the 1 to 5 percent level between groups in firm categories of size and ethnic 
affiliation. The burden of competition and finding potential clients was relatively more 
costly for smaller firms and pribumi entrepreneurs than their counterparts. These 
differences seem to reflect the situation, in which smaller and pribumi SMEs have 
fewer resources that can be allocated to marketing activities, compared with larger and 
non-pribumi SMEs. 
Quick response to requirements or claims from parent firms, shift of loss from 
parent firms to SMEs, and penalties due to incomplete fulfilment of contracts were 
rated at average scores of 3.23 , 3.10, and 2.79, respectively. Differences in average 
ratings of these costs between groups in firm categories were statistically significant at 
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the 1 to 5 percent level. Smaller SMEs, pribumi owners and firms in the agricultural 
machinery and bicycle subsectors tend to suffer from shift of loss more seriously than 
their counterparts. Difficulties in quickly responding to requirements from large-scale 
parent firms are more severe for SMEs producing agricultural machinery and bicycle 
parts than for those manufacturing automotive and motorcycle parts. Smaller SMEs 
and firms in the agricultural and bicycle subsectors see penalties for incomplete 
contracts as a greater burden than their counterparts. These differences reveal that, 
relative to their counterparts, smaller SMEs, pribumi SMEs and SMEs in the 
agricultural machinery and bicycle subsectors have only limited corporate strength to 
protect themselves from unfavourable market conditions and do not understand the 
business culture or customs of large-scale assembler firms. 
Capital requirements are not negligible burdens for SMEs that intend to develop 
subcontracting relationships. The procurement of expensive materials and preparations 
to increase production capacity have been regarded as significant costs, with average 
scores of 3.34 and 3.26, respectively. Firm S04, a non-pribumi supplier firm, struggled 
with expensive raw materials for automotive muffler production. According to the 
muffler producer, the high-cost of inputs has resulted largely from heavy reliance on 
imported raw materials, particularly metal sheets of specific thickness, due to the 
underdevelopment of domestic upstream industries. Firm S09, a larger press SME, was 
instructed by two major motorcycle assembler firms (Firm A08 and Firm Al 6) to have 
different types of production (press/stamping) lines for each of the two from those for 
others in the factory .14 As a consequence of these requests, Firm S09 had to build three 
separate production lines. The statistical tests show that larger SMEs recogrnse 
investment in production facilities as a greater burden than smaller SMEs. 
14 These two motorcycle manufacturers , respectively, intended not to safeguard their technologies but to 
have different types of press operations. This kind of requirement is not common among our sample SMEs. 
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R&D expenses were ranked the lowest, with an average score 1.68. Onl_y a 
limited number of sample firms such as Firm S02, Firm S05 and Firm S20, three of 
which are larger non-pribumi SMEs in the automobile and motorcycle subsectors, 
allocated budget and engineers to R&D activities. Mean scores of costs for R&D 
between groups in all of the firm categories are significantly different at the 1 percent 
level. Larger SMEs, non-pribumi entrepreneurs and producers in the automobile and 
motorcycle subsectors regard R&D costs more as a burden than their counterparts. 
However, in comparison with other cost items stated above, R&D expenditure is 
perceived as less of a burden by SMEs that conduct subcontracting business. This 
finding implies that subcontracting linkages provide SMEs with an opportunity to avoid 
internalisation of R&D activities. The absence of a need to internalise R&D activities 
does not only reduce costs but is also a benefit that subcontracting linkages at the 
current stage of industrial and SME development in Indonesia can provide. 
Using factor analysis, three principal factors are extracted from the 13 cost 
variables observed above. The results are shown in Table 8.8. The three factors 
account for 65.3 percent of the total variance. The first factor explains 32.4 percent of 
the total variance and can be labelled as Difficult Market Conditions. This factor 
consists of six variables: competition in the market (with a factor loading of 0.86), shift 
of loss (0.85), quick response (0.80), initial finding of parent firms (0.74), small 
markets (0.71), and penalty (0.67). 
The second factor accounts for 19.8 percent of the total variance and can be 
referred to as QCD. It is composed of variables of strict delivery timing (0.87), high 
technology (0.87), high quality (0.84) , and low prices (0.48). These items correspond 
to three pillars of the manufacturing philosophy: quality, costs and delivery. The last 
factor explains 13.1 percent of the total variance. It is characterised as High Capital 
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Requirement and comprised of three variables: large production capacity (0.90), 
expensive input materials (0.86), and R&D (0.50). 
Table 8.8 Matrix of Factor Loadings: Costs of Subcontracting Transactions with 
Parent Firms 
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 
Cost Variables Difficult Market QCD ( Quality, High Capital 
Conditions Cost and Delivery) Requirement 
1. Competition 0.86 
2. Shift of Loss 0.85 
3. Quick Response 0.80 
4. Initial Finding of Parent Firms 0.74 
5. Small Markets 0.71 
6. Penalty 0.67 
7. Strict Delivery Timing 0.87 
8. High Technology 0.87 
9. High Quality 0.84 
10. Low Prices 0.48 
11. Large Production Capacity 0.90 
12. Expensive Input Materials 0.86 
13. R&D 0.49 0.50 
Eigen Value 4.21 2.57 1.71 
Percentage of Variance Explained (%) 32.4 19.8 13.1 
Cumulative Percentage (%) 32.4 52.2 65 .3 
Number of Sample Firms = 73 
Note: Loading values are not listed if they are smaller than 0.40. 
Source: Based on author's interview and questionnaire survey during 1999-2000. 
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8.5.2 Benefits Obtained from Subcontracting Linkages with Parent Firms 
The reasons why SMEs sought to establish vertical inter-firm relationships with large-
scale parent firms were analysed in Section 8.3. Besides the motivations, this chapter 
examines revealed benefits to SMEs from subcontracting transactions with large-scale 
assembler firms in the automobile, motorcycle, agricultural machinery and bicycle 
subsectors. 
Table 8.9 represents the benefits that the sample SMEs obtained from 
subcontracting linkages with parent firms. It also displays differences in mean scores 
between firms grouped in three categories, and the difference in mean scores between 
motivations for and actual benefits from subcontracting transactions. The comparison 
of Table 8.3 and Table 8.9 indicates that corresponding items of motivations and actual 
benefits ranked in almost same order. However, the results of paired-samples t-test in 
Table 8.9 indicate that mean scores of actual gains from subcontracting linkages were 
lower than those of motivations for subcontracting transactions. These differences in 
all items reveal that subcontracting ties with large-scale parent firms did not generally 
generate the benefits to the expected degree. Costs associated with vertical inter-firm 
linkages, which were observed above, are likely to reduce expected benefits of 
subcontracting cooperation. Yet, as indicated in Table 8.9, the sample SMEs 
acknowledged that they still obtained substantial benefits from subcontracting 
relationships with principal firms. 
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Table 8.9 Revealed Benefits from Subcontracting Transactions with Parent Firms 
Mean Scores l) Differences between Groups Difference 
and Rank in Firm Categories Motivations 
Revealed Benefits All Rank Size 2) Ethnicity 3) Subsector 4) and Actual S) 
(s.d.) F -values t-values t -values t-values 
l. Lower Costs associated 2.73 3 2.15 0.55 1.88 4.46 ** 
with Contracting/Business (0.84) (+) 
2. Technical Support 3.21 2 4.42 ** 3.37 ** 3.26 ** 7.02 ** 
(1.21) (-) (-) (-) (+) 
3. Managerial Support 2.38 5 1.50 1.38 1.69 2.56 ** 
(1.49) (+) 
4. Provision of Large/Stable 3.79 1 1.33 2.97 ** 2.26 * 6.82 ** 
Orders (1.11) (-) (-) (+) 
5. Financial Support 1.41 7 1.23 1.32 0.07 7.99 ** 
(except for 6. below) (0.74) (+) 
6. Provision of Inputs and 1.62 6 1.35 1.76 1.69 5.87 ** 
Tools (0.84) (+) 
7. Specialisation 2.73 3 0.86 0.58 1.61 2.32 * 
(0.80) (+) 
Number of Firms 73 
Notes: 1) Figures in the upper row are the average of scores indicated by firms ' rating from 1 (the lowest 
score as not at all beneficial) to 5 (the highest score as very beneficial). Figures in parentheses 
are standard deviation. 
2) Differences in mean scores between firms with 1-19, 20-49, 50-99, and 100-299 workers, 
which are indicated by F-values of ANOV A. ** = significant at the 1 % level, * = significant 
at the 5 % level. When the differences are significant, ( +) = smaller SMEs > larger SMEs, (-) = 
smaller SMEs < larger SMEs. 
3) Difference in mean scores between finns of pribumi owners (P) and non-pribumi owners (NP), 
which is indicated by the t-values. ** = significant at the 1 % level, * = significant at the 5 % 
level. When the difference is significant, ( +) = P SMEs > NP SMEs, (-) = P SMEs < NP SMEs. 
4) Difference in mean scores between firms engaged in the automobile/motorcycle subsector 
(AM) and the agricultural machinery and bicycle subsector (AB ), which is indicated by the t-
values. ** = significant at the 1 level, * = significant at the 5 % level. When the difference is 
significant, ( +) = AB SMEs > AM SMEs, (-) = AB SMEs < AM SMEs. 
5) Difference in mean scores between motivations (Table 8.2) for and revealed benefits (this 
table) from subcontracting transactions with parent firms , which is indicated by the t-values of 
paired-samples t-test. ** = significant at the 1 level, * = significant at the 5 % level. When the 
difference is significant, ( +) = motivations > revealed benefits, (-) = motivations < revealed 
benefits. 
Source: Based on author's interview and questionnaire survey during 1999-2000. 
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Provision of large and/or stable orders was rated at the highest average score of 
3. 79. The SMEs we surveyed evaluated market provision as the most beneficial 
function in subcontracting linkages.15 Consistent with its expectation, Firm S85, the 
bicycle parts supplier firm in Surabaya, highly appreciated the role of subcontracting 
relations in ensuring substantial and stable orders. During the crisis of 1997-98, orders 
from the spot market decreased sharply, while those from Firm Al 2, an export-oriented 
bicycle assembler firm, through subcontracting linkages remained constant. In 1998, 
Firm S 12, a leaf spring producer in Jakarta, successfully found three new parent firms 
that offered orders with reasonable unit prices under subcontracting transactions. 
However, Firm SJ 2 noted that subcontracting linkages did not fully shield it from the 
decline of orders as a whole during 1997-1998. 
The mean scores of large and stable orders are statistically different between 
groups in ethnic and sectoral categories. Non-pribumi SMEs and those in the 
automobile and motorcycle subsectors appreciated the market function embedded in 
subcontracting relationships more highly than their counterparts. It is possible that, as 
the above-mentioned Firm S85 exploited the opportunity to start subcontracting with 
Firm Al 2 through ethnic channels in the Indonesian Chinese network, strong inter-
personal connections among Chinese entrepreneurs play a role in securing larger or 
stable orders. Also, differences in the size of the market between the automobile and 
motorcycle subsectors and the agricultural machinery and bicycle subsectors may 
explain differences in the evaluation of subcontracting linkages in terms of market 
creation and stability between SMEs in the two subsectors. 16 
15 Table 5.2 identified market access and competition in markets as the main problems our sample SMEs 
faced. Tybout (2000: 17-8) also raised substantial uncertainty about future demand conditions as one of 
the main obstacles to the growth of SMEs. Therefore, the function of providing a stable market through 
subcontracting linkages is very helpful to SMEs. 
16 For difference in the scale of output between the two subsector groups , see Section 6.3. 
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Technical support was ranked the second highest, with an average score of 3.21. 
Under subcontracting relationships , Firm S85, a non-pribumi bicycle parts supplier firm, 
has received valuable technical guidance from Firm A12. Technical support through 
the frequent dispatch of engineers from the assembler firm enabled Firm S85 to 
improve product quality and produce press parts used in bicycles for export to Europe. 
Owners of Firm S45 and Firm S51 resigned Firm S26, a first-tier supplier firm in the 
automobile and motorcycle subsectors, and started their operations as second-tier 
supplier firms. Through training programs and expert dispatch arranged by Firm S26, 
these two small-scale producers have learned how to make and repair dies , which is the 
most important technology for press stamping firms. Firm S09, a larger press parts 
supplier, and many other sample supplier firms acknowledged that TPM (Total 
Productive Maintenance) taught by Firm A08, a major motorcycle manufacturer in 
Indonesia, was a valuable management technique. They stated that transfer of TPM 
technology from Firm A08 through subcontracting improved their productivity, product 
quality and other capabilities. However, a larger non-pribumi SME (Firm S39) in 
Surabaya pointed out that, in the context of Indonesian economy or developing 
economies , supplier firms could not always rely on technological support from 
assembler firms. According to Firm S39, which produces leaf and coil springs for 
automobiles and motorcycles , even large-scale or foreign-affiliated parent firms 1n 
Indonesia do not necessarily have sufficient expertise in every technological field. 
Statistical tests reveal that mean scores are significantly different between 
groups in size, ethnicity and subsector categories. Larger SMEs, non-pribumi owners 
and firms in the automobile and motorcycle subsectors tend to evaluate benefits of 
technical assistance through subcontracting linkages more positively than smaller SMEs, 
pribu,ni owners and firms in the agricultural machinery and bicycle subsectors. These 
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differences imply that the former SME groups are better able to absorb production 
technologies and related skills than the latter. Also , based on our interviews with 
assembler firms , in comparison with parent firms in the agricultural machinery and 
bicycle industry, those in the automobile and motorcycle industry have sufficient 
technological expertise and are capable of providing SMEs with useful information and 
know-how related to production technologies. 
Transfer of managerial technologies through vertical inter-firm relationships was 
rated at 2.38 on average. In comparison to other forms of assistance, except for 
financial support, managerial support through subcontracting relations was not highly 
beneficial to our sample SMEs. However, Firm S45 and Firm S51 positively evaluated 
the role of subcontracting linkages in improving capabilities in the area of corporate 
management. Firm SJ 1, a small non-pribumi SME, also valued managerial guidance 
provided by Firm A05, an automobile manufacturer, particularly in the field of factory 
management and labour management. 
Benefits of lower costs associated with contracting/business and specialisation in 
certain production processes were ranked third, both with average scores of 2.73. 
Subcontracting linkages have played a moderate role in promoting the reduction of 
transaction costs and specialisation in certain products and services. For these benefits, 
there is no statistical difference in average scores between groups in firm categories of 
size, ethnic affiliation and subsector. Through subcontracting, the sample SMEs have 
reduced transaction costs and improved factor allocation in the process of specialisation. 
Firm SJ 1, a small non-pribumi precision machining firm in Jakarta, identified 
the lower cost of collecting information as one of the significant advantages generated 
by subcontracting linkages. This auto parts supplier firm has been able to make 
business plans for investment and human resource development without an extensive 
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effort to collect necessary information, because Firm A05, a large automobile 
manufacturer and its main parent firm, has provided it with medium- to long-term 
future production plans together with monthly orders. Another small non-pribumi firm 
(Firm S77), which deals with machining, stamping and plating of agricultural 
machinery parts in Jakarta, explained that in the case of subcontracting business, it did 
not need to be concerned about opportunistic behaviour of customers (e.g. , sudden 
cancellation of orders, unreasonable reduction of the contracted amount, and delay or 
evasion of payment). According to Firm S77, subcontracting can allow it to avoid the 
costs caused by opportunistic behaviour of another party in one-off exchanges with 
unfamiliar clients 
Firm S40, an automotive parts supplier firm, mentioned that subcontracting 
arrangements allowed it to economise various costs including time. Firm S40 in 
Surabaya and its principal firms in Jakarta communicate a range of business issues such 
as minor changes of quantity and deli very timing, simply by telephone rather than 
through direct visits and immediate modifications of contracts in writing. Firm S40 
also indicated that its specialisation in disk wheels for vehicles enabled it to pursue 
economies of scale and a better allocation of production factors. Firm S75, a small firm 
in the agricultural machinery subsector, is engaged in electroplating, which is a part of 
the process of the production of parts and components. It does not sell its products to 
retailers or wholesalers in the general market. This supplier firm pointed out that 
subcontracting allowed it to concentrate on electroplating services that can only be sold 
to specific companies. Through specialisation, it could utilise its limited financial and 
human resources more efficiently. 
Financial support and the provision of input materials were given low average 
scores of 1.41 and 1.62, respectively. These low scores, in addition to the results of 
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available linkages shown in Table 8.6, indicate that current subcontracting linkages 
have not extended sufficient financial support to the sample SMEs. In particular, credit 
and financial guarantees have not often been extended to small-medium firms through 
subcontracting. Cheap and long-term credits for investment capital from its parent firm 
(Firm AO]) have been available to Firm S06, the brake drum and brake hub supplier 
firm. However, this is one of the exceptions. In our survey, subcontracting cooperation 
in financial matters did not go beyond establishing better payment conditions and 
providing raw materials/intermediate inputs and tools. As previously explained, 
principal firms cannot easily provide their supplier firms with financial assistance, 
because even the former group often faces financial difficulties and does not necessarily 
have sufficient information on the latter group. 
Table 8.10 groups the above benefits from subcontracting transactions into three 
major factors, on the basis of factor analysis. These three factors can explain 81.3 
percent of the total variance. The first factor accounts for 39.8 percent of the variance 
and is made up of the following three variables: technical support (with a factor loading 
of 0.88), managerial support (0.87), and provision of large/stable market (0.64 ). This 
dimension can be referred to as Technical and Marketing Support, because it contains 
variables related to supportive linkages in the fields of production technologies, 
managerial technologies and market creation. 
The second factor explains 22.1 percent of the total variance and consists of two 
variables of specialisation (0.94) and lower costs associated with contracting and 
business (0.88). This factor represents benefits of Specialisation and Lower 
Transaction Costs . Finally, the third factor accounts for 19 .4 percent of total variance 
and consists of the two variables of provision of inputs and tools (0.95) and financial 
support (0.92), which is characterised as Financial Support. 
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Table 8.10 Matrix of Factor Loadings: Revealed Benefits from Subcontracting 
Transactions with Parent Firms 
Revealed Benefit Variables 
Factor 1 
Technical 
and 
Factor 2 
Specialization 
and 
Mar_keting Support Lower Transaction Costs 
l . Technical Support 0.88 
2. Managerial Support 0.87 
3. Provision of Large/Stable Orders 0.64 0.42 
4. Specialisation 0.94 
5. Lower Costs associated with 0.88 
Contracting and Business 
6. Provision of Inputs and Tools 
7. Financial Support 
Eigen Value 2.79 1.55 
Percentage of Variance Explained (%) 39.8 22.1 
Cumulative Percentage (%) 39.8 61.9 
Number of Sample Firms = 73 
Note: Loading values are not listed if they are smaller than 0.40. 
Source: Based on author's interview and questionnaire survey during 1999-2000. 
Factor 3 
Financial Support 
0.95 
0.92 
1.36 
19.4 
81.3 
8.6 Elements for the Better Functioning of Subcontracting Linkages 
This section investigates basic elements for the better functioning of subcontracting 
cooperation. In addition to the three firm categories of size, ethnicity and subsector, 
several other elements to be explained below are introduced as variables which may 
potentially improve the functioning of subcontracting linkages with large-scale 
principal firms. 
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8.6.1 Elements for the Functioning of Subcontracting Linkages: Overall Benefits 
On the basis of the results of Chapter 7 and previous studies (Baranson 1967; Berry 
1997; Lall 1980; and Odaka 1983), ten variables (including size, ethnic affiliation and 
subsector) are identified as elements that would have effects on the extent of benefits 
from subcontracting transactions. Included are educational levels of owners and 
workers, past working experiences of owners, business continuity, trust, financial 
access and location. These explanatory variables in this study were defined in the 
following way: 
l) Education (owners): educational levels of owners (0 = owners with senior 
high school or less education, 1 = owners with university education); 
2) Education (workers): educational level of skilled workers (0 = firms in which 
average educational level of skilled workers is senior high school education 
or less, 1 = firms in which average educational level of skilled workers is 
university education including D3 (polytechnic) level); 
3) Experience (owners): owners' working experience in similar business before 
taking their current position (0 = owners with no experience, 1 = owners with 
experience); 
4) Business Continuity: duration of subcontracting business with major parent 
firms ( 1 = 0-1 year, 2 = 1-3 years, 3 = 3-5 years, 4 = 5-7 years, 5 = 7 and 
more years); 
5) Trust: the degree of trust of our sample firms in their parent firms in terms of 
business and cooperation relations, indicated by a rating from 1 (the lowest 
score as little trustworthy) to 5 (the highest score as very trustworthy); 
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6) Financial Access: access to external financing sources before the 1997-98 
crisis as indicated by sample firms' rating from 1 (the lowest score as very 
bad) to 5 (the highest score as very good); and 
7) Location: location of sample SMEs (1 = firms located in rural areas, 2 = firms 
located in boundaries between urban and rural areas, and 3 = firms located in 
urban areas). 
Factor scores of Technical and Marketing Support, Specialisation and Loiver 
Transaction Costs, and Financial Support were extracted in Table 8 .10 as the combined 
indicators of benefits from subcontracting. After reliability tests by the Cronbach 
coefficients, the three factor scores were used as dependent variables in a multivariate 
analysis of variance (MANOV A) to examine which elements have significant effects on 
the overall benefits from subcontracting linkages. The results of MANOV A in Table 
8.11 reveal that all of the independent variables listed influence the functioning of 
subcontracting transactions but not to the same degree. 
Overall benefits of Technical and Marketing Support, Specialisation and Lower 
Transaction Costs, and Financial Support through subcontracting linkages are 
influenced by ethnicity , subsector and trust of small-medium supplier firms in large 
parent firms. Differences in average scores of a linear combination of Technical and 
Marketing Support, Specialisation and Lower Transaction Costs, and Financial 
Support are statistically significant at the 1 percent level between groups in each firm 
category of ethnic affiliation of owners, subsector of SMEs, the degree of trust, and 
firm location. The results of MANOV A indicate that SMEs managed by non-pribumi 
owners , those engaged in the automobile and motorcycle subsectors, those with 
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stronger trust, and those located 1n urban areas draw greater benefits from 
subcontracting linkages than their counterparts SMEs. 
Table 8.11 Effects of Elements on the Overall Benefits from and Technical and 
Marketing Support through Subcontracting Transactions with Parent Firms 
Elements 
l. Size 
2. Ethnicity 
3. Subsector 
4. Education (owners) 
S. Education (workers) 
6. Experience (owners) 
7. Business Continuity 
8. Trust 
9. Financial Access 
10. Location 
Number of Sample Firms= 73 
Multivariate Test 
( Overall Benefits) l ) 
MANOVA 
Wilks' 
Lambda F -values3) 
0.78 1.99 * 
0.80 5.66 ** 
0.83 4.66 ** 
0.87 3.45 * 
0.91 2.23 + 
0.91 2.23 + 
0.76 1.5.8 + 
0.46 4.96 ** 
0.75 1.70 + 
0.78 3.07 ** 
Univariate Tests 
(Technical and Marketing Support )2) 
ANOVA t -tests 
F -values3) t -values3) 
3.33 * 
3.38 ** 
2.86 ** 
2.82 ** 
2.61 ** 
2.18 * 
2.88 * 
5.00 ** 
1.75 
3.43 * 
Notes: 1) Factor scores of Technical and Marketing Support, Specialisation and Lower Transaction 
Costs , and Financial Support, which are extracted from factor analysis in Table 8.10, are used 
as multiple dependent variables in these multivariate tests. 
2) Factor scores of only Technical and Marketing Support, which are extracted from factor 
analysis in Table 8.10, are used as a dependent ( or test) variable in these ANOV A and t-tests. 
3) ** = significant at the 1 % level, * = significant at the 5 % level, + = significant at the 10 % 
level. 
Source: Based on author's interview and questionnaire survey during 1999-2000. 
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As already discussed above, non-pribumi SMEs can generally take advantage of 
subcontracting linkages more effectively than their pribumi counterparts, and parent 
firms in the automobile and motorcycle subsectors tend to have more capabilities to 
extend various kinds of support to supplier firms than those in the agricultural 
machinery and bicycle subsectors. Urban SMEs may be able to more effectively utilise 
subcontracting linkages under the conditions of better industrial infrastructure and 
proximity to input and output markets. Particularly interesting is the significant effect 
of trust of SMEs in LEs. Stronger trust in parent firms may encourage supplier firms to 
acquire many things from them through subcontracting ties. 
Table 8.11 also shows that the overall benefits from subcontracting transactions 
are different at the 5 percent level between groups in firm size and owner education. 
Larger SMEs and those managed by owners with higher-level education can take 
advantage of subcontracting linkages more effectively than smaller SMEs and those run 
by owners with lower-level education. The remaining variables, worker education, 
experiences of owners, business continuity, and financial access, have a positive effect 
to some extent on the overall benefits from subcontracting transactions. Subcontracting 
linkages are likely to be more beneficial to SMEs with a higher level of education of 
skilled workers, those with owners' job experiences in similar business lines, those with 
longer relationships with parent firms , and those with better external financial access 
than their counterpart SMEs. 
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8.6.2 Elements for the Functioning of Subcontracting Linkages: Technical and 
Marketing Support 
Next, Technical and Marketing Support, the first factor explaining nearly 40 percent of 
the total variance, was selected as a primary benefit and used as a dependent variable 
for univariate analysis of variance (ANOV A) and t-tests to examine the effects of 
several elements on the gains from subcontracting linkages. The last two columns of 
Table 8.11 probe the impact of the same independent variables on the functioning of 
only Technical and Marketing Support through subcontracting relationships, using 
ANOV A and t-tests. The results indicate that differences in benefit levels of Technical 
and Marketing Support were statistically significant at the 1 to 5 percent levels between 
groups in most of the explanatory variables. 
On the whole, these results suggest that SMEs managed by non-pribumi 
entrepreneurs, those in the automobile and motorcycle subsectors, those whose owners 
and/or skilled workers have a higher level of education, and those with strong trust in 
parent firms obtained more benefits from subcontracting linkages in terms of 
improvements in technological and marketing capabilities, compared with their 
counterpart SMEs. Besides, Technical and Marketing Support under subcontracting 
linkages have been more useful to SMEs that hire more employees, those whose owners 
have working experiences in similar fields, those with longer-period business ties with 
parent firms, and those located in urban areas than their counterpart groups. 
As already indicated in Table 8.9, the extent of benefits from technical support 
and provision of large/stable orders was closely related to firm-specific categories of 
ethnic affiliation, subsector and size. The owner of press parts supplier firm (Firm S46) 
with only eight employees has been energetic in acquiring dies-making and related 
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technologies from a large foreign-affiliated shock absorber manufacturer (Finn Al 7), 
by taking advantage of his technological knowledge based on university education and 
ki . . 1 ki 17 previous wor ng expenence 1n meta wor ng. The procurement division of a 
foreign-affiliated automobile assembler firm (Finn AOJ) appreciated the high 
technological capabilities of Finn S06. This SME, which has employed many skilled 
workers with a relatively high educational level, is able to absorb production 
technologies transferred from the automobile manufacturer without difficulties. 
Subcontracting cooperation has provided Finn S85, a bicycle parts supplier firm, 
with fruitful outcomes from technical linkages, due to its trust in and respect for the 
principal firm, in addition to the owner's eagerness to learn technologies. Finn S69 in 
Surabaya is a contrasting example. The owner of this agricultural machinery parts 
supplier firm worked for the current principal firm (Finn Al 0) for a long time up to 
1989. He was one of the best skilled workers there. He, therefore, believes that he still 
has superior knowledge of technologies, compared to Finn-Al 0. Because of this, he 
does not seek to learn technologies from Finn Al O and, as a result, has not effectively 
utilised technological linkages through subcontracting ties, even though Finn S69 has 
faced problems in product quality and production technology fields. It is likely that this 
supplier firm will not develop further without technological support from external 
sources. 
Finn SJ 2, which was founded in 1977 as a leaf spnng supplier firm, 
acknowledged that it had taken a long time to establish vertical inter-firm relationships 
in which its parent firms provided invaluable technologies through technical support. 
Some sample SMEs in Sukabumi, a rural area in West Java, claimed that technical 
17 There are, of course, different cases. For instance, the owner of Firm S85 is a non-technical high 
school graduate. However, he has been very enthusiastic about learning stamping technologies from the 
parent firm (Firm Al 2) and succeeded in the production of export-quality parts for bicycles. Firm Al 2 
raised the strong eagerness of the owner of Firm S85 to master skills and technologies as the main reason 
for its continuous provision of technical support to the press parts supplier firm. 
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support has not been offered by urban-based assembler firms , because of their four-hour 
distance by car from Jakarta. 
Finally, this study employs a multiple discriminant analysis to confirm whether 
the above elements really have effects on the extent of benefits from Technical and 
Marketing Support through subcontracting relations with large-scale parent firms. 18 For 
the discriminant analysis, the sample SMEs are divided into two groups according to 
whether their factor scores of Technical and Marketing Support are above or below the 
sample mean of zero. SMEs in the former group are categorised as "larger benefit 
earners" from Technical and Marketing Support through subcontracting linkages and 
those in the latter group as "smaller benefit earners." 
Table 8.12 provides the results of the discriminant analysis. It shows that the 
elements of firm size, ethnic affiliation, subsector, educational levels of owners and 
workers, prior job experiences of owners, and trust in parent firms were significantly 
related to the better utilisation of subcontracting cooperation. 19 These findings are 
similar to those of the ANOV A and t-tests observed above. Our discriminant model as 
a whole was significant, as measured by particularly the x2 statistic. Overall, the 
discriminant function was able to correctly classify 84 percent of the sample SMEs into 
larger and smaller benefit earner groups. 
18 Using discriminant analys is, Siddharthan (1998) analysed the d ifferential behaviour of the Japanese-
affiliated enterprises in comparison with non-Japanese multinational and unaffiliated Indian counterparts 
in the Indian automobile subsector. Zhao and Co (1997) employed facto r analysis and discriminant 
analysis to identify successful factors that contributed to adoption and implementation of advanced 
manufacturing technology in Singapore. 
19 As variables for educational levels of owners and skilled workers, the following 5-level classification , 
instead of 2-level classification of O (= lower educational level) and 1 (= higher educational level) in the 
previous parts , is used here: 1 = primary school or less, 2 = junior high school, 3 = senior high school, 4 
= polytechnic (D3) level , and 5 = university. 
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Table 8.12 Discriminant Analysis: Effects of Elements on Technical and Marketing 
Support through Subcontracting Transactions with Parent Firms 
Elements 
1. Size 
2. Ethnicity 
3. Subsector 
4. Education (owners) 
5. Education (workers) 
6. Experience (owners) 
7. Business Continuity 
8. Trust 
9. Financial Access 
IO. Location 
Eigen Value 
Canonical Correlation 
Wilks' Lambda 
2 I) 
X 
Wilks' 
Lambda F -values1) 
0.90 7.52 ** 
0.88 9.51 ** 
0.95 3.79 * 
0.95 3.90 * 
0.91 6.82 ** 
0.89 8.92 ** 
0.97 2.11 
0.83 15.00 ** 
0.99 0.83 
0.97 2.31 
Percent of grouped cases correctly classified (%) 
Number of Sample Firms= 73 
Correlations 2) 
0.42 
0.47 
-0.30 
0.30 
0.40 
0.46 
0.22 
0.59 
0.14 
0.23 
Notes: 1) **=significant at the 1 % level, * = significant at the 5 % level. 
Overall 
Discriminant Function 
0.60 
0.61 
0.62 
31.17 ** 
83.6 
2) Pooled within-groups correlations between discriminating variables and standardised canonical 
discriminant function. 
Source: Based on author's interview and questionnaire survey during 1999-2000. 
These results suggest that high trust of SMEs in large parent firms has played a 
crucial role 1n effectively utilising technical and marketing linkages under 
subcontracting ties. This supports Berry's ( 1997: 20) statement that the functioning of 
subcontracting linkages depends largely on mutual trust and respect. Also, owners' 
working experiences in similar subsectors, educational levels of owners and skilled 
workers are essential to the effective use of technical and market ties through 
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subcontracting networks. SMEs with experienced owners and higher-level human 
resources of owners and/or employees are better able to interact with large-scale parent 
firms in technical and marketing cooperation. These findings confirm suggestions in 
the literature that human capabilities of SMEs play important roles in the better 
utilisation of subcontracting linkages (Baranson 1967: 68-9; Berry 1997: 10). 
Firm-specific variables (firm size, ethnicity and subsector) are also significant 
elements in determining the degree of benefit from technical and marketing assistance 
extended by large assembler firms. The value of technological and marketing linkages 
with principal firms is higher for larger SMEs, those owned by non-pribumi 
entrepreneurs and those in the automotive and motorcycle subsectors than their 
counterparts. These results of the discriminant analysis are consistent with the findings 
of previous studies (Berry 1997: 10; Lall 1980: 222; Odaka 1983: 354-5). 
8.7 Subcontracting Mechanisms in Indonesia: Evid.ence from SMEs 
Chapter 6 demonstrated that subcontracting linkages, among several other channels, 
have functioned as one of the most important support mechanisms of technology 
acquisition and marketing for SMEs in Indonesia. Chapter 7 suggested that 
subcontracting transactions with large-scale parent firms improve the productivity in 
these SMEs. The current chapter looked inside the "black box" of subcontracting 
linkages conducive to SME development. Explanations of subcontracting mechanisms 
are presented here as answers to each of the five research questions raised in the 
introduction to this chapter. 
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(1) Motivations for subcontracting transactions with parent firms 
Large/stable orders and technical support have been the most important reasons why 
SMEs began subcontracting transactions with large-scale parent firms. Lower 
transaction costs and specialisation were also found to be important motivations. 
Managerial assistance through inter-firm relations was of modest importance. 
Compared with such reasons as Technical and Marketing Support and Specialisation 
and Lower Transaction Costs, Financial Support including provision of input materials 
was a relatively weak motivation for building subcontracting ties. However, Financial 
Support depends very much on firm categories. Smaller SMEs, those owned by 
pribumi entrepreneurs and those in the agricultural machinery and bicycle subsectors 
expected such financial assistance and material provision more strongly than their 
counterparts. 
(2) Intermediary channels for the initiation of subcontracting relationships with parent 
firms 
SMEs relied largely on inter-personal relationships such as family, relatives or friends 
to establish their initial contacts with their main customers and start subcontracting 
transactions. Peer firms in similar business lines also acted as intermediary agents. 
Several SMEs successfully engaged in subcontracting business because their owners 
previously worked for their current principal firms. These findings are consistent with 
the observation in Pakistan that more than half of the sample SMEs in the agricultural 
machinery industry established subcontracting linkages with parent firms through 
personal contacts (Nabi 1985: 12-3). 
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Other external channels were not generally used by firms in our case study . 
One-third of our sample firms approached main parent firms without prior direct or 
indirect relationships, but many of them were not smaller and pribumi SMEs, but rather 
larger and non-pribumi SMEs. 
(3) Types of subcontracting linkages with parent firms 
Provision of large/stable orders was the most popular type of subcontracting linkage 
with large-scale parent firms. Technical support including QC, production technology, 
and technical specifications was widespread among subcontracting SMEs. However, 
larger SMEs, non-pribumi owners and firms producing automotive and motorcycle 
parts are likely to establish these technical linkages with LEs more than their 
counterpart SMEs. 
Similar to other studies (Hill 1985: 252-3; Thee 1985: 229), this study found that 
QC support and the provision of technical specifications, which were described as "low 
technical linkages" by Lall ( 1980: 217) , were the most popular types of technical 
assistance obtained from large parent firms. "Medium and high technical linkages" by 
Lall' s classification ( 1980: 217-8), such as support for production technologies and 
joint product development, were observed in our sample firms , particularly in larger 
SMEs, those managed by non-pribumi and those in the automobile and motorcycle 
subsectors. The extent of technological linkages observed in our survey appears greater 
than suggested by other studies. 20 
20 Hill (1985) and Thee (1985) did not generally find "medium and high technical linkages" in 
respectively their Philippine and Indonesian case studies, in the early 1980s. Without further analysis , it 
seems likely that the differences between their findings and ours may be attributed to I ) the progress of 
industrialisation in Indonesia in the last 20 years and 2) differences in firm size and subsectors on which 
the studies are based. 
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Compared with technological and marketing ties, financial linkages were 
generally not as important to SMEs. Even though the setting of better payment 
conditions and provision of input materials and tools were found in 25 to 40 percent of 
the sample firms, provision of credit and financial guarantees, and support for the 
establishment of new firms were rarely observed. Vertical inter-firm linkages provided 
SMEs in our case study to some extent with working capital, but not investment capital. 
Our survey confirms the findings of Nabi (1985: 18-22) that roughly half of his sample 
SMEs relied on parent firms in financing working capital, whereas only five percent 
used them as a source of fixed investment capital. 
( 4) Costs of and benefits from subcontracting transactions with parent firms 
This study revealed three major cost factors: 1) QCD (Quality, Cost and Delivery); 2) 
Difficult Market Conditions; and 3) High Capital Requirement. The four QCD burdens 
were high quality, high production technology, low-level prices and strict delivery 
timing, which are the same as those indicated by Berry (1997: 20-1) and the Japanese 
Small and Medium Enterprise Agency (1998: 98). Our survey identified market-related 
problems, particularly limited size of demand, tough competition in markets and finding 
parent firms at the initial stage as cost factors. Expensive raw materials/intermediate 
inputs and large production capacity, which required SMEs to have sufficient financial 
strength, were also regarded as impediments to conducting subcontracting business. 
SMEs in our survey obtained large benefits from market provision and technical 
assistance through vertical inter-firm relations , which underlines findings by Watanabe 
(1971: 65). This can also be inferred from the number of respondents that have utilised 
technical and marketing linkages. Support for managerial technologies was modestly 
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useful. The extent of the gains from such Technical and Marketing Support varied 
according to firm categories of size, ethnic affiliation or subsector. Larger SMEs, those 
run by non-pribumi and those operating in the automobile and motorcycle subsectors 
tend to utilise this technological and marketing assistance more effectively than their 
counterparts. 
The sample SMEs found that the extent of benefits from specialisation and the 
reduction in transaction costs generated by subcontracting ties was moderate. 21 
According to our cost analysis, SMEs have not been required to internalise R&D 
activities under subcontracting relations. Although this requirement was different 
according to groups in firm categories, de-internalisation of R&D can be considered as 
a part of benefits from subcontracting transactions. Without noting differences between 
groups in firm categories, subcontracting has not functioned well as a support 
mechanism for financing and the procurement of raw materials . 
The actual gains from subcontracting relationships were lower than motivations 
for subcontracting transactions. Subcontracting cooperation with large-scale parent 
firms has not necessarily generated the expected degree of benefits, which should be 
reduced by costs associated with initiating and maintaining vertical inter-firm linkages 
in Indonesia. Yet our survey revealed that SMEs still obtained substantial benefits from 
subcontracting relationships with large-scale principal firms. 
(5) Elements for the better functioning of subcontracting ties with parent firms 
The essence of this question is how SMEs obtained larger benefits from subcontracting 
transactions. Subcontracting linkages tend to be more beneficial to SMEs with more 
21 Relatively small market and some other costs associated with subcontracting business in Indonesia 
mentioned above would reduce the degree of benefits from division of labour and lower transaction costs 
which Hondai (1992: 176-8) and Watanabe (1971: 71-2) stressed in their studies of Japan 's experience. 
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employees, those run by non-pribumi owners, those in the automobile and motorcycle 
subsectors, those managed by entrepreneurs with higher-level education and working 
experiences in similar subsectors, those with a higher level of education of skilled 
workers, those with longer relationships with parent firms, those with stronger trust in 
principal firms, those with better external financial access and those located in urban 
areas than those counterpart SMEs. Although the explanatory power of each of these 
conditions was different, all of the elements had positive effects on the better use of 
subcontracting system as an effective support mechanism for SMEs. These results 
support previous studies such as Lall (1980: 222), Nabi (1985: 17-8) and Odaka (1983: 
354-5). 
Our analysis indicated that Technical and Marketing Support was related to 
almost the same elements as those mentioned above. Our discriminant analysis found 
that stronger trust of small-medium supplier firms in large parent firms, owners' job 
experiences in similar fields, higher educational levels of skilled workers and higher 
educational levels of SME owners, in addition to firm-specific elements of size (larger 
SMEs), ethnicity (non-pribumi SMEs), and subsector (SMEs in the automobile and 
motorcycle subsector), were crucial elements for the higher benefits from technological 
and marketing linkages through vertical inter-firm relations. These findings are 
consistent with arguments of Baranson (1967: 68-9) and Berry (1997: 10, 20). 
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Chapter 9 
Subcontracting Transactions and 
SME Development in Indonesia: 
Qualitative Evidence from Parent Firms 
9.1 Introduction 
Chapter 6 found that inter-firm linkages, particularly subcontracting linkages, were 
essential support mechanisms for SME development in the Indonesian metal working 
and machinery industry. Chapter 7, based on the estimates of the production functions 
and TFP indices, indicated that the degree of subcontracting transactions was positively 
related to the level of productivity of the sample metalworking and machinery SMEs in 
Indonesia. Chapter 8 gave a comprehensive picture of subcontracting mechanisms in 
Indonesia, using qualitative data from SMEs in the Indonesian metalworking and 
machinery industry. These chapters analysed subcontracting linkages and SME 
development in Indonesia from the perspective of SMEs. 
This chapter changes the standpoint and gives an insight into subcontracting 
relations and SME development from the point of view of large-scale principal firms. 
Chapter 2 theoretically explained why large parent firms seek to conduct subcontracting 
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transactions with small and medium supplier firms. This chapter investigates the 
detailed characteristics and functions of subcontracting ties with SMEs, in particular 
local SMEs, using qualitative data from large-scale assembler firms. 1 It examines how 
large-scale assembler firms perceive subcontracting transactions with SMEs, whether 
they intend to involve the SME sector in subcontracting linkages, and whether the 
subcontracting system has built-in support mechanisms for SME development. 
More specifically, this chapter raises the following questions to confirm whether 
subcontracting linkages can function as support mechanisms for SME development. 
(1) Why did large-scale assembler firms 1n Indonesia initiate subcontracting 
transactions with SMEs? 
(2) What type of linkages have LEs established with SMEs through subcontracting? 
(3) What kind of costs and benefits have LEs borne that are associated with and 
obtained from subcontracting transactions with SMEs? How significant are they? 
(4) To what extent do large-scale parent firms support their small-medium supplier 
firms? 
These four questions will be answered on the basis of a survey among assembler firms 
in the Indonesian automobile, motorcycle, agricultural machinery and bicycle 
subsectors. Table 9 .1 lists several items as possible answers to each of the first three 
questions above, based on our discussion in Chapter 2, particularly Sections 2.2 and 2.3. 
Similar to Table 8.1, Table 9.1 includes several contradictory items, as some examples 
are indicated in the note. However, this is because Table 9 .1 is designed to show the 
degree to which each item is regarded as relevant or not. 
1 Local SMEs (or LEs) in this study mean non-affiliated domestic SMEs (or LEs), as already explained in Chapter 5. 
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Table 9.1 Description of Items Listed in Motivations, Benefits, Costs and Linkage 
Types: Subcontracting Transactions with SMEs 
Items Description 
Motivations for and Bene.fits to Parent Firms 
1. Specialisation 
2. Shock Absorber 
3. Lower Wages 
4. Special Skills 
5. Better Products 
6. Lower Costs for 
Monitoring Workers 
7. Lower Costs associated 
with Contracting 
Costs for Parent Firms 
1. Initial Finding of SMEs 
2. Slow Response 
3. Low Quality 
4. Low Technology 
the concentration on assembling and other advantageous operations 
and the enjoyment of economies of scale, by contracting out 
disadvantageous processes to SMEs. (I) 
the prevention of underutilisation or short capacity of internal 
resources in an economic fluctuation period, by adjusting order 
volume contracted out to SMEs. (J) 
the reduction of production costs of parts and components, by 
contracting out to SMEs with cheaper labour costs. (J) 
the utilisation of skills unfamiliar to parent firms, by contracting out 
to SMEs with special technologies. (I) 
purchasing of parts and components satisfying requirements, by 
providing SMEs with stable business environment in a long and 
continuous contract period. (S) 
the reduction of costs for monitoring workers, by limiting the number 
of own employees through contracting out to SMEs. (I) 
the reduction of costs such as the collection of information on 
potential SMEs, preparation for contracts, enforcement of contracts, 
and following-up of contracts, by establishing close relations with 
SMEs. (S) 
search for potential SMEs under the conditions of limited 
information. (J) 
SMEs' slow response to instructions/claims. (I) 
higher defect ratios of products supplied by SMEs due to insufficient 
QC knowledge, insufficient testing/inspection, etc. (J) 
the difficulties in ensuring required products due to lower levels of 
production technologies and skills in the areas of process design, 
process technology, die/mold making, production line arrangements, 
etc. (]) 
5. High Prices higher prices of products because of inefficient production operations 
by SMEs. (E) 
6. Unstable Delivery Timing late or unstable delivery timing due to insufficient awareness, lack of 
production scheduling, etc. (I) 
7. Monitoring SMEs careful monitoring of SMEs to make them satisfy requirements m 
terms of quality, quantity, deli very time, etc. (I) (S) 
8. Small Production Capacity the difficulties in ensuring required quantity because of small 
production capacity of SMEs. (1) 
9. Technical and Other the provision of various support to SMEs that do not have sufficient 
Assistance technical and other related capabilities. (I) (S) 
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Table 9 .1 Description of Items Listed in Motivations, Benefits, Costs and Linkage 
Types: Subcontracting Transactions with SMEs ( continued) 
Items Description 
Linkage Types established by Parent Firms 
1. Support of Establishment 
2. Stable Market 
3. Technical Specifications 
4. Lending of Tools 
5. Advice on Machinery 
6. Provision of Used 
Machinery 
7. QC Support 
8. Production Technology 
Support 
9. Joint Design 
direct assistance to potential entrepreneurs in establishing new 
supplier firms through the provision of credit, capital participation, 
guarantee of order, etc. 
the provision of stable order in a long term, (with some exceptions 
during an economic fluctuation period). 
the provision of detailed technical specifications (including detailed 
technical instruction and drawing). 
the supply of tools such as dies, molds, etc. 
advice on the selection and layout of machinery and equipment. 
the provision of second-hand machinery and equipment at cheaper 
pnces. 
transfer of QC technique (including testing/inspection methods and 
acquisition of industrial standards) through expert dispatch, training, 
etc. 
transfer of production technologies and skills in the areas of process 
design, process technology, die/mold making, production line 
arrangements, etc. through expert dispatch, training, etc. 
joint activities between parent firms and SMEs in the area of product 
design and development. 
10. Managerial Support transfer of managerial skills such as managerial planning, sales 
management, procurement management, human resource 
management, financial management, accounting, etc. 
11. Provision of Inputs the supply of input materials. 
12. Financing Support the provision of credit and bank guarantees (including setting-up of 
(Provision of Credit/Guarantees) reasonable payment conditions for SMEs). 
13. Price Negotiations setting-up of negotiation procedures to determine prices of products 
and services. 
14. Market Information the provision of information on new markets (products, clients, etc.). 
Note: Several contradictory items are included in the table. For example, "Lower Wages" in 
motivations and benefits and "High Prices" in costs contradict each other. "Shock Absorber" in 
motivations and benefits and "Stable Market" in linkage types also contradict each other. In 
the former case, parts and components supplied by SMEs may be cheaper than those produced 
by parent firms. However, products supplied by foreign-affiliated SMEs will not have cost 
merits relative to those by local SMEs. Price levels of products supplied by SMEs are 
sometimes expensive relative to those expected by parent firms. In the latter case, parent firms 
possibly intend to provide SMEs with large/stable order during the period except for the 
outbreak of drastic economic changes, while, in sharp economic fluctuation periods like the 
recent economic crisis, they can use small-medium supplier firms as their shock absorber. In 
this way, the degree of merits and demerits of subcontracting with SMEs in the above list is not 
an absolute indication but a relative one. In Description above, (I), (S), and (E) indicate that 
subcontracting is more beneficial or costly than the vertical integration system, spot-base 
transactions, and expectation by parent firms, respectively. 
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Previous studies (e.g., Harianto 1996: 55-60; Mead 1984: 1103; Siddharthan 
1998: 103-7) have shown that the characteristics of subcontracting linkages with 
supplier firms depend on sector and nationality of parent firms. This chapter therefore 
distinguishes between different groups of principal firms by subsector and origin of 
investment. 
As noted in the preceding chapters, local SMEs have to rely on external sources 
through inter-firm linkages, because they have few other sources that can provide 
technical, marketing and other necessary support. On the other hand, foreign-affiliated 
SMEs can receive sufficient assistance from their foreign owner or partner companies. 
Thus, SMEs in the former group may wish more support from parent firms through 
subcontracting relationships than SMEs in the latter group. Taking account of these 
characteristics, this chapter investigates whether the behaviour of assembler firms 1s 
different towards local SMEs and foreign-affiliated SMEs. 
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 9.2 describes the survey 
method together with the key characteristics of the sample parent firms. Section 9 .3 
presents the reasons why large assembler firms wish to maintain subcontracting 
transactions with small and medium supplier firms, and Section 9.4 explores linkage 
types that LEs have established with SMEs through subcontracting relations. In Section 
9.5, costs associated with subcontracting arrangements and revealed benefits obtained 
from subcontracting linkages with SMEs are examined. Section 9 .6 investigates the 
extent to which LEs are willing to assist SMEs and assesses how much effort they made 
or will make to improve capabilities of their small-medium supplier firms. The last 
section summarises the answers to the four research questions , which will confirm 
whether subcontracting linkages can support SME development. 
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9.2 Survey Method and Characteristics of the Sample Parent Firms 
On the basis of our firm-level survey described in Chapter 5, this chapter analyses 
parent firms that engage in assembling operations in the automobile, motorcycle, 
agricultural machinery (including diesel engines for agricultural machinery) and bicycle 
(including tricycle) subsectors. 
Based on several information sources explained in Chapter 5, 48 enterprises 
were identified as parent firms in the designated subsectors. Of the 48 manufacturers, 
20 firms were nominated as those suitable for our survey and they were contacted by 
telephone. Among the 20 firms, five did not accept our visit because of unwillingness, 
bankruptcy or internal management problems. Subsequently, our intensive interview 
with presidents, vice presidents or at least relevant directors was carried out with 15 
assembler firms (including one large-scale first-tier automotive component 
manufacturer) during 1999-2000.2 
Table 9 .2 demonstrates some of the basic characteristics of the sample parent 
firms in 1998. The automobile and motorcycle assembler firms accounted for almost 
half, and the agricultural machinery and bicycle manufacturers for the other half. 
Concerning investment nationality, one-third of the surveyed enterprises were 
unaffiliated Indonesian firms and the remaining were foreign affiliates. Nearly half of 
the firms had more than 1,000 workers. Roughly three-quarters of the surveyed 
manufacturers were located in Jakarta (and surrounding areas) and the rest were in 
Surabaya (including surrounding areas). Two-thirds of the sample assembler firms 
2 The performance of assembler firms was affected by the 1997-98 crisis. However, since this study was 
not designed to examine the impact of the economic crisis , it requested parent firms to consider the 
situation not only in the last 1-2 years but also in the last 5-10 years , when they responded to our interview questions on subcontracting issues. With regard to the impact of the crisis on manufacturing industry in Indonesia, see Thee (2000) and Chapters 4 and 5 of this study. 
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were established before 1979 and the remaining started operations in the l 980s and the 
1990s. 
Table 9.2 Profile of 15 Sample Assembler Firms in 1998 
I. Subsector 
1) automobile/motorcycle1) 
2) agricultural machinery 
3) bicycle 
2. Type of Investment (Investment Nationality) 
1) domestic investment 
2) foreign investment 
3. Size: Number of Workers 
1) - 299 
2) 300 - 499 
3) 500 - 999 
4) 1,000 -
4. Location 
1) Jaka..4:a (surrounding areas) 
2) Surabaya (surrounding areas) 
5. Year Established 
1) - 1979 
2) 1980 - 1989 
3) 1990 -
6. Number of Subcontracting Supplier Firms 
1) - 19 
2) 20 - 49 
3) 50 - 99 
4) 100 -
7. Market Share of Sample Firms (1999 )2) 
1) automobile 
2) motorcycle 
Notes: 1) This includes one large-scale automotive/motorcycle components producer. 
53% 
20% 
27% 
33% 
67% 
7% 
26% 
20% 
47% 
73% 
27% 
67% 
7% 
26% 
20% 
33 % 
33% 
14% 
77 % 
40% 
2) The market share of the sample assembler firms in the agricultural machinery and bicycle 
subsectors is not available. For the former subsector, our sample includes the first and third 
largest assembler firms in Indonesia, and for the latter subsector encompasses the first and 
fourth largest bicycle manufacturers . 
Sources: Based on author's interview survey during 1999-2000. The market share data for automobiles 
and for motorcycles are derived from GAIKINDO (Association of Indonesian Car 
Manufacturers) and PASMI (Association of Indonesian Motorcycle Assemblers and 
Manufacturers), respectively. 
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Nearly half of our sample parent firms had 50 or more supplier firms under 
subcontracting ties. The surveyed assembler firms in the automobile subsector 
occupied nearly 80 percent of the domestic market, whereas those in the motorcycle 
subsector accounted for 40 percent. For the agricultural machinery subsector, our 
sample includes the first and third largest assembler firms in Indonesia, and for the 
bicycle sector contains the first and fourth largest bicycle manufacturers. 
9.3 Motivations for Subcontracting Transactions with SMEs 
Table 9.3 explores the reasons for building subcontracting ties with small- and medium-
scale supplier firms. It shows the degree of expectation parent firms had of 
subcontracting business with local and foreign SMEs. Explanation of each motivation 
is illustrated in Table 9 .1. 
What kind of motivations induced principal firms to establish subcontracting 
linkages with local SMEs? Lower wages were rated at the highest average score of 
4.80 on a five-point Likert-type scale, where "5" represented the highest degree of 
expectation and "1" the lowest. The assembler firms perceived the lower level of 
wages as the most attractive feature that local subcontractors can provide. For example, 
a foreign-affiliated motorcycle assembler firm in Jakarta (Firm A07) with 73 supplier 
firms expected a reduction in production costs through subcontracting ties with lower-
wage local SMEs in order to survive fierce domestic and international competition. 
There are no statistically significant differences between the automobile and motorcycle 
subsectors and the agricultural machinery and bicycle subsectors , or between domestic 
investment and foreign investment. Hence, most of the sample LEs expected that local 
SMEs would pass on cost advantages based on lower wages . 
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Table 9.3 Motivations for Subcontracting Transactions with SMEs 
Subcontracting with 
LocalSMEs Foreign SMEs Comparison 
Mean Scores Differences between Groups Mean Scores Differences 
Motivations and Rank in Firm Categories and Rank between 
(I)r ) Rank Subsector 2) Investment 3) (II) !) Rank (I) and (II) 4 ) 
(s.d.) t-values t-values (s.d.) t-values 
1. Specialisation 4.60 2 0.20 0.00 4.53 3 1.00 
(0.51) (0.52) 
2. Shock Absorber 3.47 5 1.23 0.24 2.93 7 4.00 ** 
(0.74) (0.70) 
3. Lower Wages 4.80 1 1.44 1.50 3.00 6 10.31 ** 
(0.56) (0.65) 
4. Special Skills 3.33 7 1.64 0.81 4.93 I 5.87 ** 
(1.11) (0.26) 
5. Better Products 4.20 3 1.71 0.69 4.80 2 3.67 ** 
(0.77) (0.41) 
6. Lower Costs for 3.87 4 2.33 * 1.47 4.07 4 1.87 
Monitoring Workers (0.52) (-) (0.59) 
7. Lower Costs associated 3.47 5 1.03 2.28 * 3.67 5 1.15 
with Contracting (0.64) (-) (0.49) 
Number of Sample Firms 15 15 
Notes: 1) Figures in the upper row are the average of scores indicated by assembler firms' rating from 1 
(the lowest score as not at all important) to 5 (the highest score as very important). Figures in 
parentheses are standard deviation. (I) and (II) represent evaluation on local SMEs and on 
foreign-affiliated SMEs, respectively. 
2) Difference in mean scores given by assembler firms in the automobile and motorcycle 
sub sectors (AM) and by those in the agricultural machinery and bicycle subsectors (AB), which 
is indicated by t-values. ** = significant at the I level, * = significant at the 5 % level. When 
the difference is significant, ( +) = AB firms > AM firms, (-) = AB firms< AM firms. 
3) Difference in mean scores given by assembler firms of domestic investment (D) and by those of 
foreign investment (F), which is indicated by t-values. ** = significant at the 1 % level , * = 
significant at the 5 % level. When the difference is significant, ( +) = D firms > F firms, (-) = D 
firms < F firms. 
4) Difference in mean scores between evaluation on (I) local SMEs and on (II) foreign SMEs, 
which is indicated by t-values of paired t-test. ** = significant at the 1 level, * = significant at 
the 5 % level. 
Source: Based on author's interview survey during 1999-2000. 
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Specialisation was the second most important motivation for subcontracting 
transactions , with an average rating of 4.60. Assembler firms expected vertical inter-
firm linkages to promote a division of labour. For instance, Firm A08, a foreign-
affiliated motorcycle producer in Jakarta with 99 vendor firms , intends to concentrate 
on assembling activities by contracting out other production processes to supplier firms. 
The parent firms in our sample expect that subcontracting allows them to allocate their 
capital and labour to the main business activities such as assembling and marketing, in 
order to optimise the use of resources. 
Ensuring better products was also rated high as a reason for subcontracting, with 
an average score of 4.20. This indicates that, by establishing close subcontracting 
relationships with local SMEs, parent firms want to ensure that supplied products meet 
their technical, quality and delivery requirements. Through subcontracting linkages, 
assembler firms have given local SMEs clear and detailed information on how to 
produce parts and components. Because local SMEs do not usually have sufficient 
technical and other necessary knowledge, it seems difficult to procure satisfying 
products and services from them in spot-base transactions or without any technical 
guidance through close relationships. The expectations are not significantly different 
according to groups in firm categories of subsector and nationality of investment. 
Reduction in costs for monitoring labour was also rated high, with a mean score 
of 3.87. If assembler firms adopt an in-house production system, they need to hire a 
larger number of workers, which may result in an increase in the cost of monitoring the 
work effort of employees. Subcontracting arrangements enable principal firms to save 
on such costs. The sample assembler firms in the automobile and motorcycle 
subsectors expected that such costs would be significantly lower than firms in the 
agricultural machinery and bicycle subsectors. Producers in the former subsector have 
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usually much longer and more complicated production processes, and as a consequence, 
they need to hire relatively more employees. From that perspective, their expectations 
of reducing the cost of monitoring through subcontracting are higher. 
Firms also expected subcontracting to lead to lower costs associated with 
contracting, with an average score of 3.47. The t-tests suggest that foreign-affiliated 
manufacturers had greater expectations of the opportunity to reduce transaction costs of 
collecting information, coping with uncertainties and risks, and preparing and enforcing 
contracts than unaffiliated Indonesian assembler firms. 
Similar to business costs, the expected role of subcontracting as shock absorber 
was rated at an average score of 3.47. The differences between groups of firm 
categories by subsector and investment nationality are small. Therefore, all parent 
firms expected local subcontractors to enable them to cushion economic fluctuations. 
The special skills that local metal working and machinery firms may offer 
assembler firms were ranked the lowest, with an average score of 3.33. This outcome 
was roughly the same according to subsector and investment categories. For example, 
Firm A08, which is a motorcycle assembler firm, regarded local SMEs as producers of 
simple parts, but saw foreign-affiliated counterparts as producers of complicated 
components. The low ranking may reflect the fact or perception that the local SME 
sector has insufficient technical capabilities. 
The expectations parent firms had of foreign-affiliated SMEs are different from 
those of local SMEs, as Table 9.3 shows. Special skills were mentioned as the most 
important inducement to establish inter-firm linkages with foreign-affiliated SMEs. An 
average score of 4.93 shows that parent firms strongly desire to utilise the special 
technical skills and know-how foreign-affiliated supplier firms can offer. The mean 
scores of expectations regarding technological expertise were statistically different at 
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the 1 percent level between subcontracting transactions with local SMEs and with 
foreign-affiliated SMEs. 
Better products were rated in second place with an average score of 4.80. Parent 
firms clearly expected subcontracting with foreign SMEs to yield better products and 
services. The mean scores of expectations of local SMEs and foreign-affiliated SMEs 
were significantly different. Firm S63, a Japanese-affiliated SME in Jakarta engaged in 
press stamping for the automotive, motorcycle and electrical parts, mentioned that the 
majority of its resources have been allocated to produce products of long-term contracts 
and that, as a consequence, it is not easy to produce output with high quality and 
sufficient quantity on time on the basis of spot-base orders. Foreign subcontractors 
often need these long-term work arrangements to guarantee quality, quantity and 
delivery timing of products. In this sense, the surveyed assembler firms expected 
foreign-affiliated SMEs through subcontracting to supply good products and services. 
Specialisation, lower costs for monitoring workers and lower costs associated 
with contracting were rated highly, with average scores of 4.53, 4.07 and 3.67, 
respectively. These ratings and the ranking of subcontracting transactions with foreign-
affiliated SMEs are not very different from those with local SMEs. 
In contrast, lower wages and shock absorbers were rated not high, with average 
scores of 3.00 and 2.93, respectively. These expectations for foreign-affiliated SMEs 
are significantly lower than for local SMEs. This is because wage levels of foreign-
affiliated SMEs are higher than their local counterparts. 3 
3 According to BPS ' unpublished data of Large and Medium Manufacturing Statistics , the average wage 
rate of SMEs with 20-299 workers classified as PMA (foreign-affiliated firms ) was 2.9 times as high as 
that of SMEs classified as non-PMA (local firms) in 1996. This wage difference between local SMEs 
and foreign-affiliated SMEs is a consequence of some factors . One of the main reasons is the shortage of 
skilled workers compared with unskilled workers (Oshima 1987: 66). Local SMEs without sufficient 
financial resources generally cannot employ skilled workers, while foreign-affiliated SMEs can do this in 
a relative sense by paying higher wages. This dual labour market structure can be explained by an 
efficiency-wage theory of the labour market (Akerlof 1984: 79). Wages at market clearing are observed 
in the local SME sector and those in excess of market clearing are in the foreign-affiliated SME sector. 
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In general terms, the items listed in Table 9.3 are the most important motivations 
for contracting out part of the production processes to small-medium supplier firms. 
Local SMEs were expected to deliver lower wages but not to draw on special skills. On 
the other hand, foreign-affiliated SMEs were not primarily expected to provide lower 
wages and perform a shock absorber function but to deliver benefits associated with 
technological expertise and higher-_quality products. 
9.4 Types of Subcontracting Linkages with SMEs 
As explained in Chapter 2, Lall's study (1980: 208-9, 213-22) presented ten types of 
inter-firm linkages between two truck assembler firms and their parts suppliers in India. 
By modifying Lall's classification, this chapter identified 14 categories of linkages 
provided by assembler firms to their supplier firms in Indonesia (see Table 9.1) . 
Table 9.4 shows the number of the sample parent firms which have extended 
each type of linkage to their local and foreign-affiliated supplier firms under 
subcontracting relationships. Technical specifications have been provided by all 
sample parent firms. More than 90 percent of principal firms provided SMEs with 
technical linkages through support in the areas of QC and production technology. Most 
of the respondents offered technological support to SMEs particularly in the 
introduction of new models and the emergence of technical problems. This corresponds 
with the results of Chapter 8, in which around 90 percent and 80 percent of the sample 
SMEs mentioned receiving QC guidance and production technology assistance, 
respectively, from their parent firms through subcontracting relationships. 
As indicated in the efficiency-wage hypothesis, by paying higher wages or wages in excess of market 
clearing, foreign-affiliated SMEs can obtain benefits such as: 1) a larger opportunity to hire skilled 
workers; 2) the reduction of shirking by employees due to a higher cost of job loss; 3) lower turnover; 
and 4) improved morale (Yellen 1984: 200). 
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Table 9 .4 Types of Subcontracting Linkages with Local and Foreign-affiliated SMEs 
No. of Finns and Rank 
Linkage Types No. of Finns I ) Rank 
(%) 
1. Support of Establishment 5 12 
(33.3) 
2. Stable Market 12 4 
(80.0) 
3. Technical Specifications 15 1 
(100) 
4. Lending of Tools 11 5 
(73.3 ) 
5. Advice on Machine ry 7 8 
(46.7) 
6. Provision of Used Machinery 6 10 
(40.0) 
7. QC Support 14 2 
(93.3) 
8. Production Technology 14 2 
Support (93.3) 
9. Joint Design 5 12 
(33.3 ) 
10. Managerial Support 7 8 
( 46.7) 
11. Provision of Inputs 1 1 5 
(73.3 ) 
12. Financing Support 5 12 
(Provision of Credit/Guarantee) (33.3) 
13. Price Negotiations 9 7 
(60.0) 
14. Marke t Infonnation 6 10 
(40.0) 
Number of Sample Firms 15 
Differences between Groups in Finn Categories 
Subsector 2) 
p-values 
0.28 
0.08 
0.03 * 
(-) 
1.00 
0.61 
0.47 
0.47 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
0.28 
0.00 ** 
(-) 
0.12 
Investment 3l 
p-values 
0.60 
0.02 * 
(-) 
0.08 
1.00 
0.58 
0.33 
0.33 
0.60 
1.00 
0.56 
0.60 
0.00 ** 
(-) 
0.58 
Notes: 1) Figures in the upper row indicate the number of assembler firms which provide local and/or 
foreign-affiliated SMEs with each subcontracting linkage. Figures in parentheses are the share 
of firms with each linkage in the total sample firms. 
2) Difference in frequency ratios between assembler firms in the automobile and motorcycle 
subsectors (At\1) and the agricultural machinery and bicycle subsectors (AB ), which is 
indicated by p-values of Fisher's exact test. ** = significant at the 1 % level, * = significant at 
the 5 % level. When the difference is significant, ( +) = AB firms > AM firms , (-) = AB firms < 
A!\1 firms . 
3) Difference in frequency ratios between assembler firms of domestic investment (D) and foreign 
investment (F) , which is indicated by p-values of Fisher's exact test. ** = significant at the 1 % 
level , * = significant at the 5 % level. When the difference is significant, ( +) = D firms > F 
firms , (-) = D firms< F firms . 
Source: Based on author's interview survey during 1999-2000. 
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For example, Firm A05, a foreign-affiliated automobile assembler firm in 
Jakarta, has continuously assessed the performance of subcontractors on product quality 
and delivery timing. It organised monthly meetings with many of its 105 supplier firms 
and, based on evaluations from the preceding month, requested them to improve 
product quality and delivery problems where necessary. Firm A05 sent QC staff 
members to supplier firms which consistently failed to overcome difficulties and gave 
them guidance in product quality, production technology and delivery timing. Firm 
A03, a large automobile manufacturer in Indonesia located in Jakarta, has been very 
interested in improving the technological capabilities of their parts and components 
supplier firms. 4 Before 1998, Firm A03 had 15 quality improvement (Kaizen) staff 
members in its purchasing division, who were fully responsible for technical assistance 
to vendor firms. 5 It selected a manageable number of its supplier firms and supported 
these intensively for a certain period in enhancing quality management and production 
technology, by dispatching its Kaizen staff to the individual factory sites. The selected 
vendor firms were encouraged to upgrade their QC activities and were to participate in 
an annual QC competition organised by Firm A03. 
Firm All with 42 parts and components supplier firms, a foreign affiliate 
producing diesel engines for agricultural machinery in Jakarta, also acknowledged the 
need for technical support, particularly in the QC area. It frequently sent employees of 
its purchasing division to local supplier firms. Since local vendor firms did not usually 
consult Firm All about technical problems, it visited them regularly in order to 
familiarise itself with the structural problems of supplier firms and gave them QC and 
technical guidance to solve such issues. An Indonesian bicycle assembler in Surabaya 
4 For the effective transfer of technology to supplier firms, many of the automobile and motorcycle 
assembler firms, including Firm A03, have organised vendor firms in individual cooperation groups as 
institutional devices to provide them with technical support. 
5 In 1998, Firm A03 had to suspend this support program due to the impact of the economic crisis. 
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(Firm Al 2) with around 30 supplier firms stressed the importance of "working together 
with vendor firms" (the firm's motto). It seeks to improve their product quality and 
delivery time by arranging a long-term stay of QC staff at workshops. Similarly, the 
largest bicycle manufacturer in Indonesia (Firm Al 3), which is a non-affiliated 
Indonesian entity located in Surabaya, has given vendor firms technical support through 
the dispatch of engineers. However, Firm Al 3 pointed out that technical support to 
supplier firms would not necessarily generate a successful outcome. Its experience was 
that, after technical assistance, some of them did not improve performance, while others 
moved to different assembler firms and served them in an opportunistic way. 
Advice on layout and selection of production machinery has been offered by 
seven of the sample manufacturers to subcontracting SMEs. Joint design and joint 
product development have not been so common. Only five firms have given SMEs 
opportunities for joint design and development under subcontracting ties. Generally, 
cooperation like joint design requires both assembler firms and supplier firms to have 
sufficient technological capabilities. Insufficient technological levels of LEs and/or 
' 
SMEs are likely to lead to infrequent efforts at joint design and development activities.6 
Nearly half of the large-scale assembler firms have transferred managerial 
technology to small-medium supplier firms. This percentage is close to the result of 
Chapter 8, where 55 percent of SMEs received management assistance from parent 
firms through subcontracting linkages. For example, Firm A08, a major foreign-
affiliated motorcycle manufacturer, noticed that supplier firms, especially local SMEs, 
were not able to take full advantage of their production facilities and employees mainly 
because of insufficient management capabilities. For this reason, Firm A08 started a 
6 Many of the foreign-affiliated assembler firms in our sample admitted that they are usually required to 
have permission from headquarters for new design or development of parts and components. In addition 
to insufficient technological capabilities of assembler firms and supplier firms, this organisational 
constraint is one of the reasons why joint design and development are infrequent. 
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plant-tour-type study program to let supplier firms exchange ideas on how to improve 
their management capabilities, as already described in Chapters 6 and 8. Firm A03, a 
large auto manufacturer in Indonesia, has a specific program for production 
management. It offered two types of seminars to improve managerial capabilities for 
production: one for the top management of vendor companies; and the other for 
managers responsible for production lines at factories. 
According to Table 9 .4, 80 percent of our sample parent firms have provided 
supplier firms with stable markets. For instance, Firm A08, a motorcycle assembler 
firm, has usually given supplier firms a one-year order forecast, which helps stabilise 
sales and assists firms in preparing long-term marketing strategies. The results of the 
Fisher's exact test in the last column indicate that foreign-affiliated assembler firms 
tend to offer subcontractors better marketing support than their domestic counterparts in 
terms of the provision of stable orders. The likely reason is that manufacturers in the 
former group generally have a larger market size and greater corporate strength than 
those in the latter group. Market information about new domestic and export markets 
has also been offered to small and medium supplier firms by 40 percent of parent firms. 
More than 70 percent of the assembler firms have provided small-medium parts 
supplier firms with raw materials, intermediate goods and tools (e.g., dies and molds) 
through subcontracting arrangements. For example, Firm A05, a foreign affiliate in the 
automobile subsector, stated that small-medium supplier firms in this field have faced 
difficulties in procuring necessary input materials due to the weaknesses of Indonesia's 
heavy and chemical industries, which result partly in the underdevelopment of the 
metalworking and machinery SME sector. Recognising the difficult situation, Firm 
A05 has provided raw materials to small and medium supplier firms. In the same way, 
Firm A04, which is a foreign-affiliated automobile assembler firm in Jakarta and has 
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over a hundred vendor firms , explained that, since dies and molds are technologically 
weak in Indonesia, it has had to lend precision tools to vendor firms engaged in press 
stamping, die-casting, plastic injection and so on. 
The share of the assembler firms that have supplied tools to SMEs in the total 
sample is statistically different between manufacturers in the automobile and 
motorcycle subsectors and those in the agricultural machinery and bicycle subsectors. 
The difference may reflect the characteristics of the subsectors. Compared with the 
agricultural machinery and bicycle subsectors, the automobile and motorcycle 
subsectors tend to require supplier firms to produce higher quality parts and 
components, which often need very precise and more expensive tools. 
Under subcontracting ties , 33 percent and 40 percent of the sample assembler 
firms have furnished SMEs with support related to the establishment of firms and the 
provision of second-hand machinery and equipment, respectively . Similarly, only one-
third of the principal firms have offered small-medium supplier firms support in the 
form of credit and financial guarantees. For instance, Firm AOJ is a foreign-affiliated 
automobile manufacturer in Jakarta, which was established in 1970 and owns more than 
80 supplier firms. It is one of a few enterprises in our sample that has assisted in the 
establishment of new vendor firms by guaranteeing a certain amount of orders and 
lending the initial investment capital. It has provided supplier firms with credit and 
financial guarantees. Firm Al 0, a non-affiliated assembler firm in the agricultural 
subsector, facilitated the establishment of new SMEs by former employees by 
guaranteeing orders for a certain period. 
Nine assembler firms gave small and medium supplier firms chances to 
negotiate the prices of products and processing services. The statistical tests indicate 
that the proportion of parent firms that opened price negotiations for SMEs was 
significantly different at the 1 percent level between groups by subsector and 
investment nationality. Large-scale assembler firms in the automobile and motorcycle 
subsectors and those with foreign investment tend to give small and medium supplier 
firms more opportunities to negotiate the prices of products, compared to their 
counterparts in the agricultural machinery and bicycle subsectors and those with 
domestic investment. The assembler firms in the former group have generally adopted 
the negotiated cost-plus fee methoq or similar schemes. Those in the latter group do 
not tend to open up the process of price setting to supplier firms. This tendency is 
consistent with the responses from SMEs in Chapter 8. 
Among the financial linkages described above, price negotiations and provision 
of input materials and tools are popular forms of assistance by assembler firms for 
SMEs. In contrast, the provision of credit and guarantees, that of used machinery, and 
assistance in establishing enterprises are not often extended to small-medium supplier 
firms. This implies that subcontracting cooperation provides SMEs to some extent with 
working capital. Investment capital may also be made available, but not to a sufficient 
degree. 
This section has shown that, among subcontracting linkages, technological and 
marketing relations are generally more popular than financial ones. These findings 
confirm those in Chapter 8. 
9.5 Costs of and Benefits from Subcontracting Transactions with 
SMEs 
The first part in this section investigates burdens on principal firms in conducting 
subcontracting business with small-medium metalworking and machinery firms. The 
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second part explores several kinds of realised benefits to parent firms generated by 
subcontracting transactions with SMEs. After looking into costs and revealed benefits 
separately, the last section evaluates cost-benefit balance of subcontracting transactions 
with SMEs. Each of the cost and benefit items is explained in Table 9.1. 
9.5.1 Costs of Subcontracting Transactions with SMEs 
Table 9 .5 lists the costs that principal firms associate with subcontracting with local 
SMEs, together with the differences of the burdens between groups by categories of 
parent firms. 
Unstable delivery timing was rated at the highest average score of 4.87. 
Regardless of subsector and investment origin, the large-scale parent firms perceived 
unreliable delivery time of local SMEs as the heaviest burden in conducting 
subcontracting transactions. For instance, Finn A05, an auto manufacturer, has been 
aware of losses due to unstable delivery timing of local SMEs and has introduced a 
monthly evaluation of delivery time as well as product quality. Similarly, Firm A03 in 
the automobile subsector considers imprecise delivery time and the resulting shortage 
· or excessive stock of intermediate inputs as the main factor for high product costs. By 
introducing the well-known "just-in-time system," Firm A03 has attempted to diffuse 
this technique to supplier firms, in particular local SMEs, and to improve their 
management system of delivery timing. 
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Table 9 .5 Costs of Subcontracting Transactions with SMEs 
Subcontracting with 
LocalSMEs Foreign SMEs Comparison 
Mean Scores Differences between Groups Mean Scores Differences 
Costs and Rank in Firm Categories and Rank between 
(l)l ) Rank Subsector 2) Investment 3l (II) 1) Rank (I) and (II)4) 
(s.d.) t-values t-values (s.d.) t -values 
1. Initial Findings of 4.07 5 0.45 0.60 2.53 6 7.99 ** 
SMEs (0.59) (0.52) 
2. Slow Response 3.33 7 1.51 2.08 2.27 7 5.17 ** 
(0.49) (0.46) 
3. Low Quality 4.20 2 1.71 4.16 ** 3.27 3 6.09 ** 
(0.77) (-) (0.70) 
4. Low Technology 4.00 6 1.64 3.87 ** 3.13 4 3.67 ** 
(1.00) (-) (0.83) 
5. High Prices 3.33 7 0.37 0.39 4.53 1 4.58 ** 
(0.90) (0.52) 
6. Unstable Delivery 4.87 1 0.10 0.51 3.53 2 5.74 ** 
Timing (0.35) (0.92) 
7. Monitoring SMEs 4.13 3 0.88 0.64 2.60 5 5.28 ** 
(1.13) (0.83) 
8. Small Production 2.73 9 3.85 ** 3.15 ** 1.87 9 9.54 ** 
Capacity (0.59) (-) (-) (0.64) 
9. Technical and Other 4.13 3 2.05 2.31 2.27 7 8.67 ** 
Assistance (1.06) (0.70) 
Number of Sample Firms 15 15 
Notes: 1) Figures in the upper row are the average of scores indicated by assembler firms' rating from I 
(the lowest score as very small) to 5 (the highest score as very large). Figures in parentheses 
are standard deviation. (I) and (II) represent evaluation on local SMEs and on foreign-affiliated 
SMEs, respectively. 
2) Difference in mean scores given by assembler firms in the automobile and motorcycle 
sub sectors (AM) and by those in the agricultural machinery and bicycle sub sectors (AB), which 
is indicated by t-values. ** = significant at the 1 level, * = significant at the 5 % level. When 
the difference is significant, ( +) = AB firms > AM firms, (-) = AB firms < AM firms. 
3) Difference in mean scores given by assembler firms of domestic investment (D) and by those of 
foreign investment (F), which is indicated by t-values. ** = significant at the I % level, * = 
significant at the 5 % level. When the difference is significant, ( +) = D firms > F firms, (-) = D 
firms < F firms. 
4) Difference in mean scores between evaluation on (I) local SMEs and on (II) foreign SMEs, 
which is indicated by t-values of paired t-test. ** = significant at the I level , * = significant at 
the 5 % level. 
Source: Based on author's interview survey during 1999-2000. 
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Lower quality of products and processing services supplied by local 
metalworking and machinery SMEs was ranked the second highest, with an average 
score of 4.20. The assembler firms suffered from low quality of supplied parts and 
components. The firms also cited low production technology of local supplier firms as 
a substantial ' cost factor associated with inter-firm linkages , with a rating of 4.00 on 
average. The t-tests show that foreign-affiliated parent firms perceived low quality and 
insufficient technology as more serious problems than their domestic counterparts . 
Because of the higher quality of their final products and their experience outside 
Indonesia, foreign-affiliated manufacturers are more quality- and technology-conscious 
than their non-affiliated counterparts. 
The cost of monitoring local supplier firms was significant, with a mean score of 
4.13. Considering great concerns about unstable delivery timing, low quality and low 
technology, LEs in our sample have had to supervise their local supplier firms closely. 
For example, Finn A08, a motorcycle assembler firm, monitors and evaluates vendor 
firms regularly on quality control , production control, production engineering, 
management control, purchasing control, and labour control. In this way, Finn A08 has 
to regularly allocate a considerable amount of money, time and human resources to 
monitoring in order to prevent costs caused by unreliable delivery time, unsatisfactory 
quality and insufficient technology. 
The sample manufacturers assigned a high average score of 4.13 to technical and 
other related assistance to local supplier firms. If LEs wish to make vertical inter-firm 
relations v orkable, they are required to enable local SMEs to address problems 
associated with unstable delivery timing, low quality and low technology through 
technical assistance. 
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The cost of searching for and finding suitable local SMEs was rated an average 
score of 4.07. Even large-scale assembler firms do not usually have sufficient data and 
information on potential local supplier firms. For example, Firm A08, a foreign-
affiliated motorcycle assembler firm, claimed that since there is limited information on 
competent local SMEs in Indonesia, the firm had to take substantial man-hours to seek 
them out. Even after finding potential local producers, Firm A08 indicated that it still 
needs to carefully collect information that confirms product quality, production 
facilities and management capabilities. 
High prices of products and services and slow response from local supplier firms 
were rated at modest average scores of 3.33. Local SMEs can offer LEs much lower 
prices of products and services than their foreign-affiliated counterparts. Assembler 
firms did not regard price levels as very serious obstacles to subcontracting business 
with local vendor firms. 
Small production capacity was ranked the lowest, with a mean score of 2. 73. 
Compared to other costs listed 'in Table 9 .5, the low production capacity of local SMEs 
was regarded as less obstructive to the successful implementation of subcontracting 
transactions. This relatively low rating may have been affected by the sharp decrease in 
demand for products in the subsectors due to the recent economic crisis. If our field 
research had been carried out in the high economic growth period, the result is likely to 
have been different. Because of contracted demand during the crisis period, parent 
firms did not perceive low production capacity of SMEs as a serious problem. 
Differences in average scores of small capacity were statistically significant at the 1 
percent level according to subsector and investment nationality. The assembler firms in 
the automobile and motorcycle subsectors and those with foreign investment have been 
more aware of difficulties due to the low capacity of local SMEs than their counterparts 
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1n the agricultural machinery and bicycle subsectors and those with domestic 
investment, reflecting differences in order volume between the two manufacturer 
groups. Since LEs in the former group generally place a larger order, they tend to 
regard the small capacity of SMEs as a more apparent problem than those in the latter 
group. 
The ranking and degree of costs given by our sample parent firms were different 
between subcontracting transactions with local SMEs and with foreign-affiliated SMEs. 
Significantly different were the high prices of products and services. In contrast to 
local SMEs, the parts and components from foreign-affiliated supplier firms were 
deemed relatively expensive, with an average score of 4.53. The difference was 
statistically significant at the 1 percent level. Many of the assembler firms pointed out 
that quality, technology and delivery timing of foreign-affiliated supplier firms were 
acceptable, but that the prices of their products were high. 
Unlike in the case of local SMEs, technical and other necessary assistance to 
foreign-affiliated SMEs was ranked the second lowest, with a mean score of 2.27. The 
difference was statistically significant at the 1 percent level. This seems reasonable, 
because better quality, technology and delivery timing of foreign-affiliated supplier 
firms do not require parent firms to allocate much time and costs to technical and other 
support. 
The ranking of other listed variables for foreign-affiliated SMEs was not much 
different from that for local SMEs. However, the average scores of such variables for 
the latter group were significantly higher than for the former group. This indicates that, 
if large-scale principal firms wish to exploit lower price levels of parts and components 
offered by local SMEs, they have to bear higher levels of other costs, compared to 
foreign-affiliated SMEs. 
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9.5.2 Benefits from Subcontracting Transactions with SMEs 
The reasons why parent firms wished to exploit subcontracting business with SMEs 
were investigated in Section 3. This section analyses realised benefits that parent firms 
have gained from subcontracting ~angements with SMEs. Table 9.6 indicates the 
degree of benefits that the surveyed assembler firms obtained from vertical inter-firm 
relations with local SMEs and foreign-affiliated SMEs. It also presents differences in 
the mean scores between groups in the categories of parent firms and between local 
SMEs and foreign-affiliated SMEs. 
The most valuable benefit from subcontracting ties with local metalworking and 
machinery SMEs was lower wages, which were rated at a mean score of 4.53. The 
average score and the ranking are similar to those of the motivations in Table 9.3. It is 
also consistent with the observation in Table 9 .5, where price levels of parts and 
components were not a serious problem in conducting subcontracting transactions with 
local, SMEs. LEs obtained significant benefits of lower wages provided by local 
supplier firms . For example, Firm A07 explained that cost advantages resulting from 
lower wage rates based on economies of small-scale production was one of the most 
important reasons for price competition in the domestic and international motorcycle 
market. 
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Table 9.6 Revealed Benefits from Subcontracting Transactions with SMEs 
Subcontracting with 
LocalSMEs Foreign SMEs Comparison 
Mean Scores Differences between Groups Mean Scores Differences 
Revealed Bene.fits and Rank in Finn Categories and Rank between 
(I) i) Rank Subsector 2) Investment 3) (II)1 ) Rank (I) and (II)4) 
(s.d.) t-values t-values (s.d.) t-values 
1. Specialisation 4.13 2 1.07 0.19 4.33 3 1.38 
(0.92) (0.72) 
2. Shock Absorber 3.87 4 0.74 1.49 3.67 5 0.76 
(0.64) (0.62) 
3. Lower Wages 4.53 1 1.46 0.56 3.47 7 5 .17 ** 
(0.64) (0.74) 
4. Special Skills 2.53 7 1.23 0.48 4.40 2 8.67 ** 
(0.74) (0.51) 
5. Better Products 4.00 ,.., 1.72 0.95 4.60 1 2.81 ** .) 
(0.93) (0.51) 
6. Lower Costs for 3.67 5 1.88 0.36 3.93 4 1.74 
Monitoring Workers (0.49) (0.70) 
7. Lower Costs associated 3.00 6 2.18 * 1.03 3.53 6 2.78 * 
with Contracting (0.53) (-) (0.52) 
Number of Sample Firms 15 15 
Notes: 1) Figures in the upper row are the average of scores indicated by assembler firms' rating from 1 (the lowest score as not at all beneficial) to 5 (the highest score as very beneficial). Figures in 
parentheses are standard deviation . (I) and (II) represent evaluation on local SMEs and on 
foreign-affiliated SMEs, respectively. 
2) Difference in mean scores given by assembler firms in the automobile and motorcycle 
subsectors (AM) and by those in the agricultural machinery and bicycle subsectors (AB), which 
is indicated by t-values. ** = significant at the 1 level, * = significant at the 5 % level. When 
the difference is significant, ( +) = AB firms> Al\1 firms, (-) = AB firms < Al\1 firms. 
3) Difference in mean scores given by assembler firms of domestic investment (D) and by those of 
foreign investment (F), which is indicated by t-values. ** = significant at the 1 % level, * = 
significant at the 5 % level. When the difference is significant, ( +) = D firms > F firms , (-) = D 
firms< F firms. 
4) Difference in mean scores between evaluation on (I) local SMEs and on (II) foreign SMEs, 
which is indicated by t-values of paired t-test. ** = significant at the 1 level, * = significant at 
the 5 % level. 
Source: Based on author's interview survey during 1999-2000. 
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Specialisation achieved an average rating of 4.13. Subcontracting business with 
local SMEs allowed principal firms to specialise in the assembling process and improve 
production efficiency. For instance, Firm A06, a foreign-affiliated manufacturer 
producing automotive components such as air-conditioners, radiators, alternators and 
starters, pointed out that the production processes of local SMEs were generally in the 
areas of simple and labour-intensiv~ technologies, where large-scale parent firms would 
not have significant advantages. Thus, Firm A06 has sought to concentrate on 
specialised processes through the contracting out of processes with little advantages to 
local vendor firms. It achieved a more efficient utilisation of its production factors. 
Ensuring better products was given an average score of 4.00. Subcontracting 
linkages made it possible for manufacturers to purchase better parts and components 
from local supplier firms. For instance, Firm A04 stated that automobile manufacturers 
could not easily procure good products and services in Indonesia without close 
relationships and mutual understanding between buyers and local sellers. It maintained 
that, after the establishment of subcontracting linkages, it was able to purchase reliable 
- parts and components from local vendor firms. In addition, Firm Al 2 reported that 
even a bicycle assembler firm had to establish close subcontracting linkages if it 
intended to buy products and services with a certain minimum quality from local SMEs. 
The role of shock absorber was given a mean score of 3.87. Sample parent firms 
regarded local supplier firms as shock absorbers, which allowed them to avoid short or 
idle capacity of workers and production facilities during periods of economic upturn, 
respectively downturn. All of the surveyed assembler firms admitted that they were 
able to respond flexibly to the downturn in demand during the 1997-98 economic crisis 
period by reducing orders to their local supplier firms. 
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In line with expectations in Table 9.3 , subcontracting linkages enabled sample 
LEs to reduce the cost of supervising hired employees. A mean score of 3 .67 indicates 
gains of lower costs for monitoring own workers. Consistent with our theoretical 
framework in Chapter 2, all of the sample manufacturers have struggled to improve 
work morale and discipline, for instance, by providing incentives including promotions 
and bonuses. Subcontracting arrangements allow them to reduce the number of their 
own workers. They are an effective way to save costs for supervising directly hired 
employees. 
The parent firms assigned a moderate average score of 3.00 to lower costs 
associated with contracting. For example, Firm A08, a foreign-affiliated motorcycle 
manufacturer, indicated that, compared to spot-based transactions, subcontracting could 
reduce the costs of collecting information on potential supplier firms, coping with 
uncertainties and risks , preparing contracts, enforcing contracts and following up 
contracts. Statistical tests show that assembler firms in the automobile and motorcycle 
subsectors drew more benefit from the reduction of transaction costs than those in the 
agricultural machinery and bicycle subsectors. The explanation is that the former group 
generally has a much greater number of supplier firms involved, handles more parts and 
components under more complicated contracts, and is more engaged in strict 
enforcement of contracts than the latter group. 
The benefits of special skills that local vendor firms offered were ranked the 
lowest, with an average score of 2.53. Local SMEs do not usually have advanced skills 
to provide large-scale principal firms with technical expertise through subcontracting. 
For instance, Firm A08 maintained that simple parts and easy processes would often be 
contracted out to local SMEs, but complicated components and difficult processing to 
foreign-affiliated SMEs. 
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The most remarkable benefit from subcontracting linkages with foreign-
affiliated SMEs was to ensure better products. With a rate of 4.60, this was ranked the 
highest. This outcome is statistically different from local SMEs. As explained in the 
previous section, foreign-affiliated SMEs are generally willing to make a longer-term 
allocation of their resources in order to supply reliable parts and components. 
With an average score of 4.40, special skills were ranked the second highest. 
This is in contrast to the lowest ranking in the case of local SMEs. The difference was 
statistically significant, which implies that both categories of SMEs have different 
levels of technological capabilities. 
Lower wages were rated the lowest, with a mean score of 3.47, lower than for 
local SMEs. The difference between both categories of SMEs was statistically 
significant at the 1 percent level. This is consistent with the observation in the previous 
subsection that the parts and components from foreign-affiliated supplier firms are 
regarded as relatively expensive. 
The ranking of other variables was not so different between foreign-affiliated 
SMEs and local SMEs. Average scores of benefits were not statistically different, 
except for lower costs associated with contracting. 
Table 9 .6 indicates that subcontracting business with local SMEs provides large-
scale parent firms with benefits of lower wages and shock absorption. Subcontracting 
relationships with foreign-affiliated SMEs offer LEs benefits of special skills and better 
products. 
In Table 9.7, factor analysis is used to group the above benefits from 
subcontracting transactions with local SMEs into three major factors. The three 
extracted factors explain 80 percent of the total variance. The first factor, 
Specialisation and Lower Transaction Costs , accounts for 43 percent of the variance 
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and consists of the first three variables in the table: specialisation ( with a factor loading 
of 0.86), lower costs for monitoring workers (0.82), and lower costs associated with 
contracting (0.75). The second factor, Economies of Small-scale Production, explains 
21 percent of the variance and is made up of two variables: shock absorber (0.93); and 
lower wages (0.78), which are the main revealed benefits specific to local supplier firms. 
The third factor, Quality and Skills, accounts for 16 percent of the variance and 
comprises two variables of special skills (0.93) and better products (0.70). 
Table 9.7 Matrix of Factor Loadings: Revealed Benefits from Subcontracting 
Transactions with Local SMEs 
Revealed Benefit Variables 
Factor 1 
Specialisation 
and 
Lower Transaction Costs 
1. Specialisation 0.86 
2. Lower Costs for Monitoring Workers 0.82 
3. Lower Costs associated with Contracting 0.75 
4. Shock Absorber 
5. Lower Wages 
6. Special Skills 
7. Better Products 0.61 
Eigen Value 2.99 
Percentage of Variance Explained (%) 42.7 
Cumulative Percentage (%) 42.7 
Number of Sample Firms= 15 
Factor 2 
Economies of 
Small-scale 
Production 
0.93 
0.78 
1.48 
21.2 
63.9 
Note: Loading values are not listed if they are smaller than 0.40. 
Source: Based on author's interview survey during 1999-2000. 
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Factor 3 
Quality 
and 
Skills 
0.93 
0.70 
1.13 
16.2 
80.1 
Table 9.8 Matrix of Factor Loadings: Revealed Benefits from Subcontracting 
Transactions with Foreign-affiliated SMEs 
Factor 1 Factor 2 
High Skills with High Quality 
Revealed Benefit Variables Economies of Small-scale with 
Factor 3 
Specialisation 
and Lower 
Production Less Internal Supervision Transaction Costs 
1. Special Skills 
2. Shock Absorber 
3. Lower Wages 
4. Better Products 
5. Lower Costs for Monitoring Workers 
0.92 
0.87 
0.64 
6. Lower Costs associated with Contracting 
7. Specialisation 
Eigen Value 2. 77 
Percentage of Variance Explained (%) 39.6 
Cumulative Percentage(%) 39.6 
Number of Sample Firms= 15 
Note: Loading values are not listed if they are smaller than 0.40. 
Source: Based on author's interview survey during 1999-2000. 
0.55 
0.84 
0.82 
1.93 
27.5 
67.1 
0.93 
0.86 
1.05 
15.0 
82.1 
Table 9 .8 also uses factor analysis to extract three principal beneficial factors 
from subcontracting ties with foreign-affiliated SMEs. The three factors account for 82 
percent of the total variance. The first factor, High Skills with Economies of Small-
scale Production, explains 40 percent of the variance and consists of the variables: 
special skills (0.92); shock absorber (0.87); and lower wages (0.64). The second factor, 
High Quality with Less Internal Supervision, accounts for 28 percent of the total 
variance and comprises two variables: better products (0.84); and lower costs of 
monitoring workers (0.82). The last factor, Specialisation and Lower Transaction 
Costs , explains 15 percent of the variance. It includes two variables : lower costs 
associated with contracting (0 .93) and specialisation (0.86). 
346 
9.5.3 Cost-Benefit Balance of Subcontracting Transactions with SMEs 
Table 9.9 contains a rough evaluation of the cost-benefit balance of subcontracting 
transactions with SMEs. The parent firms rated the cost-benefit of subcontracting with 
local SMEs in the long-term at 3.27 on average. 7 The difference in average scores 
between subsectors was statistically significant at the 5 percent level. Assembler firms 
in the automobile and motorcycle subsectors perceived larger net benefits from 
subcontracting arrangements than those in the agricultural machinery and bicycle 
subsectors. For example, Firm A07, a motorcycle assembler firm, enjoyed lower wage 
rates based on economies of small-scale production through subcontracting transactions 
with local SMEs, and obtained substantial gains from vertical inter-firm linkages. On 
the other hand, Firm A09 of a foreign-affiliated agricultural machinery enterprise noted 
that subcontracting links did not generate large benefits. Even though Firm A09 
provided various forms of support to local SMEs, it had to put up with their low quality 
and unreliable deli very time. 
The cost-benefit of subcontracting with foreign-affiliated SMEs was rated at 
3.93. Compared to local supplier firms , foreign-affiliated supplier firms have been 
more beneficial to the parent firms. This may reflect the fact that foreign-affiliated 
SMEs have usually higher technological capabilities and can provide assembler firms 
with reliable products and services. 
7 Our survey required parent firms to give the evaluation based on their views reflecting the situation not 
immediately before the interview in 1999 and 2000 but in the last 5 to 10 years. 
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Table 9 .9 Cost-Benefit Balance of Subcontracting Transactions with SMEs 
Subcontracting with 
LocalSMEs Foreign SMEs Comparison 
Mean Scores Differences between Groups Mean Scores Differences 
in Firm Categories between 
(I)I ) Subsector Z) Investment 3) (II)! ) (I) and (II)4) 
(s.d.) t-values t-values (s.d.) t -values 
Cost-Benefit Balance 3.27 2.46 * 1.04 3.93 3.57 ** 
(0.70) (-) (0.70) 
Number of Sample Firms 15 15 
Notes: 1) Figures in the upper row are the average of scores indicated by assembler firms' rating from 1 
(the lowest score as very costly) to 5 (the highest score as very beneficial). Figures in 
parentheses are standard deviation. (I) and (II) represent evaluation on local SMEs and on 
foreign-affiliated SMEs, respectively. 
2) Difference in mean scores given by assembler firms in the automobile and motorcycle 
subsectors (AM) and by those in the agricultural machinery and bicycle subsectors (AB), which 
is indicated by t-values. ** = significant at the 1 level, * = significant at the 5 % level. When 
the difference is significant, ( +) = AB firms > AM firms, (-) = AB firms < AM firms. 
3) Difference in mean scores given by assembler firms of domestic investment (D) and by those of 
foreign investment (F), which is indicated by t-values. ** = significant at the 1 % level, * = 
significant at the 5 % level. When the difference is significant, ( +) = D firms > F firms , (-) = D 
firms < F firms. 
4) Difference in mean scores between evaluation on (I) local SMEs and on (II) foreign SMEs, 
which is indicated by t-values of paired t-test. ** = significant at the 1 level, * = significant at 
the 5 % level. 
Source: Based on author's interview survey during 1999-2000. 
9.6 Willingness of Parent Firms to Support SMEs in Subcontracting 
Transactions 
The large-scale assembler firms in our sample generally regarded subcontracting with 
SMEs as a useful and beneficial vertical production arrangement. However, the results 
in Table 9 .5 indicated that utilisation of SMEs through subcontracting requires principal 
firms to bear various costs , particularly as a consequence of insufficient technical 
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capabilities of SMEs. If parent firms wish to make subcontracting linkages work well, 
they need to improve the technological and related capabilities of SMEs. 
Table 9.10 Willingness to Utilise SMEs in Subcontracting Transactions in the Future 
Willingness to Utilise 
SMEs in Subcontracting 
Number of Sample Firms 
Subcontracting with 
LocalSMEs Foreign SMEs 
Mean Scores Differences between Groups Mean Scores 
(I) I) 
(s.d.) 
4.27 
(0.96) 
15 
in Firm Categories 
Subsector 2) Investment 3) 
t -values t-values 
3.54 ** 
(-) 
1.37 
(II) I) 
(s.d.) 
4.07 
(0.59) 
15 
Comparison 
Differences 
between 
(I) and (II)4) 
t-values 
1.00 
Notes: 1) Figures in the upper row are the average of scores indicated by assembler firms' rating from 1 
(the lowest score as not at all willing) to 5 (the highest score as very willing). Figures in 
parentheses are standard deviation. (I) and (II) represent evaluation on local SMEs and on 
foreign-affiliated SMEs, respectively. 
2) Difference in mean scores given by assembler firms in the automobile and motorcycle 
subsectors (AM) and by those in the agricultural machinery and bicycle subsectors (AB), which 
is indicated by t-values. ** = significant at the 1 level, * = significant at the 5 % level. When 
the difference is significant, ( +) = AB firms > AM firms, (-) = AB firms < AM firms. 
3) Difference in mean scores given by assembler firms of domestic investment (D) and by those of 
foreign investment (F), which is indicated by t-values. ** = significant at the 1 % level, * = 
significant at the 5 % level. When the difference is significant, ( +) = D firms > F firms, (-) = D 
firms < F firms. 
4) Difference in mean scores between evaluation on (I) local SMEs and on (II) foreign SMEs, 
which is indicated by t-va]ues of paired t-test. ** = significant at the 1 level, * = significant at 
the 5 % level. 
Source: Based on author's interview survey during 1999-2000. 
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Table 9 .10 shows the degree to which assembler firms are willing to involve 
small and medium producers as vendor firms in subcontracting deals in the future . 8 The 
willingness to utilise local SMEs in subcontracting business was rated high at 4.27 on 
average. The mean scores were significantly different at the 1 percent level between 
subsectors of parent firms . The automobile and motorcycle manufacturers have a 
stronger desire to involve local SMEs in vertical inter-firm networks than the firms 
producing agricultural machinery and bicycles. The willingness to use foreign-
affiliated SMEs was also rated high at 4.07 on average. Though slightly lower than that 
of local SMEs, there was no statistically significant difference. 9 
Table 9 .11 shows the extent to which parent firms made and will make an effort 
to support small-medium supplier firms in developing technological and other 
necessary capabilities in the past and in the future. 10 Efforts made by assembler firms 
to foster local SMEs in the past were rated at 4.27 on average. Differences in mean 
scores of efforts were statistically significant at the 1 percent level according to groups 
of subsectors and investment nationality of parent firms. LEs in the automobile and 
motorcycle subsectors and those with foreign participation made greater efforts to 
extend assistance to local SMEs than their counterparts in the agricultural machinery 
and bicycle subsectors and those with domestic investment. 11 
8 The future here means 5 to 10 years after the date of our interview survey (in 1999-2000). 
9 The decision of course depends to a large extent on the characteristics of the products and services 
parent firms have to procure. However, here we generalise their willingness to utilise local and foreign-
affiliated SMEs. 
10 The past and future here indicate 5 to 10 years before and after the date of the interview survey (in 
1999-2000). 
11 Firm A06 mentioned that the provision of technical and other relevant assistance to local SMEs was 
recognised by most foreign-affiliated assembler firms in the automobile and motorcycle subsectors as a 
necessary condition for the success of subcontracting deals. 
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Table 9.11 Efforts to Support SMEs in the Past and in the Future 
Subcontracting with 
LocalSMEs Foreign SMEs Comparison 
M ean Scores Differences between Groups Mean Scores Differences 
in Firm Categories between 
(I) I ) Subsector 2) Investment 3) (II)1) (I) and (II/) 
(s.d.) t-values t-values (s.d.) t-values 
Efforts to Support SMEs 4.27 4.24 ** 3.72 ** · 3.13 4.80 ** 
in the Past (0.88) (-) (-) (1.51) 
Efforts to Support SMEs 4.40 3.06 * 2.66 * 2.87 7.99 ** 
in the Future (0.99) (-) (-) (1.36) 
Number of Sample Firms 15 15 
Notes: 1) Figures in the upper row are the average of scores indicated by assembler firms' rating from 1 
(the lowest score as very negative) to 5 (the highest score as very positive). Figures in 
parentheses are standard deviation. (I) and (II) represent evaluation on local SMEs and on 
foreign-affiliated SMEs, respectively. 
2) Difference in mean scores given by assembler firms in the automobile and motorcycle 
subsectors (AM) and by those in the agricultural machinery and bicycle subsectors (AB), which 
is indicated by t-values. ** = significant at the 1 level, * = significant at the 5 % level. When 
the difference is significant, ( +) = AB firms > AM firms, (-)=AB firms < AM firms. 
3) Difference in mean scores given by assembler firms of domestic investment (D) and by those of 
foreign investment (F) , which is indicated by t-values. ** = significant at the 1 % level, * = 
significant at the 5 % level. When the difference is significant, ( +) = D firms> F firms, (-) = D 
firms < F firms . 
4) Difference in mean scores between evaluation on (I) local SMEs and on (II) foreign SMEs, 
which is indicated by t-values of paired t-test. ** = significant at the 1 level , * = significant at 
the 5 % level. 
Source: Based on author's interview survey during 1999-2000. 
Past efforts to provide technical and other related support to foreign-affiliated 
SMEs were rated on average at 3.13. Mean scores given by the surveyed assembler 
firms were statistically different at 1 percent level between efforts to support local 
SMEs and those to assist foreign-affiliated SMEs. Assembler firms acknowledged that 
local SMEs needed more support than foreign-affiliated SMEs to serve well as supplier 
firms. This reflects the different levels of technological and other relevant capabilities 
of local and foreign-affiliated SMEs. 
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According to Firm AOJ, which has a long experience in business in Indonesia, 
almost all of the automobile and motorcycle assembler firms in Indonesia strongly 
preferred subcontracting arrangements to other vertical production alternatives, because 
these subsectors need a large number of high quality parts and components with good 
delivery timing. Thus, they have attempted, within the scope of cost-effectiveness, to 
foster SMEs, in particular local SMEs, to become capable vendor firms. For example, 
in an effort to enhance supplier firms, Firm AO 1 itself, as explained above, has 
furnished vendor firms with a wide range of support including giving technical 
guidance, providing credit and guarantees for banks, and establishing local SMEs. In 
contrast, responses from Firm Al 4 and Firm Al 5 implied that both bicycle and tricycle 
manufacturers did not have a positive attitude to fostering small-medium supplier firms. 
They wanted to obtain benefits from subcontracting ties without significant effort. 12 
The extent of efforts by large-scale assembler firms to assist SMEs in the future 
1s also shown in Table 9.11. For involving supplier firms in subcontracting chains, 
future efforts of parent firms to offer necessary support to local SMEs were rated at 
4.40 on average. This mean score of future efforts reveals the strong need of 
manufacturers to purchase lower-priced intermediate inputs through subcontracting 
networks. It also reveals their commitments to fostering local SMEs as supplier firms 
in the future. The statistical tests suggest that the foreign-affiliated manufacturers and 
the automobile and motorcycle assembler firms plan to render support to local supplier 
firms more actively than their non-affiliated Indonesian and agricultural machinery and 
bicycle counterparts. 
Future efforts to extend assistance to foreign-affiliated SMEs were assigned an 
average score of 2.87. The difference in mean scores between local SMEs and foreign-
12 According to Finn Al 4, the limited capabilities of its own employees and lack of technologies are the 
main factors preventing the firm from deploying support activities for the development of competent 
vendor firms. 
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affiliated SMEs are statistically significant at the 1 percent level. This result shows that 
assembler firms perceive foreign-affiliated SMEs as immediately active players who do 
not need substantial support, and local SMEs as potential actors who require support, in 
subcontracting transactions in the long-term perspective. For example, Firm A06, a 
large-scale automotive component manufacturer, claimed that technical support 
provided by auto manufacturers in Indonesia to foreign-affiliated SMEs has been 
sufficient, and that future assistance should be focused on local supplier firms. 
These results confirm a positive attitude of the respondents toward offering 
support to local SMEs. However, views from the principal firms indicated a recent 
movement toward the provision of comprehensive support only to supplier firms that 
have made serious efforts to improve their insufficient capabilities. For instance, Firm 
A03 and Firm Al 3 explained in almost a same way that they would select, from the 
entire number of vendor firms under them, a certain number of supplier firms that have 
shown steady progress in response to support. They would intensively allocate 
assistance only to such cost-effective SMEs. 
9.7 Subcontracting Transactions and Support Mechanisms for SMEs: 
Evidence from Parent Firms 
Based on qualitative data obtained from large-scale assembler firms, this chapter 
examined subcontracting transactions with and support for SMEs in the Indonesian 
machinery industry, particularly the automobile, motorcycle, agricultural machinery 
and bicycle subsectors. This section answers each of the four research questions set out 
in Section 9 .1. 
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(1) Motivations for subcontracting transactions with SMEs 
The principal firms in our sample considered most of the motivations listed in Table 9.3 
as relevant inducements for subcontracting transactions with small-medium supplier 
firms. They did not expect advanced skills from local SMEs. Nor did they expect 
foreign~affiliated SMEs to provide a shock absorber function or to provide benefits 
from lower wages. However, parent firms did expect to benefit from lower wage rates 
and the role of shock absorber in the case of local SMEs, while foreign-affiliated SMEs 
were expected to deliver benefits of technological expertise and higher-quality products. 
(2) Linkage types with SMEs 
This case study revealed subcontracting linkages that parent firms have developed with 
small-medium supplier firms. Technical specifications, QC guidance and production 
technology through subcontracting linkages were the main forms of technical support 
for SMEs. Nearly half of the parent firms had transferred managerial technology, 80 
percent had offered SMEs stable markets as marketing support in the form of 
continuous orders, 60 to 70 percent had created opportunities for SMEs to negotiate 
price levels and provide input materials and tools, while only 30 to 40 percent had 
rendered SMEs direct credits, financial guarantees and help for establishing companies. 
Thus, various forms of assistance have been provided through subcontracting 
linkages between assembler firms and small-medium supplier firms. Technological and 
marketing support was more common than financial support. This is in line with 
Chapters 6 and 8. Assembler firms financially help SMEs through subcontracting ties 
by providing working capital but not fixed investment capital. 
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(3) Costs associated with and benefits from subcontracting transactions with SMEs 
With regard to local SMEs, most of the costs and burdens listed in Table 9 .5 are 
significant for principal firms. In particular, unstable delivery timing, low product 
quality coupled with low production technology, monitoring supplier firms, technical 
and other necessary support, and initial finding of potential SMEs were the main 
obstacles to conducting subcontracting business with the local SME sector. 
Concerning foreign-affiliated SMEs, relatively expensive parts and components 
were the main cost item, while technical and other assistance was not a significant 
burden. The ranking of other costs was not significantly different between foreign-
affiliated SMEs and local SMEs. However, except for high prices, all burdens 
associated with subcontracting transactions with local supplier firms were higher than 
with foreign-affiliated supplier firms. Parent firms wishing to exploit lower price levels 
of products from local SMEs need to bear other costs. 
The assembler firms basically obtained most of the benefits from subcontracting 
listed in Table 9 .6, such as specialisation, shock absorption, lower wages, better 
products, lower costs for monitoring own employees and lower costs associated with 
contracting. However, the extent of these benefits differed between local and foreign-
affiliated supplier firms. Local SMEs provided parent firms with large benefits from 
lower wages and shock absorber function. Foreign-affiliated SMEs offered assembler 
firms significant benefits of high skills. 
The cost-benefit balance of large-scale parent firms from subcontracting ties 
with supplier firms was positive. Automobile and motorcycle assembler firms 
perceived larger net benefits from subcontracting arrangements than their agricultural 
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machinery and bicycle counterparts. Local SMEs have provided smaller net benefits to 
assembler firms than foreign-affiliated SMEs. 
( 4) Willingness of parent firms to support SMEs through subcontracting linkages 
In the future, the large-scale assembler firms are seeking positive involvement in 
subcontracting chains of small-medium supplier firms. The automobile and motorcycle 
manufacturers indicated stronger willingness to utilise local SMEs under subcontracting 
networks than their agricultural machinery and bicycle counterparts. 
Such willingness to involve small-medium supplier firms in subcontracting 
linkages leads assembler firms to a willingness to offer necessary support to local SMEs, 
because it seems difficult for local SMEs to play a crucial role in subcontracting 
without proper assistance from parent firms. In contrast, foreign-affiliated SMEs can 
improve capabilities by using their internal resources. The foreign-affiliated and the 
automobile and motorcycle assembler firms intended to render such assistance more 
actively than their non-affiliated Indonesian and the agricultural machinery and bicycle 
counterparts. 
The results obtained from parent firms in this chapter are consistent with those 
from SMEs in Chapter 8. The types of subcontracting linkages established do not show 
significant differences in views between parent firms and small-medium supplier firms. 
This suggests that the data and information obtained from LEs and SMEs are both 
reliable. 
UNIDO (2000: 208) reported that principal firms 1n the Indonesian 
manufacturing industry have not been induced to identify potential small-medium 
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supplier firms, extend technical support to SMEs, and enter into long-term contracts 
with them. Supratikno ( 1998: 140) in his study of the motorcycle and diesel engine 
subsectors concluded that the possible contribution of subcontracting linkages to the 
competitiveness of assembler firms has not been significant. 
In contrast, our case study of the Indonesian machinery industry has shown that 
subcontracting transactions with SMEs have generally allowed parent firms to obtain 
net benefits, although the behaviour or responses to subcontracting varied according to 
groups of assembler firms by subsectors and origins of investment. Assembler firms in 
our sample subsectors perceive foreign-affiliated SMEs as immediately active players 
and local SMEs as potential actors in their vertical production system. Assembler firms 
seek positive involvement in subcontracting chains of both types of SMEs. LEs 
recognise that local SMEs have insufficient technological and other capabilities, and are 
prepared to support such SMEs in improving their performance. 
As reasons for the small benefits to LEs from subcontracting transactions with 
SMEs in Indonesia, UNIDO (2000: 208) pointed out insufficient design and 
engineering capabilities of supplier firms, while Supratikno (1998: 140) maintained that 
local SMEs supplied to assembler firms not main and high value components but 
labour-intensive and low value products. In contrast, this study found that foreign-
affiliated SMEs have offered LEs special skills and better products with the use of their 
design and engineering capabilities and that large-scale assembler firms themselves 
identified cheaper products based on lower wages and labour-intensive technology as 
the main benefits from subcontracting transactions with local SMEs. 
The results of this chapter indicated that the subcontracting systems in the 
studied machinery subsectors have built-in support mechanisms for the development of 
SMEs, in particular local SMEs. As Sato (1998a) observed in her study on the 
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Indonesian motorcycle component industry, subcontracting linkages and its support 
mechanisms for SMEs are developing in the Indonesia machinery subsectors based not 
on government regulations but business reasons. 
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Chapter 10 
·conclusion: 
SME Development and Subcontracting in 
Indonesia at Present and Japan in the Past 
10.1 Introduction 
This study answered several questions on the role of subcontracting in the development 
of small- and medium-scale enterprises in the process of economic development in 
contemporary Indonesia. The study was motivated by both the very limited number of 
comprehensive studies in this area in Indonesia and Japan's experience with SME 
development through subcontracting. The main questions are whether and how SMEs 
have contributed to economic development in Indonesia, how and why subcontracting 
linkages between SMEs and LEs have been ( or have not been) established and 
developed in Indonesia, and whether and how subcontracting could be beneficial to 
SME development in Indonesia. In addressing these questions, this study has analysed 
the Indonesian manufacturing industry, particularly the machinery industry, based 
primarily on micro-level data and information obtained from an interview and 
questionnaire survey, with reference to Japan's historical experience. 
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This concluding chapter summarises the main findings of investigation on SMEs 
and subcontracting in Indonesia at present and Japan in the past. On the basis of 
similarities and differences between the two countries identified, this chapter concludes 
with some implications of our micro-level survey for more general issues on SME 
development through subcontracting in Indonesia. 
10.2 Summary of the Main Findings: Japan in the Past and Indonesia 
at Present 
It seems likely that some of Japan's unique cultural traits such as benevolence, loyalty 
and goodwill in the context of paternalistic relations enhanced its experience with SME 
development and subcontracting. Such aspects should be included in any attempt to 
draw lessons for developing economies from SME development in Japan. However, 
the relevance of specific cultural traits is likely to depend on the country Japan is 
compared with. Hence, it may be more fruitful to concentrate on the essence of Japan 's 
historical experience with the development of SMEs through subcontracting. 
Large-scale firms in the Japanese machinery industry started and resumed 
subcontracting transactions with SMEs in the 1930s and the first half of the 1950s, 
respectively. This was motivated by the rapid expansion of markets coupled with 
unpredictable future economic situations, scarce capital resources, a substantial wage 
gap between LEs and SMEs, and the development of infrastructure and technology. 
These conditions caused LEs to perceive purchasing from SMEs as both necessary and 
economical. Although SMEs did not generally have sufficient technological and other 
capabilities that could satisfy the needs of LEs, the latter expected that the former could 
improve such necessary capabilities and meet the expectations of LEs, if assistance was 
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extended to the former. Therefore, LEs sought to foster SMEs through the provision of 
various forms of support. However, the intensity of cooperative relationships between 
LEs and SMEs depended on the stage of the development of industry and 
subcontracting. Support mechanisms through subcontracting linkages in the 1930s 
were more embryonic than those in the 1950s and after. 
Continued high rates of economic growth after the mid-1950s, better access to 
financial sources and reduction in labour surplus inspired large-scale machinery firms 
in Japan to purchase parts and components from SMEs with the aim of substituting for 
labour, instead of capital. In addition, the modernisation of the industrial structure, 
rapid technological development and fierce competition in domestic and foreign 
markets encouraged LEs to strengthen ties with technically capable SMEs. Reflecting 
these changes, LEs expected that SMEs could not only offer low wage rates but would 
also have sufficient technology and equipment. 
In the mid-1950s and the early 1960s, the rapid increase in demand for 
machinery and the shortage of capable SMEs urged LEs to further strengthen SMEs, by 
providing technical, financial and other support. These large-scale parent firms 
recognised that, without modernisation and rationalisation of small-medium supplier 
firms , subcontracting systems did not work efficiently. For this reason, large-scale 
machinery firms, particularly automobile assembler firms, organised vertical keiretsu 
groups, which provided a large number of SMEs with a secure outlet for their products 
and an opportunity to improve their technological and other capabilities. 
In the 1950s and 1960s, the dual structure problem appeared as a consequence of 
power imbalance in subcontracting relations between SMEs and LEs. However, SMEs 
alleviated their subordinate relationships with LEs in the process of high growth from 
the early 1960s onwards. Several indicators representing economic performance by 
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firm size in the period implied that Japan 's SMEs were able to coexist with LEs, by 
producing a unit of output with less capital but more labour than LEs. 
The proportion of subcontracting SMEs in the manufacturing industry as a 
whole was increasing between the mid-1960s and the early 1980s. This suggests an 
increasingly important role of subcontracting in the Japanese economy and SME 
development. The role was import~nt particularly for machinery SMEs, because their 
reliance on subcontracting was more significant than in other industries. 
Stable markets and technical assistance were the frequently-used and beneficial 
forms of support that LEs extended to SMEs. Through subcontracting linkages, parent 
firms were the largest external source of new technology for manufacturing SMEs. 
Subcontracting contributed significantly to the improvement of production efficiency of 
SMEs. 
The main factors that enhanced the functioning of subcontracting were long-
term relationships between LEs and SMEs, competition between supplier firms within a 
subcontracting system, technical and other support given by parent firms to SMEs, and 
government support in the form of an environment that facilitated the establishment of 
subcontracting systems. 
What about Indonesia at present? Each of the core chapters of this study 
investigated SME development and subcontracting in the Indonesian manufacturing 
industry, particularly the machinery industry. Most of them used micro-level data and 
information obtained from our sample metalworking and machinery SMEs together 
with large-scale parent firms in the automobile, motorcycle, agricultural machinery and 
bicycle subsectors. 
Based on the nation-wide data, along with LEs, SMEs in the Indonesian 
manufacturing industry, particularly the machinery industry, developed reasonably well 
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in terms of output and employment growth during a decade before the recent economic 
crisis. The share of SMEs in value added was relatively small, but they contributed to a 
great extent to the Indonesian economy in terms of numbers of establishments and share 
in employment. The analysis of economic performance in the manufacturing industry 
by firm size broadly suggested that SMEs developed concurrently with LEs by way of 
producing a unit of output with less capital but more labour than LEs. During 1986-96, 
SMEs and LEs in the manufacturing industry increased labour productivity at a 
comparable rate. SMEs in the machinery industry recorded good growth of labour 
productivity and total factor productivity (TFP). The development of SMEs concurrent 
with LEs and the high portion of SMEs in the manufacturing industry indicated their 
significant contribution to economic development in Indonesia. A positive impact of 
subcontracting on SME development was inferred from the better performance of 
SMEs in the machinery sector where firms tend to have closer vertical inter-firm 
linkages. 
Our firm-level survey with sample metalworking and machinery SMEs revealed 
that, among the possible external sources, inter-firm linkages (particularly 
subcontracting ties with LEs) were important technological and marketing support 
mechanisms for SME development. The usefulness of these support mechanisms in the 
private sector varied according to firm groups in size, ethnic affiliation and subsector 
categories. Large SMEs, non-pribumi owners and firms in the automobile and 
motorcycle subsectors were able to take better advantage of technical and marketing 
support through subcontracting linkages than smaller SMEs, pribumi owners and firms 
in the agricultural machinery and bicycle subsectors. On the other hand, smaller and 
pribumi SMEs tend to have used technical collaboration with peer firms through 
horizontal inter-firm linkages more frequently than their larger and non-pribumi SMEs. 
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Relative to these inter-firm linkages in the private sector, public and collective 
channels such as government agencies and industrial associations were not frequent! y 
utilised by SMEs to acquire technologies and develop markets. However, those public 
and collective channels did supplement private channels to some extent and helped 
particularly smaller and pribumi SMEs improve their technological and marketing 
capabilities. In contrast to these t~chnological and marketing support mechanisms, 
financial support mechanisms for SMEs through inter-firm linkages did not work well. 
After confirming the importance of subcontracting linkages with LEs as a source 
of upgrading technological and marketing capabilities of SMEs, this study sought to 
examine in a quantitative way whether such vertical inter-firm ties have a positive 
impact on productivity of SMEs. The estimation of production functions and 
subcontracting ratio functions together with the calculation of TFP indices suggested 
that vertical inter-firm cooperation through subcontracting linkages with LEs 
contributed to an increase in productivity of sample metalworking and machinery SMEs 
in Indonesia. Such subcontracting linkages proved conducive to the improvement of 
production efficiency. They enhanced creditworthiness and financial capabilities of 
SMEs. The levels of production efficiency were different between different firm 
groups, reflecting their uneven access to support mechanisms through subcontracting 
networks. Larger SMEs, non-pribumi SMEs and SMEs supplying parts for vehicles 
generally tend to have had a higher TFP than smaller SMEs, pribumi SMEs and SMEs 
producing parts for agricultural machinery and bicycles. 
Then, this study looked inside the "black box" of subcontracting mechanisms, by 
analysing the qualitative data obtained from metalworking and machinery SMEs. 
Sample SMEs in Indonesia started subcontracting with LEs in order to obtain benefits 
such as large/stable orders, technical support lower transactions and specialisation. For 
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their initial contacts with LEs, metalworking and machinery SMEs often used inter-
personal relationships (e.g. , family, relatives and friends) , peer firms in similar business 
lines, and former employment relationships between current parent firms and SME 
owners . Technological and marketing linkages were the main forms of subcontracting 
relationships with LEs, while financial linkages were not often established and 
remained limited to working capital. Subcontracting cooperation with LEs did not 
necessarily generate the expected degree of benefits, because they were reduced by 
costs associated with QCD ( quality, cost and delivery timing) and difficult market 
circumstances. However, SMEs still obtained substantial benefits from subcontracting 
ties with LEs, in the areas of market provision, technical assistance, specialisation and 
lower transaction costs. These subcontracting linkages were generally more beneficial 
to SMEs with more employees, those owned by non-pribumi entrepreneurs, those 
operating in the automobile and motorcycle subsectors, those managed by owners with 
higher-level education and working experiences in similar subsectors, those with 
higher-level education of technical workers, those with longer relationships with parent 
firms, those with stronger trust in parent firms, those with better financial access, and 
those located in urban areas than their counterpart SMEs. 
Finally, our study changed viewpoint and investigated subcontracting 
transactions with and support for SMEs from the perspective of large-scale parent firms 
in the automobile, motorcycle, agricultural machinery and bicycle subsectors. Sample 
large-scale assembler firms expected local SMEs to provide benefits of lower wage 
rates and a shock absorber function, while they counted on foreign-affiliated SMEs to 
deliver benefits of technological expertise and high-quality products. LEs provided 
SMEs with technological and marketing support but not financial support in a 
substantial way. They obtained most of the expected benefits from subcontracting with 
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SMEs, such as specialisation, shock absorption, lower \vages, better products, lower 
costs for monitoring own workers and lower costs associated with contracting. Despite 
the existence of associated costs ( e.g., unstable delivery timing, low product quality 
coupled with low production technology, and technical and other support), the cost-
benefit balance of LEs from subcontracting with SMEs was positive. Such net benefits 
encouraged LEs to promote subcontracting with SMEs in the future and offer necessary 
support to SMEs, particularly local SMEs. In this sense, the subcontracting systems in 
the Indonesian machinery industry have built-in support mechanisms for SME 
development. 
10.3 Conclusion: Implications for the Development of SMEs through 
Subcontracting based on a Comparison between Indonesia at 
Present and Japan in the Past 
Our study has been aware of Japan's historical experience with SME development 
through subcontracting. The study of this experience did not intend to recommend 
copying of Japan 's past experience but to establish a research framework of how to 
examine the development of SMEs and subcontracting in the Indonesian context and 
better understand those relatively new issues in Indonesia. This final section seeks to 
provide a synthesis of similarities and differences regarding SME development and 
subcontracting in Indonesia in the present and Japan in the past. 
In Indonesia, SMEs in the manufacturing industry contributed significantly to 
economic development. In particular, the performance of SMEs in the machinery 
industry was remarkable. Based on our micro-level evidence in the automobile, 
motorcycle, agricultural machinery and bicycle subsectors, many sample metalworking 
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and machinery SMEs without sufficient internal resources reduced technological and 
marketing obstacles through subcontracting collaboration with large-scale parent firms 
and were able to realise their potential and contribute actively to industrial and 
economic development. In the early 1980s, support mechanisms for SMEs through 
subcontracting linkages did not function well in Indonesia (Thee 1985). In the course 
of high growth since the mid-1980s, subcontracting in the Indonesian machinery 
industry has evolved. In the 1990s, subcontracting linkages with LEs· worked as a 
major support mechanism for SMEs and helped to improve productivity of SMEs. The 
hypothesis of this study, that subcontracting systems in Indonesia have developed as a 
vertical production mode and can be beneficial to the development of SMEs, has been 
confirmed for the observed sub sectors. 
Despite the limited scope of our investigation, some common characteristics of 
SMEs and subcontracting have been found between Indonesia at present and Japan in 
the past. Subcontracting linkages with LEs generally enabled SMEs to alleviate certain 
constraints stemming from their limited internal resources, improve their capabilities 
and production efficiency, and contribute to economic development not only in Japan 
but also in Indonesia. The main benefits to SMEs from subcontracting ties with LEs 
are similar between Indonesia at present and Japan in the past. 1 The provision of 
technological and marketing support mechanisms and the improvement of production 
efficiency are the major common gains for SMEs obtained from subcontracting 
1 At the later stage of economic development, subcontracting tends to lose its usefulness and popularity. 
Since many SMEs become technologically and managerially capable and some of them can supply their 
own-brand products to markets, they may prefer to become independent producers and refrain from using 
any assistance from LEs. Therefore, it is necessary to note that the roles and characteristics of 
subcontracting in developed economies are often not same as those in developing economies. This 
phenomenon is observed in a decline in the proportion of subcontracting SMEs in Japan since the early 
1980s. See Section 3.3. 
367 
transactions with LEs.2 These functions generally worked well in the two countries, in 
firms where the levels of human resources of SME owners and employees are high, the 
intensity of relationships between SMEs and LEs is strong, and access to financial 
sources is good. 
Several basic conditions and general rules concerning SMEs and subcontracting 
have also been identified from thi.s study. Sufficient size of markets and rapid but 
unstable growth of demand are demand-side factors for the development of 
b . 3 su contractmg. In addition, the existence of SMEs that have not realised their 
potential to become competent supplier firms is also an important factor from the 
supply-side for the initiation and development of subcontracting. These Conditions 
generally induce LEs to choose subcontracting, rather than one-off exchanges or in-
house production, as a necessary and economical vertical production system and to 
provide SMEs with various forms of assistance such as technical and marketing support. 
For the decade before the recent 1997-98 crisis, the rapid growth of the Indonesian 
economy gave the machinery industry an impetus to develop subcontracting. 
The difference in sector and subsector is an important and common factor that 
affects the course of the establishment and development of vertical production systems. 
The adaptability and importance of subcontracting production systems depend 
significantly on the specific characteristics of technologies in each sector or subsector 
such as the divisibility of production processes and quality of products. Reflecting the 
differences in those technological characteristics, the degree of development and 
2 Of course, the degree of these benefits from technical and marketing support and productivity 
improvement through subcontracting linkages with LEs should be different between the two countries, 
but cannot easily be measured in a clear manner. 
3 As Adam Smith (1970: 15-9) stated, when the market becomes large, scale economies can make 
specialisation through outsourcing more economical than in-house production. Odaka (1981: 172) added 
the speed of market expansion as another factor for promoting the division of labour. He explained that, 
when the market expands very quickly, LEs cannot sufficiently expand their production facilities and 
tend to purchase inputs from outside. Therefore, the size and speed are both important factors for 
subcontracting. 
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importance of subcontracting was different between our observed subsectors even 
within the same machinery sector in Indonesia and Japan. The quality of 
subcontracting is determined by the levels of capabilities of parent firms, which are also 
different according to sectors and subsectors to a certain extent. In our micro-level 
survey, assembler firms in the automobile and motorcycle subsectors usually have more 
business resources in technological, marketing, managerial and financial areas than 
those in the agricultural machinery and bicycle subsectors. Because of this, parent 
firms in the former group often provided their small-medium supplier firms with more 
useful support than those in the latter group. 
The functioning of subcontracting is different between SMEs in different ethnic 
groups. Our firm-level survey in Indonesia indicated that SMEs owned by non-pribumi 
entrepreneurs took better advantage of subcontracting linkages with LEs in many cases 
than those by their pribumi counterparts. The styles of subcontracting arrangements are 
likely to be affected by not only economic factors but also other factors such as social 
and cultural specificity. Japan's keiretsu-type linkages were not observed as a style of 
subcontracting relations in Indonesia. In addition to the small market size, an ethnically 
heterogeneous society and weak social cohesion relative to Japan may have induced 
LEs in Indonesia not to form keiretsu-type dense subcontracting ties with SMEs but 
rather to establish more flexible subcontracting organisations. These non-economic 
factors have a certain impact on the direction of subcontracting development in each 
country. 
The characteristics of subcontracting production systems are also affected by 
whether or not foreign-affiliated SMEs have a substantial influence on the 
manufacturing industry in each country. Our findings in Indonesia indicated that 
subcontracting transactions with local SMEs provided LEs with benefits of lower wages 
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and shock absorption, while those with foreign-affiliated SMEs offered them benefits of 
special skills and better products. Accordingly, subcontracting tends to show different 
features in countries with this kind of dual structure within an economy and in those 
without such structure. 
Legal systems, incentive programs and public technical institutions in Japan 
helped promote SME developme~t through subcontracting. In Indonesia, general 
economic reform measures implemented since the mid-1980s have benefited SMEs to 
some extent. However, SME-specific policies in Indonesia have not yielded the 
expected fruit. Legal systems that support and promote subcontracting SMEs have not 
been developed well. Public technical institutions, which have been utilised by smaller 
SMEs and those managed by pribumi owners as an important source of technical 
information, cannot necessarily provide sufficient services to small-medium customers. 
The degree of effectiveness of government support in industrial and economic 
development is likely to generate differences in levels of SME development and 
subcontracting among countries. 
As discussed above, this study established the validity of SME development 
through subcontracting in Indonesia, using micro-level evidence based on a limited 
number of sample SMEs in limited subsectors in the post crisis period. The micro-level 
survey we used allowed us to draw a detailed and comprehensive picture of SMEs and 
subcontracting in the observed sectors and subsectors. This methodology proved useful 
to understanding the features of SMEs. Further generalisation of our findings, however, 
would require the execution of more firm-level survey on the basis of a larger number 
of sample firms in more sectors and subsectors in a greater number of regions during a 
period of relatively stable economic situation. A nation-wide analysis on relations 
between the performance of SMEs and subcontracting is also preferable, if such data 
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become available in the future. To more fully understand the relevance of 
subcontracting to SME development, it would be desirable to cover not only Indonesia 
but also several other Asian countries in this type of micro-level survey. 
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